A Real Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula By Chung-in Moon

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-04-30/real-path-peace-korean-peninsula?sp_mid=56580751&sp_rid=ZHN5aHVuQHlhaG9vLmNvbQS2&spMailingID=56580751&spUserID=ODcxODMxNTY1NDIS1&spJobID=1401354510&spReportId=MTQwMTM1NDUxMAS2

A Real Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula
The Progress and Promise of the Moon-Kim Summit

By Chung-in Moon
April 30, 2018

Twelve hours in Panmunjom—the village in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea that has long symbolized division and war—produced an unexpected miracle of peace on Friday. In the Panmunjom Declaration, Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un, the leaders of South and North Korea, pledged that “there will be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and thus a new era of peace has begun.” Given North Korea’s military provocations, the growing North Korean nuclear arsenal, and the acute sense of crisis that has haunted South Koreans over the last year, such a reversal looks surreal. But after attending all three summits between the two Koreas (in 2000, 2007, and 2018), I believe that this latest one represents real progress and lays the groundwork for lasting peace.

Although much commentary has focused on the remaining difficulties, which are considerable, it has missed just how much was accomplished last week. Moon and Kim did not just make high-level commitments; they also laid out specific timetables for implementing them and took concrete steps that will have immediate effects in facilitating cooperation and preventing conflict. That offers cause for hope that for all the remaining challenges, a comprehensive peace deal including real denuclearization by North Korea is achievable in a couple of years, if not in the months ahead.

ENDING THE KOREAN WAR

The tangible outcomes of the summit are significant. It successfully normalized inter-Korean relations, and the two leaders agreed to “hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields including at a high level, and to take active measures to implement the agreements reached at the Summit.” They will establish a joint liaison office with resident representatives from both sides and encourage active cooperation, exchanges, visits, and contacts at all levels. They also agreed to proceed with reunion programs for families split between North and South Korea, on the occasion of National Liberation Day on August 15. And there will be practical steps to connect and modernize railways and roads, building on a 2007 agreement.

The summit also produced a watershed agreement to alleviate military tension and eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air, and sea, and to transform the demilitarized zone into a peace zone. They pledged to turn the areas around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone, in order to prevent accidental military clashes. They also committed to military measures, including launching a joint military committee to ensure active cooperation, exchanges, visits, and frequent meetings between military authorities and defense ministers.

The Panmunjom Declaration further included a historic joint commitment to cooperate in establishing a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, ending the current state of armistice that has persisted since fighting stopped in the Korean War more than 60 years ago. As part of these efforts, the leaders agreed to carry out disarmament in a phased manner, through the reduction of military tensions and confidence-building measures, and to pursue three-party meetings, involving North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, or four-party meetings, involving China as well, within the year. The aim would be to declare an end to the war and to turn the armistice into a peace treaty. Finally, and most important of all, the South and North Korean leaders confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear weapons–free Korean Peninsula.

BREAKING GROUND

For all the real importance of such commitments, the significance of the summit goes well beyond them. Past agreement and declarations have never included such bold goals. The two leaders were able to narrow a long-standing gap: the South has generally favored a functionalist approach based on the logic of “economy first,” but the North has insisted on “military-political issues first.” Panmunjom was the first inter-Korean summit in which the two sides converged on the primacy of military-political issues.

The adoption of a written agreement on complete denuclearization was also groundbreaking. In the past, North Korea has refused to accept the nuclear issue as an agenda item in inter-Korean talks, arguing that it is a matter solely for the United States and North Korea to address. This time, Kim made a written commitment, and Rodong Sinmun, the official daily newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, openly reported agreement on complete denuclearization, which is unprecedented. Underscoring his commitment to complete denuclearization, Kim told Moon that he would close the North’s still usable nuclear test sites in Punggye-ri in May, inviting experts and journalists from the United States and South Korea to observe and verify.

Throughout the meeting, Kim was pragmatic and realistic. He did not mention the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea, or the status of the U.S.–South Korean alliance, as a precondition for denuclearization. “Once we start talking,” Kim said, “the U.S. will know that I am not a person to launch nuclear weapons at South Korea, the Pacific, and the U.S.” He also identified to Moon what he wants from Washington: frequent meetings and trust building, an official end to the Korean War, and a nonaggression treaty. If these conditions are met, he added, “why would we have nuclear weapons and suffer?” That is why he wanted to link denuclearization to the process of ending war and building a peace regime. As the final declaration says, if the process of ending the Korean War and transforming the armistice into a peace treaty occurs, the North will expedite efforts to denuclearize.

Finally, recognizing the mistakes in past agreements, both leaders made precise concrete pledges to implement what they agreed to. The dates for major meetings and events were specified in the declaration, with high-level talks and a general-level military meeting already scheduled in May. The reunion of separated families will take place on August 15. And Moon is scheduled to visit Pyongyang in the fall.

ROCKY ROAD AHEAD

What made such success possible? First, the summit never would have happened without Kim’s strategic decision to engage; he initiated and engineered the encounter. He presumably did so partly because he needed economic concessions from the South (he emphasized in his New Year’s speech that he will push for economic development even at the expense of nuclear weapons) and partly because he wanted to utilize Moon to secure access to the Trump administration. But also critical was Moon’s sincerity, open-mindedness, and willingness to play the role of honest broker between Pyongyang and Washington, which he demonstrated during the North Korean delegation’s visit to Seoul during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics earlier this year. (Seoul also worked hard to persuade the North’s officials through numerous clandestine contacts.) Finally, U.S. President Donald Trump’s combination of “maximum pressure” on Kim and timely encouragement of Moon’s approach to the North helped bring the two leaders together.

Yet as many observers have aptly pointed out, there is a rocky road ahead. However comprehensive the Panmunjom Declaration, it will not be easy to transform long-standing Korean conflict into a lasting peace. Reducing military tensions, building confidence, and finding agreement on arms reduction are challenging and time-consuming tasks, especially for archrivals.

The same will be true when it comes to the denuclearization of North Korea. Although the North, the South, and the United States all understand denuclearization as the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of nuclear weapons, they differ in the sequencing. Whereas the U.S. position is “CVID first and reward later,” the North demands an incremental, synchronized exchange of denuclearization and reward. South Korea advocates an eclectic approach, in which North Korea’s credible commitment to and actions toward denuclearization would be followed by step-by-step implementation of declaration, inspection, and verifiable dismantling in a compressed time frame.

The critical question is whether Kim is truly willing to get rid of his nuclear facilities, materials, and bombs in a verifiable, irreversible way. Skeptics contend that he will use “salami tactics,” insisting on incremental, synchronized denuclearization in which every action he takes must be met with a reciprocal step by the United States; in the past, the North has in fact managed to get the benefits without following through on its own pledges. Such skepticism is reinforced by Kim’s own domestic uncertainties. No matter how tame the North Korean military may have become under Kim’s ruthless rule, it might be difficult for the military to accept agreements on complete denuclearization. But neither Seoul nor Washington can accept the incremental approach; the entire deal would collapse if the North pursues it, leading to another round of crises and the possibility of military action and even all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul and Washington are aware of that risk and have sent a clear message to the North. And it is not likely that the North will return to this old practice, because its leader appears to fully understand that gains from denuclearization are hefty, whereas the nuclear path is excruciating.

By obtaining North Korea’s explicit commitment to “complete denuclearization” in the Panmunjom Declaration, South Korea laid the groundwork for the Trump-Kim meeting that is supposed to occur in late May. Now the ball is in Washington’s court. The Trump administration needs to deal with Kim to work out the details of denuclearization, which will require a compromise between Washington’s preferred comprehensive one-shot deal and Pyongyang’s incremental, synchronized approach. Trump will likely have to come up with a more realistic, flexible, and creative way of handling North Korea in order to move forward.

South Korea is not free from domestic constraints either. What will happen to U.S. forces in South Korea if a peace treaty is signed? It will be difficult to justify their continuing presence in South Korea after its adoption. But there will be strong conservative opposition to the reduction and withdrawal of U.S. forces, posing a major political dilemma for Moon. Although he wants to push for legislative approval of the declaration, in order to assure implementation even after a change in the government, conservative opposition is likely to block such approval, stalling implementation efforts.

“A peaceful, nuclear weapons–free Korean Peninsula” has been Moon’s goal since long before his election to the presidency. Although the Panmunjom summit has opened a new historical opportunity to fulfill his dream, shaping a new history of peace is not easy. But Moon is acutely aware of the obstacles on the path ahead. He will approach his long-standing goal with prudent and patient stewardship.

A Peace Treaty in Korea—and a Nobel Prize for Trump? Bruce Cumings on Korea’s past and future.

https://www.thenation.com/article/a-peace-treaty-in-korea-and-a-nobel-prize-for-trump/

A Peace Treaty in Korea—and a Nobel Prize for Trump?
Bruce Cumings on Korea’s past and future.
By Jon WienerTwitter

May 3, 2018, 12:30 PM

Historian Bruce Cumings is the author of many books, including The Korean War: A History and North Korea: Another Country. He writes for The Guardian, The London Review of Books, and The Nation, and teaches at the University of Chicago. This interview has been edited and condensed.

Jon Wiener: North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, said he would abandon his nuclear weapons if the United States agreed formally to end the Korean War and promise not to invade his country. Let’s start with a little history: why did North Korea develop nuclear weapons?

Bruce Cumings: The U.S. put hundreds of nuclear weapons into South Korea starting in 1958 with “Honest John” and “Matador” missiles, even nuclear land mines. Ever since then, the North Koreans have tried to come up with a deterrent. For decades, they built underground—about 15,000 facilities. Almost their entire military is underground in caves, in mountains. It was their only recourse since they didn’t have nuclear weapons. George H.W. Bush removed all battlefield nuclear weapons from around the world in 1991, including Korea, but every president since then has sent B-1 nuclear-capable bombers along the North Korean coast. Obama did it many times. Trump has done it. We also have Trident submarines in the area—they’re basically killing machines that could wipe out North Korea in a few hours with nuclear weapons. The North finally succeeded with a deterrent, exploding an atomic bomb in 2006, a very small one, and then last September they detonated what seems to have been a hydrogen bomb, much larger than the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombs.

JW: A little more history: why was there a war in Korea in the early fifties? What was the Korean War about?

BC: The Korean War is one of the most vexed in our history. If you look at high school and college textbooks, they say there was a war because Stalin in 1950 told Kim Il-sung to invade the South. But the war had origins going back into the 1930s, when Korea was a colony of Japan and Kim Il-sung and his friends fought the Japanese for a decade—as guerrillas in the most forbidding circumstances imaginable in Manchuria, where winter temperatures get down to 40 below zero. The Japanese, after their fashion, found Koreans to chase down Kim Il-sung. That set up a terrible nationalist dynamic in Korea after the Japanese left. Kim and his people set up the North Korean government in 1948, made up of former guerrillas and supported by the Soviets, and an American-supported South Korea was created with an entire army high command consisting of officers who fought with the Japanese. Americans never understood this dynamic. The Korean War was fundamentally a civil war, a war just waiting to happen because of this fratricidal colonial background, but because it came at the height of the Cold War, it generally was never seen—by most Americans—as a war similar to the Vietnam War. But it was a very similar war.

JW: What’s life like in the north for ordinary Koreans?

BC: It’s a lot better than it was 20 years ago when they had a famine caused by floods that destroyed about 40 percent of their arable land. Six or seven hundred thousand people died. Our papers always say it was two million, but careful demographic studies have shown that, while it was pretty awful, two million is wrong. The North Korean economy fundamentally collapsed in the 1990s. Their industries weren’t working. Their energy regime was gone. Then came the floods and the famine. Now, their economy is actually good by North Korean standards. It grew about 4 per cent last year. Kim Jong-un has tried to begin creating a middle class, at least in the urban areas, especially Pyongyang. They have many markets there now. People dress in a great variety of clothing, unlike the old proletarian garb. A lot of people have private cars now. I was supposed to go to Pyongyang last September for a visit. I haven’t been there for many years, but I was prevented by President Trump’s embargo of all American travel to North Korea. However, a friend of mine went last summer, and said he was just flabbergasted by the changes in Pyongyang: so much new building and new construction.

JW: It’s not just the Trump administration that’s deeply skeptical about North Korean promises. The mainstream media has been saying, “Don’t trust Kim Jong-un.” When Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Seoul a year ago, he said, “North Korea has a history of violating one agreement after another, and it would be foolish to trust them now.” I wonder if you agree.

BC: No, I don’t. Our mainstream media, including The New York Times, gets this stuff wrong all the time. The first major agreement between the US and North Korea was made in 1994 under Bill Clinton. That agreement froze North Korea’s plutonium production—all of it, for eight years, under UN inspection. The whole facility was sealed, with closed circuit cameras all over the place. As a result they had no plutonium until 2002. Also: under the prodding of Kim Dae-jung, the South Korean president who came in in 1998 and started the reconciliation with the North, the Clinton administration moved to buy out North Korea’s medium- and long-range missiles. The general who ran the conglomerate making those missiles came to the White House in October 2000, and Madeline Albright went to Pyongyang two weeks later to complete this missile deal. But everybody’s forgotten that, because the 2000 election ended up in the Supreme Court and five people decided George Bush would be president.

When Bush came in, he did everything he could to destroy our agreements with North Korea. John Bolton and Dick Cheney, in particular, were determined not to proceed with the missile deal and to kill the agreement that froze North Korea’s plutonium. The main reason they did this was not because North Korea was a threat to the United States, but rather because it was a useful foil for China, which Cheney and Bush and others saw as a looming threat; here was a great way to build up missile defense. And of course, Bush put them into the Axis of Evil. So I don’t blame the North Koreans for moving in the direction they did after 2002. It’s the same today: when North Korea explodes an atomic bomb or tests a missile, we put more anti-missile batteries into the Far East, which undermine China’s deterrent, and we try to weld together South Korea, Japan, and the US in a tight alliance against China.

JW: North Korea has said it will abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for an agreement with the United States that we will not invade. That seems like a great idea, but how do we get from here to there?

BC: When the general who ran the North’s missile conglomerate came to Washington in 2000, he signed an agreement with President Clinton that neither North Korea nor the United States would have hostile intent toward the other. This diplomatic agreement is very much like what North Korea appears to want again in 2018. However the Bush people acted as if it had never been signed, never even been written. I’m not, of course, suggesting that North Korea is faultless in all this. Quite the contrary. But the fact is that we already signed an agreement saying that we would not have hostile intent toward North Korea, which implies we’re not going to invade it or try to overthrow the regime.

I’m skeptical now about what kind of an agreement we could make with North Korea that would convince them that we’re sincere about it this time. I imagine it would have to come in the context of diplomatic relations finally being opened between Pyongyang and Washington, and guarantees both by South Korea and the US that they would not attempt regime change, or invade the north.

JW: How much can be accomplished by South Korea working with North Korea, and how much has to be the work of the United States, and China?

BC: The South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, has A long-term plan for relations with North Korea. He wants to reconcile with it, not necessarily unify with it, but to proceed with reconciliation, and rebuild the North Korean economy road by road, bridge by bridge, business by business. That’s really what’s behind this and it’s what’s attracting Kim Jong-un.

China has to be a part of ending the war in Korea and getting a peace agreement, since it signed the armistice agreement and South Korea didn’t. There are only three signatories, China, the US and North Korea. But I think that a real tension exists, more hidden now than open, between Seoul and Washington. Moon Jae-in is committed to moving forward quickly to reconcile with North Korea and help rebuild their economy and get rid of their nukes. But the foreign policy establishment in Washington mostly agrees with John Bolton, who said that South Korea is like putty in the hands of the North Koreans. A former high official in the Obama State Department said they’re running off the cliff like lemmings. I think that attitude is going to become prominent—unless Donald Trump somehow turns into a big supporter of President Moon.

JW: Last question: If we get a treaty ending the Korean War, would you support the proposal to give Donald Trump the Nobel Peace Prize?

BC: No. I think it would be much better to give the Peace Prize to President Moon and Chairman Kim. The North and South Koreans are doing much more to move this peace process forward than Trump is. Just a few months ago he was screaming that he was going to totally destroy North Korea. I don’t think Trump has the slightest idea of the nature of the Korean conflict, how deep it has run, or how long it has been going on. I’ll just say this: If he gets the Nobel Peace Prize, let’s hope it’s not like Henry Kissinger’s Nobel for achieving “peace” in Vietnam.

북 미사일 억제 수단은 필요 … 미•중이 상호 설득하게 해야 - 하영선, 문재인

http://joongang.joins.com/article/787/17406787.html?ctg=1000&cloc=joongang%7Chome%7Cnewslist1

2015.03.22

[사드 한국 배치 논란] 전문가들이 제시하는 해법은

사드(THAAD)라고 불리는 미국 고(高)고도미사일방어 체계의 한국 배치 문제가 안보 논쟁의 ‘블랙홀’로 떠오른 양상이다. 한국을 둘러싼 모든 안보 이슈가 사드에 귀결되기라도 하는 분위기다. 보수냐 진보냐, 혹은 친미냐 친중이냐는 진영에 따라 찬반도 엇갈려 자칫 국론이 두 토막으로 갈릴 판이다.

우리의 필요나 의사보다 미국과 중국의 국익이 더 크게 부각돼 한국이 중간에서 이러지도 저러지도 못하는 난감한 처지에 몰렸다는 지적도 있다. 이러한 상황에서 우리가 어떤 선택을 해야 할지, 어떤 식으로 미국·중국·북한을 대해야 할지 정부의 고민이 깊어지고 있다. 외교안보 전문가인 하영선(서울대 명예교수) 동아시아연구원 이사장과 문정인 연세대 정치외교학과 교수에게 해법을 들어봤다.

-사드 배치가 중요한 문제이긴 하지만 논의가 지나치게 가열돼 오히려 우려가 되고 있는 상황이다.
▶문정인=기본적으로 논의의 순서가 틀렸다. 사드는 최선이 아닌 차차선의 선택이다. 먼저 북한이 핵이나 미사일을 사용하지 않도록 외교적 접근을 강화하는 것이 바람직하다. 다음으로는 선제타격 능력을 키우는 것이다. 그것이 공세적 방어다. 이것마저 제대로 안 될 때 마지막 단계로 고려할 수 있는 것이 사드를 포함한 미사일 방어다. 하지만 최근의 논의에서 예방외교적 접근과 공세적 방어 능력 증강은 거론되지 않고 있다. 영국의 철학자 화이트헤드가 말하는 ‘오도된 구체성의 오류’를 지금 범하고 있는 것은 아닌가 싶다.
▶하영선=사드가 가지고 있는 복합성에 비해 너무 단순화된 논의들이 행해지고 있다. 미·중 사이에 낀 딜레마의 문제 이전에 남북한 간에 존재하는 실질적인 위협의 존재부터 출발해야 한다. 다음 단계로는 북한의 공격용 미사일 무기체계에 자주적으로 대응할 것인가 아니면 추가적으로 미국의 억제체제를 추가적으로 활용할 것인가에 대한 원칙적 합의가 있어야 한다. 마지막으로 한반도의 안보를 위해 활용하는 미국의 억제체제가 중국을 비롯한 동아시아 안보질서에 영향을 미칠 것인가를 검토해야 할 것이다. 이 과정에서 북한의 공격용 미사일 무기체계에 대해 최소한의 억제용 무기체계를 갖추지 않으면 북한의 정치적·군사적 선택을 지나치게 확대시키는 부작용을 가져올 것이다.

-사드가 우리에게 적합한 미사일방어 체계인가.
▶하=남북한이 냉전적 군사 대결을 하는 동안엔 불가피하게 적절한 억제체제를 가져야 한다. 이것은 생존의 문제다. 한반도 평화체제로 가기 위해 군비경쟁을 지나치게 자극하지 않는 최소한의 억제력은 불가피하다. 생존의 확실한 담보를 위해서는 킬 체인이나 한국형미사일방어(KAMD) 체계 같은 저고도 요격과 함께 이중적 생명보험 형태로 고고도 사드에 관심을 갖게 된 거다.
▶문=미사일 방어는 미국적 개념이다. 대서양과 태평양이라는 큰 자연적 장애물이 놓여 있는 지리적 환경에서 대륙간 장거리 미사일이 발사됐을 때 대응하는 방어 시스템이다. 탄도미사일이 대기권 밖으로 나가기 전에 지상 또는 해상에서 요격했는데 실패했을 경우 하강하는 종말 단계에서 쏘는 것이 사드다. 왜 우리나라에서 차차선택인 사드 배치가 최우선적으로 논의되는지 이해가 안 된다.

-우리 정부의 대응이 혼란을 가중시키고 있는 듯하다.
▶문=최근의 사드 논의를 보면 ‘허깨비 게임’이라는 생각이 든다. 미국 정부가 이 문제를 한·미연례안보협의회(SCM)나 한·미군사위원회(MCM)에서 한 번도 공식 거론한 적이 없었다. 언론에서 튀어나온 것이다. 우리 정부 내에서 서로 다른 메시지를 보내면서 갈팡질팡하는 모습이다. 정부의 혼란스러운 모습이 언론의 과열 보도를 부추긴 면이 없지 않아 있다.
▶하=국가안전보장회의(NSC)가 중심을 잡고 부처 간 의견을 교통정리해야 하는데 그러지 못하고 있다는 인상을 준다.

-중국은 과잉대응하는 것 같다. 왜 그렇다고 보나.
▶문=사드 논의가 언론에 의해 증폭이 되니까 중국은 한국 언론에 주목했다. 중국에선 사드의 한반도 배치가 대북 억제력을 높이는 것보다는 한·미·일 3국 미사일 방어체제 구축으로 보는 경향이 강하다. 북한에 대한 위협보다 자신들에 대한 위협으로 인식하게 된 것이다. 사드가 들어오면 한·미·일 남방 삼각축과 북·중·러 북방 삼각축 사이의 대결구조가 생기면서 신(新)냉전 구도가 생긴다고 본다. 시진핑 중국 국가주석은 신냉전 체제를 원치 않기 때문에 한국 정부가 사드를 들여오지 못하도록 막겠다는 것이다. 중국에선 ‘한국이 돈은 중국에서 벌고 안보는 미국으로부터 얻는다’는 비판이 있다.
▶하=만약 사드의 한반도 배치로 중국이 주관적으로 위기를 느낀다면 불충돌과 불대항을 명분으로 하고 있는 신형대국 관계를 지향하고 있는 미국과 중국이 일차적으로 상호 설득을 해야 한다.

-사드로 북한 미사일 요격이 가능한가.
▶문=설령 요격 능력이 검증됐다 하더라도 한반도 상황에서는 북한의 핵 미사일 발사 조짐을 사전에 탐지했을 때나 요격이 가능할 수 있다. 북한이 유인용(decoy)으로 먼저 재래식 미사일을 발사했을 때 사드 1개 포대가 최대 48기의 요격용 미사일을 다 소모하면 재장전해 대응하기가 기술적으로 힘들다.

-정부에 바라는 점이 있다면.
▶하=우리 정부가 사드 문제가 가지고 있는 국방·외교 등 여러 측면의 복합적 요소를 다양하게 검토하면서도 말을 아끼고 있을 수는 있다. 북한의 공격용 무기체계가 가지는 정치적 그리고 군사적 효율성을 최소화하기 위해서는 확실한 대응군사적 검토가 필요하며, 동시에 우리 힘만으로 부족한 경우에 동맹국 미국의 억제 무기체제를 활용할지의 여부와 이러한 선택이 가져올 중국의 반응에 대한 외교적 검토가 동시에 복합적으로 이뤄져야 한다.
▶문=왜 NSC나 국방부가 전략적으로 생각하면서 국민적 중지를 못 모으는지 안타깝다. 종심이 짧은 한국적 지형은 방어에 굉장히 취약하다. 북한이 미사일을 계속 쏘아대는 것은 우리를 심리적 패닉 상태로 몰아가기 위한 의도가 있다. 이런 것에 대한 종합적인 평가를 거치고 대안을 만든 상태에서 사드가 나와야 대국민 설득이 되는데 그러질 못했다. 현 정부의 외교안보 관리체계에 혁신이 필요하다. 국방부와 외교부의 입장이 충돌하면 NSC가 나서야 한다. 이것을 조율하면서 하나의 통일되고 일관된 정책을 내는 것이 NSC의 역할인데 이번에 전혀 작동하지 못했다. 지금의 NSC는 방관자처럼 보인다.

-미국은 공식 표명을 하지는 않았지만 사드의 한국 배치 의지가 강해 보인다.
▶하=미국은 1차적으로 주한미군 2만8000만 명의 확실한 안전 확보에서 검토하고 있다. 미국 입장으로선 적절한 억제체제 마련이 중요하기 때문에 고고도미사일방어 무기체계를 개발하고 배치하기 시작한 것이다.
▶문=미국은 처음에는 평택 미군기지에 배치하겠다고 얘기했다. 그러다 갑자기 입장을 바꿔 한국이 구매하도록 하는 듯했다. 우리 국방부도 구매 쪽으로 가다가 여론이 나빠지니까 이번엔 구매 계획이 없다고 했다. 최근에 나온 건 한국이 일부를 구매하고 미국이 주한미군에 자체 배치하는 절충형이 돼 가고 있다. 배후에는 군산복합체의 이해관계가 숨어 있다고 본다. 이들의 교묘한 언론·정치플레이에 우리가 이용당하는 것은 아닌지 잘 생각해야 한다.

-북한 압박을 위해서는 군사적 효율성을 떠나서라도 사드가 필요하다는 주장도 있다.
▶하=남북한 평화체제를 제대로 구축하지 못하고 군사적인 긴장이 계속된다면 생존 전략의 기본 원칙에 따르자면 한국은 최대한의 보험을 들고 싶을 것이다.
▶문=사드라는 보험을 들어도 핵 미사일 요격이 어렵다는 것이 문제다. 요격이 어려워도 가지고 있으면 안심이 되지 않느냐는 논리에는 동의하기 어렵다.

-미국과 중국 사이에 끼어 한국이 곤란한 입장이다.
▶하=갑과 을이 뒤집혀서 미국은 우리보고 주권의 문제라고 하고, 중국도 우리에게 중국의 안보를 충분히 고려해서 결정을 하라고 얘기하고 있다. 그러나 우리는 일차적으로 남북한의 군사적 긴장 구조에서 보험용 무기체계를 선택해야 하며, 만약 사드 배치가 미국과 중국의 신형대국 관계에 부정적 영향을 미친다면 미국과 중국이 일차적으로 조율해서 해결책을 찾아야 할 것이다. 그렇기 때문에 중국 주도의 아시아인프라투자은행(AIIB)에 한국이 참여하는 문제의 타협점이 마련된 것처럼 군사무대가 경제무대보다 훨씬 힘들지만 반드시 양국은 해결책을 찾아야 한다.
▶문=중국이 북한을 설득하라고 하는데 이것은 상당히 잘못된 메시지다. 미국 스스로가 숙제(북한과의 협상)를 해놓고 중국더러 ‘우리가 북한과 협상하는데 당신들도 해라’라고 하는 식이 돼야 한다. 미국이 자신은 평화적 해결 노력을 하지 않으면서 중국에 ‘아웃소싱’ 하려는 태도는 문제가 있어 보인다. 동맹인 미국뿐 아니라 전략적 협력동반자인 중국에도 투명성 있게 솔직하게 얘기해야 한다. 우리 국민여론이 이러니까 당신들이 북한문제에 도움을 주든지, 아니면 우리가 이런 선택을 할 수밖에 없다고 얘기했다면 이렇게까지 꼬이진 않았을 것이다.

-북한·미국·중국에는 각각 어떻게 대응해야 하나.
▶문=사드 논쟁은 북한에 대한 좋은 협상 카드가 될 수도 있다. 이를 계기로 정부 당국자가 북한과 비공개 접촉도 하고 남북 현안 얘기하면서 사드 문제를 카드로 사용할 수 있을 것이다. 남북관계 개선 조짐이 보여야 이 문제가 어느 정도 정리되지 않겠는가. 미국에는 그들이 공식적인 입장표명을 할 때까지 기다려야 한다. 미국 중간 관리들의 한마디에 난리법석 떨지 말고 기다리자. 박근혜 대통령의 중국 채널이 좋으니까 이를 활용하면 된다. 중국에 ‘3NO’ 입장을 명확히 설명하고 변화가 생기면 충분히 협의할 테니까 이것을 외교적 쟁점으로 삼지 말라고 당부해야 한다.
▶하=정부뿐 아니라 언론과 학계도 신중해야 한다. 보수나 진보 모두 구시대적인 냉전구도의 눈으로 보고 있는 것이 아닌가 돌아봐야 한다. 한국이 갑이 되어 한반도와 동아시아의 안정을 충족할 수 있는 해결책을 미국이나 중국에 설득해야 한다. 한반도의 안정을 확보하고, 동아시아에서 초보적으로 진행되고 있는 신형의 미·중 관계를 원점으로 돌리지 않는 제3의 길을 찾자고 제안해야 한다.


한경환 기자 han.kyunghwan@joongang.co.kr

North Korea Nuclear Timeline - Fast Facts

North Korea Nuclear Timeline - Fast Facts

Tue October 29, 2013   By CNN Library  

http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/

(CNN) -- Here's a look at what you need to know about North Korea's nuclear capabilities and history.

1985
North Korea joins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1993 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) charges that North Korea is violating the NPT and demands that inspectors be given access to two nuclear waste storage sites.

North Korea threatens to quit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty amid suspicions that it is developing nuclear weapons. It ultimately does not quit the program but agrees to inspections in 1994.

1994 
North Korea and U.S. sign an agreement. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to build two power-producing nuclear reactors.

1998
August 31 - North Korea fires a multistage rocket that flies over Japan and lands in the Pacific Ocean, proving the North Koreans can strike any part of Japan's territory.

November 17 - The U.S. and North Korea hold the first round of high-level talks in Pyongyang over North Korea's suspected construction of an underground nuclear facility. The United States demands inspections.

1999
February 27-March 16 - During a fourth round of talks, North Korea allows U.S. access to the site in exchange for U.S. aid in increasing North Korean potato yields. U.S. inspectors find no evidence of any nuclear activity during a visit to site in May.

September 13 - North Korea agrees to freeze testing of long-range missiles while negotiations with the U.S. continue.

September 17 - President Bill Clinton agrees to ease economic sanctions against North Korea.

December - A U.S.-led international consortium signs a $4.6 billion contract to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea.

2000
July - North Korea threatens to restart its nuclear program if the U.S. does not compensate it for the loss of electricity caused by delays in building nuclear power plants.

2001
June - North Korea warns it will drop its moratorium against testing missiles if the U.S. does not pursue normalized relations with North Korea. It also says it will restart its nuclear program if there is not more progress on two U.S.-sponsored nuclear power plants being built in North Korea.

2002
January 29 - President George W. Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger," he says.

October 4 - U.S. officials, in closed talks, confront North Korea with evidence that they are operating a nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 nuclear agreement. Specifically, the U.S. has proof that they are operating a uranium enrichment facility. North Korea admits that is has been operating the facility in violation of the agreement. The information is NOT made public.

October 16 - The Bush Administration first reveals that North Korea has admitted operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement. They have NOT, apparently, admitted having any nuclear weapons.

December 22 - North Korea says it has begun removing IAEA monitoring equipment from nuclear facilities.

December 31 - North Korea expels IAEA inspectors.

2003
January 10 - North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

February 5 - North Korea's official news agency says the nation has reactivated its nuclear power facilities.

February 24 - North Korea test fires a land-to-ship missile into the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.

February 26 - The United States says North Korea has reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

March 10 - North Korea test fires another surface-to-vessel anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan.

April 23, 2003 - Declares it has nuclear weapons.

August 27 - The U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia take part in talks about the crisis in North Korea.

2004
February 24-28 - The U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia meet in Beijing, China for more talks. The summit closes with no major progress but with an agreement for more talks.

June - The six nations meet again in Beijing for more talks.

August 2004 - North Korea offers to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for aid, easing of sanctions and being removed from the US's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The U.S. wants North Korea to disclose all nuclear activities and allow inspections.

2005
February 10 - North Korea drops out of six-party nuclear talks and says it will bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal. North Korea insists on a bilateral non-aggression pact with the U.S. before it will consider dismantling its nuclear program. The U.S. insists Pyongyang must first agree to permanently and verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program before it will grant any incentives, including economic assistance and diplomatic recognition.

August 7 - After meeting for 13 straight days, diplomats from the United States, North Korea and four other Asia-region powers decide to take a recess from talks aimed at getting North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.

September 13 - The six-party talks resume in Beijing.

September 19 - North Korea agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons, a joint statement from six-party nuclear arms talks in Beijing said. "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards," the statement said.
- In exchange, the U.S., China, Japan, Russian and South Korea have "stated their willingness" to provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.
- North Korean officials later state that their country would begin dismantling its nuclear program only if the U.S. provides a light-water reactor for civilian power -- a demand that could threaten a day-old agreement among North Korea, its neighbors and the United States.

"Without this physical guarantee of the (light-water reactor), our position is not to even dream of us giving up our nuclear deterrence."

2006
July 4 - North Korea test-launches a Taepodong-2 missile along with two short-range rockets, but the long-range missile apparently fails.

July 15 - The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend its missile program. The North Korean ambassador immediately rejects the resolution.

October 9 - North Korea claims to have successfully tested a nuclear weapon. The supposed test is conducted at an underground facility in Hwaderi near Kilju city. Though the nature of the blast as nuclear remains unconfirmed, South Korea's geology research center detects an artificial earthquake in the region of the test, and world leaders condemn North Korea's actions (test conducted at 10:36 am local time or 9:36 pm Eastern time on 10/8/2006).

October 14 - The UN Security Council approved a resolution imposing sanctions against North Korea, restricting military and luxury good trade and requiring an end to nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

October 16 - An analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detects radioactive debris, confirming North Korea's nuclear test.

2007
February 13 - North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth $400 million.

March 5-6 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill meets with his North Korean counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, to discuss North Korea's nuclear program.

March - During six-party talks, the U.S. agrees to release approximately $25 million of North Korean funds frozen at a Macao bank, a sticking point in the negotiations. The actual release of funds does not occur until June.

June 25 - After spending two days in Pyongyang meeting with North Korea's nuclear negotiator, the U.S. Envoy to North Korea, Chris Hill, says that North Korea has reaffirmed its commitment to the nuclear disarmament agreement reached in February. He also says North Korea has invited the IAEA to monitor the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, scheduled to occur within a few weeks.

September 2 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill announces that after talks in Geneva between U.S. and North Korean officials, North Korea has agreed to fully declare and disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.

September 30 - At six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea signs an agreement stating it will begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities. North Korea also agrees to include a U.S. team of technical experts in the disabling activities.

October 2, 2007 - South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun becomes the first South Korean leader to walk across the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea on his way to a three day summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

October 4, 2007 - North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun sign an eight-point agreement in Pyongyang; among other things, it calls for a smooth implementation of the six-party agreements to shut down of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the replacement of North and South Korea's current armistice agreement with a permanent peace.

November 14-16, 2007 - North Korean Prime Minister Kim Yong Il and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo meet in Seoul, South Korea. At the end of the summit, they announce a number of economic projects including cross-border cargo train services, road repairs, and construction of a new industrial complex near Haeju, North Korea.

December 31 - North Korea misses a deadline to declare all its nuclear programs.

2008
January 4 - The North Korean Foreign Ministry states, via broadcast message, that North Korea had already provided enough explanation to meet the 12/31/2007 deadline, and that it had provided that information in a report presented to the U.S. in November. Members of the six party talks dispute this claim.

February 21 - After meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, South Korean envoy Chun Yung Woo states that North Korea still plans to meet the obligations it agreed to during six party talks in 2007.

May 8 - An official with the U.S. State Department announces that North Korea has handed over thousands of documents pertaining to its nuclear activities, especially related to its production of plutonium, to visiting U.S. official Sohn Kim. Another official puts the number of documents at 18,000 to 19,000.

June 27 - North Korea destroys a water cooling tower at the Yongbyon facility, where officials now acknowledge they extracted plutonium to build nuclear weapons. The massive implosion is intended to be a powerful public symbol of a move to end nuclear activities by the Communist nation.

September 24 - At the request of North Korea, the IAEA removes surveillance equipment and seals from the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

October 11 - U.S. State Dept. spokesman Sear McCormack announces that North Korea has been removed from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism.

October 10-17 - In response to the U.S. move, North Korea replaces the seals and surveillance equipment at its Yongbyon nuclear facility.

December 8 -11 - Another round of six-party talks is held in Beijing, China. The talks break down over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspectors unfettered access to suspected nuclear sites.

2009
January - U.S. scholar Selig Harrison meets with senior officials in North Korea. After the meeting he reports that the officials have claimed that North Korea has weaponized most of its plutonium stockpile. The amount of weaponized plutonium is allegedly enough for four to five nuclear bombs.

April 25 - North Korea announces it has begun reprocessing spent fuel rods.

May 25 - North Korea announces it has conducted its second nuclear test shortly after the U.S. Geological Survey reports a magnitude 4.7 seismic disturbance at the site of North Korea's first nuclear test. The White House is reporting that North Korea also test-fired a short range missile.

June 12 - The UN Security Council approves Resolution 1874, condemning North Korea's May 25th nuclear test. The UN also impose new sanctions, banning the sale of most arms to or from North Korea.

November 3 - North Korea's state run news agency reports that the reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods has been completed. The reprocessing garnered enough weapons-grade plutonium for one to two nuclear bombs.

2010
November 20 - According to a report by Stanford University professor, Siegfried Hecker, North Korea has a new nuclear enrichment facility composed of 2,000 centrifuges. Hecker was given unprecedented access to North Korea's facility and documents.

2011
October 24 - 25 - U.S. officials, led by U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, meet with a North Korean delegation, led by First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan, in Geneva, Switzerland, in an effort to restart the six-party nuclear arms talks that broke down in 2008.

December 15 - U.S. and North Korean officials meet in Beijing to discuss possible food assistance to North Korea in exchange for the suspension of North Korea's uranium enrichment program.

2012
January 11 - North Korea indicates that it is open to further discussions with the U.S. over suspending its uranium enrichment program in exchange for food aid, an agreement that seemed close to realization before Kim Jong Il's death on December 17, 2011.

February 29 - The U.S. State Department announces that North Korea has agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile launches and nuclear activity at Yongbyon, the nation's major nuclear facility.

April 10 - Ryu Kun Chol, the deputy director of the Space Development Department of the Korea Space Technology Committee, outlines the country's plans to complete and launch a rocket within the next seven days. Japan, South Korea and the U.S. believe the launch to be a cover-up for testing a long-range ballistic missile.

April 13 - North Korea's long-range rocket launch is a failure. Shortly after launch, it breaks apart and falls into the sea.

May 24 - A spokesperson for South Korea's Defense Ministry says that based on analysis of commercial satellite images at North Korea's nuclear test site, North Korea appears ready to carry out a nuclear test at anytime.

December 12, 2012 - North Korea successfully launches an Unha-3 long-range rocket from the Sohae Space Center in Cholsan County and puts a "working satellite" into orbit, days after Pyongyang suggested the launch could be delayed.

2013
January 24, 2013 - North Korea's National Defense Commission says it will continue nuclear testing and long-range rocket launches, all of which are a part of an "upcoming all-out action" aimed at the United States, "the sworn enemy of the Korean people." Two days prior to this statement, the United Nations Security Council condemned a recent rocket launch by North Korea and expanded sanctions.

February 12, 2013 - Conducts its third underground nuclear test. This is the first nuclear test carried out under leader, Kim Jong Un.

H. R. 1771 -- ‘North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2013’

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr1771ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr1771ih.pdf

113TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 1771
To improve the enforcement of sanctions against the Government of North Korea, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 26, 2013

A Better Approach Towards North Korea by Jeffrey Sachs

A Better Approach Towards North Korea

Jeffrey Sachs, Director, Earth Institute at Columbia University; Author, 'The Price of Civilization'  04/15/2013

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/a-better-approach-towards_b_3083799.html?utm_hp_ref=fb&src=sp&comm_ref=false

In 2003, Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi agreed with the US and Europe to end his pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons in order to normalize relations with the West. Eight years later, NATO abetted his overthrow and murder. Now we are asking North Korea to end its nuclear program as we once asked of Qaddafi. North Korea's leaders must be wondering what would await them if they agree.

US foreign policy is based on the idea that the US can dictate who rules and who does not, and which countries can keep nuclear weapons and which cannot. Moreover, the US Government reserves the right to change its opinion on these matters. It supported Qaddafi until it did not. It supported Saddam until it did not; it supported Iran's Mohammad Mossadegh in the early 1950s until it joined the UK in toppling him; and it supported Panama's Manuel Noriega until it toppled him. This list goes on, and North Korean leaders must suspect that they are next.

There is a huge problem with this strategy. Not only does it sow enormous discord and violence around the world. It also sows a deep distrust by other countries of US intentions and policies, and contributes to an arms race by at least some of these countries. Iran and North Korea pursue nuclear programs in part to ward off the kind of regime change that they've seen other non-nuclear opponents suffer at the hands of the US.

America continues in the regime-change business to this day. The current target is Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, whom we've declared, "must go." He's a very nasty guy, no doubt, like many others around the world. Yet by declaring that Assad must go, the US and Europe contributes to an escalation of bloodletting as the Assad regime brutally battles a rebellion stoked by Western arms and US intentions to topple Assad.

(DO – so, when it comes to Syria, is the author calling for Obama to act on the principle of non-intervention?)   

In fact, America's real target is not even Assad, but Assad's main backer, Iran. Americans are trying to topple Assad mainly to staunch Iran's regional influence in Syria and Lebanon. We claim we are tightening the noose on Assad, but in fact we are abetting the devastation of Syria itself as the result of a proxy war with Iran.

Through decades of practice, regime change comes naturally to the US Government and especially to the CIA, which carries out much of the operational support. Yet the US Government fails time and again to factor in the serious and sustained blowback that inevitably follows our overthrow of foreign governments. Consider, for example, the history of our current confrontation with Iran.

In 1953, the US and UK conspired to overthrow Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had committed to the grievous sin of believing that Iran's oil belonged to Iran rather than to Britain and the US. Mossadegh was brought down by the CIA and MI6 and replaced by the despotic Shah of Iran, who governed ruthlessly with US backing until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. In light of this history, Iran's current pursuit of nuclear-weapons capability is far more understandable.

Iran also has three not so friendly nuclear neighbors - Israel, India, and Pakistan - all of which are allied with the US despite their failure to sign, ratify, or honor the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Being a nuclear power is based on, well, power, not on international law. That the US demands that this or that state must denuclearize while others flout the treaty is an assertion of power, not principle. Nor are such demands likely to be heeded by Iran, given their plausible fear that unilateral disarmament would be met not by peace with the US, but by US attempts to destabilize the regime.

Which brings us back to North Korea. Secretary of State John Kerry is onto something when he broaches the idea of opening negotiations with North Korea. Every experienced observer in the world notes that North Korea's erratic behavior is mainly an attempt to be heard, acknowledged, and respected. As Kim Jong-un told basketball star Dennis Rodman, he simply wants Obama to call him, "because if we can talk, we can work this out."

But Kerry then went on this weekend to make the usual US demands. There will be no phone call until North Korea first pledges to denuclearize. In other words: surrender first and we'll talk afterwards.

I am reminded of one of John F. Kennedy's most famous admonitions: "And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy -- or of a collective death-wish for the world."

If we act calmly and sensibly, we can easily defuse the current crisis. North Korea is looking for respect, not war. It's time to talk, to lower the heat, and to avoid a confrontation or the imposition of impossible or humiliating demands. And we need to remember, if we are to induce good behavior among others, we will have to stop our bad habit of killing them afterward.

The Road to Pyongyang Goes Through Helsinki by FRANK JANNUZI

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Frank Jannuzi is currently the director of AI's DC office. He worked for the State Department in the Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, and moved on to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under John Kerry and Joe Biden.  Hope he will work with John Kerry on issues around the North. 

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The Road to Pyongyang Goes Through Helsinki

Here's how you really solve the North Korean nuke problem.

BY FRANK JANNUZI | APRIL 12, 2013

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/12/the_road_to_pyongyang_goes_through_helsinki?page=full

As John Kerry makes his first trip to Asia as secretary of state, North Korea seems poised to welcome him with a flurry of missile tests, and in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo, he will surely discuss how to deal with North Korea's recent provocations. But Washington's head-on approach to Pyongyang's nuclear program has failed for decades, and the situation has only grown more dangerous, as shown by the new reports that North Korea may have developed a warhead small enough to fit on a ballistic missile. The best way to resolve the ongoing nuclear crisis is to stop talking about nukes -- and instead focus on advancing North Korean human rights, reorienting global attention from the North's plutonium to its people.

Amnesty International has long chronicled the DPRK's endemic human rights abuses, under which millions suffer. That suffering takes many forms. Food insecurity and malnutrition are widespread, and there are persistent reports of starvation, particularly in more remote regions. The country's famines have been under-reported inside and outside the DPRK because of severe restrictions of movement and a near-total clamp-down on expression, information, and association.

Hundreds of thousands of people -- including children -- are arbitrarily held in political prison camps and other detention facilities, where they are subjected to forced labor, denial of food as punishment, torture, and public executions. In 2011, Amnesty used satellites to document the apparent expansion of some of these prison camps. Last month, analysis of newly acquired images showed what appeared to be the blurring of lines between a political prison camp (Kwanliso-14) and the surrounding population, raising fears of new movement controls and other restrictions on people living near prison camps.

In January, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, said that North Korea had "one of the worst -- but least understood and reported -- human rights situations in the world." And last month the U.N. Human Rights Council voted to launch a commission of inquiry into "systemic, widespread and grave" human rights violations inside the DPRK, including crimes against humanity. This is a laudatory step -- even if there is little chance the North will cooperate with the inquiry -- but the real question is not whether there are severe human rights violations inside the DPRK. The question is what can be done about them.

For the better part of three decades, the world has focused its attention on ending the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, leaving the human element largely as an afterthought. Those in the know have avidly watched every meter of concrete poured at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, every shovel of dirt removed from nuclear-test-site adits, and every kilometer of highway driven by road-mobile missile systems. Sternly worded letters have been drafted, U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted, a framework agreement struck, cooling towers destroyed, international monitoring schemes devised, a "Leap Day" deal crafted.

Nothing has worked.

And the coercive tactics favored by the international community to dissuade the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons -- trade sanctions, diplomatic isolation, travel restrictions, limits on cultural and educational exchanges, suspension of humanitarian assistance -- have arguably bolstered the legitimacy and power of those in Pyongyang who fear openness more than isolation. The marshals of the Korean People's Army and their precocious leader are masters at playing chess with a board populated by bombast, infantry divisions, artillery pieces, Scud missiles, and nukes.

The world needs to change the pieces and stop playing the DPRK's game.

The leaders of the DPRK are not motivated by a love of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, but by their quest for security and power. To persuade them to abandon their nuclear weapons, the voices of the North Korean people, especially elites in Pyongyang, will be more powerful than those of foreigners. We can't be certain what North Koreans make of their nation's circumstances, because there is no independent domestic media, no known opposition political parties, no independent civil society, and criticism of the government can lead to imprisonment. But we know that the government makes extraordinary efforts to prevent its people from learning the truth about the failures of their economy and the successes of the DPRK's neighbors. By focusing its attention on the human dimension of the North Korean challenge, the world can gradually change the attitudes of the elites and thereby bring pressure on the leadership to see their nuclear program as a liability rather than an asset.

The DPRK's leaders will not be easily swayed. The Obama administration has held up Myanmar as an example -- change course, and the United States will be your friend. But viewed from Pyongyang, the Libya case study remains far more persuasive than the example of Myanmar, no matter how gussied up. North Korea's leaders believe that Muammar al-Qaddafi's decision to abandon his nuclear program allowed the subsequent overthrow of his government.

The Obama administration's approach has come to be known as "strategic patience." I have learned over 24 years of dealing with the DPRK that "wise and masterly inactivity" can sometimes be an effective tactic. Right now, for instance, the first order of business is to defuse the current crisis by avoiding tit-for-tat escalations, restoring North-South cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and reiterating offers of dialogue. These steps require only patience.

But inactivity, however masterful, must eventually give way to action. The smart choice on the Korean Peninsula is to engage Pyongyang with the goal of improving human rights, especially access to information. That's how we will change the dynamic that has driven us from crisis to crisis -- and ultimately resolve the nuclear issue.

It's worked before. The 1975 Helsinki Accords and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that they created promoted reconciliation among former adversaries and, ultimately, the end of the Cold War. The Helsinki process established people-to-people channels of communication and cooperation between East and West, with a heavy focus on human rights and exchanges. As Korea expert Andrei Lankov has pointed out, contrary to the expectations of the skeptics, those channels, over time, reshaped public opinion in the Soviet Union, encouraging a process of opening up and reform.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye has proposed a Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative to replace or augment the defunct Six Party Talks on denuclearization. It is a worthy idea. If embraced by China, Russia, and the United States, a Helsinki-style peace mechanism could be established with the immediate goal of expanding contacts at all levels of North Korean society and enhancing the access of the North Korean people, especially elites, to reliable sources of information. Truth is a powerful antidote for fear and repression. Governments and NGOs should address the nutritional and public health needs of North Korea's malnourished and sick children, and the international community should press for every North Korean prisoner to have not just humane living conditions, but justice.

The North Korean people are smart, hard-working, and ambitious, but they cannot grasp a future obscured by the smoke of Musudan missile launches or hidden by the barriers of international isolation. Putting human rights first, and doing so through a regional mechanism that fosters openness, should be an alternative to the policies that have failed for so many years to resolve to conflict on the Korean Peninsula.