DPRK
Deadlock: Implications for the Future of US-Japan Defense Cooperation
By Yuki
Tatsumi Post Published: 09 July 2012 Found in section: Foreign Affairs
(all
talk based on the assumption that the US
policy shifts from dismantlement to containment)
(a brief historical backdrop on “little hope” for renewed Six
Party Talk)
It
has been nearly four years since the Six Party Talks last took place. Since
then, the North Korean nuclear problem has been essentially at a standstill.
While some had hoped for a resumption of the Talks when the United States and
DPRK reached the February 29 Agreement, that hope quickly turned into
disappointment when the North Korean government announced less than three weeks
later its intention to conduct a “satellite launch.” Although the test itself
ended in failure, Pyongyang’s defiance brings about a renewed sense of
frustration, one that is close to despair. North Korea’s provocative behavior
under its new leader Kim Jong Un has dashed any hopes had before the power
succession that the young Kim might be open to negotiating with the West. So
far, there is little hope that North Korea will return to the Six Party
Talks anytime soon.
(growing possibility that North Korea may never give up its
nuclear program, leads the US to (i) strategic patience, (ii) growing
probability of the US policy shift from “dismantlement” to “containment”)
In
fact, the most disturbing development on the North Korean problem since 2008 is
the growing possibility that North Korea may never give up its nuclear program,
no matter how long diplomatic efforts go on. This presents a serious problem
for the United States. On the one hand, upcoming presidential elections in
Washington and Seoul, an anticipated leadership transition in China, and
continuing political uncertainty in Japan all suggest that the next six to
twelve months will not be the best time for diplomacy. In this sense,
“strategic patience”—maintaining pressure on the North by enforcing existing
economic sanctions, sending a clear signal that any provocative behavior would
be promptly met by decisive action, and keeping channels of communication open
while not rushing to enter into negotiations prematurely—may be the best course
of action in the short term. On the other hand, “strategic patience” should not
mean continuing the status quo forever. If North Korea consistently refuses to
return to negotiations (Six Party Talks or otherwise) as it continues to make
progress on its nuclear program, Washington may be forced to change its
declared policy goal vis-à-vis North Korea’s nuclear program from
“dismantlement” to “containment,” acquiescing to Pyongyang’s status as a de
facto nuclear weapons state as long as it does not proliferate. The probability
of such a policy shift by the US will only grow as the current diplomatic
impasse persists.
(The policy shift will have impact on international community
and, more importantly, alliance relations with Japan and South Korea)
Should
the US make such a shift, it would have a devastating impact on the
international community’s effort to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
What is potentially more serious for US security interests in Northeast Asia,
however, is its possible impact on alliance relations with Japan and South
Korea.
(what I mean by a “devastating impact on alliance relations
with Japan and South Korea, is the common goal of an dismantlement of North
Korea’s nuclear program shared by the US, Japan and South Korea will shatter.
The difference in perceiving threat posed by the North will resurface.)
Over
the years, the security threats posed by North Korea—both nuclear and
conventional—have served as a primary driver to facilitate relations between
the US, Japan, and South Korea. In particular, these three countries have long
shared the goal of an eventual complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear
program. Should this overarching goal disappear due to a change in American
policy, the divergence in threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea—which has
existed among the three partners but has not been explicitly demonstrated in
the face of this overarching goal of a nuclear-free North Korea—will likely
resurface, only to cause a strain on trilateral security relations.
(what a US policy shift means to Japan v.
what it means to the US and South Korea.
Japan considers itself as the only potential target for Pyongyang’s
nuclear weapons. The US policy shift
will trigger a strong sense of abandonment and betrayer)
Specifically,
what would such a US policy change mean for Japan? Tokyo has consistently
insisted that it cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea, largely because Japan
considers itself as the only potential target for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons.
From the American perspective, the distance between the continental United
States and North Korea makes Washington more concerned about Pyongyang’s
nuclear and other WMD proliferation, rather than a nuclear attack. Although
South Korea is investing more heavily in improving its military capability to
deal with the WMD threat, Seoul’s primary concern remains the North’s
conventional military capability and short-range missiles. Furthermore, as long
as the two Koreas strive for eventual reunification, many South Koreans believe
that it is inconceivable for the North to target them with its nuclear arsenal.
Therefore, while the United States and South Korea may think that a nuclear
North Korea is not desirable but tolerable, Japan feels a tangible and direct
military threat. This means a US policy of containing a North Korea with a
limited nuclear capability is an unacceptable prescription for Japan, and will
likely to be seen as the US not only sacrificing Tokyo’s acute security
concerns in order to reach a settlement with Pyongyang, but also triggering a
strong sense of abandonment, resentment, and betrayal among the Japanese public
and in the political leadership.
(the
sense of abandonment and betrayer will have adverse
effects, such as (i) undermine the working relationship between the two defense
establishments, (ii) undermine the public’s confidence in America’s commitment
to extend nuclear deterrence)
An
increasing perception of the US abandoning Japan would have a number of adverse
effects. For example, the cooperation between US and Japanese defense officials
as well as the two militaries is today closer than ever—in fact, deepening
defense cooperation between the two militaries is a positive development in the
US-Japan alliance that remains unpublicized. Even when the US-Japan alliance
hit a significant speed bump during the tenure of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama
over the issue of the relocation of Marine Air Station in Futenma, the US military
and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces continued to nurture their working
relationship. The public perception of a diminishing US security commitment to
Japan would create an atmosphere that would significantly undermine the working
relationship between the two defense establishments, despite the fact that the
US would, of course, still be obligated to defend Japan as stipulated by the
Mutual Security Treaty. It would also undermine the public’s confidence in
America’s commitment to protect Japan by providing extended nuclear deterrence.
In short, a US policy shift away from the dismantlement of North Korea’s
nuclear program could considerably sour attitudes among the Japanese public and
political leadership—two important constituents for maintaining the alliance.
(the erosion of confidence will have adverse regional effect. Japan’s defense buildup has focused on the
capabilities to achieve joint operations with the US military.)
The
erosion of Japanese confidence would be destabilizing for the region as well.
Up to the present, the security threat from North Korea has been driving Japan
to deepen its defense ties with the United States. Japan’s efforts so far have
been focused on acquiring defense capabilities that are useful not only in
shoring up its own capabilities, but also in strengthening cooperation with the
United States. Cooperation on ballistic missile defense is the prime example.
From cooperation on ballistic missile defense, to the decision by the Maritime
Self-Defense Force to invest in its command and control, communications,
computer, intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) several
years ago, to last year’s decision by the Air Self-Defense Force to acquire the
F-35 to replace its retiring F-4 fighter aircraft, Japan’s post-Cold War
defense buildup has focused on the capabilities and platforms that allow its
Self-Defense Forces to achieve seamless joint operations with the American
military.
(the erosion of confidence will drive Japan to distance itself
from the US and move toward preemptive offensive capabilities.)
Even
if Japan does not go so far as to walk away from the alliance, a US decision to
shift the goal of its North Korea policy from “dismantlement” to “containment”
would likely drive Tokyo to distance itself from the United States. This means,
for example, the revival of the debate in support of Japan acquiring preemptive
offensive capabilities and adjusting its legal framework to allow such an
acquisition in the near term. The sense of abandonment and/or betrayal
vis-à-vis the United States under such a circumstance would result in a
politically permissive environment for Japan to make such a move.
(the erosion of confidence will give ammunition to proponents
of an autonomous defense posture.)
It
would also create space in Japanese policy discourse for proponents of an
autonomous defense posture, many of whom also argue that Japan should acquire
an independent nuclear capability. Today, they are considered marginal, too
extreme, and only representing a small part of the Japanese population. It is
unlikely that Japan would eventually decide to pursue its own nuclear weapons
capability, particularly in view of the intensified nuclear opposition among
the public after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Still, this kind of policy
shift would likely create an environment in which a nuclear option is more
openly discussed and considered. Given Japan’s rising tension with China and
persisting mistrust of South Korea, such developments would only destabilize
the security environment in East Asia. It would not benefit anyone in the
region (maybe with the exception of North Korea), and certainly would not
benefit the United States.
(an assurance that the US’s ultimate goal remains the
denuclearization of North Korea)
One
step to lessen the immediate impact of a US policy shift would be for
Washington to continue to argue that its ultimate goal remains the
denuclearization of North Korea. That would certainly be true although
achieving such an outcome is clearly more difficult. Even if how to get from
here to there remains a challenging open question, this approach would, at
least in the near term, give Japan a sense of reassurance that its security
concerns are being taken into account, which would go a long way in countering
the extreme voices within the country.
(time sensitiveness)
However, policymakers should realize that the
longer the current impasse lasts, the harder it will be to sustain such an
approach, particularly if North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities
continue to grow unchecked. On the other hand, if the US can, through
diplomatic or other means, achieve some progress on the North Korean nuclear
problem—even if only by gradually limiting the growth of Pyongyang’s nuclear
capabilities—then it may be possible to successfully manage its allies’
reactions to this recalibration, avoiding greater mistrust and instability in
East Asia.
