Trump, Israel and the Art of the Giveaway By Thomas L. Friedman,
Dec. 6, 2017
I’m contemplating writing a book on the first year of President Trump’s foreign policy, and I already know the name: “The Art of the Giveaway.”
In nearly 30 years of covering United States foreign policy, I’ve never seen a president give up so much to so many for so little, starting with China and Israel. In both the Middle Kingdom and in the Land of Israel, Christmas came early this year. The Chinese and the Jews are both whispering to their kids: “There really is a Santa Claus.”
And his name is Donald Trump.
Who can blame them? Let’s start with Israel, every Israeli government since its founding has craved United States recognition of Jerusalem as its capital. And every United States government has refrained from doing that, arguing that such a recognition should come only in the wake of an agreed final status peace accord between Israelis and Palestinians — until now.
Today, Trump just gave it away — for free. Such a deal! Why in the world would you just give this away for free and not even use it as a lever to advance the prospect of an Israeli-Palestinian deal?
Trump could have said two things to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First, he could have said: “Bibi, you keep asking me to declare Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. O.K., I will do that. But I want a deal. Here’s what I want from you in return: You will declare an end to all Israeli settlement building in the West Bank, outside of the existing settlement block that everyone expects to be part of Israel in any two-state solution.”
Such a trade-off is needed. It would produce a real advance for United States interests and for the peace process. As Dennis Ross, the veteran American Middle East peace negotiator and author of “Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israeli Relationship From Truman to Obama,” explained: “When you stop building outside the settlement blocs, you preserve, at a maximum, the possibility of a two-state outcome and, at a minimum, the ability for Israelis to separate from Palestinians. Keep up the building in densely populated Palestinian areas and separation becomes impossible.”
Trump also could have said, as the former United States ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk suggested, that he’d decided “to begin the process of moving the embassy to western Jerusalem, but at the same time was declaring his willingness to make a parallel announcement that he would establish an embassy to the state of Palestine in East Jerusalem” — as part of any final status agreement. That would at least have insulated us from looking like making a one-sided gesture will only complicate peacemaking and kept the door open to Palestinians.
In either case, Trump could then have boasted to Israelis and Palestinians that he got them each something that Barack Obama never did — something that advanced the peace process and United States credibility and did not embarrass our Arab allies. But Trump is a chump. And he is a chump because he is ignorant and thinks the world started the day he was elected, and so he is easily gamed.
Just ask the Chinese. Basically, his first day in office, Trump tore up the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade deal — clearly without having read it or asked China for any trade concession in return. Trump simply threw out the window the single most valuable tool America had for shaping the geoeconomic future of the region our way and for pressuring China to open its markets to more United States goods.
Trump is now trying to negotiate trade openings with China alone — bilaterally — and getting basically nowhere. And yet he could have been negotiating with China as the head of a 12-nation TPP trading bloc that was based on United States values and interests and that controlled 40 percent of the global economy. Think of the leverage we lost.
In a column from Hong Kong last June a senior Hong Kong official told me: “When Trump did away with TPP, all your allies’ confidence in the U.S. collapsed.” After America stopped TPP, “everyone is now looking to China,” added Jonathan Koon-shum Choi, chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong. “But China is very smart — just keeping its mouth shut.”
Just to remind: TPP was a free-trade agreement that the Obama team forged with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. It was not only the largest free-trade agreement in history, it was the best ever for United States workers, closing loopholes Nafta had left open. Some 80 percent of the goods from our 11 TPP partners were coming into the United States duty-free already, while our goods and services were still being hit with thousands of tariffs in their countries — which TPP eliminated.
As I also noted last June, the other people we disappointed by scrapping TPP, explained James McGregor, author of “One Billion Customers: Lessons From the Front Lines of Doing Business in China,” were China’s economic reformers: They were hoping that the emergence of TPP “would force China to reform its trade practices more along American lines and to open its markets. … We failed the reformers in China.”
Trump is susceptible to such giveaways, not only because he is ignorant, but because he does not see himself as the president of the United States. He sees himself as the president of his base. And because that’s the only support he has left, he feels the need to keep feeding his base by fulfilling crude, ill-conceived promises he threw out to them during the campaign. Today, again, he put another one of those promises ahead of United States national interest.
Showing posts with label china. Show all posts
Showing posts with label china. Show all posts
UNCLOS Tribunal Rules Against China, Jurisdiction Over Philippines South China Sea Claims
Breaking:
UNCLOS Tribunal Rules Against China, Unanimously Finds It Has Jurisdiction Over
Philippines South China Sea Claims
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/10/29/breaking-unclos-tribunal-rules-against-china-unanimously-finds-it-has-jurisdiction-over-philippines-south-china-sea-claims/
by
Julian Ku October 29th, 2015
It’s
been a rough week for China’s South China Seas policy. In addition to facing a
US Freedom of Navigation operation near one of its artificial islands, the
arbitration tribunal formed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea has decided that
it has jurisdiction to proceed to the merits on the Philippines’ legal
challenge to certain Chinese activities in the South China Sea.
I
will blog more about this later, but for now it is worth noting that the
tribunal unanimously ruled that it can proceed to the merits on seven out of 15
of the Philippines’ claims, and that it reserves the question of jurisdiction
on seven other claims as being so interwoven with the merits that it cannot be
resolved without first considering the merits.
I
will note that the tribunal reserved the question of jurisdiction over the
Philippines’ biggest and most flashy claim: the argument that China’s Nine Dash
Line “historic rights” claim is inconsistent with UNCLOS. It held that:
The Philippines’ Submission No. 1 does, however, require the Tribunal to consider the effect of any historic rights claimed by China to maritime entitlements in the South China Sea and the interaction of such rights with the provisions of the Convention. This is a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider this question, however, would be dependent on the nature of any such historic rights and whether they are covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction over “historic bays or titles” in Article 298. The nature and validity of any historic rights claimed by China is a merits determination. The possible jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute underlying Submission No. 1 therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly, the Tribunal reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines’ Submission No. 1 for consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines’ claims.
On
the other hand, the Tribunal did find that the question of whether the
Scarborough Shoal is a “rock” or an “island” is clearly within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, irrespective of the merits. It did so because it held that
there are no overlapping sovereignty or sea boundary claims that might impact
the determination.
Overall,
it should never be surprising when an arbitral tribunal finds that it has
jurisdiction to hear a case. The Tribunal did throw China a bone by noting that
it is still possible that seven of the Philippines’ claims (including the Nine
Dash Line challenge) could be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction at the merits
stage.
But
by reserving the question of jurisdiction, and guaranteeing it will rule on the
merits for several other claims, the Tribunal shoves the ball back onto China’s
court. Will China continue to claim it is not bound by the Tribunal for
lack of jurisdiction, when the Tribunal has now found it has jurisdiction?
China would more clearly be in violation of UNCLOS now than it was
before, because UNCLOS Article 288(4) makes it clear that “[i]n the event of a
dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by decision of that court or tribunal.” My guess is China will
pretend that Article 288 doesn’t exist and continue to refuse to participate.
The interesting question is whether China will pay any serious price (in
reputational terms) if it does so.
Why Won’t Japan Send the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute to the ICJ?
Why Won’t Japan Send
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute to the ICJ?
by Julian Ku September 20th
The former owners of
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, whose sale to the Japanese government has unleashed
hundreds of violent anti-Japan protests across China, are calling for
Japan to send the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
China is very
outspoken about its position over the Senkaku Islands, but Japan has its own
position as well, and it needs to get that message out to the global community
— and I think the best way is to turn to the ICJ,” Kurihara told The Japan
Times. “Once both sides start stating their positions and listing their
evidence of sovereignty, there is no end. . . . An objective decision should be
made under international law, not by the people of both countries.
Nicholas Kristof has
a post with
a similar call for the ICJ, and with a sympathetic take on the strength of
China’s legal claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu. Thus far, I am not aware of any
reports that Japan has welcomed the possibility of ICJ arbitration here,
although I’ve heard that they have done so in the past.
It is curious that
Japan has not called for the ICJ to settle this dispute, given it has done
just that in its ongoing dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo Islands.
While it is true that Japan could not force China to agree to ICJ
arbitration, a call for arbitration would put China on the defensive in the
same way it has (sort of) put Korea on the defensive over the Dokdo.
The cynical
explanation is probably the best one. Japan is more than happy to call for the
ICJ when the other country is in possession of the disputed territory (e.g.
Korea) but when they possess the territory, they have a different view on the
merits of international adjudication. Hypocritical? Yes. Surprising? No.
Hot Rocks: Asia's most controversial islands
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/03/hot_rocks
.
.
Hot Rocks
Asia's most
controversial islands.
BY JOSHUA E. KEATING |
NOVEMBER 3, 2010
SENKAKU/DIAOYU/DIAOYUTAI
Location: Northeast of Taiwan in the East China Sea
Claimed by: Japan, China, Taiwan
The dispute: Diaoyu means "fishing platform"
in Chinese, and there are records of these small rocks in
Chinese navigation documents as far back as the 15th century.
Japan's legal claim on the islands dates to 1895 (though some documents say it
was earlier), when Taiwan and its surrounding islets were ceded to Japan at the
end of the Sino-Japanese War. Tokyo formally incorporated them into Japanese
territory shortly afterward.
After World War II,
however, Japan ceded Taiwan and the Paracels (see below) back to China. And
because Diaoyu was traditionally part of Taiwanese territory, the government in
Taipei believes it has claim to the islands. Complicating matters further,
because Beijing views Taiwan as part of Chinese territory, it also claims the
islands. However, in 1970, the United States and Japan signed a treaty
reverting occupied Okinawa back to Japanese control which, unlike the treaty
signed after World War II, explicitly mentioned Senkaku as Japanese territory.
Japan cites this bilateral agreement as legal backing for its claim.
The dispute would be
little more than a historical curiosity if not for the sizable gas deposits
believed to be located near the islands.
The territorial
dispute has flared ever since with Japan expelling Chinese fishing boats from
the region and Japanese nationalists traveling to the island to build a
lighthouse in 1990. And in September, the dispute once again came to a head
when a Chinese fishing boat captain was arrested after colliding with a
Japanese warship, prompting the bitterest Sino-Japanese diplomatic standoff in decades.
DOKDO/TAKESHIMA/LIANCOURT
ROCKS
Location: In the Japan Sea, about 117 miles east of
the Korean coast
Claimed by: South Korea, Japan
The dispute: Known as the Liancourt Rocks to Westerners, this group of
volcanic islets is known as Dokdo or "Lonely islands" in Korean and
Takeshima, or "Bamboo islands" in Japanese. There are only two permanent residents on the islands --
an elderly Korean fisherman and his wife whose presence is
described by Tokyo as an "illegal occupation." Nonetheless,
Liancourt's symbolic importance and potentially rich energy deposits have made
the islands a flashpoint in Japanese-Korean relations for more than half a century.
The islands were part
of Korean territory annexed by Japanese forces during their conquest of the
Korean peninsula in 1905. Japan lost control of Korean territory after World
War II, and Seoul has stationed Korean Coast Guard troops around the islands
since the 1950s as a symbol of ownership. Naval standoffs have been
increasingly frequent in recent years, though air and naval forces have stopped
short of firing at each other. Japan has so far rejected a 60-year-old proposal
by Seoul to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice for
resolution.
The nationalist
passions the islands provoke can sometimes be extreme. In 2005, when the
Japanese prefecture of Shimane declared a "Takeshima Day" holiday, a
South Korean mother and son sliced off their fingers in protest in front of the
Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
THE KURILS
Location: Stretching from Japan's Hokkaido Island to
Russia's Kamchatka peninsula
Claimed by: Russia, Japan
The dispute: Fifty years after the conclusion of World
War II, Japan and Russia have still never
signed a peace treaty, the obstacle being the four southernmost Kuril
Islands, which Japan calls its "northern territories." Russia and
China fought over the Kurils as far back as the 1700s, when fur-trappers and
fishermen began to explore the region. In 1875, Russia agreed to hand over the
Kurils to Japan in exchange for control of the much larger Sakhalin Island, which
lies closer to the Russian mainland.
But Japan won control
of half of Sakhalin during the 1904 Russo-Japanese war, which Russia claims
nullifies the original treaty. In the treaty of San Francisco that Japan signed
with the Allies in 1951, Tokyo gave up its claim to the Kurils. But the treaty
refused to recognize Soviet control of the islands, which led Stalin's
negotiators to withdraw from the conference. The international agreement didn't
stop the Soviets from taking control and an estimated 17,000 Japanese were
expelled from the islands when the Soviets invaded. Russia has encouraged
citizens to move to the islands because of its rich fishing and mineral wealth,
and nearly 17,000 Russian and indigenous people live there today. The
ownership of the Kurils has remained unresolved ever since.
Tensions were
reignited in recent weeks when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited the islands, prompting an angry Japanese
government to temporarily withdraw its ambassador from Moscow in protest.
THE PARACEL ISLANDS
Location: Roughly equidistant from Vietnam and China
in the South China Sea
Claimed by: China, Vietnam
The dispute: This chain of about 30 islets and reefs in
the South China Sea hasbeen one of the main points of contention between two
erstwhile Cold War allies. There's evidence
of Chinese habitation on the islands as far back as the eighth
century Tan dynasty, though today it is occupied only by Chinese military
personnel. The cluster of small rock islands and reefs was claimed by France as
part of French Indochina in 1887 over strong Chinese protests.
In 1956, with the
support of the Communist North Vietnamese government, Beijing declared its
sovereignty over the islands, though this claim was largely moot as the South
Vietnamese government continued to maintain a small military presence there.
Things came to a head during 1974's "Battle
of the Paracels," when South Vietnam dispatched warships to
force the Chinese military out of the area. The Chinese forces, which were
supported by the North Vietnamese, easily repelled the South Vietnamese and
consolidated Beijing's control over the islands, though Vietnam has continued the diplomatic dispute.
In the past year,
Chinese authorities have repeatedly arrested Vietnamese fishermen near
the islands, prompting angry protests from Hanoi.
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
Location: In the South China Sea, about two-thirds of
the way from Vietnam to the Philippines
Claimed by: China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei
The dispute: It might almost be easier to list the East
Asian countries that don't have a claim on this chain of about 100 islets, reefs, and sea mounts. Competing
claims on the islands and the surrounding waters began in the
1930s when the region's abundant resources, including gas, oil, and fish,
became apparent. Since the 1950s, 29 oil fields and four gas fields have been
developed in the Spratly area.
The various actors'
claims differ, though only China is bold enough to claim all the islands (based on Han dynasty
navigation records dating back to 110 A.D.). The Spratly Islands were claimed
by the Japanese during World War II but Tokyo makes no claim on them today. The
islands are uninhabited by civilians, though China, Vietnam, and the
Philippines have all stationed troops on the islands they control. The dispute
has led to violence at times: In 1998 when Chinese and Japanese
naval vessels fought over a disputed reef, more than 70 sailors were
killed.
A joint resolution in
1992 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations committed the parties to
attempt to resolve the disputes peacefully, but many countries continue to
accuse China of using its military muscle to consolidate control over the
entire island chain.
2012.06.06 DPRK Daily
Kim Jong Un made his
second speech at a major public event since taking power in December,
addressing a children’s rally aimed at winning a new generation’s support
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/north-korean-leader-stages-massive-children-rally-article-1.1090747
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/north-korean-leader-stages-massive-children-rally-article-1.1090747
-
North Korea typically
holds mass events for landmark anniversaries such as the leaders’ birthdays and
the founding of the Workers’ Party or military. It is the first time such
extensive celebrations have been organized for the founding of the Korean Children’s
Union, the first political organization young North Koreans join.
-
By speaking publicly
twice in his six months as leader, Kim already is distinguishing himself from
his father. Kim Jong Il, who died in December, addressed the public only once,
two years before he succeeded father Kim Il Sung.
Prolonged drought
major test to Kim
-
The worst drought in
decades is threatening to aggravate already serious food shortages in
North Korea, posing a grave challenge to its new leader Kim Jong-un
-
An expected food
crisis could force Kim to make a choice ― whether to open dialogue with the
international community or to tighten the iron-fist rule to preempt any signs
of destabilization
-
The North’s official
Korean Central News Agency said the drought is the country’s worst since 1962. The western coastal areas, long deemed a
breadbasket for the country, were among the hardest hit
o
“The North’s
self-publication of drought has two purposes ― drumming up public participation
in its nationwide agricultural campaign and attracting support from the
international community.”
-
Food shortages are
projected to intensify in the coming months with up to 3 million
estimated by the U.N. World Food Program to be at risk of starvation.
-
The U.N. body (WFP)
said it plans to scale back its aid by excluding 140 senior North
Koreans from its list of recipients largely comprised of women and children.
The agency last year provided 83,000 tons of food, merely a quarter of its
initial target
-
The U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization said in its outlook that the North would secure 2
million tons of rice this year, up nearly 18 percent from 2011. The
sum includes 300,000 tons in international aid and translates into more than 70
kilograms of rice per person, the highest level in six years
-
During his 17-year
rule, the senior Kim (Kim Jong-il) formulated a two-pronged economic
policy. On the domestic front, he
trumpeted a “self-reliant” socialist economy. While turning a blind eye to
rampant black markets after the rationing system effectively went bust, he kept
them in check to prevent his country from going capitalist. Outside, Kim strove
to entice foreign investors. He promoted trade with China and other countries
and installed free economic zones in remote border regions, despite meager
outcome.
-
More than 23,500 North
Koreans have taken refuge in the South since the 1950-53 Korean War. The figure
constantly rose on a yearly basis ― from 1,383 in 2005 to 2,927 in 2009 ―
according to the Unification Ministry.
-
U.S. officials said
two weeks ago that Washington may consider reviving the deal if Pyongyang
changes course and cause no additional provocations as it promised before.
-
While defending its nuclear program as a “self-defense” measure, Pyongyang
said late last month it has no plan for an atomic test for the time being
and remains open to dialogue
-
Pyongyang has been searching
for alternative donors and diplomatic partners. It has recently sent its high-ranking
officials to Southeast Asia in an apparent bid to perk up foreign assistance
and investment.
o
Kim Yong-nam, president
of the Presidium of North Korea’s parliament, visited Singapore and Indonesia
last month. The KCNA said Tuesday a North Korean delegation led by Kim Yong-il,
secretary of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party, has left for a
weeklong tour with stops in Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar.
o
Indonesian media
reported last week that Jakarta plans to provide Pyongyang with $2 million in
humanitarian aid. They cited Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa as saying that
his government is discussing distribution methods with the WFP and UNICEF
-
The U.S. suspended food
handouts in 2009 after Pyongyang banished foreign food distribution
monitors.
-
Seoul rolled back
state-level support after conservative President Lee Myung-bak was sworn in in
February 2008. It then severed it completely following the killing of a
South Korean tourist in the North’s Mt. Geumgang resort in the summer of 2008.
Ties have been further worsened by the North’s naval and artillery attacks in
2010 that killed about 50 people. Civic groups continued to provide
humanitarian aid, however
-
Kim Yong Nam,
president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly, met and had a
talk with Hor Nam Hong, deputy prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation of Cambodia, and his party who paid a courtesy
call on him at the Mansudae Assembly Hall on Tuesday.
-
Hor Nam Hong said the
traditional friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries
provided by Great King Norodom Sihanouk and Generalissimo Kim Il Sung have a
long history and a firm foundation
North Korea, Cambodia ministers possibly discuss nuclear
issue
BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific, June 5, 2012, Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, in English 0952gmt 05 Jun 12
-
Cambodian Foreign
Minister Hor Namhong is believed to have extended an invitation to North Korean
Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum this
July in Phnom Penh.
-
Hor Namhong, whose
country currently chairs the 10-member ASEAN, is also thought to have offered
to facilitate talks between North and South Korea on the sidelines of
the regional security meeting, at which all countries involved in the six-party
talks will be present
North Korean officials
visit Fiji
-
A North Korean
delegation has arrived in Fiji to explore areas of mutual interest and
development co-operation with Fiji.
-
North Korea has no
diplomatic mission in the South Pacific after closing its Canberra office in
2008 for financial reasons.
A delegation of the
Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] headed by Kim Yo'ng-il, alternate member of the
Political Bureau and secretary of the C.C. [Central Committee] of the WPK, left
Pyongyang Tuesday [5 June] to visit Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar [Burma].
BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific, June 5, 2012, Source: KCNA website, Pyongyang, in English 0731gmt 05
Jun 12
Lee criticizes pro-N.
Korean sympathizers in Memorial Day speech
-
In a Memorial Day
address, Lee also urged North Korea to follow in the footsteps of Myanmar and
open up to the outside world with democratic reforms, while at the same time
warning the regime in Pyongyang of "strict punishment" for any
provocations.
-
Criticism of pro-North
Korean sympathizers has risen sharply in South Korea in recent months after
some newly elected lawmakers of a minor opposition party displayed strong
leanings to the communist nation and reluctance to criticize the autocratic
regime
-
Last month, Lee urged
pro-North Korea groups to wake up to reality and stop blindly accepting any
nonsense assertions Pyongyang makes. It was the first time he has openly criticized
those sympathetic to Pyongyang by using the word, "jongbuk," which
means "blindly following the North."
Korea seeks balance
between security partners and China
-
Seoul's strategy to
diversify its network of security partnerships, not only to fend off the
North's threat, but also to tackle uncertain challenges of a future multi-polar
world
o
Seoul has been working
with Japan over possible military agreements concerning logistics and
information despite domestic opposition stemming from long-standing historic
and diplomatic disputes.
o
With China, South
Korea is seeking an agreement facilitating supplies cooperation between the two
militaries during humanitarian aid and rescue missions.
-
the General Security
of Military Information Agreement with Japan would be "essential" to
national security as the agreement would allow Seoul's military to keep a
closer eye on North Korea
o
Japan's military
possesses a number of high-tech surveillance equipment including six Aegis
destroyers fitted with the latest radar equipment and several early warning
aircrafts, giving Japan an advantage in monitoring developments in North Korea
o
"On the outside
it is a tool for countering North Korea, but from China's point of view it is
ultimately strengthening the frame for keeping it in check," professor
Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies said.
o
Observers suspect
South Korea has been pressured by the US to push defence ties with
Japan despite a significant political burden. A leaked diplomatic document states
that South Korea's participation in the 2008 Defence Trilateral Talks was
"entirely due to strong US government pressure," citing a South
Korean diplomat stationed in Japan.
-
Japan's Ministry of
Defence is reviewing plans to deploy Aegis destroyers in the international
waters "near the launch site" when North Korea is scheduled to launch
long-range rockets.
o
Although patrolling in
international waters is allowed under international laws, a Japanese military
vessel operating within close proximity to the Korean Peninsula is a thorny
issue for Korea due to unresolved historical and territorial issues.
o
The Japanese
government continues to deny its involvement in forcing Korean women into
sexual slavery for its military during Japan's occupation of Korea.
o
In addition, Japan is
maintaining that the Dokdo islets in the East Sea are its territory.
-
In addition, such
developments could aggravate China, which had responded strongly to the South
Korea-US joint military exercise conducted in the West Sea in 2010
-
a military agreement
with China remains a far more distant prospect
o
advanced cooperation
with China -- beyond humanitarian missions -- could have negative effects on
Korea's relations with other countries
o
too early to be
considering military agreements when the bilateral relationship is that of
strategic partners. The Seoul-Beijing relations were upgraded to that of
strategic partners in 2008. Since then
the two nations have been holding joint search and rescue exercises and seeking
ways to increase military exchange
o
"For instance, an
information sharing agreement could strain the Korea-US alliance because such a
pact represents risks of secrets shared by Seoul and Washington going into
China," Nam said
-
After Seoul and
Beijing established diplomatic relations with South Korea on August 24, 1992,
North Korea-China relations took a sudden dive that lasted for nearly seven
years
The United States is
in the process of selling hundreds of cutting-edge weapons to South Korea, a
deal expected to be worth $325 million
The Chinese State Media
has sent a clear warning to the United States today. The country’s news sources
are unhappy with the military power of the United States in the Asia Pacific
region and what is clearly a strategy of increasing that power in future
Europe: Press for
Commission of Inquiry on North Korea
-
A delegation
representing the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity in
North Korea (ICNK) will travel to Europe beginning on June 7, 2012, to urge
European governments and the European Union to support the establishment of a
United Nations Commission of Inquiry to investigate crimes against humanity in
North Korea
-
The ICNK is an
international coalition formed to work to end the dire human rights situation
in North Korea
-
The delegation
includes:
Kang Cheol-hwan, a survivor of a North
Korean prison camp and co-author with Pierre Rigoulot of The Aquariums of
Pyongyang;
David Hawk, visiting scholar at Columbia
University and author of The Hidden Gulag (new edition published in April
2012);
Kwon Eunkyoung from Open North Korea; and
Jared Genser, an international
human rights lawyer who submitted a petition to the United Nations on April 2,
2012, on behalf of ICNK, calling for an investigation into North Korea’s human
rights violations.
2012.06.05 DPRK Daily
Indonesia plans to
give 2m dollars in food aid to North Korea
BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific, June 5, 2012, Source: The Jakarta Post website, Jakarta, in English 31
May 12
-
The Indonesian
government plans to give 2 m US dollars of aid to the North Korean government
to help it with its ongoing food crisis
-
The government, Marty
said, was currently working with the World Food Program and UNICEF to figure
out the methods and forms of aid delivery to the Communist country
-
On May 15, North Korea's
chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Yong-nam, met
with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to discuss trade and investment during
a bilateral meeting between the two countries
The response from
Seoul to the North targeting media outlets in the South
-
SEOUL - South Korea's government is chiding the North
for a specific threat made by its military against some of the media in Seoul
-
South Korean reports
say it is unprecedented for North Korea to publicly speak of map coordinates
for specific targets.
-
One television channel
in Seoul had compared the ceremonies to those of the Hitler Youth of Nazi-era
Germany
-
South Korea's
Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk says it takes the threat seriously
and calls North Korea's reaction way out of line
-
However, Yim Tae-hee -
a former chief of staff to the current South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak
and declared presidential candidate of the ruling New Frontier Party - says
Seoul should not over-react. It should step back and put things in perspective.
literally interpreting such threats
could cause an erroneous move by Seoul in regards to relations with the North.
-
Ryu says a competition
is underway in North Korea among various entities to demonstrate their loyalty
to Kim Jong Un and such belligerent rhetoric directed at the South is one part
of this.
N. Korea threatens
specific attacks on S. Korean media
-
The North Korean
statement is the latest in a series of threats aimed at Seoul’s conservative
government and news agencies following the December death of Kim Jong-il
-
Among the South Korean
media groups North Korea threatened was Channel A, a television network
affiliated with the conservative Dong-a Ilbo newspaper, which has described the
children’s festivals in Pyongyang as an Adolph Hitler-style “political show.”
North Korea’s Threat
Gets Coordinates Wrong
the Defense Ministry received
President Lee Myung-Bak’s approval to spend as much as $2.14 billion to buy
between 500 and 600 new missiles
-
The request for the missile
procurement followed North Korea’s failed satellite launch on 13 April
Lee Hae-chan, a
contender to take over leadership of the opposition Democratic United Party, opposes
so-called “North Korean human rights law” proposed by the ruling Saenuri Party
-
it is diplomatically
inappropriate for South Korea to intervene in the human rights situation in the
North
-
“Politically speaking,
one country deeply arguing over a domestic political problem of another country
or intervening in it is a diplomatic discourtesy,” Lee said, “There is a human
rights issue in North Korea. It is true they have it, but it is up to North
Korea to deal with it. It’s not
something other countries can intervene in.”
o
DO- he could have put
it in a more nuanced way by putting things in the context of efforts toward
re-unification, as opposed to the general prohibition of intervention in
domestic affairs under UN Charter Art. 2(7)
-
On Sunday, Saenuri
lawmaker Yoon Sang-hyun said he and 10 other Saenuri lawmakers submitted a bill to enable the South Korean
government to create a foundation on North Korean human right issues for the
purpose of finding policies to improve human rights in the North. Under the
bill, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade will create a North Korea human
rights ambassador position. Similar
bills were submitted twice by Saenuri lawmakers in 2005 and 2008. Both failed
due to opposition from the DUP, the largest opposition party
The upcoming trip of Amb.
King and Amb. Glyn Davies
-
Amb. Glyn Davies,
special representative for North Korean policy, en route to Brussels, Moscow
and Paris
-
Amb. Robert King,
special envoy for North Korean human rights issues, Seoul and Tokyo
The US special envoy
for human rights in North Korea, Amb. Robert King, will travel to Japan and
South Korea this week for meetings with senior officials, the State Department
says
-
Tokyo where he will
meet Japan's Minister for the Abduction Issue Jin Matsubara and a senior
foreign ministry official tasked with Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Shinsuke
Sugiyama
-
In 2002, North Korea
admitted to the abduction of 13 Japanese nationals. It allowed five victims to
return to Japan along with their spouses and offspring, but claimed the others
had died
-
Tokyo does not have
diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and ties are tense, due in part to Japan's
sometimes brutal 1910-1945 occupation of the Korean peninsula
The Committee for the
Release of North Korea Human Rights Activist Kim Young Hwan plans to urge the
U.S. State Department’s dedicated envoy for North Korean human rights, Robert
King, to do more to obtain the release of Kim and three other South Korean men
-
King is due to arrive
in Seoul on June 9th after visiting Japan on the 7th, and during this period is
due to meet with human rights groups on the 12th
US lets S Korea extend
missile range to 550 km
-
At the talks with the
United States, South Korea demanded its missile range be extended up to 1,000
km, but the two sides eventually agreed on the range of 550 km, the official
said
Threat of
Finlandization by China Should Spur Korean Reunification
the North – China
-
In advising several
colleagues with ties to senior levels of the DPRK leadership, I have learned
that the North Koreans’ distrust of China is fundamental and profound. It is not polemical and for public
consumption, … as the late China-hand James Lilley sometimes hinted, the
undercurrent of Chinese-North Korean relations is likely more vicious and
brutal than we imagine.
-
Nowadays, the North
senses China has been displeased that the DPRK leadership is not
sufficiently responsive to Chinese authority. Specifically, it has been
intimated that Kim Jong Il himself was greatly distrusted by China because he
was not responsive to Chinese requests. Ironically, the subversion the North
fears comes not from the South, but from China.
-
For years, the
North sought improved relations with the U.S. to balance the immense
pressure it feels from China, although today it likely has given up on that
hope
the South – China
-
South Korea’s policies reveal an entirely different view of China. China is now the ROK’s largest trading
partner, even seeks a mutual military logistical agreement with
China (along with Japan), underlying ROK policy toward the DPRK in the Lee
administration has been to join hands with China .. to “envelop” the North
in the expectation of compelling irreversible economic reform
the consequence
-
However, the actual
result, some fear, may be that the North would be incrementally
integrated economically into China’s northeast provinces, end up using the
yuan as its currency, and find itself only nominally sovereign.
implication for the
effort toward re-unification
-
This scenario would
mean Korean reunification would take place – if ever – under Chinese auspices
and only if a united Korea’s foreign policy conformed to China’s. Simply put, how could red-blooded Koreans –
North, South, or overseas – accept such an outcome, after 35 years of Japanese
colonialism and nearly 70 years of division?
-
good reason to be
deeply concerned about potential Finlandization at the hands of China.
China may feel it is its right to secure its regional sphere of influence so that
its neighbors’ policies are more “compatible” with Chinese interests – but
Koreans could once again in their history pay the price by giving up national
unity and genuine independence
-
As a 2009 Goldman
Sachs report noted, the synergies between the two Koreas are more significant
than many think: e.g., they predicted the GDP of a unified Korea would surpass
that of Japan in a few decades
-
The two Koreas need to
concur that neither has a guaranteed future of political and economic
independence and viability , Reunification .. but a matter of contemporary
urgency to create a strong, unified and independent Korea.
China Targets North
Korean Refugees and the Activists Who Help Them
-
“I heard that police and security staff are in every nook of the
streets. All defectors must take shelter and cannot come out of it,” he said.
“Most of the brokers appear to have returned home due to the crackdown. Chinese
residents also refuse to help defectors in dire need of their support.” [....]
-
There is also this
suspicious event to consider: Kang Ho-bin, a South Korean human
rights activist and survivor of an apparent assassination attempt in 2011, died
in a car accident in China on Sunday
UAV Crash in Korea
Linked To GPS Jamming
Threat of
Finlandization by China Should Spur Korean Reunification
JUNE 5, 2012 Mark
P. Barry, Ph.D., is an independent Asian affairs analyst who has followed
Northeast Asian affairs for 22 years. He
met the late President Kim Il Sung in 1994.
China is usually
considered the only nation with influence in North Korea, and we have
repeatedly heard that only it can moderate the North’s behavior. China, host of
the Six Party Talks, and the world’s second largest economic power, allegedly
understands the North Koreans better than anyone. As recently as this past
March, at the nuclear summit in Seoul, President Obama asked president Hu
Jintao to use all the instruments of China’s power to reign in Pyongyang. This
is often referred to as outsourcing the North Korean problem to Beijing.
Yet, China has not
lived up to that billing in moderating North Korean behavior. Though the North
remains critically dependent on Chinese economic assistance, China’s policy
toward the DPRK is evidently based on self-interest and not on the wider
interests of the other members of the Six Party Talks. There are also limits to
Chinese influence in the North, both self-imposed, and more importantly, beyond
China’s control due to strong underlying distrust of China in the North.
Despite the massive
Chinese economic aid it receives (food, fuel, consumer goods, investment), the
North wishes aid could come from elsewhere. Gone are the days of fraternal
assistance from the socialist bloc. As the North’s present food shortages are
aggravated by a spring drought, and with the cancelled food aid from the U.S.
due to the failed mid-April satellite launch, the North again has no one else
to turn to but China.
In advising several
colleagues with ties to senior levels of the DPRK leadership, I have learned
that the North Koreans’ distrust of China is fundamental and profound. It is
not polemical and for public consumption, as it is with Japan, South Korea and
the U.S.; yet it is deadly serious. It is based on both recent and more distant
history, and, as the late China-hand James Lilley sometimes hinted, the
undercurrent of Chinese-North Korean relations is likely more vicious and
brutal than we imagine.
North Korea sees China
as a regional hegemon in a modern-day reprise of its historical role in
treating Korea as a tributary state. It remembers that in October 1950, China
not only intervened in the Korean War – saving the Korean People’s Army from
oblivion – but took over all command and control, subsuming the North’s forces
into its own; it became China’s war with the U.S. After the 1953
Armistice, several thousand Chinese troops remained based in North Korea until
1958.
Nowadays, the North
senses China has been displeased that the DPRK leadership is not sufficiently
responsive to Chinese authority. Specifically, it has been intimated that Kim
Jong Il himself was greatly distrusted by China because he was not responsive
to Chinese requests. Ironically, the subversion the North fears comes not from
the South, but from China. Since Korean People’s Army officers have often
received training in China by the People’s Liberation Army, the North is
suspicious that the Chinese may have levers to influence the train of events in
the DPRK. For years, the North sought improved relations with the U.S. to
balance the immense pressure it feels from China, although today it likely has
given up on that hope.
In the purported last
will and testament of Kim Jong Il, parts of which are in the possession of ROK
think tanks like the Sejong
Institute and others, Kim allegedly warned his countrymen to be
vigilant of China:
“Historically, China
is the country that forced difficulties on our country, the country that
currently has the closest relations with us, but could become the country we
need to watch most in the future. Keep this in mind and be careful. Avoid being
exploited by China.”
Ironically, South
Korea’s policies reveal an entirely different view of China. China is now the
ROK’s largest trading partner, a dramatic leap since diplomatic ties were
restored in 1992. South Korea now even seeks a mutual military logistical
agreement with China (along with Japan). As many have argued, President Lee
Myung-bak’s policies of not providing aid to the North without significant
political concessions have helped push the North further into China’s grasp. A
friend of mine recently served as a presidential advisor in the Blue House, and
from his description, underlying ROK policy toward the DPRK in the Lee
administration has been to join hands with China, as highly developed economies
bordering North Korea, to “envelop” the North in the expectation of compelling
irreversible economic reform.
However, the actual
result, some fear, may be that the North would be incrementally integrated
economically into China’s northeast provinces, end up using the yuan as its
currency, and find itself only nominally sovereign. This scenario would mean
Korean reunification would take place – if ever – under Chinese auspices and
only if a united Korea’s foreign policy conformed to China’s. Simply put, how
could red-blooded Koreans – North, South, or overseas – accept such an outcome,
after 35 years of Japanese colonialism and nearly 70 years of division?
Ironically, despite
the deep divisions and divides between North and South, they are the same
people, and possess a common cultural memory of China in its various dynastic
incarnations as a hegemon. Watch almost any South Korean saeguk –
historical television drama – and the Chinese are typically depicted with more
disdain and distrust than even Japan. Given the uncertainty of China’s regional
intentions – in part evidenced by Obama’s renewed emphasis on Asia – Koreans,
North and South (and perhaps Vietnam as well), have good reason to be deeply
concerned about potential Finlandization at the hands of China. China may feel
it is its right to secure its regional sphere of influence so that its
neighbors’ policies are more “compatible” with Chinese interests – but Koreans
could once again in their history pay the price by giving up national unity and
genuine independence.
Instead, the two
Koreas should begin to reintegrate and eventually reunify as a nation of over
70 million people as the most viable solution to potential prolonged division
and Finlandization by
China. Near-term Korean reintegration would constitute a regional strategic
realignment which would be a win-win scenario for each Korea, as well as the
U.S. and Japan. For the proud North, moreover, it would send the message to
China that it will no longer be relegated to beggar status and subject to its
exploitation. Despite the huge challenges of incorporating the North’s
underdeveloped economy and the ideological and psychological chasms between the
two societies, perhaps no people on earth can overcome them as well as the
Koreans. As a 2009 Goldman Sachs report noted, the synergies between the two
Koreas are more significant than many think: e.g., they predicted the GDP of a
unified Korea would surpass that of Japan in a few decades.
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