U.S. Tightens
Drone Rules
NOVEMBER 4,
2011, By ADAM ENTOUS, SIOBHAN GORMAN and JULIAN E. BARNES
CIA
brass want a free hand
vs. DoD and State Dept. demands more-selective strikes
out of concern about the fragile US relationship with Pakistan ...
The Central
Intelligence Agency has made a series of secret concessions in its drone
campaign after military and diplomatic officials complained large strikes were
damaging the fragile U.S. relationship with Pakistan.
The covert
drones are credited with killing hundreds of suspected militants, and few U.S.
officials have publicly criticized the campaign, or its rapid expansion under
President Barack Obama. Behind the scenes, however, many key U.S. military and
State Department officials demanded more-selective strikes. That pitted them
against CIA brass who want a free hand to pursue suspected militants.
White
House intervenes and, in essence, affirmed its support for CIA with some of CIA’s
concession
The disputes
over drones became so protracted that the White House launched a review over
the summer, in which Mr. Obama intervened.
The review
ultimately affirmed support for the underlying CIA program. But a senior
official said: "The bar has been raised. Inside CIA, there is a
recognition you need to be damn sure it's worth it."
The
State Dept. greater sway
; Pakistani advance notice
Among the
changes: The State Department won greater sway in strike decisions; Pakistani
leaders got advance notice about more operations; and the CIA agreed to suspend
operations when Pakistani officials visit the U.S.
The Pakistan
drone debate already seems to be influencing thinking about the U.S. use of
drones elsewhere in the world. In Yemen, the CIA used the pilotless aircraft in
September to kill American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a suspected terrorist.
But the White House has for now barred the CIA from attacking large groups of
unidentified lower-level militants there.
The CIA
concessions were detailed by high-level officials in a series of interviews
with The Wall Street Journal. But in a measure of the discord, administration
officials have different interpretations about the outcome of the White
House review. While some cast the concessions as a "new phase" in
which the CIA would weigh diplomacy more heavily in its activities, (vs)
others said the impact was minimal and that the bar for vetting targets has
been consistently high.
"Even if
there are added considerations, the program—which still has strong support in
Washington—remains as aggressive as ever," said a U.S. official.
A glance
at drone operations
Last year,
Mr. Obama expanded the CIA program to 14 drone "orbits." Each orbit
usually includes three drones, sufficient to provide constant surveillance over
tribal areas of Pakistan. The CIA's fleet of drones includes Predators and
larger Reapers. The drones carry Hellfire missiles and sometimes bigger bombs,
can soar to an altitude of 50,000 feet and reach cruise speeds of up to 230
miles per hour.
The drone
program over the past decade has moved from a technological oddity to a key
element of U.S. national-security policy. The campaign has killed more
than 1,500 suspected militants on Pakistani soil since Mr.
Obama took office in 2009, according to government officials.
the
diplomatic costs of air strikes
To some
degree, the program has become a victim of its own success. Critics question
whether aggressive tactics are necessary following the eradication of senior al
Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, including Osama bin Laden, killed in a helicopter
raid by Navy Seals in May after drone and satellite surveillance of the
compound where he was living.
Many officials
at the Pentagon and State Department privately argued the CIA pays too little
attention to the diplomatic costs
of air strikes that kill large groups of low-level fighters. Such strikes inflame
Pakistani public opinion. Observers point to the rising power in Pakistan
of political figures like Imran Khan, who held large rallies to protest the
drones and could challenge the current government.
All this
comes at a time when the State Department is trying to enlist Pakistan's
help in advancing peace talks with
the Taliban, a key element of a White House drive to end the war
in neighboring Afghanistan. Top officials of the (i) CIA, (ii) Pentagon,
(iii) State Department and (iv) National Security Council have
been pulled into the debate. Among those voicing concerns was Gen. David
Petraeus, who commanded the war in Afghanistan before becoming CIA director in
September. A senior intelligence official said Gen. Petraeus voiced
"caution against strikes on large groups of fighters."
drone
operations still remains a key element despite internal dispute
Changing the
handling of the drone program doesn't mean the CIA is pulling back. The agency
in recent weeks has intensified strikes in Pakistan focusing on the militant
Haqqani network, a group believed to be behind a series of attacks in
Afghanistan. The Pentagon and State Department have backed those strikes as
serving U.S. interests.
why
Pakistani public outraged
The debate in
Washington was fueled by a particularly deadly drone strike on March 17. It
came at a low point in U.S.-Pakistani relations, just a day after Pakistan
agreed after weeks of U.S. pressure to release a CIA contractor who had killed
two Pakistanis.
Infuriated
Pakistani leaders put the death toll from the drone strike at more than 40,
including innocent civilians. American officials say about 20 were killed, all
militants.
"signature"
strike
vs. "personality" strike
The March 17
attack was a "signature" strike, one of two types used by the CIA,
and the most controversial within the administration. Signature strikes target
groups of men believed to be militants associated with terrorist groups, but whose
identities aren't always known. The bulk of CIA's drone strikes are
signature strikes.
The second
type of drone strike, known as a "personality" strike, targets known
terrorist leaders and has faced less internal scrutiny.
Signature
strike and Pakistani permission
Signature
strikes
were first used under former President George W. Bush. His administration began
arming unmanned aircraft to hunt al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan immediately
after the Sept. 11 attacks. As al Qaeda militants fled to Pakistan, the CIA
began a secret drone program there, with
quiet backing from Islamabad.
For the first
years, U.S. officials used drones only to target known, top terror suspects.
The drone strikes quickly became unpopular with the Pakistani public. In 2008,
when Pakistani leaders bowed to public pressure and began to block U.S.
requests for strikes, President Bush authorized a major expansion, allowing the
CIA to conduct strikes, including signature strikes, without Pakistani permission.
Initially,
the CIA was skeptical of the value of expending resources on lower-level
operatives through signature strikes, a former senior intelligence official
said. Military officials, however, favored the idea. The debate eventually
would lead to the CIA and the military reversing their initial positions.
Obama
gives CIA freehand
Mr. Obama was
an early convert to drones. The CIA has had freedom to decide who to
target and when to strike. The White House usually is notified immediately
after signature strikes take place, not beforehand, a senior U.S. official
said.
The program
had some early skeptics, but their concerns gained little traction. Dennis
Blair, Mr. Obama's first director of national intelligence, recommended that
the CIA measure the program's effectiveness beyond numbers of dead militants,
U.S. officials said. It didn't happen.
The
CIA and the State Department had been at odds for months over the use of drones. Tensions flared with the
arrival in Islamabad late last year of a new ambassador, Cameron Munter, who
advocated more judicious use of signature strikes, senior officials said.
On at least
two occasions, Leon Panetta, then the CIA director, ignored Mr. Munter's
objections to planned strikes, a senior official said. One came just hours
after Sen. John Kerry, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, visited Islamabad.
Pentagon
began to question the CIA’s approach
State
Department diplomats weren't alone in their concerns. Adm. Mike Mullen, then
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military leaders, who
initially favored more aggressive CIA methods, began to question that approach.
Watershed
event-- March 17 strike, spark dispute
The debate
erupted after the March 17 strike, when National Security Advisor Tom Donilon
and others at the White House, taken aback by the number of casualties and
Pakistan's sharp reaction, questioned whether the CIA should for large groups,
at times, hold its fire. Officials asked what precautions were being taken
to aim at highly valued targets, rather than foot soldiers.
"Donilon
and others said, 'O.K., I got it; it's war and it's confusing. Are we doing
everything we can to make sure we are focused on the target sets we
want?'" said a participant in the discussions. "You can kill these
foot soldiers all day, every day and you wouldn't change the course of the
war."
A senior
Obama administration official declined to comment on Mr. Donilon's closed-door
discussions but said that he wasn't second-guessing the CIA's targeting
methodology and pointed to his long-standing support for the program. The
official said the White House wanted to use the drone program smartly to pick
off al Qaeda leaders and the Haqqanis. "It's about keeping our eyes on the
ball," the official said.
In the
spring, military leaders increasingly found themselves on the phone with Mr.
Panetta and his deputy urging restraint in drone attacks, particularly
during periods when the U.S. was engaging in high-level diplomatic exchanges
with Pakistan. "Whenever they got a shot [for a drone attack], they
just took it, regardless of what else was happening in the world," a
senior official said.
The
first concession of the CIA
Mr. Panetta
made his first concession in an April meeting with his Pakistani counterpart.
He told Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha that the
U.S. would tell the Pakistanis ahead of time about strikes expected to kill more than
20 militants, officials said.
Internal
debate intensified after the killing of OBL (over signature strike)
The debate
over the future of the drone program intensified after the death of Osama bin
Laden the next month. Pakistani
leaders were embarrassed that
the U.S. carried out the operation in their country, undetected. They
demanded an end to the signature drone strikes.
Mr. Donilon,
the National Security Advisor, launched a broad review of Pakistan policy,
including the drone program. Officials said the internal debate that ensued was
the most serious since the signature strikes were expanded in 2008.
A lack
of verifiable information
Independent
information about who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is scarce.
The agency tells U.S. and Pakistani officials that there have been very few
civilian deaths—only 60 over the years. But some senior officials in both
governments privately say they are skeptical that civilian deaths have been
that low.
Broader
question on wisdom of drone operation
Some top
officials in the White House meetings this summer argued for a broader
reassessment. "The question is, 'Is it even worth doing now? We've got the
key leadership in al Qaeda, what is it that we're there for now?" one of
the officials recalled some advisers asking.
The White
House review culminated in a Situation Room meeting with Mr. Obama in June in
which he reaffirmed support for the program.
current
state around drone operations
But changes
were made. Mr. Obama instituted an appeals procedure to give the State Department more of a voice
in deciding when and if to strike.
If the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan objected to a strike, for example, the CIA
director or his deputy would first try to talk through their differences with
the ambassador. If the conflict was unresolved, the secretary of state would
appeal directly to the CIA director. If they couldn't reach agreement, however,
the CIA director retained the final
say.
Since the
changes were made, officials say internal tensions over the strikes have eased
and agencies were acting more in concert with each other.
Though Mr. Petraeus
voiced a preference for smaller drone strikes, officials said the agency has
the leeway to carry out large-scale strikes and hasn't been formally directed
to go after only higher-value targets and avoid foot soldiers. Since Mr.
Petraeus's arrival at CIA, some strikes on larger groups have taken place, the
senior intelligence official said.
To reduce the
number of CIA strikes on Pakistani soil, the military moved more of
its own drones into position on the Afghan side of the border
with Pakistan, according to participants in the discussions. That makes it
easier for the CIA to "hand off" suspected militants to the U.S.
military once they cross into Afghanistan, rather than strike them on Pakistani
soil, U.S. officials said.
U.S.-Pakistani
relations remain troubled, but Islamabad recently expanded
intelligence cooperation and has toned down its opposition to the
drone strikes, both in public and private, officials said. Pakistani officials
had sought advance notice, and greater say, over CIA strikes so they could try
to mitigate the public backlash.
"It's
not like they took the car keys away from the CIA," a senior
official said. "There are just more people in the car."
—Jay Solomon
contributed to this article
Inside Executive Branch Policy Discussions on Drone Strikes
by Kenneth Anderson , November
4th, 2011
Among other things, the article follows arguments, raised in earlier
news stories .. over the weight to be given the Pakistan government’s anger
over the strikes — and, more exactly, not being told in advance
or being asked permission for attacking targets. This was primarily a concern raised by the
State Department, and the then-new US ambassador, Cameron Munter. One difficulty, noted in earlier articles,
was that advance warning to Pakistan
sometimes resulted in obvious
leaks to the targets. But to
judge by today’s piece, the permissions process has been altered to give more
weight to State’s concerns
It is noteworthy that there appears to be no sense anywhere in
the US government that there is a legal issue with the CIA conducting
the strikes, despite the on-going debate among academics and others outside
of the US government.
The personality strikes are at
the core of the US’s counterterrorism
program, whereas the signature strikes are much more part of the counterinsurgency campaign —
attacking safe havens, fighters who would otherwise wind up in Afghanistan,
etc.
(A distinct legal debate, as Charlie Savage has reported in the Times,
took place over the legal authority for engaging in signature strikes in places
outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s border regions, such as Yemen, but it
appear to have been resolved at this point in favor of a legal view that such
strikes are permitted, but as a policy matter do not make sense for the United
States at this point.)
(DO- counter-terrorism, turning more toward preventing direct attack on
the US ; counter-insurgency, attacking safe haven)
Much of the policy debate within the administration seems to have
revolved around the extent of signature strikes which, by their nature, attack
a group of people who the US has identified as fighters, rather than individual
as in a targeted killing. Indeed, this
illustrates the important point that as drone uses ramify, targeted killing is
only one such use (and targeted killing, too, might be carried out with a human
team; targeted killing and drone warfare only partly overlap).
