Would-be bomber was a double-agent

http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-05-11/friday-news-roundup-international/transcript  

The Diane Rehm Show , May 11, 2012

MS. DIANE REHM

Thanks for joining us. I'm Diane Rehm. Twin suicide bombings in Syria kill at least 55 and injure hundreds. Voters in France and Greece oust incumbent leaders and Russia clamps down on protests of Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency. Joining me to talk about the week's top international stories on the Friday News Roundup, David Sanger of The New York Times, Susan Glass of Foreign Policy magazine and Matt Frei of the UK's Channel 4 News

REHM

Earlier this week, we learned that the U.S. somehow foiled the plot to bring down an airliner by infiltrating al-Qaida. How did we do it?

FREI

The information has been leaked about this, much to the dismay of several intelligence agencies here and in London.  very effective collaboration between Saudi intelligence, British intelligence and American intelligence to have this plant.

It's also got to be concerning to the Iranians, who realize that, the only people in the world who are more intent that they don't get a nuclear weapon than Israel, are the Saudis.  And so this degree of cooperation is something that will really get a lot of attention throughout the Middle East

REHM

"What public interest was served by releasing and publishing details of the successful intervention in the latest bomb plot? Are we safer knowing that not only was a double agent involved, but that he was managed by British intelligence?”

SANGE

in this particular case I think the administration, my sense of it is, wanted to get this out.  I can't read their motives. I can guess their motives.

First of all, by the time this whole thing came together .., it's pretty clear that Al-Qaida in the peninsula had figured out what happened and they knew this guy disappeared. They had given him a bomb. They sent him off. He didn't set the bomb off. They knew he was a double agent at that point.

when you release something like this is the psychological effect of the release greater on the target, which in this case is the Al-Qaida group, because it begins to make them look at every other member of their group and wonder who they're working for.

http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-08/middleeast/world_meast_yemen-qaeda-plot_1_device-double-agent-law-enforcement?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST

News report: Would-be bomber was a double-agent

May 08, 2012

A man who volunteered as a suicide bomber for a terrorist group intent on blowing up a U.S.-bound plane was working instead as an intelligence agent for Saudi Arabia, The New York Times reported Tuesday, citing American and foreign officials.

The double agent departed Yemen, traveled through the United Arab Emirates and gave the bomb and information about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to the CIA, Saudi intelligence and other foreign intelligence agencies, the newspaper said.

The bomb, which was intended to pass undetected through airport security, was given to the FBI, which was poring over it, the newspaper said

The Times, citing officials, said the agent works for Saudi intelligence, which has "cooperated closely" with the CIA for years. The officials, who would not identify the man, said he is safe in Saudi Arabia, the newspaper reported.

Citing a senior American official, the newspaper described the device as sewn into "custom fit" underwear and able to be detonated in two ways. That redundancy may have been an attempt to ensure that an attempt to blow up a jet over Detroit in 2009, which failed because the bomb did not detonate, would not be repeated.

The primary charge in the latest device was high-grade military explosive that the Times, quoting an official, said "undoubtedly would have brought down an aircraft."

A senior administration official told CNN that officials were debating whether to release photographs of the device to law enforcement agencies.

On one side of the argument, Transportation Safety Administration screeners and law enforcement might more easily identify any similar devices made as part of the same plot, the official said.

But officials were reluctant to do so out of concern that the photographs would be leaked to the news media and that the would-be bombers would learn what law enforcement knows -- and might not know -- about the bomb's workings.

The news of the double agent might explain comments made earlier Tuesday by John Brennan, the chief White House counterterrorism adviser, who told ABC's "Good Morning America" that U.S. officials were confident they were in control of the situation leading up to the seizure of the improvised explosive device, or IED.

Brennan said that officials believe redundant security systems would have prevented any attempt at bombing a flight from succeeding, but analysts were studying the device to see whether security procedures should be adjusted.

"We're trying to make sure that we take the measures that we need to prevent any other type of IED, similarly constructed, from getting through security procedures," Brennan said.

The device investigators were studying is more sophisticated than were previous ones and represents a disconcerting advance in al Qaeda bomb-making techniques, officials said Tuesday.

"It is a device similar to the underwear bomber of 2009, but an evolution to that," Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said.

The device never posed an immediate danger to air travel or the United States, she said.

But lawmakers said more such devices may exist, and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Michigan, said the release of information about the device could complicate an effort to seal the long-term threat.

"If something bad happens because it was leaked too early, that's a catastrophe and it's also a crime," Rogers told CNN.

News about the device became public on Monday, about two weeks after U.S. intelligence agents thwarted the plot after receiving a tip from Saudi Arabia, a source familiar with the operation said.

Information from the double agent proved key to a CIA drone strike Sunday in Yemen that killed Fahd al Quso, 37, a senior operative of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Quso was a suspect in the bombing in 2000 of the USS Cole in Yemen.

The vehicle he was in was hit by a drone strike in the Rafdh district in Shabwa province, U.S. officials said.

Al Qaeda's bomb-makers evolve, adapt

"I was told by the White House they are connected; they're part of the same operation," the source familiar with the operation said.

Al Quso hinted at the existence of another bomb effort in February, when he was asked whether the group had stopped exporting terrorism operations.

"The war didn't end between us and our enemies," he replied. "Wait for what is coming."

Western officials describe AQAP as al Qaeda's most dangerous affiliate.

U.S. Rep. Peter King of New York, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, expressed dismay that the news was public.

"It's really, to me, unfortunate that this has gotten out, because this could really interfere with operations overseas," he said. "My understanding is a major investigation is going to be launched because of this."

Officials have provided few specifics about the device. But Rogers said it underscores al Qaeda's continuing efforts to carry out terrorist attacks.

"This is a device that was more sophisticated, had some fail-safes built into it, and it was something that concerns us because it tells us that they brought some very capable people together to build something," he said.

A Department of Homeland Security spokesman said authorities have "no specific, credible information regarding an active terrorist plot against the U.S. at this time."

Though the threat was foiled around the time of the anniversary of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, a second U.S. counterterrorism official said the two were not related.

President Barack Obama was told last month about the plot, which "underscores the necessity of remaining vigilant against terrorism here and abroad," the White House said.

AQAP has been responsible for two of the most audacious attempts to target the United States in recent years: the attempted Christmas 2009 bombing and a 2010 attempt to load bombs hidden inside printer cartridges onto cargo planes headed for Chicago. In both cases, U.S. authorities believe the bombs were built by Ibrahim al-Asiri. Both devices contained PETN, a white, powdery explosive that conventional "single-beam" X-ray machines are rarely able to detect.

In 2009, al-Asiri outfitted his brother, Abdullah al-Asiri, with a PETN-based underwear bomb in an attempt to kill Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, a top Saudi security official. The device killed his brother instantly but failed to kill its target.

"We are not ready to say the threat stream is over," a U.S. official told CNN. "We believe external plotting continues."

The investigation involves a number of countries and is "ongoing," King, R-New York, said on CNN's "Starting Point."

He said the leadership of al Qaeda was intimately involved in the plot.

Rogers told CNN International's Christiane Amanpour, "I can confirm to you that, in fact, it was an al Qaeda core group that was responsible for the development and procurement and financing and putting together this particular bomb."

As the hunt continues for the mastermind bomber, a U.S. official said the assumption continues to be that al-Asiri is training others in bombmaking.

"They understand that Asiri is going to be killed or captured one day," Mustafa Alani, the director of security and defense studies at the Gulf Research Center, told CNN. Alani had been briefed on AQAP by Saudi counterterrorism officials. "We're talking about a new generation of very skillful bomb builders and very committed people."

U.S. counterterrorism agencies have reached a similar conclusion.

"I think the fear is not just that he'll share his ability within his own circle, but rather more widely, and send it to other al Qaeda-sympathetic individuals or organizations," a senior U.S. counterterrorism official told CNN in March.

Yemen's government has been fighting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for years with mixed results.

Yemen president vows offensive against al Qaeda

Yemeni authorities appeared miffed by the revelations of the foiled plot, saying that Washington had shared no information with them.

The One-Year Anniversary of Osama bin Laden's Death: A Live Web Chat with Daniel Byman

The One-Year Anniversary of Osama bin Laden's Death: A Live Web Chat with Daniel Byman

Wednesday, May 2 / 12:30pm - 1:00pm

(DO – I was told that I was not the only one who made trip to Brookings to attend the event, though it was “live web chat”)

A year after the death of Osama bin Laden, the United States continues to fight the former al Qaeda leader's terrorist network at home and abroad. While the raid on bin Laden's compound proved a major victory for the nation a decade after 9/11, al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to find safe harbor around the world and are renewing their threats against the U.S. and its allies.

How has al Qaeda evolved since the death of bin Laden, and what danger does it pose to the United States? What might victory in the "war on terror” ultimately look like?

On Wednesday, May 2, Brookings expert Daniel Byman answered your questions in a live web chat from 12:30 PM to 1:00 PM with moderator Vivyan Tran of POLITICO.

Daniel L. Byman

Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy 

it is natural that politicians of all parties take credit for the good things that happen under their watch. So of course much (most) of the credit goes to the intelligence and military folks who made this happen, but the President deserves credit for ordering a risky operation that could have easily backfired -- and that his opponents would not have hesitated to use to criticize him should it have failed.

We are definitely safer than we were a year ago.

The standard line, which I endorse, is that al-Qa'ida is "down but not out." So the death of Bin Ladin, and other blows to senior leaders, have hurt the organization. And the Arab spring has damaged the appeal of its message. But it remains intact, and its affiliates remain strong (though most are more focused locally). So we can't count al-Qa'ida out, but that shouldn't mean that we don't feel safer with Bin Ladin dead.

Al-Qa'ida's appeal remains strong. I would not say it is "growing," but one of Bin Ladin's accomplishments is that he took a fringe ideology and made aspects of it palatable. Far more Muslims see the United States as a bitter enemy and support the use of violence against civilians than did when Bin Ladin formed al-Qa'ida in 1988. Support is down from the peak years after the initial U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, but the numbers remain sizable.

(why see US as a bitter enemy ?)

Some object to U.S. policies (military presence in the Middle East, support for autocratic regimes, support for Israel, etc.), and others are hostile to Western values (women's rights, rights for gays, and so on). Still others simply join to be part of a cause. So it's a bit of a mix

I think that terrorism is not likely to play an important part in the election, barring another significant attack on the United States. Obama was able to take this issue -- normally a loser for Democrats -- off the table by killing Bin Ladin. But I don't think many people are going to vote for him because of his tough counterterrorism measures. But he won't be hit as John Kerry was (unfairly) for being weak on terrorism.

So it will primarily revolve around the economy. I don't think other foreign policy issues will matter much either, for better or for worse

This is a difficult question. Bush administration officials talked of victory as when Americans live their lives without the fear of terrorism, and I think that is a sensible approach. However, by this standard we may be there -- yes, of course some people are afraid, but terrorism fears seem largely to have faded to the background.

The affiliate question is a knotty one. (Warning: self-promotion alert. I have a Brookings paper coming out on this in a week or two.)

On the one hand the affiliates are pledged to al-Qa'ida and have increasingly become international in their focus. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula has even done al-Qa'ida core-like attacks on the U.S. homeland. On the other hand, most remain focused on their country in question, and taking them on is resource intensive and may backfire if it makes them even more anti-U.S.  So part of the strategy is figuring out which are the most dangerous and allocating resources accordingly.

Yes and no. On the one hand, Pakistan may be the most difficult foreign policy issue facing the administration. And they have given a lot of attention to it. But the policy is not one that requires a high level of public engagement (as would, say, a military intervention in Syria). Moreover, the policy is nuanced (at best) and reactive or conflicted (at worse), and that doesn't make for a good public statement.

(DO- interesting! The policy on Pakistan does not require a high level of public engagement, as would a military intervention in Syria

I wish he could expand on that)  

Bin Ladin's deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, is clearly in charge. He has long been the #2 and very important in his own right, and he is well known to the organization. Key figures and affiliates seemed to have pledged loyalty to him. However, he is leading a weaker organization than Bin Ladin did.

Iraq already has a low-level civil war going on, and Afghanistan's more serious one shows little sign of abating before the US drawdown and then withdrawal in the coming years.

In Iraq, terrorism stokes the fire, but the real problem is the venality and power-hungry nature of many Iraqi leaders, particularly Maliki.  Good leadership could defeat a weak al-Qa'ida there, but terrorism is likely to remain a problem.

In Afghanistan, al-Qa'ida is close to the Taliban.  The Taliban are likely to grow in power as the U.S. withdraws and the Afghan government remains corrupt and weak

If I have the question right, I think that it's often the interaction of the individuals in the West (fewer in number, but dangerous due to their citizenship and knowledge of Western civilization), and organized groups overseas. Individuals can go abroad and radicalize further, get training, and join in a broader organization, all of which makes them much more dangerous.

Affiliates are of concern as they tie into diaspora groups, which gives them strong networks in selected parts of the Western world (e.g. Pakistanis in the UK, Algerians in France, and so on).

Allies in the Middle East are less afraid we'll abandon them due to the "pivot" and more afraid due to U.S. policy in the Arab spring.  I think it was the right move to turn on Mubarak, but from the point of view of many regional allies the United States unceremoniously dumped an ally of many decades in a matter of days. That doesn't exactly give them confidence that the United States will always stand by them.

The Afghanistan strategic partnership is largely about the military partnership (or, more broadly, security as there is probably a strong intel relationship being forced).  In general, a number of countries in different parts of the world (Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the UK, etc.) have explored "deradicalization" programs that try to either turn existing terrorists/radicals into peaceful folks or to stop people from becoming radicalized in the first place. Part of this is akin to working with gangs and others within a community to change the nature of the community. But there aren't really good answers for this. Standard tools -- say education and economic support -- don't really correlate with success. (Terrorists often have jobs and are relatively well-educated).

Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates are easily the most dangerous threat to the United States.   Groups like Hizballah are very capable but do not appear to be actively targeting the United States (that could change with, say, a U.S. strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, as Iran is HIzballah's patron).   Right-wing groups in the US also should remain on the radar screen.

The degree of Pakistan's culpability in all this is debated -- and to me is one of the key analytic questions. It is hard for me to imagine that no Pakistani officials knew of Bin Ladin's presence in Pakistan.  What I don't know is how high up this went and -- if it didn't go up that high -- whether senior Pakistani leaders deliberately chose not to know.

It is amazing to me that after giving Pakistan tens of billions in aid to fight al-Qa'ida after 9/11, when the key moment comes the United States decides that Pakistan cannot be trusted.

I think that al-Qa'ida is not likely to establish a large-scale presence in Afghanistan akin to what it had before 9/11 after US and allied forces draw down. The US would continue to back the Afghan government, do special operations force raids, and of course use the drone program.  So small and decentralized things are possible and likely, but big training camps and an open leadership is unlikely and can be stopped. The key is to make sure that the draw down ensures the United States still has some ability to operate.