Osama Bin Laden’s killing constitute the war crime of wilful killing? -- hors de combat


Does Navy SEAL's New Book Suggest Bin Laden Killing was a War Crime?
By Adam Serwer|   Fri Aug. 31

The famously shifting Obama administration narrative of the special forces raid that killed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden left some understandable doubts about how the operation actually went down. The key question, from a legal perspective, is whether or not the administration had ordered Bin Laden killed no matter the circumstances, and whether or not he had tried to surrender or was otherwise "hors de combat" or "out of the fight" as defined in the Geneva Conventions

No Easy Day, the memoir by "Mark Owens" (later outed as Mark Bissonette), a former Navy SEAL who participated in the raid, sheds light on both questions. According to Owen, Bin Laden was unarmed when he was shot. Here's the description from the Associated Press:

Bissonnette says he was directly behind a "point man" going up the stairs. "Less than five steps" from top of the stairs, he heard "suppressed" gunfire: "BOP. BOP." The point man had seen a "man peeking out of the door" on the right side of the hallway[.]  
Bissonnette writes that bin Laden ducked back into his bedroom and the SEALs followed, only to find the terrorist crumpled on the floor in a pool of blood with a hole visible on the right side of his head and two women wailing over his body.
Bissonnette says the point man pulled the two women out of the way and shoved them into a corner and he and the other SEALs trained their guns' laser sites on bin Laden's still-twitching body, shooting him several times until he lay motionless.

Kevin Jon Heller, a senior lecturer at Melbourne Law School and a blogger for Opinio Juris, has quite a different take. Heller argues that the shots fired at Bin Laden's body after he was already wounded make his killing a war crime. "[Bissonette] and his fellow SEAL thus intentionally killed bin Laden while he was 'otherwise incapacitated by wounds' and hors de combat," Heller writes. "That was a war crime—the war crime of wilful killing." Heller had previously defended the operation as legal.

Kenneth Anderson, a law professor at American University Washington School of Law, disagrees. "Being wounded does not necessarily render one hors de combat; hors de combat means they’re not actually posing a threat to you," Anderson says, citing moments where wounded combatants have used hidden guns or explosives to kill American servicemembers who thought they were surrendering or incapacitated. "There have been far too many incidents in the past, including in Afghanistan and Iraq...cases where American soldiers get killed because they were mistaken about the other side, or parts of the other side surrendering... There’s still no obligation to pause the attack, you’re allowed to put your own safety first."

Author of “No Easy Day” Admits to Committing a War Crime
by Kevin Jon Heller   August 29th, 2012

I claimed that the killing of Usama bin Laden was perfectly legal under international law
I based the conclusion that bin Laden’s death was legal under IHL on Nicholas Schmidle’s account of the bin Laden operation in The New Yorker.
As recounted by Schmidle, the SEALs’ actions were consistent with IHL.

Art. 41(1) of the First Additional Protocol: “A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.“  A combatant is hors de combat in three situations: (1) “he is in the power of an adverse Party” (ie., captured); (2) “he clearly expresses an intention to surrender”; or (3) “he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself.”

In Schmidle’s account, bin Laden was not in the power of the U.S. when he was killed; he was not wounded or sick; and — most relevantly — he had not clearly expressed an intention to surrender.

The author of the new book “No Easy Day,” however, provides a very different account of bin Laden’s death — one that has to be taken seriously, because the author is one of the two SEALs who fired the fatal shots.  Here is the Huffington Post’s summary of the author’s account(emphasis mine):

He and his fellow SEAL thus intentionally killed bin Laden while he was “otherwise incapacitated by wounds” and hors de combat.  That was a war crime — the war crime of wilful killing.

I imagine some readers will respond by pointing out that bin Laden was already fatally wounded when the SEALs shot him.  There are two problems with that response.  To begin with, the author is not a doctor; bin Laden might not have actually been fatally wounded.  More importantly, though, it makes no difference if he was dying — he was still alive when the author and his fellow SEAL shot him, and that is all the war crime of wilful killing requires.  That is not a controversial idea; no domestic criminal-law system would consider shooting a person dying of a fatal heart attack to be anything but murder.  If your actions deprive someone of even one second of life, you are both the factual and legal cause of their death.

My Response to Ken About Bin Laden’s Death (Updated)
by Kevin Jon Heller    August 31st, 2012

recent post at Mother Jones mentions my view of UBL’s killing and provides Ken’s brief thoughts on his death:

To be clear, though, I am not claiming that being wounded necessarily makes a combatant hors de combat.  I chose my words carefully: UBL was hors de combat because he was “otherwise incapacitated by wounds” — the language in Art. 41(2)(c) of the First Additional Protocol.  Wounding is not enough; incapacitation is required.

Owens clearly states that UBL was shot and fatally wounded by someone else; after “[taking] their time entering the room,” Owens and his fellow SEAL found UBL lying on the floor, “blood and brains” spilling out of his skull, being attended to by his wives.  Only at that point did they shoot him.  It is thus problematic to see UBL’s death as part of a continuous attack — or to imply, as Ken does, that viewing UBL’s death as a war crime requires imposing “an obligation to pause the attack” on Owens and his fellow SEAL.  The facts clearly indicate that their attack on UBL began when they first discovered his prone, dying body.

(DO- why did author italicize “some else”?  They are one team.  How could it make a difference?)
(the team only began after Bin Laden had his brains spilling out of his skull --, Kevin argues, falls within “otherwise incapacitated by wounds.”)

Finally, and most importantly, we need to recognize the implication of the “danger” argument made by Ken and a number of commenters on my previous post: if a combatant who is in his death throes with his brains spilling out of his head does not qualify as “incapacitated by wounds,” Art. 41(2)(c) is a complete nullity, because by that standard no wounded combatant could ever be considered incapacitated.  If UBL’s wounds were not incapacitating, what wounds could be? 

Nor is it an adequate response to say that the key is whether the wounded combatant had been captured prior to his killing (and thus presumably neutralized); that response also renders Art. 41(2)(c) a nullity, because Art. 41(2)(a) already deems a combatant “in the power of an adverse Party” to be hors de combat.  

Here is my question for Ken or for anyone else who believes UBL’s killing was consistent with IHL: can you please identify a situation in which a wounded but non-captured combatant cannot be lawfully killed?

NOTE 1: Ken’s response, like many of the comments, appears to assume that fear or suspicion that a wounded soldier might continue to engage in combat justifies killing him.  That assumption is incorrect.  As the ICRC’s authoritative commentary on the First Additional Protocol makes clear, the wounded soldier loses his presumptive hors de combat status only if he engages in some kind of positive act that indicates he intends to continue fighting (emphasis mine):

The wounded and sick in the sense of Article 8 (Terminology), sub-paragraph (a), of the Protocol, are those persons who need medical care as a result of a trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, and who refrain from any act of hostility.…  On the other hand, there is no obligation to abstain from attacking a wounded or sick person who is preparing to fire, or who is actually firing, regardless of the severity of his wounds or sickness.

In other words, a soldier cannot simply assume — even based on past experience with different wounded combatants — that a seemingly incapacitated combatant will continue to fight if given the chance.  That is an important limitation in the context of UBL’s death; nothing in Owens’ account indicates that they believed UBL was capable of harming them — much less that he actually tried to harm them.

NOTE 2: Don’t forget that the First Additional Protocol was adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War.  The Viet Cong relied heavily on nearly every perfidious tactic imaginable, yet the drafters of AP I still adopted Art. 41(2)(c).  So it impossible to argue that al-Qaeda’s tactics somehow render the “incapacitated by wounds” provision obsolete.

9.01.2012 at 8:13 am EST Kevin Jon Heller
Ben,
As for your first comment, my point is that the critical question is whether the SEALs had time to determine that UBL had been incapacitated by the wounds inflicted by whomever shot him.  Had the SEAL who shot UBL continued to fire at him even as he fell to the ground with his brains spilling out, I would accept that he would not have had time to recognize that his earlier shots had rendered UBL hors de combat

But that is not the situation here. 

The two SEALS saw UBL shot (or at least shot at), “took their time entering the room,” saw UBL on the ground with his brains spilling out and in his death throes, and then killed himThat is not a continuous attack, and I think it is very difficult to argue that the SEALS did not have time to recognize that UBL had been rendered hors de combat by his wounds  (And that assumes, of course, that the SEALs honestly believed that he was not hors de combat when they fired at him, which is anything but clear from Owens’ account.)

9.01.2012 at 2:37 pm EST Kenneth Anderson

Quick note from Ken – I realize you can’t tell from the article, but I hadn’t actually read Kevin’s piece and didn’t know it was up when I gave the reporter a quick reaction.  Not reacting to Kevin here – I’ve been away from blogging for some family reasons – plan to be back in a week – and haven’t read either Kevin’s post or the Mother Jones piece.  Adam Serwer mentioned Kevin’s blogging in our conversation, and I thought he was referring to Kevin’s post from when UBL was killed.  I’m going to keep my promise to my wife and stay away from this until I am genuinely back, though.  Ken