Showing posts with label international criminal law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international criminal law. Show all posts

Frakt on Direct Participation as a War Crime (- does DPH constitute (international) war crime?)


Frakt on Direct Participation as a War Crime  (- does DPH constitute (international) war crime?)  
by Kevin Jon Heller  July 18th, 2012

I want to call readers’ attention to David Frakt’s excellent essay on direct participation in hostilities as a war crime.  Here is the abstract:

This article addresses, in part, the question of what to do with civilian (DPH) direct participants in hostilities who are not killed by opposing armed forces, but are captured. Specifically, the article address the potential criminal prosecution of detained DPHs. The ability to detain provides an opportunity to the detaining power to prosecute the DPH “for an offence arising out of the hostilities.” But is it a crime for someone who does not meet the Geneva Convention requirements for POW status to directly participate in hostilities? In other words, are all DPHs criminals? If so, are they war criminals, or, rather, common domestic criminals? The prevailing international view is that direct participation in hositilities in and of itself is not a war crime. Contrary to the prevailing international view, the United States has attempted, through the military commissions of Guantánamo, to treat direct participation in hostilities as a war crime. This article examines that effort, including the prosecutions of David Hicks and Omar Khadr, and the failed prosecution of Mohammed Jawad for alleged direct participation in hostilities. The article concludes that America’s effort to convert all fighting against the U.S. by unprivileged enemy belligerents into a war crime has been a failure.

I’ve spent a great deal of time over the years criticizing the US government for attempting to invent war crimes — and criticizing courts for all too often permitting those attempts to succeed.  Frakt’s essay addresses one of the government’s rare failures, and it is a model of clarity, fairness, and analytic precision.  I was particularly struck by the force of his conclusion that “[i]n the future, if the United States seeks to create new customary international law, it should focus on criminalizing acts that are of greater global concern than routine attacks on U.S. troops.”  That seems like very good advice indeed.

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John C. Dehn
 the U.S. government is currently charging this offense and argues that participation in hostilities without the combatant’s privilege is an American, domestic common-law-of-war offense rather than an “international” war crime? 
Frakt takes as given a different view of the subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions (as encompassing only “international” war crimes) than is currently being asserted by the government prosecutors (that it also includes violations of international humanitarian law historically treated as crimes in the U.S. “common law of war”). 

David Frakt
You are absolutely correct that the U.S. is now treating direct participation in hostilities as a common law domestic war crime rather than as an international war crime.  I view the Law of War as a body of international law (IHL)
The primary vehicle for prosecuting direct participation in hostilities has been the offense of “murder in violation of the law of war” in the Military Commissions Act.  According to the latest version of the manual for military commissions, in order to commit murder in violation of the law of war, one need not actually violate the international law of war.
The shift from treating this offense as an international war crime to a common law domestic war crime was motivated by a desire to protect CIA drone operators from charges that they are violating the law of war as civilians directly participating in hostilities. 

John C. Dehn
“The shift from treating this offense as an international war crime to a common law domestic war crime was motivated by a desire to protect CIA drone operators from charges that they are violating the law of war as civilians directly participating in hostilities.”
But I also suspect that it was in part a response to the reality that this issue is unsettled in international law.

As I have stated numerous times here and elsewhere, there were “war crimes” before the Nuremberg IMT, but there were no “international war crimes” as that term is today understood (crimes defined as such by international law).

we are not only discussing civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.  We are also discussing individuals possessed of a continuous combat function for a non-state party to an armed conflict.

Combatant immunity for acts of war is derivative of a state’s sovereign immunity.  As such, it is not available to members of a non-state organized armed group engaged in armed conflict.  Such individuals may legitimately be targeted, and have historically been potentially subject to prosecution for their acts of violence, even those forming a part of the hostilities of an armed conflict that would be immunized if engaged in by a member of a state’s armed forces.

David Frakt
The other reason they changed the commentary describing the offense may have been the rejection by the military judges at Guantanamo of the government’s theory of the offense of murder in violation of the law of war in the Hamdan, Jawad and al Bahlul cases

Dwayne
The notion that a civilian participating directly in hostilities could, in and of itself, be a war crime, is plainly ludicrous.
If an American person woke up one morning and found the USA had been invaded by China, is there seriously an academic in the entire USA who would call him a _war criminal_ for engaging in a guerilla defence of his homeland?

John C. Dehn
The Geneva Conventions account for the spontaneous taking up of arms by the civilian population in immediate response to an imminent or actual invasion by granting prisoner of war status to those who do so.  However, it does not and should not apply to Al Qaeda or its off-shoots for what I would think are obvious reasons, even if those groups recruit from an effected civilian population.

Nuremberg, Tribunals and 'Justice And The Enemy' - Shawcross


Talk Of The Nation 03:00 PM EST, January 11, 2012 Wednesday
Nuremberg, Tribunals and 'Justice And The Enemy'
Hartley Shawcross, William Shawcross

NEAL CONAN:
Toward the end of the Second World War, the Allies faced questions about what to do with senior Nazis. The United States proposed a military commission. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin agreed that the grand criminals ought to face trial before they were shot.  British Prime Minister Winston Churchill preferred summary justice, but he lost office as the war ended.  

The new Labour government appointed Sir Hartley Shawcross as chief British prosecutor. He delivered his opening statement at Nuremberg on November 20, 1945.

HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: And so we believe that this tribunal, acting with complete and judicial objectivity, will provide a contemporary touchstone, an authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn for truth and future politicians for warning.  
NEAL CONAN: A new book, "Justice and the Enemy," looks to Nuremberg, to the Tokyo trials, and to more recent precedents as we approach the start of the trial of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

What does the history of war crimes trials tell us about how to proceed against the mass murderers of al-Qaida?
journalist and author William Shawcross joins us from our bureau in New York. The name is no coincidence. He's the son of the chief British prosecutor at Nuremberg. His new book is "Justice and the Enemy: Nuremberg, 9/11, and the Trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed."

NEAL CONAN: And are there more differences between these two cases or more similarities? 
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Well, there are a lot of similarities. although Nuremberg was a success, it was sometimes denounced as victor's justice. I think it was not that. It was a success and it dealt, as Roosevelt and Truman wanted to do, in a judicial and proper manner with the appalling criminals of the Nazi regime who survived the end of the war and were captured.

Nonetheless, there were restrictions on their defendants - on those defendants' rights. And in all the debate about Guantanamo and military justice in the United States today, I think it's worth making the point that any Nazi in the dark at Nuremberg who was suddenly transported by time machine to Guantanamo would be astonished at the privileges and the access to human rights lawyers and the amazing efforts that were made on his behalf by the military defendants - the defense lawyers in Guantanamo. None of that existed in Nuremberg.

It was a fair trial, but the defense lawyers were all Nazi lawyers who were seconded by the occupying authorities, the British and the Americans and the Russians and the French. But the law has gone a long ways since then. And the Guantanamo defendants, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the others, will have much more chance of their day in court than the Nazis did. 

NEAL CONAN: Yet you pointed out that one of the key elements of a trial is that should a defendant be found not guilty, he gets to go free. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: That's right. And Justice Jackson, who is one of the heroes of my book, if you like, who is the Supreme Court justice who was asked by Roosevelt and then after Roosevelt's death by Truman to become the chief American prosecutor, said: You must never put a man on trial unless you are prepared to see him walk free.

And rather oddly, both Attorney General Eric Holder and President Obama have said in the last three years, somewhat injudiciously, I feel, that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will never walk free, that he will be found guilty.

And there's no doubt in my mind that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a vicious, murderous thug who should be found guilty. But that is for the courts to decide. And I have absolute confidence that the court in Guantanamo, as it is now constituted, will provide a very fair trial for him and his al-Qaida cohorts. 

NEAL CONAN: Yet it's been made clear if he should, for whatever reason, be found not guilty, if evidence were not allowed into court for whatever reason, he would not be set free. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: That is a predicament for the U.S. government. And I think it was a mistake for senior U.S. government officials to say that whatever happened, he would not be set free. And it is indeed a predicament.
But I think the evidence is overwhelming that he will be found guilty. And so he, in my view - I'm not a lawyer, I'm a layman, but I've studied this case and others - I think he should be found guilty and I'm confident that under American law he will be.
And the chief American prosecutor - Robert Jackson's successor, if you like - is a remarkable American officer, General Mark Martins, who until recently has been administering the law of - the rule of law campaign in Afghanistan, trying to bring law through Afghan judges and prosecutors and defenders to Afghanistan - to villages in Afghanistan throughout the area controlled by the United States.
And he's a very fine man. And he's now been appointed chief prosecutor, as I say, direct successor to Justice Robert Jackson. It's a remarkable position to be in.
And I heard, actually, a lecture he gave in New York last week - last night - in which he spoke very eloquently to the New York Bar Association about the way in which justice will be done and be seen to be done in Guantanamo. And I think that he's a very fine prosecutor and that one can have confidence that in his hands the prosecutions will be carried out both robustly and judiciously and fairly. 

NEAL CONAN: You mentioned a hypothetical time machine that would whisk those Nazi defendants from Nuremberg to Guantanamo. One thing they would also be astonished by is the amount of time that has passed. That trial in Nuremberg started in the same year the war ended. It happens to be, just as a coincidence, 10 years to the day since the first prisoners arrived at Guantanamo. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: You're absolutely right. And justice delayed is often said to be justice denied. And it has been a very long time, too long a time. That is correct. And part of it is because of the way in which the first military courts set up by the Bush administration were overturned by the Supreme Court in the famous case of Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld. And then the 2006 act was also brought into - reformed military commissions were brought and question by another Supreme Court judgment.

And then when Obama came into office he originally said we will have no military commissions, no military trials whatsoever. And he had - throughout his time as senator and as campaigning for the presidency, he had condemned much of the Bush administration's policies during the war on terror, including the use of military tribunals.

Now, however, he has come to the same position as President Bush on most of these issues and forced to accept the reality of military commissions in some cases. Not in all. Most of the terrorist cases will probably still be carried out in federal courts, but there will be some cases - like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed - which the administration has decided - rightly I think - should be conducted in military commissions. 

NEAL CONAN: How do they make that decision, who goes to federal court and all the rights guaranteed there, and who goes to a military court with slightly fewer rights? 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Well, very slightly fewer, actually. And the important thing about the military courts now is that anyone convicted in a military court in Guantanamo will have the right of appeal right up to the Supreme Court. So he has basically the same rights of appeal as anyone convicted in a federal court. So that I think is a vastly important safeguard.   In Nuremberg, there were no rights of appeal whatsoever. The judgment of the tribunal was final.

One should point out that in Nuremberg, of the 22 people who were on trial, I think it was 14 were sentenced to death, six or seven were given long imprisonments, and two or three were released.  So justice, I think, was done fairly in Nuremberg, and I'm sure it'll be done here the same. 

But the question you raise is a very interesting one - who will go to a military commission and who will go to a federal court. And Attorney General Holder made a rather bizarre, I thought, suggestion two years ago that anyone who had attacked, for example, the U.S. military abroad, like - as in the case of the USS Cole, the naval vessel which was blown up in Aden Harbor by an al-Qaida bomb and 19 U.S. sailors were killed - they would go the military court.
But if terrorists attacked within the United States, killing civilians, they would go to a civilian court, a federal court, which seemed to me to be slightly bizarre.

It encourages terrorists to attack civilians rather than military installations. 

Simeon is on the line with us from Rochester, New York. 
SIMEON: Oh, hello. 
NEAL CONAN: You're on the air. Go ahead, please. 
SIMEON: Hi. I was thinking that perhaps one of the  most perhaps interesting paradigms for understanding what you're talking about is the decision of the Israeli government to bring Adolph Eichmann to trial in the early 1960s, who was the architect of the Final Solution, rather than allowing him to be executed.
And it seems that that was a tremendous moral victory. It helped educate the rest of the world in terms of the horrors of the Holocaust. And it really vindicated the rule of law. So perhaps that might be a useful precedent. 
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: He was executed, but I think you're absolutely right that the Eichmann trial was a very important one and it did establish even more of the documentary evidence against the Nazis.
One should note in that context that the Nuremberg trial itself had produced massive amounts of evidence. The Nazis had been extraordinarily, absurdly fanatical book bureaucrats, as well as everything else, and they kept extensive records of their crimes.
And Justice Jackson, when he arrived in Paris a few months after the VE Day in the summer of 1945, was astonished by the amount of material that the U.S. Army had already gathered in Paris to reveal the Nazi war crimes. And that material has been essential, ever since 1945, in helping historians form the history of the Nazi regime from the 1930s to 1945. 

NEAL CONAN: "The Man in the Glass Booth," that's the Eichmann trial, where we first heard the phrase, from Hannah Arendt, about the banality of evil. 
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: That's correct. Yes. And, I mean, it was a famous book. There's another book actually, which I discovered while I was doing this research for mine. A rather remarkable little novella by a Jewish - German Jewish British philosopher called George Steiner, who wrote in the late 1960s.
Well, actually, no, I'm sorry. It was in 1981. he wrote a little book called, "The Portage to San Cristobel of A.H," meaning Adolf Hitler, which is a conceit in which Nazi - anti-Nazi Israeli hunters find Hitler deep in the South American jungle and bring him out. And they put him on trial in the jungle and Hitler makes an extraordinary speech in his own defense. 

NEAL CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. I'm Neal Conan. 
On a trip to Cambodia in 1980, William Shawcross visited what he calls the grim symbol of mass murder in the 20th century - a mass grave. For Shawcross, the sight recalled for him the voice of his father at Nuremberg, reading the diary of a German engineer that recounted in horrific detail the sight where Jewish victims were shot in a Ukrainian town. You can read more from that diary entry and an excerpt at our website.
Throughout his book "Justice and the Enemy," Shawcross considers precedents like Nuremberg and Cambodia to look for lessons to inform the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed coming up in a few months time. 
. 
Just before the break you were talking about that extraordinary speech Adolf Hitler gives in that fictional book. As it turned out, it was Hermann Goring, the former head of the Luftwaffe, who gave a performance on the stage at Nuremberg, which was just what Winston Churchill was concerned about. And indeed, what we have every reason to expect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will try to do in Guantanamo. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Yes. You're absolutely right. That has been one of the concerns about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that he would be like Goring who dominated the proceedings by the force of his personality at Nuremberg. And Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is said to be a, sort of, equally a master demagogue as well as a mastermind of terror. And it is felt that he will try to dominate the proceedings as well.
It's not clear yet, what his plea will be. Will he plead guilty or will he plead not guilty and refuse to defend himself and ask for immediate execution and martyrdom. There are all sorts of questions that General Mark Martins, the prosecutor, is going to have to deal with, many of which have not yet surfaced even.
And if he does decide to grandstand, he'll have to be controlled by the judges. If he decides to be mute in court and refuse to enter any plea and to defend himself, then I'm sure that the court will insist that his defense, nonetheless, be played out in full. 

NEAL CONAN: Another difference between the military commission in Guantanamo and a civilian trial for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the passage of time, but also if the defense at a trial of anyone in a civilian court said he has been tortured by the prosecution, the case would be thrown out for prosecutorial misconduct. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Well, that's not quite correct. What happened, there was a trial of a man called Ghailani who was implicated in the terrible bombings - the al-Qaida bombings of U.S. embassies in east Africa in 1998. And his trial took place last year in Manhattan. And he had been harshly interrogated.

And the judge - Judge Kaplan - in the case, said all the fruits of the poisonous tree - by which he meant the information that had come out as a result of his harsh interrogation - will not allowed in this case. And it was not allowed.
And nonetheless, he was, even in a federal court, convicted.  

In the case of - he wasn't convicted of mass murder, as he should've been, I believe, but he was convicted of destroying government buildings, which wasn't very satisfactory, has to be said, to the families of the victims.

Nonetheless, it was a conviction and the judge gave him the maximum sentence, quite rightly, as a result of it. in the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, General Martins has made clear that he was, as we all know, he was subjected to enhanced interrogation...

NEAL CONAN: Waterboarding, yeah.
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: And he was one of the three al-Qaida people who was waterboarded...
NEAL CONAN: That we know of.

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: ...during the Bush administration. We know that. And he produced a lot of information. He sort of told - he became a sort of instructor, apparently, to the CIA, as a result of this enhanced interrogation - which many senior officials have said led to the defanging of many al-Qaida plots and eventually helped to track down bin Laden.

Anyhow, General Martins has made absolutely clear that none of that information which came out as a result of his waterboarding will be allowed in court. And all the - the defense will have to rely upon information derived independently and nothing to do with that enhanced interrogation. 

NEAL CONAN: Let's get another caller in. This is Jack. And Jack's on the line from Nashville. 
JACK: Yeah, I would just say that I would not share your guest's certainty that justice and the rule of law will prevail. And I would point to what happened at the end of World War II when Japanese war criminals were not tried because of political reasons, in terms of wanting to utilize them in a future Japanese government. 
NEAL CONAN: Which ones? There were trials in Tokyo. 
JACK: Yeah. Well, in the particular case I'm referring to a movie was made out of it. It was called "Blood Oath" in Australia. And there was a Japanese colonel or general who commanded a POW camp. And he had beheaded a fairly large number of American and Allied POWs - mostly Australians, but some Americans also. And essentially he was given a pass at the end of the war because - and later became a part of the Japanese government. 
NEAL CONAN: I'm not familiar with that case, I have to say, Jack. But, William Shawcross, there were many war crimes trials held, not just in Tokyo, but indeed in the Philippines as well.
 
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: There were. And it's an odd thing, but the Japanese war crimes trials, the Tokyo tribunals, never had the same impact, either in Japan or in - they weren't so successful, I think, as Nuremberg.
And this is partly, perhaps, because in Germany, despite the horrors of Nazis - and there was a - Germany is, after all, one of the most civilized countries in the history of the world. And there was a sort of - there was an agreement to accept the judgment at Nuremberg, a sort of widespread public acceptance of it. And in Japan, that was not the case. And there's no question that the Japanese tribunals were less successful than the Nuremberg. 

JACK: And my questioning, of course, relates to the behavior of our government in choosing to not prosecute some of the war criminals for political reasons, relative to their future designs for building a Japanese government. 
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Well, I don't know the particular case that you're referring to. But I think that the important thing is that both in Japan and in Germany, the United States rule, or occupation, after the war created a - particularly in Germany, but also in Japan - created far better and more democratic societies than either country had ever known. 

NEAL CONAN: Let's see if we can go next to - this is Colin. Colin with us from San Francisco. 
COLIN: Good morning. My concern with the commissions, no matter who the judges are, is that they are still judges, particularly military judges, who are career officers, whose incentives probably are not going to be inclined towards a finding of innocence or not guilty.
This is a problem with legitimacy that seems to be the same problem that the British government had with prosecuting IRA terrorists in the 1980s, that the suspects did not have the right to a jury trial. Are we really going to have a perception of legitimacy to the whole proceedings if detainees do not have the same right to a jury trial that U.S. citizens enjoy? 

NEAL CONAN: In Northern Ireland, Williams Shawcross, the concern was that juries would be intimidated by the Irish Republican Army, among others, and thus the special courts that were set up there. But they did, indeed, come in for considerable criticism. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: They did. And I think that the British government, in effect, discontinued them. In the case of these trials in Guantanamo, the defense lawyers and the judges are military men, anyone convicted there will still have the right of appeal through the federal criminal civil process. that is a great safeguard.
in all the military trials that have taken place so far since 9/11, the defense lawyers assigned to the terrorists on trial have all been extremely diligent on behalf of their clients.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court judgments that were reached against the government in the middle part of the last decade after 9/11, were all forced - taken all the way to the court, if you like, by military defense lawyers. 

NEAL CONAN: Colin, thanks very much. 

(Ex parte Quirin)
in fact, military commissions where the trials were held completely in secret. 

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Absolutely. .. these eight Nazi saboteurs, all of whom who'd lived in the United States in the 1930s and then gone back to Germany. And two of them were American citizens. They were landed by submarine on the coast of Long Island and Florida in 1942, and they were rounded up pretty quickly. Two of them actually surrendered and gave information on the others. But Roosevelt was absolutely furious and demanded a military commission and basically demanded execution.
He said to his attorney general, Francis Biddle, he said I want one thing clearly understood, Francis. I won't give them up. I won't hand them over to any U.S. marshal aimed with a writ of habeas corpus. Understand?

but the Supreme Court judge, the special military commission set up to try them to be legal, and they were tried and found guilty very quickly. And of eight, six were executed, and the two who had surrendered and turned in the others were given long sentences.

…
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: I think that the civilian courts have shown themselves to be able to deal with most of these cases now. And it has been difficult. There's - one of the cases that I quoted just now, Gailani, it was nearly lost.  That government's case was nearly lost because one recalcitrant juror held out. He was called the famous phrase from movies and everything else, of a rogue juror. And one juror on that - in that jury wanted to find him, Gailani, not guilty on every charge.

And in the end, the compromise was that he was not - he was found not guilty of murdering several hundred people - mostly Africans it has to be said, not American citizens - who were killed in the bomb blasts in Kenya and Tanzania, but found guilty only of blowing up government - damaging government buildings, which is a bit of an absurd situation. And I think in the military court, he probably - though one doesn't know this - had been found guilty of the real crime that he was involved in, which was mass murder.

….
DONALD: I wonder if your author could possibly connect the dots and I'll just reference, I'll, I guess, channel an old cliche that justice is now written by the winners. And I'm referring - and I told your screener about a wonderful volume by John Maynard Keynes called "The Consequences of the Peace," about how the German terms of surrender in World War I literally led to Hitler's rise. By the same logic - and I'm playing devil's advocate here - Noam Chomsky has referenced this many times, the brutality of despotic regimes supported by us for oil and how you literally view justice in that context. Thanks. I'll take my answer off the air.

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Well, that's a difficult question. I'm not a great admirer of Noam Chomsky. I think his anti-Americanism is frankly grotesque. I have a very different view. I think the United States, despite as you say the support that we give you and we, the British, and all of Western Europe and all of the whole democratic world give to regimes like the Saudi regime because we are dependent upon oil, I, nonetheless, I think the United States has done immense good in the world in the last century.
Indeed, in 1945, you could say that the U.S. Army was the greatest human rights organization that the world had ever seen. It did release millions of people from tyranny and slavery. And I think that the U.S. Army continues to do that, and millions of people all over the world since 1945 have been freed by the U.S. Army and the blood and treasure spilt by Americans. And I think it's a tribute, which is not adequately and often enough pay to the United States.
It's very fashionable in the rest of the world to criticize America for its mistakes, which, of course, have been made and there were mistakes made following 9/11. But - there's no question about that. But there is no greater guarantee of peace and progress in the world than the United States, in my view.

NEAL CONAN: William Shawcross, let me ask you a question that might seem a little bit off the point. You first came to attention with a wonderful book called "Sideshow," about the war in Cambodia conducted by the United States, including the so-called secret bombing, B-52 carpet bombing of...
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Areas of Cambodia.
NEAL CONAN: but that helped lead to the rise of Khmer Rouge who then went on to commit terrible atrocities in Cambodia. Nevertheless, we had Henry Kissinger on this program talking about his most recent book a few months ago. A listener called him on that.
And he said, why is this different from what President Obama is doing now with drone attacks in Pakistan? And you might argue a difference of scale, a difference of greater accuracy in the case of the drones. But as a matter of principle, what's the difference?
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: Well, I think that's a really important question. And if you - President Bush was hated throughout the world and attacked by Senator Obama and others on the left for not only enhanced interrogation but for - almost all of the policies in the war on terror. And since Obama came to power, he has - and the promise to close down Guantanamo, which he's not done, and promised to stop military trials, which he has not done, he has adopted almost all of Bush's policies, except he doesn't detain suspects and interrogate them harshly or properly. He kills them by drones.
And this is an extraordinary difference. And it's astonishing to me that until recently there has been so little protest about it. I'm quite sure that most of the people whom are targeted by drones are terrorists plotting appalling atrocities in the wilds of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and they can't be reached any other way.
I don't have a terribly - I don't believe that the use of drones is wrong per se, but I do believe that if President Bush had used drones to kill terrorists and terrorist suspects, and inevitably bystanders with the same enthusiasm that President Obama has shown, he would - it would not have been tolerable either to the American opinion-formers of The New York Times and other great papers or within Europe itself. And it seems to me the tolerance that has been extended to President Obama on this - over this policy is - which would certainly not have been extended to President Bush, is an extraordinary example of how personality and political largesse can define people's perceptions of morality.

Antonio Cassese; helped develop law on war crimes


The International Herald Tribune, October 25, 2011 Tuesday, BY MARLISE SIMONS

Antonio Cassese; helped develop law on war crimes
PARIS

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DO- he would have been the chief architect of another area—terrorism. The STL could have produced another piece of a breath-taking decision like the one in Tadic case.      
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He was often described as the chief architect of modern international criminal justice.

Antonio Cassese, who helped found two international war-crimes tribunals and who was often described as the chief architect of modern international criminal justice, died on Saturday at his home in Florence. He was 74.

He had had leukemia. After receiving the diagnosis some years ago, he underwent taxing treatments but worked ever harder, staying late in his office, writing on weekends and helping students.

In books, law journals and decisions from the bench, Mr. Cassese expanded the body of international law that had lain mostly dormant since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II.

He taught law at the University of Florence, the European University Institute and the University of Oxford. In 1993, he became the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, a court established by the United Nations to deal with war crimes in the Balkans in the 1990s.

He proved to be something of a maverick among normally discreet justices. Invariably affable but outspoken, he prodded fellow lawyers and Western governments into providing more support for the fledgling tribunal. And he played a central role in defining rules that would guide it and that have since served as a model for other tribunals and courts.

Among his early decisions, seen as controversial at the time but widely accepted since, were several that changed basic precepts of international criminal law. One was that war crimes could be punished not only in wars between nations, but also in conflicts within a particular country. In another, he wrote that even if there was no war going on, massacres, torture and other atrocities committed by governments or groups could be found to be crimes against humanity and punished accordingly.

''Perhaps more than any other person, Antonio Cassese was both the visionary and the architect of international criminal justice,'' said Theodor Meron, an American judge who will take over next month as president of the Yugoslavia tribunal.

Most recently, Mr. Cassese was president of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, created by the United Nations to try those accused of killing Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others. He resigned as president this month as his health failed but stayed on as a judge.

As an independent expert, he led the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur and reviewed the judicial efficiency of the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Over the years, Mr. Cassese became a familiar figure in The Hague, where several international courts are based. He was often seen riding his bicycle, and he was popular with colleagues for his wit and personal modesty, as well as his erudition.

Claude Jorda, a former judge from France at the Yugoslavia tribunal, said that when Mr. Cassese arrived in The Hague, he was a great legal scholar with no idea what it meant to be a judge. ''But he did know that the new tribunal was the one and perhaps only chance to make international justice work,'' Judge Jorda said. ''Failure was unthinkable to him.''

Mr. Cassese, who was born on Jan. 1, 1937, in Atripalda, Italy, had hoped to study philosophy or sociology. He said his father, whom he once described as an impecunious civil servant, urged him to pursue a more secure career. He chose law; a bonus was that he was offered free board and lodging at the University of Pisa if he did so.

In an essay called ''Soliloquy,'' a personal history, he wrote that he initially found it difficult to learn the hard discipline and the rigorous logic of law. But eventually he became known for scholarly work ranging from numerous essays to books including ''The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger,'' based on his conversations with a Dutch judge, B.V.A. Roling.

Mr. Cassese won many awards for his work, including the 2009 Erasmus Prize in the Netherlands. He used the prize money to help law students publish their papers. He was editor in chief of The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, a reference work, and founded The Journal of International Criminal Justice, which became a prestigious forum for debate.

Mr. Cassese insisted on the need for continuous debate because international law was gradually emerging, and as such, reflecting the common conscience of mankind. But he said it was vital to remain skeptical about harsh laws. ''Laws may and should be improved if they are not up to reality,'' he said frequently.

To remind himself, he kept these words from Bertolt Brecht, the German playwright and poet, on his office wall in The Hague: ''I am by nature a man who is difficult to control. I reject with outrage any authority that does not rest on my respect. And I regard laws only as provisional and changeable proposals for regulating human intercourse.''

Patricia M. Wald, a former U.S. judge who also served on the Yugoslavia tribunal, said, ''There are moments in history when one individual can make a great difference, and he was such a man.''


The former President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Judge Antonio Cassese, has died after a long fight with cancer. He passed away peacefully at home in Florence on Saturday 22 October 2011. He was 74.

Judge Cassese was professor of international law at the University of Florence from 1975 until 2008. Between 1987 and 1993 he was professor of law at the European University Institute. Judge Cassese was also a visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University (1979-80). He was a member of the Institut de Droit International and former president of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture

An enthusiastic proponent of self-determination and human rights throughout his whole life, Judge Cassese wrote extensively on all aspects of international law, with a particular focus on international criminal law. He was the recipient of many honorary degrees and awards. Read the full press release about the death of Judge Cassese



More on the International Law of Surrender

http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2011/05/more-on-the-international-law-of-surrender
May 20, 2011 | Charli Carpenter


I have recently taken issue with State Department Harold Koh’s characterization of the law of surrender and questioned Kenneth Anderson’s claim that it is correct.

In a personal exhange, Anderson refers me to a book entitled The Contemporary Law of Targeting, pp. 83-92 – I’m sure it’s an absolutely brilliant read but since it costs almost $150 I can as of now neither confirm nor deny Ken’s claim that it supports his argument.

More helpfully to those of us without blogging-research-accounts, Stephanie Carvinpoints me to Article 41 of Additional Protocol I which reads as follows:

Art 41. Safeguard of an enemy hors de combat

1. A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.

2. A person is hors de combat if:
(a) he is in the power of an adverse Party;
(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or
(c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself;

provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.

Contrast this to what Harold Koh wrote:

… The laws of armed conflict require acceptance of a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated by the surrendering party and received by the opposing force, under circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing force to accept that offer of surrender. But where that is not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force against an enemy belligerent, under the circumstances presented here.

I still see a disconnect here. I think Koh is spot on until he gets to the clause “under circumstances where it is feasible” because he has already communicated the contingent assumption that a genuine surrender occurs and US troops know it occurred, so the “feasible conditions” criteria he is describing seem to imply that even at that point US troops have discretion. Upon my reading of the Geneva Conventions this is false.

Now let me point out that the US is not a signatory to AP1 (though I believe it is considered customary law) so let’s look at the Hague Convention of 1907 (Article 23) in which:

It is especially forbidden
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;…

That’s right, failing to accept an unconditional surrender from an unarmed enemy ranks right up there with assassination and the use of chemical weapons. No ifs, ands or buts about it.

I’m not saying this was the case in Abbottabad. But I am saying that Koh either doesn’t understand the law on surrender, or wants to misinform us about it.


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http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2011/05/harold-koh-killing-obl-was-legal-because-we-said-drone-warfare-was-legal-last-year-though-we-didnt-use-drones-oh-and-you-only-have-to-accept-surrender-if-you-feel-like-it

Harold Koh: Killing OBL Was Legal Because We Said Drone Warfare Was Legal Last Year, Though We Didn’t Use Drones… Oh, and You Only Have to Accept Surrender When You Feel Like It Judge It “Feasible.”



May 19, 2011 | Charli Carpenter

Like Robert Haddick, though for different reasons, I was glad to see a State Department spokesperson publicly issue the legal justification for the manner in which the OBL raid was carried out.* Also as a blogger, I was delighted to see the explanation take the form of a much-trumpeted guest post at Opinio Juris.

Slightly disappointed, however, at the content of the post, posted earlier today.

To begin with, Harold Koh focuses solely on jus in bello concerns, although important legal questions were about whether it was legal to conduct the raid on Pakistani soil. I can imagine a number of ways you could argue that case, any of which would have been fascinating from a norm development perspective, so I’m disappointed the State Department is so opaque on this.

Koh also spends over half the post simply pasting in his comments on drone warfare last year – interesting since drones weren’t even used for this operation. It makes some sense, however, given that the real issue with drones isn’t the drones – it’s targeted killings.

The most interesting part of the argument, however, and what we should watch for commentary on in the next few days, is Koh’s comments on the law of surrender – addressing the conditions under which bin Laden would have been captured instead of killed. Here is what he writes:

Consistent with the laws of armed conflict and U.S. military doctrine, the U.S. forces were prepared to capture bin Laden if he had surrendered in a way that they could safely accept. The laws of armed conflict require acceptance of a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated by the surrendering party and received by the opposing force, under circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing force to accept that offer of surrender [my emphasis]. But where that is not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force against an enemy belligerent, under the circumstances presented here.

Now, I do not understand the law of surrender perfectly, and when I went to look it up I had a hard time identifying the appropriate clauses, though I’ll update this post as soon as I hear back from people trained in the nuances of Hague and Geneva law. (Help, anyone?) But in my non-lawyer’s understanding the requirement to accept surrender if it is requested is not contingent on any contextual understanding of whether in the judgment of belligerents the circumstances render it ‘feasible’.**

Milbloggers who have commented on the bin Laden raid echo this understanding –here for example is Ghosthawk:

Look, in war, if someone is attempting to surrender, you have a legal and moral obligation to accept that surrender.

Ken Anderson, on the other hand, who is actually a lawyer, tells us at Volokh Conspiracy that Koh’s articulation is entirely consistent with both treaty law and the UCMJ:

This is the international law standard in the laws of war for surrender, and it is the standard applied in operational law by US JAG in operations in Afghanistan on a regular basis — in conventional operations as well as special operations. I had some fears that, in order to present what was apparently a marvelously clean operation in terms of targeting and collateral damage in its most favorable light, the administration might be tempted to raise the bar on the law of surrender. It is an act in the law of war that is much more fraught and difficult in many circumstances than it might appear. But the Legal Adviser has stated the law as it is, and as it is operationally applied by US forces on a regular basis.

Unfortunately Ken doesn’t point us to the specific provisions in his post, so that we can interpret them for ourselves. I hope to get you more on this as my own understanding improves, and I can’t wait to use this as a case study in Rules of War next year.

The open thread on Koh’s remarks is here.

*(More on the latest details of the raid here. Kavetching about the coverage of raid details here.)

**To be absolutely clear, I am not claiming that bin Laden tried to surrender, or that Seals were required to offer him that option if he didn’t ask for it. I’m saying that hypothetically if he had asked for it, I am unfamiliar with conditions under which it would have been legal for troops to then kill him anyway due to it being “infeasible” to accept his surrender.