by Stephan Haggard | November 23rd, 2012 |
07:00 am
We have been following the flap
over the NLL in South Korean politics. Prof. Moon Chung-in, at Yonsei
University, attended the 2007 summit with President Roh and was deeply involved
in crafting the proposal for a joint fishing zone as a confidence-building
measure. He sent us a long email, and a link to his interview in Ohmynews and to a recent
piece in Sisa In and it was too informative not to
pass on:
“As you argued, I
pointed out that NLL is not a territorial line, a maritime boundary line nor a
maritime de-militarized line. Henry Kissinger used the term “Northern Patrol
Limit Line.” But its official term should be “Maritime Non-Aggression
Boundary Line” as stipulated in the 1992 Basic Agreement. I also discovered
that neither the operational order given by General Clark on August 30, 1953
nor the ROK’s naval operational order 1235 that was based on Clark’s order
appear to exist in document form. They were apparently discarded. I
therefore relied on the CIA report (January 1974), Kissinger telegram (Feb.
1975), and another State Dept. document [SH: see our post on these documents,
collected by Terence Roehrig.]
Most importantly, the
Enforcement Ordinance of Law on Territorial Water (영해법 시행령),
which became effective as of September 20, 1978 under Park Chung-hee, did not
identify the disputed West Sea as part of ROK territorial waters. In
fact, it did not mention the West Sea at all, perhaps due to US pressure.
In my recollection of
the summit, Kim Man-bok (ROK intelligence head) and Kim Yang-gon (head of the
Department of United Front, Korea Workers’ Party, his counterpart for the
North) negotiated over the issue of a common fishery zone until 3 o’clock in
the morning of October 4, but failed to reach an agreement. The South proposed
to draw equidistant lines on both sides of the NLL to create a common fishery
zone, but the North rejected it by arguing that the southern part of the NLL was
in its territorial waters Thus, the Oct. 4th Joint Summit Declaration did not
mention the NLL at all [SH: see item 5 of the declaration, reproduced
below]. However, both North and South agreed to resume the negotiations
on the common fishery zone in the North-South defense ministers’ talk scheduled
for November 27-29.
At that time, South
Korea’s defense minister, Kim Jang-soo was given the following instructions by
the Blue House. First, Kim was instructed to make the same proposal of an
equidistant divide of the NLL. Second, if the North did not accept, he was
instructed to make an alternative proposal of an equal-area divide along
different sections of the NLL in order to forestall security concerns on both
sides. If the North accepted the equidistant line proposal, the common fishery
zone would make a deeper inroad toward the North’s coastline, especially at the
eastern part of the NLL near Yeonpyong island. It was very unlikely that the
North would have accepted the proposal. Thus, the Blue House instructed Kim
Jang-soo to make another proposal under which the South would make a concession
of more area in the eastern part of the NLL near Yeonpyong, while the North
would in return make a concession of equal area in the western part of the NLL
near Baekryong island where the Northern coastline is rather far away. But
Defense Minister Kim derailed the negotiation with the North when his northern
counterpart rejected the first proposal. Thus, what President Roh had in
mind was to make the NLL a de facto boundary line by making the adjustments:
the equidistant line and equal-area proposals. It is thus completely
unfair for the Saenuri Party to accuse Roh of abandoning the NLL.
Won Se-hun, head of
National Intelligence Service, made it clear that his agency has the verbatim
transcript of the dialogue between Roh and Kim Jong-il, but cannot reveal its
contents because of national security interests. It seems very strange
that the ruling Saenuri is demanding the opening of the record against the
opinion of its own intelligence chief. Such behavior can only be
interpreted as a gimmick for the election campaign. Furthermore, Park Geun-hye
has been proposing confidence-building measures with the North as a way of
normalizing ties. The behavior of her party seems to contradict her own
election pledge [SH: see her
recent speech.]
President Roh had
three agendas in mind in proposing the West Sea Peace and Cooperation Special
Zone [again, see item 5 of the joint declaration below]: a common fishery zone;
a common peace zone; and the creation of a special economic zone in Haeju port.
The first was to transform the conflictual West Sea into the sea of peace
through such economic measures as a common fishing zone. The second was
to prevent the loss of young lives of North and South Korea by avoiding
military conflicts in the NLL. The third was to make the NLL a de facto
non-aggression boundary line by proposing both equidistant and equal area
divide of the NLL. The current debate on the NLL in South Korea seems to be
overly politicized, which can severely undermine prospects for inter-Korean
rapprochement. Whoever gets elected as leader of South Korea, he or she must
resume negotiations with the North on how to resolve military tensions over the
NLL so that more young lives will not be sacrificed, not to mention the
economic costs. The Faustian bargain should be avoided by ending the current
futile politicization of the NLL issue.”
Declaration on the
Advancement of South-North Korean Relations,
Peace and Prosperity
October 4, 2007
…
5. The South and
the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further develop inter-Korean
economic cooperation projects on a continual basis for balanced economic
development and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the
principles of common interests, co-prosperity and mutual aid.
The South and the
North reached an agreement on promoting economic cooperation, including
investments, pushing forward with the building of infrastructure and the
development of natural resources. Given the special nature of inter-Korean
cooperative projects, the South and the North have agreed to grant preferential
conditions and benefits to those projects.
The South and the
North have agreed to create a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West
Sea” encompassing Haeju and vicinity in a bid to proactively push ahead with
the creation of a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone, establishment of
a special economic zone, utilization of Haeju harbor, passage of civilian
vessels via direct routes in Haeju and the joint use of the Han River estuary.
The South and the
North have agreed to complete the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong
Industrial Complex at an early date and embark on the second-stage development
project. The South and the North have agreed to open freight rail services
between Munsan and Bongdong and promptly complete various institutional
measures, including those related to passage, communication, and customs
clearance procedures.
The South and the
North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju railroad and the
Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.
The South and the
North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in
Anbyeon and Nampo, while continuing cooperative projects in various areas such
as agriculture, health and medical services and environmental protection.
The South and the
North have agreed to upgrade the status of the existing Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation to be headed by deputy prime minister-level officials.
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