South
Korea’s North Korea human rights bill … why it is stuck on the tracks
On
Thursday, August 16, 2012, the President of the United States signed into law
the “Ambassador James R. Lilley and Congressman Stephen J. Solarz North Korea
Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2012," which reauthorizes the North
Korean Human Rights Authorization Act of 2004.
In South Korea, by contrast, the North Korea human rights bill (Bill) that
has been proposed several times by the conservative party is nowhere near seeing
the light of day. Although liberal parties
agree with the purpose of the Bill – to improve human rights in the North – they
have persistently opposed the Bill, because, they argue, the Bill is ineffective
in fulfilling its purpose; instead it will likely be used to fund civil society
organizations that share conservative ideals regarding North Korea, which they
believe ultimately increase, not alleviate, tension in the Korean
Peninsula. This blog post is to help you
better understand their arguments and intends not to take a position on whether
the Bill should be passed into law, which I would leave to you.
The
meat of the Bill includes:
-
establishing
a North Korea human rights advisory council within the Ministry of Unification that
would provide advisory opinions to the Minister of Unification in setting a
North Korea human rights blueprint,
-
creating
the Office of the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade charged with coordinating international
efforts to promote human rights in the North,
-
monitoring
humanitarian aid by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as government
agencies to make sure the aid reaches intended beneficiaries and is not
diverted to the military,
-
setting
up a North Korea human rights foundation under the Minister of Unification,
whose missions include making grants to North Korea human rights NGOs, and
-
creating
a North Korea human rights archive within the Ministry of Justice.
Most
of these provisions are not novel ideas or mechanisms in addressing North Korea
human rights issues. Both the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade have long engaged on the issue of North Korea human
rights. The archive is already in the
National Human Rights Commission of Korea.
Nevertheless, human rights in the North did not improve because of the work
of the South Korean government. The one new
concept introduced in this Bill is one that allows taxpayers’ money to fund
North Korea NGOs; it is also the main source of controversy over the Bill. Then the question to ask is, will the NGOs
funding provision – a new measure – be effective in improving the human rights
situation in the North?
Liberal
parties justly point out that the North Korea Human Rights Act of the U.S. (Act)
proved otherwise. To facilitate the
dissemination of information in the North, the Act authorized the President of
the U.S. to provide grants to broadcast organizations, including Radio Free Asia
and Voice of America. While having a
positive impact on people outside the North, such as North Korean refugees and
defectors, the Act did little to improve human rights inside North Korea.
The
same goes true for the Bill, liberal parties argue. Cynically dubbing the Bill as a “leaflet
bill,” they assume that it will likely fund the NGOs mainly interested in
sending balloons and leaflets containing information that criticizes the Kim
regime. As with the broadcast
organizations, this measure will prove ineffective, only to provoke the North
Korean government and, therefore, seriously hamper any future efforts of the
South Korean government toward peaceful engagement with the North.
Admittedly,
those who oppose the Bill fail to come up with an immediately effective way of
fulfilling the purpose of the Bill, i.e., improving human rights in the North,
which would constitute an alternative to sending balloons and leaflets. Instead, they emphatically remind us that we
do not have the luxury of confronting a simple question when it comes to issues
dealing with North Korea.
Although
the Act of the U.S. reportedly inspired the Bill of South Korea, as evidenced
by their similarities, there are inherent differences between the two countries
in terms of strategic interest vis-à-vis North Korea. For example, for South Korea, a peaceful unification
has the potential to lead to a major breakthrough on the South Korean economy
that is currently stagnant and raise it to the next level by expanding the
domestic market and taking advantage of natural resources and cheap labor in
North Korea, making the unification arguably an event of existential
consequence for South Korea.
Parenthetically, the unification may be the surest way to improve human
rights in the North. The U.S., however,
probably sees the unification through the lens of regional balance of power
with China in mind.
On
the other hand, if the South Korean government only employs the stick against
North Korea and calls on the international community to coalesce around it, the
consequent isolation will probably accelerate subordination of the North’s
economy to China, as is happening as I speak.
To make matter worse, if the South and North confrontation worsens and an
armed conflict somehow arises, it would be Koreans both South and North, not
Americans, who would sustain catastrophic damages. Thus, South Koreans have every reason to
develop their own policy toward North Korea distinct from that of the U.S. and,
in so doing, should resist the temptation to expect simple answers to this
difficult question.
Some
of those who oppose the Bill believe that it is time to bridge philosophical
differences over how to see and deal with North Korea through public
discussions rather than pressing with the Bill that polarizes South Korean
society without yielding pragmatic solutions.
