February 11, 2011
Mubarakism Without
Mubarak
Why Egypt’s Military
Will Not Embrace Democracy
Ellis Goldberg
ELLIS GOLDBERG is
Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington and at the
American University in Cairo.
Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak gave into the demands of the protesters today, leaving Cairo and
stepping down from power. That came hours after a speech, broadcast live across
the world yesterday, in which he refused to do so. Earlier that day, the
Supreme Military Council released a statement -- labeled its "first"
communiqué -- that stated that the military would ensure a peaceful transition
of Mubarak out of office. In practice, it appears that power has passed into
the hands of the armed forces. This act was the latest in the military's creep
from applauded bystander to steering force in this month's protests in Egypt.
Since the protest movement first took shape on January 25, the military has,
with infinite patience, extended and deepened its physical control of the area
around Tahrir Square (the focal point of the protests) with concrete barriers,
large steel plates, and rolls of razor wire. In itself, the military's growing
footprint was the next act in a slow-motion coup -- a return of the army from
indirect to direct control -- the groundwork for which was laid in 1952.
The West may be
worried that the crisis will bring democracy too quickly to Egypt and empower
the Muslim Brotherhood. But the real concern is that the regime will only shed
its corrupt civilians, leaving its military component as the only player left
standing. Indeed, when General Omar Suleiman, the recently appointed vice
president to whom Mubarak entrusted presidential powers last night, threatened
on February 9 that the Egyptian people must choose between either the current
regime or a military coup, he only increased the sense that the country was
being held hostage.
The Egyptian political
system under Mubarak is the direct descendant of the republic established in
the wake of the 1952 military coup that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free
Officers to power. Nasser and the officers abolished Egypt's limited
parliamentary monarchy and ousted an entire generation of civilian political
and judicial figures from public life. They created their own republic stocked
with loyal military figures. Their one experiment with technocratic governance,
allowing Egyptian legal experts to write a new basic document, was a failure.
The experts' draft had provisions for a strong parliament and limited
presidency, which the officers deemed too liberal. They literally threw it into
the wastebasket and started over, writing a constitution that placed immense
power in the hands of the president.
Such an arrangement
would prove to work out well for the military, as every Egyptian president
since 1953 has been an army officer. For two generations, the military was
able, through the president, to funnel most of the country's resources toward
national security, arming for a series of ultimately disastrous wars with
Israel. These defeats, combined with the government's neglect of the economy,
nearly drove the country to bankruptcy. Popular revolt erupted between 1975 and
1977 over the government's economic policies. To regain control, the military
turned its attention away from war and toward development. It gradually
withdrew from direct control over politics, ceding power to domestic security
forces and the other powerful backer of Egypt's ruling party -- small groups of
civilian businessmen who benefited from their privileged access to government
sales and purchases to expand their own fortunes.
In the 1990s, Mubarak
waged a domestic war against Islamists, and the role of the military evolved
further. As the government became dependent on an expanded domestic police
force, the army was reduced in size and importance. Over time, the police and
the Ministry of the Interior supplanted the armed forces and Ministry of
Defense as the keystone of the regime. Meanwhile, the factions of the business
elite that fed on the state, such as the now disgraced steel magnate and former
ruling party leader Ahmed Ezz, grew more powerful. Mubarak gave them privileged
access to the ruling National Democratic Party, which they convinced to open
the Egyptian economy to world trade -- enriching them even further.
The officer corps was
appeased to some degree, however, by its own economic good fortune. Throughout
the 1990s, the army expanded its involvement in the economy. By this decade,
industries owned by the military were estimated to control 5 to 20 percent of the
entire Egyptian economy; likewise, army officers receive a variety of benefits,
such as special preference in access to goods and services.
Today, the army
presents itself as a force of order and a neutral arbiter between contending
opponents, but it has significant interests of its own to defend, and it is
not, in fact, neutral. The basic structure of the Egyptian state as it now
exists has benefited the military. The practical demands of the protesters seem
fairly simple: end the state of emergency, hold new elections, and grant the
freedom to form parties without state interference. But these demands would
amount to opening up the political space to everyone across Egypt's social and
political structure. That would involve constitutional and statutory changes,
such as reforming Egypt as a parliamentary rather than a presidential system,
in which a freely elected majority selects the prime minister (who is now
appointed by the president). These changes would wipe away the power structure
the army created in 1952 and has backed since.
A freely elected
parliament and a reconstituted government would weaken the role of the
presidency, a position the military is likely to try to keep in its portfolio.
Moreover, open elections could hand the new business elites power in
parliament, where they could work to limit the role of the army in the economy.
This would put the army's vast economic holdings -- from the ubiquitous propane
cylinders that provide all Egyptian homes with cooking gas to clothing, food,
and hotels -- in jeopardy. Moreover, the army has always preferred that the
country be orderly and hierarchical. It is uncomfortable with the growing
participatory festival on the streets, and even if the officers were to
tolerate more contestation than their grandfathers did in the 1950s, they would
likely try to limit participation in politics to those whose lives have been
spent in the military by retaining the system of presidential appointment for
government ministers.
Indeed, instead of
pursuing institutional change, leading military figures will likely try to
satisfy the public with symbolic gestures. They would surely investigate the
most corrupt businessmen and their ministerial associates for the misuse of
public funds and public property. At the same time, there will likely be an
investigation of the former minister of interior for deliberately murdering
demonstrators during the crisis.
If the military takes
further control, two of the players currently on the scene will be crucial.
First, Suleiman, who has strong ties to the military, is at the center of every
negotiation among the opposition factions and is almost constantly on
television. Unsurprisingly, he has made it clear that he has no intention of
reforming the presidential system. Playing for time, he has consistently
insisted that even negotiations should be strictly limited to changing the
three articles of the constitution that deal with elections.
Second, although
Egypt's defense minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, has been much less
visible, he is no less important. He is behind the army's announcement that it
would not, unlike the hated security police, fire on Egyptians. In fact, the
army fired on neither the demonstrators nor on the thugs who attacked them, and
even went so far as to announce that the protesters had legitimate demands. I
have heard accounts of the army arresting some protesters and members of human
rights groups. Some of those who have been arrested and released report that a
faction of army officers remain sympathetic to Mubarak's appeals that he has a
mission to carry out. Still, under Tantawi, the army will likely try to at
least appear neutral while negotiating with the rest of the opposition to
manage a transition, even as Suleiman works to ensure that reform is limited.
The Mubarak regime as
it has existed for the last decade -- an increasingly corrupt and incompetent
government that has conferred immense economic advantages on a handful of
politically connected businessmen -- has been shattered. A more open political
system and a responsive government that ensures its own safety by trimming back
the power and privileges of the military could still emerge. And the army may
step in as a transitional power and recognize that, as much as it might like
to, it cannot return to complete control. The Egyptian military is far more
professional and educated than it was in the 1950s, so many officers may
recognize the benefits of a democracy. More likely, however, is the culmination
of the slow-motion coup and the return of the somewhat austere military
authoritarianism of decades past.
For further expert
analysis of the uprisings across the Arab world, please check out Foreign
Affairs/CFR new ebook, The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It
Means, and What Comes Next. It is available for purchase in multiple
formats including PDF [1], Kindle [2], and Nook [3].
Copyright © 2002-2012
by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
All rights reserved. To request permission to distribute or reprint this article, please fill out and submit a Permissions Request Form. If you plan to use this article in a coursepack or academic website, visitCopyright Clearance Center to clear permission.
All rights reserved. To request permission to distribute or reprint this article, please fill out and submit a Permissions Request Form. If you plan to use this article in a coursepack or academic website, visitCopyright Clearance Center to clear permission.
Return to Article: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67416/ellis-goldberg/mubarakism-without-mubarak
Home > Snapshot >
Mubarakism Without Mubarak
Published on Foreign
Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com)
Links:
[1] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/books/fabooks/the-new-arab-revolt?cid=oth-internal-foreign_affairs-the_new_arab_revolt
[2] http://www.amazon.com/New-Arab-Revolt-Happened-ebook/dp/B004YXFMIY/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&m=AG56TWVU5XWC2&s=books&qid=1304393147&sr=8-1
[3] http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-New-Arab-Revolt/Council-on-Foreign-Relations/e/2940012488015/?itm=1&USRI=the new arab revolt
[1] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/books/fabooks/the-new-arab-revolt?cid=oth-internal-foreign_affairs-the_new_arab_revolt
[2] http://www.amazon.com/New-Arab-Revolt-Happened-ebook/dp/B004YXFMIY/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&m=AG56TWVU5XWC2&s=books&qid=1304393147&sr=8-1
[3] http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-New-Arab-Revolt/Council-on-Foreign-Relations/e/2940012488015/?itm=1&USRI=the new arab revolt
