A
Better Approach Towards North Korea
Jeffrey
Sachs, Director, Earth Institute at Columbia University; Author, 'The Price of
Civilization' 04/15/2013
In
2003, Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi agreed with the US and Europe to end his
pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons in order to normalize relations with
the West. Eight years later, NATO abetted his overthrow and murder. Now we are
asking North Korea to end its nuclear program as we once asked of Qaddafi.
North Korea's leaders must be wondering what would await them if they agree.
US foreign policy is based on the idea that the US can dictate who rules and
who does not, and which countries can keep nuclear weapons and which cannot. Moreover, the US Government reserves the right to change its opinion on these matters.
It supported Qaddafi until it did not. It supported Saddam until it did not; it
supported Iran's Mohammad Mossadegh in the early 1950s until it joined the UK
in toppling him; and it supported Panama's Manuel Noriega until it toppled him.
This list goes on, and North Korean leaders must suspect that they are next.
There
is a huge problem with this strategy. Not only does it sow enormous discord and
violence around the world. It also sows a deep distrust by other countries of
US intentions and policies, and contributes to an arms race by at least some of
these countries. Iran and North Korea pursue nuclear programs in part to
ward off the kind of regime change that they've seen other non-nuclear
opponents suffer at the hands of the US.
America
continues in the regime-change business to this day. The current target is Syrian
leader Bashar al-Assad, whom we've declared, "must go." He's a
very nasty guy, no doubt, like many others around the world. Yet by declaring
that Assad must go, the US and Europe contributes to an escalation of
bloodletting as the Assad regime brutally battles a rebellion stoked by Western
arms and US intentions to topple Assad.
(DO
– so, when it comes to Syria, is the author calling for Obama to act on the
principle of non-intervention?)
In
fact, America's real target is not even Assad, but Assad's main backer, Iran.
Americans are trying to topple Assad mainly to staunch Iran's regional
influence in Syria and Lebanon. We claim we are tightening the noose on Assad,
but in fact we are abetting the devastation of Syria itself as the result of a
proxy war with Iran.
Through
decades of practice, regime change comes naturally to the US Government and
especially to the CIA, which carries out much of the operational support. Yet
the US Government fails time and again to factor in the serious and sustained
blowback that inevitably follows our overthrow of foreign governments.
Consider, for example, the history of our current confrontation with Iran.
In
1953, the US and UK conspired to overthrow Iran's democratically elected Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had committed to the grievous sin of believing
that Iran's oil belonged to Iran rather than to Britain and the US. Mossadegh
was brought down by the CIA and MI6 and replaced by the despotic Shah of Iran,
who governed ruthlessly with US backing until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
In light of this history, Iran's current pursuit of nuclear-weapons capability
is far more understandable.
Iran
also has three not so friendly nuclear neighbors - Israel, India, and
Pakistan - all of which are allied with the US despite their
failure to sign, ratify, or honor the terms of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Being a nuclear power is based on, well, power, not
on international law. That the US demands that this or that state must
denuclearize while others flout the treaty is an assertion of power, not
principle. Nor are such demands likely to be heeded by Iran, given their
plausible fear that unilateral disarmament would be met not by peace with the
US, but by US attempts to destabilize the regime.
Which
brings us back to North Korea. Secretary of State John Kerry is onto something
when he broaches the idea of opening negotiations with North Korea. Every
experienced observer in the world notes that North Korea's erratic behavior
is mainly an attempt to be heard, acknowledged, and respected. As Kim
Jong-un told basketball star Dennis Rodman, he simply wants Obama to call him,
"because if we can talk, we can work this out."
But
Kerry then went on this weekend to make the usual US demands. There will be no
phone call until North Korea first pledges to denuclearize. In other words: surrender
first and we'll talk afterwards.
I
am reminded of one of John F. Kennedy's most famous admonitions: "And
above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert
those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a
humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the
nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy -- or of a
collective death-wish for the world."
If
we act calmly and sensibly, we can easily defuse the current crisis. North
Korea is looking for respect, not war. It's time to talk, to lower the heat,
and to avoid a confrontation or the imposition of impossible or humiliating
demands. And we need to remember, if we are to induce good behavior among others,
we will have to stop our bad habit of killing them afterward.
