New study says the
Cheonan was sunk by mine, not NK torpedo
The Hankyoreh. 8/27/12
By Oh Cheol-woo
An article has been
published in an international academic journal arguing that the explosion that
sank the South Korean Cheonan warship in March 2010 may not have been from a
North Korean torpedo, but from a mine discarded by the South Korean navy.
This is the second scientific study on the Cheonan sinking
published in an academic journal, the first being a seismic analysis
published last year by Yonsei University Department of Earth System Sciences
professor Hong Tae-kyung. That study supported the findings of the
government’s joint investigation team.
In the study published
in the international academic journal “Pure and Applied Geophysics,” Korea
Seismological Institute director Kim So-gu and the Geophysical Institute of
Israel’s Yefim Gitterman wrote that analysis of the seismic waves, acoustic
waves and bubble frequency made it clear an underwater explosion took place.
They said the seismic
magnitude of the explosion was 2.04, that of 136kg of TNT and equivalent to the
individual yield of the large number of land control mines abandoned by the
Korean navy after they were first installed in the 1970s.
The findings are
noteworthy in that they differ greatly from those of the Civilian-Military
Joint Investigation Group (MCNJIG), which found the cause of the sinking to be a North Korean
CHT-02D torpedo with a yield of 250kg of TNT exploding at a depth of six to
nine meters, producing a seismic yield of 1.5.
In the thesis, the
research team analyzed the cause of the underwater explosion through equations,
models and simulations examining the frequency of gas bubbles that expand
rapidly after an explosion and the amount of explosive yield needed to produce
them.
The repeated expansion
and contraction of bubbles, which expand quickly with an explosion but then
contract due to water pressure, causes damage to a ship.
The time it takes for
one expansion and contraction is called the bubble pulse period. In their
observed data, Kim and Gitterman calculated the bubble pulse period - a value
needed to determine explosive yield and explosion depth - to be 0.990 seconds.
Kim and Gitterman then
made calculations based on various explosive yields and depths and found that
an explosion of 136km of TNT at 8m in depth would produce the bubble pulse
period in the observed data.
Kim and Gitterman said
confirmation attempts using several methods showed that an explosion of 250kg
of TNT produced results too discordant with the observed bubble pulse period.
MCMJIG also considered
the possibility that the explosion was caused by a land control mine.
According to the
MCMJIG findings report published in 2010, the Korean navy - following a 1985
decision that they were no longer necessary - abandoned its land control mines
on the ocean floor after a process of deactivation that involved the cutting of
their long fuse lines. The mines were placed around Korea’s West Sea islands
along the Northern Limit Line in 1977.
MCMJIG excluded the
mines as a possible cause of the explosion, saying that a land control mine
with a yield of 136kg of TNT would have been unable to cut a ship’s hull in two
at 47m, the water depth at which the incident took place.
Kim said, “The results
of the MCMJIG study did not sufficiently reflect the basics of underwater
explosions and bubble dynamics. As other possibilities are being raised, there
should be a reinvestigation to scientifically study the cause of the
explosion.”
N.K. defector gives
self up to police
The Korea Herald.
8/27/12 By Kim Young-won
North Korean defector
who arrived in Jeju Island by air from China, has turned herself in, the police
said Sunday.
The defector, surnamed
Kim, 41, arrived at Jeju International Airport at 2:30 on Sunday from Bejing.
Kim passed through
immigration with a fake Chinese passport.
After failing to get a
visa to come to the South (from China), she reportedly
chose to come to Jeju, which has not required a visa from Chinese
travelers since 2008.
South Korea to pay
families of slain activists
BBC. 8/27/12
The Supreme Court in
South Korea has ordered the government to compensate the families of a group of suspected North Korean
sympathisers killed during the Korean War.
The court ordered the
government to pay up to 40 million won ($35,200, £22,300) to 492 families who
filed the lawsuit.
Their families said
that security forces executed their relatives without proper trials.
Many left-wing
activists were targeted in South Korea during the war with North Korea from
1950-1953, as part of its anti-communism campaign.
In 1950, the
government detained a group of about 400 people who were thought to be
communist sympathisers. Most were killed by security forces.
The families filed the
lawsuit in 2009.
The government had
said that the group's claims exceeded the statute of limitations, but
the court decided otherwise.
"We believe...
that the government's argument about the statutory limit is a misuse of rights
and is against the principle of bona fide," it said in its ruling, which
upheld an earlier decision by a lower court in April.
Christian group to
provide 500 tons of flour to flood-stricken North
Yonhap News Agency.
8/27/12
SEOUL, Aug. 27
(Yonhap) -- An international Christian relief organization has agreed
with North Korea to provide 500 tons of flour to regions heavily hit by
recent floods in the North, the organization said Monday.
An official of World
Vision said, "We agreed with the North's National Economic Cooperation
Federation to provide 500 tons of flour to the most heavily-hit cities of Anju
and Kaechon, South Pyongan Province."
The agreement was made
late Sunday in a faxed letter after officials of the Christian charity
organization visited Kaesong, a North Korean border city, and held a discussion
over aid provision on Aug. 17.
Mongolia, N. Korea look to Russia
Bangkok Post. 8/27/12
Russia is favoured by
Mongolia and North Korea just as the United States is welcomed by some of its Southeast
Asian partners. At the same time, Mongolia
and especially North Korea provide opportunities for Russia to raise its stakes
in Northeast Asian matters.
Despite the collapse
of the Soviet Union and relative inattention by the Kremlin in the 1990s, Ulan
Bator and Pyongyang never abandoned their attempts to renew ties with Russia.
High-ranking political and military officials constantly made calls to advance
political, military, economic and cultural ties with Moscow.
Positive responses
came after a decade. President Vladimir Putin's visits to North Korea and
Mongolia in 2000 demonstrated the Kremlin's new emphasis on its former
allies, whose industrial facilities and enterprises were built with Soviet
assistance and technology.
Their treaties
of mutual assistance with Russia were replaced by treaties of good
neighbourliness in 1993 with Mongolia and in 2001 with North Korea.
And the US$11-billion debts
incurred during the Soviet era were resolved favourably for Mongolians
in 2003 and North Koreans in 2012.
As a result, Russia
seems to have secured its stake in key infrastructure development projects.
In North Korea, Russia will invest in the trans-Korean railway, a gas pipeline,
special economic zones and education. In Mongolia, Russia will invest in the
trans-Mongolian railway, its extension and the mining of uranium and aluminum.
Economic cooperation
with Mongolia and North Korea will play an important role in Mr Putin's agenda
to develop Russia's long-neglected Far East and Siberia and to secure Chinese
and East Asian markets for its mineral exports.
Three reasons explain
Mongolian and North Korean collaboration with Russia. First,
all three fear Chinese demographic expansion. North Korea and Mongolia
have always been attentive to the number of Chinese nationals in their
countries. Both expelled a significant number of Chinese nationals during the
Cultural Revolution and closely monitored those who remained.
Mongolia is even more
vulnerable than the other two because of its small population _ a mere 2.8
million people, a number even smaller than the population of ethnic Mongolians
in China. Even during the Soviet period, when both nations welcomed Soviet
citizens, most Russians perceived both Mongolia and North Korea as a strange
land, culture and civilisation and had no intention of settling down. Chinese
are likely to think and act differently.
Mongolia, North Korea
and the Russian Far East are considered the most marginalised and underdeveloped (despite
abundant minerals) parts of Northeast Asia. Conversely, China, Japan and South
Korea are seen as economic powerhouses. Although Mongolia and North
Korea have the largest mineral deposits, both lack fuel and natural gas;
therefore, they long for benefits from the long-discussed gas pipelines from
Siberia to China and South Korea.
Russia is the only way
for Mongolia and North Korea to reach Eurasian markets and to import fuel and technology.
While there are various explanations for
North Korea's reluctance to follow the Chinese recipe for economic reform,
North Korea, like Mongolia, avoids increasing dependence on Chinese investment,
technology and markets.
This explains
Mongolia's welcoming of Russia in key mining and infrastructure projects while
adopting laws against the investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises in
strategic sectors of its economy. Similarly, Kim Jong-il's visit to Ulan Ude in
2011 after his learning trip to China's northeastern provinces signals a
similar desire to get involved with Russia.
All three have
distinct geopolitical needs. For Russia, North Korea traditionally provides a strategic buffer from
the US and Japan, while Mongolia seeks the same insulation from China. Russia's
partnership with North Korea increases its ability to deal with South Korea and
Japan on economic issues and with the US on security issues such as Nato
expansion and missile defence. Mongolia, similarly, increases Russia's stake in
Sino-Russian relations and offers leverage for Moscow when dealing with
Beijing. In recent years, Russia has resumed its military assistance to
Mongolia quite actively. For Mongolia and North Korea, Russia has been the only
source of political, economic and military support in the face of an assertive
China. Their learning of Russian culture strengthens their non-Chinese
identities.
Finally, unlike
Central and Eastern European former communist states, Mongolia and North
Korea have positive views of their past ties with Russia, hiccups
notwithstanding. Both countries established their state institutions with
Russian assistance, while Russians destroyed similar institutions in
Central and Eastern European states. Mongolia and North Korea became members of
the current international system with Soviet backing in 1961 and 1991
respectively. At the same time, both want to formalise ties with the US and
Japan, though only Mongolia has succeeded so far, following its political
changes in the 1990s.
Although Russia is
favoured by its East Asian partners, its geostrategic rebalancing is
complicated _ much like the US "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region.
Russia has the ability to upgrade its Far Eastern military presence, but it
cannot engage in intensive security ties with both nations. Any military
move would undermine relations with key investors China, Japan and South
Korea. Assertive moves might also push Mongolia and North Korea closer
to China.
Like the US, Russia
faces economic turbulence, but it remains the most approachable and
understandable partner for Mongolian and North Korean political elites and
public. Both nations will serve as Russia's economic gateways to
Northeast Asia and a strategic buffer from its competitors.
North Korea and Japan to hold first talks in four years
The Telegraph. 8/27/12
The two countries, at
odds for decades, have never had formal diplomatic relations.
For Japan, North
Korea's past abductions of its citizens, sabre-rattling ballistic
missile tests over Japanese territory and underground nuclear
experiments have curbed progress on normalising relations.
North Korea,
meanwhile, criticises Japan's military alliance with the United States, colonisation
of the Korean peninsula in the first half of the 20th century and treatment
of ethnic Koreans in Japan.
The one-day
working-level talks Wednesday in Beijing are also being closely watched for
clues about the foreign policy of North Korea's new leader Kim Jong-Un, who
took over after his father Kim Jong-il died in December.
Toshimitsu Shigemura,
professor of Korean studies at Waseda University in Tokyo, expects little
progress, noting Japan wants to discuss the abductions though it is unclear if
Pyongyang will go along.
"If the North
rejects Tokyo's wishes, the talks could easily be deadlocked," Shigemura
said. "The North has different objectives from the meeting, which
are money and food, while Tokyo's priority is to talk about the kidnapping."
Pyongyang admitted in
2002 its agents kidnapped Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s to help train spies,
by teaching them the Japanese language and culture.
It allowed five of
them and their family members to go home, while claiming the rest died. Many
Japanese believe some are alive.
