Long Range Missiles Of
Any Kind
BY JEFFREY | 16 MARCH
2012 |
I have previously
noted the importance of reading
very, very closely the utterances of the Great Fitzpatrick.
Another case in point:
On March 15, Mark gave a talk at the Daiwa Foundation Japan House in which he “predicted trouble” over the DPRK
moratorium on long-range missiles launches “because North Korea does not consider space-launch rockets to be
missiles.”
Of course, today, I
awake to learn that KCNA has announced the
DPRK will launch a “space launch” vehicle on Kim Il Sung’s birthday.
I will spare you the
back and forth on whether there is any meaningful difference between a
missile and a “space launch” vehicle –Mark does a wonderful
job of summarizing the minute details in a blog
post at the IISS Voices site. The short version is that there is no important difference from
a testing standpoint. A moratorium on missile launches that includes an
exception for space launches is like a moratorium on nuclear testing that
permits “peaceful nuclear explosions” — pointless.
1.
Should the Obama
Administration have seen this coming? If Fitzpatrick could, why didn’t the
State Department ? Why, by the way, doesn’t Fitzpatrick have a job in
this Administration?
I’d like to hold off
judgement on a thing like this, as someone once said, until all the facts are
in. But it appears this was a
pretty serious foul up.
When the US and DPRK
issued statements about the resumption of talks, their competing statements of
what had been agreed differed in some interesting ways. Both statements,
however, used identical language relating to the moratorium: “The DPRK has
agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches.” (That’s
the US version,
but the DRPK version translates as “The DPRK… agreed to a moratorium on …
long-range missile launches.”)
I went back to look at
the how the Clinton Administration handled the
issue of space launches during
North Korea’s 1999-2003 moratorium, embodied in the 2000
Joint Communique. And there it was: “long-range missile launches of any kind.” [Emphasis added.] The
details matter!
2.
The interesting thing
about the 1999-2003 moratorium was that it evolved. North Korea made a
private pledge in 1999 that eventually became a written commitment in the form
of the 2000
Joint Communique.
In September 1999, the
DPRK privately
committed to a moratorium of one sort or another. North Korea then publicly announced,
” It will not launch a missile while the talks are under way…” The Clinton
Administration then attempted to secure that pledge in an agreed
statement. Unfortunately, the few accounts of the missile negotiations —
by Albright,Samore and Sherman
(well, a long account by Michael
Gordon quoting Sherman)– focus on the Albright visit to Pyongyang,
which followed the 2000 Joint Communique.
Still, the
evolution of “missile” into “long-range missile of any kind” is
tantalizing evidence of intensive discussions about scope. I observe that
US officials usually used the entire phrasein written documents.
It seems clear that it meant something.
Without access to the
negotiating record, it is impossible to conclude that “of any kind” referred
to precisely the problem we face now, but that seems like a good
bet. Regardless, why omit it now? Certainly, departing from the
previous language should have thrown up red flags. I have to ask: Did the
relevant officials not examine the original moratorium? Wouldn’t they have
become suspicious if the North Koreans had objected to adding “of any kind”?
State Department
Spokesperson Toria Nuland released a statement today
that is not encouraging — she appeals to the UN Security Council Resolution
as opposed to the agreed
language. That’s going to get you far. What the hell? Wendy Sherman, Gary Samore and Bob Einhorn are all
senior US officials who were deeply involved in the details of this in
1999-2000. I am just baffled.
Sigh. So, what
to do? We gave the North Koreans a loophole large enough to fly a
Taepodong through and they took it. (Or at least announced their intent to take
it.) The North Koreans have really made a mess here: If the Administration
admits it made a mistake (fat chance), its political opponents will use that
admission as a cudgel against any future agreement its negotiates anywhere in
the world. On the other hand, if the Administration blames North Korea
for walking away from an agreement after a few days, then the Administration
will get killed in Congress over any future deal.
4.
By the way, I observe
that Kim Jong Un has made some very interesting visits of late, including to
the Strategic
Rocket Forces Command. If I am not mistaken, that would be the first
mention of this particular organization. This is my chance to plug the
excellent, North
Korean Leadership Watch.
Also priceless are the
description of the location of the command, as well as the exterior
shots. I bet I can find this place.
Late Update | 9:40 pm
PST 16 March 2012 In a press
briefing today, Toria Nuland claims that the United States “made clear
unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a
deal-breaker.” Of course, a US diplomat can “make clear” the US position
in a negotiation without securing the agreement of the other party.
Here is the relevant
graf:
MS. NULAND: Well, first of all, in the
context of working on the Leap Day agreement, we made clear unequivocally that
we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker. So on the
front end, they understood that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MS. NULAND: We were called yesterday. We
were contacted through the New York channel and advised late in the afternoon
yesterday that they were likely to move forward with this. Obviously, the
individual who took that message was uninstructed at that time, but made very
clear what he considered the implications of this to be. And then just a few
hours afterwards, the statement was released by the North Korean news service,
which was why we felt we had to respond almost immediately. Hence the
notification you got at 4 o’clock in the morning.
So from our perspective, there shouldn’t
have been any doubt in the North Koreans’ mind before this what the
implications will be if they go forward.
I am still waiting to
hear someone from the Obama Administration say “North Korea accepted our
position that space launches are a kind of long-range missile launch.”
[1] here: http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5083/long-range-missiles-of-any-kind
[2] Image: http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tumblr_lxhvfyLpcr1qf71bqo1_500.jpg
[3] reading very, very
closely: http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2475/covert-site-in-iran
[4] announced: http://www.kcna.kp/
[5] blog post: http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/north-korean-rocket-may-shoot-down-leap-day-deal/
[6] US: http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_pr_022912.html
[7] 2000 Joint
Communique: http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html
[8] privately
committed: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/44966876.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Sep+18%2C+1999&author=John+Burgess&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.01&desc=U.S.+Lifts+Key+Facets+Of+N.+Korea+Embargo%3B+Some+Trade%2C+Investment+to+Be+Legal
[9] publicly
announced: http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9909/news09/24.htm
[10] Albright: http://www.madamsecretary.com/
[11] Samore: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92samore.pdf
[12] Michael Gordon: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/06/world/how-politics-sank-accord-on-missiles-with-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
[13] statement: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/185910.htm
[14] Wendy Sherman: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/174931.htm
[15] Gary Samore: http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/147931.htm
[16] Bob Einhorn: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/125079.htm
[17] Strategic Rocket
Forces Command: http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201203/news02/20120302-42ee.html
[18] North Korean
Leadership Watch: http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2012/03/03/kim-jong-un-visits-missile-command/
[19] priceless: http://www.kcna.kp/kcnadata/kor/photo/2012/3/311339-7.jpg
[20] meme: http://www.funnyordie.com/slideshows/02af4e01b0/10-funniest-examples-of-the-hungry-kim-jong-un-meme
[21] exterior shots: http://www.kcna.kp/kcnadata/kor/photo/2012/3/311339-1.jpg
[22] press briefing
today: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/03/185935.htm
[23] Jeffrey Lewis: http://38north.org/author/jeffrey-lewis/
