The
One-Year Anniversary of Osama bin Laden's Death: A Live Web Chat with Daniel
Byman
Wednesday,
May 2 / 12:30pm - 1:00pm
(DO
– I was told that I was not the only one who made trip to Brookings to attend
the event, though it was “live web chat”)
A
year after the death of Osama bin Laden, the United States continues to fight
the former al Qaeda leader's terrorist network at home and abroad. While the
raid on bin Laden's compound proved a major victory for the nation a decade
after 9/11, al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to find safe harbor around the
world and are renewing their threats against the U.S. and its allies.
How
has al Qaeda evolved since the death of bin Laden, and what danger does it pose
to the United States? What might victory in the "war on terror” ultimately
look like?
On
Wednesday, May 2, Brookings expert Daniel Byman answered your questions in a
live web chat from 12:30 PM to 1:00 PM with moderator Vivyan Tran of POLITICO.
Daniel
L. Byman
Director
of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
it
is natural that politicians of all parties take credit for the good things that
happen under their watch. So of course much (most) of the credit goes to the
intelligence and military folks who made this happen, but the President
deserves credit for ordering a risky operation that could have easily backfired
-- and that his opponents would not have hesitated to use to criticize him
should it have failed.
We
are definitely safer than we were a year ago.
The
standard line, which I endorse, is that al-Qa'ida is "down but not out." So the
death of Bin Ladin, and other blows to senior leaders, have hurt the
organization. And the Arab spring has damaged the appeal of its message.
But it remains intact, and its affiliates remain strong
(though most are more focused locally). So we can't count al-Qa'ida out,
but that shouldn't mean that we don't feel safer with Bin Ladin dead.
Al-Qa'ida's
appeal remains strong.
I would not say it is "growing," but one of Bin Ladin's accomplishments
is that he took a fringe ideology and
made aspects of it palatable. Far more Muslims see the United States
as a bitter enemy and support the use of violence against civilians than
did when Bin Ladin formed al-Qa'ida in 1988. Support is down from the peak
years after the initial U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, but the
numbers remain sizable.
(why
see US as a bitter enemy ?)
Some
object to U.S. policies (military presence in the Middle East, support
for autocratic regimes, support for Israel, etc.), and others are hostile to Western
values (women's rights, rights for gays, and so on). Still others simply
join to be part of a cause. So it's a bit of a mix
I
think that terrorism is not likely to play an important part in the election,
barring another significant attack on the United States. Obama was able to take
this issue -- normally a loser for Democrats -- off the table by killing Bin
Ladin. But I don't think many people are going to vote for him because of
his tough counterterrorism measures. But he won't be hit as John Kerry was
(unfairly) for being weak on terrorism.
So
it will primarily revolve around the economy. I don't think other
foreign policy issues will matter much either, for better or for worse
This
is a difficult question. Bush administration officials talked of victory as
when Americans live their lives without the fear of terrorism, and I think that
is a sensible approach. However, by this standard we may be there -- yes, of
course some people are afraid, but terrorism fears seem largely to have
faded to the background.
The
affiliate question is a knotty one. (Warning: self-promotion alert. I have a
Brookings paper coming out on this in a week or two.)
On
the one hand the affiliates are pledged to al-Qa'ida and have increasingly
become international in their focus. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula has
even done al-Qa'ida core-like attacks on the U.S. homeland. On the other hand,
most remain focused on their country in question, and taking them on is
resource intensive and may backfire if it makes them even more anti-U.S. So part of the strategy is figuring out
which are the most dangerous and allocating resources accordingly.
Yes
and no. On the one hand, Pakistan
may be the most difficult foreign policy issue facing the administration. And
they have given a lot of attention to it. But the policy is not one that requires a high level of
public engagement (as would, say, a military intervention in Syria).
Moreover, the policy is nuanced (at best) and reactive or conflicted
(at worse), and that doesn't make for a good public statement.
(DO-
interesting! The policy on Pakistan does not require a high level of public
engagement, as would a military intervention in Syria
I
wish he could expand on that)
Bin
Ladin's deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, is clearly in charge. He has long been the #2
and very important in his own right, and he is well known to the organization.
Key figures and affiliates seemed to have pledged loyalty to him. However, he
is leading a weaker organization than Bin Ladin did.
Iraq already has a
low-level civil war going on, and Afghanistan's
more serious one shows little sign of abating before the US drawdown and
then withdrawal in the coming years.
In
Iraq,
terrorism stokes the fire, but the real problem is the
venality and power-hungry nature of many Iraqi leaders, particularly
Maliki. Good leadership could defeat a
weak al-Qa'ida there, but terrorism is likely to remain a problem.
In
Afghanistan,
al-Qa'ida is close to the Taliban. The Taliban are likely to grow in power
as the U.S. withdraws and the Afghan government remains corrupt and weak
If
I have the question right, I think that it's often the interaction of the
individuals in the West (fewer in number, but dangerous due to their
citizenship and knowledge of Western civilization), and organized groups
overseas. Individuals can go abroad and radicalize further, get training, and
join in a broader organization, all of which makes them much more dangerous.
Affiliates
are of concern as they tie into diaspora groups, which gives them strong
networks in selected parts of the Western world (e.g. Pakistanis in the UK,
Algerians in France, and so on).
Allies in the Middle East are less
afraid we'll abandon them due to the "pivot" and more afraid due
to U.S. policy in the Arab spring. I
think it was the right move to turn on Mubarak, but from the point of view of many regional
allies the United States
unceremoniously dumped an ally of many decades in a matter of days. That doesn't exactly give them confidence that the United States will
always stand by them.
The
Afghanistan strategic partnership is largely about the military
partnership (or, more broadly, security as there is probably a strong
intel relationship being forced). In
general, a number of countries in different parts of the world (Singapore,
Saudi Arabia, the UK, etc.) have explored "deradicalization" programs
that try to either turn existing terrorists/radicals into peaceful folks or to
stop people from becoming radicalized in the first place. Part of this is akin
to working with gangs and others within a community to change the nature of the
community. But there aren't really good answers for this. Standard tools -- say
education and economic support -- don't really correlate with success.
(Terrorists often have jobs and are relatively well-educated).
Al-Qa'ida
and its affiliates
are easily the most dangerous threat to the United States. Groups
like Hizballah are very capable but do not appear to be actively
targeting the United States (that could change with, say, a U.S. strike on
Iran's nuclear facilities, as Iran is HIzballah's patron). Right-wing
groups in the US also should remain on the radar screen.
The
degree of Pakistan's culpability in all this is debated -- and to me is one of
the key analytic questions. It is hard for me to imagine that no
Pakistani officials knew of Bin Ladin's presence in Pakistan. What I don't know is how high up
this went and -- if it didn't go up that high -- whether senior Pakistani
leaders deliberately chose not to know.
It
is amazing to me that after giving Pakistan tens of billions in aid to fight
al-Qa'ida after 9/11, when the key moment comes the United States
decides that Pakistan cannot be trusted.
I
think that al-Qa'ida is not likely to establish a large-scale presence in
Afghanistan akin to what it had before 9/11 after US and allied forces draw
down. The US would continue to back the Afghan government, do special
operations force raids, and of course use the drone program. So small and decentralized things are possible
and likely, but big training camps and an open leadership is unlikely and can
be stopped. The key is to make sure that the draw down ensures the United
States still has some ability to operate.
