The limits of reform
in Myanmar
By Bertil Lintner , Jan
18, 2012
BANGKOK - The release
of more than 200 political prisoners and a tentative ceasefire with the rebel
Karen National Union represent the latest of steps taken by Myanmar president
Thein Sein's government to improve its international image and assuage its many
critics at home and abroad.
(DO- To author, the
change is meant to improve its international image and soothe its critics ; the
author will argue the change is cosmetic, I guess ^^)
The cosmetic change
(DO- yeah, Bingo) in the traditionally military-run country is unmistakable. In
recent months, it has become easier for ordinary citizens to access the
Internet and local magazines and journals are able to publish articles on
topics that would have been unthinkable only a year ago. Pictures of
pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, who spent 15 of the past 21 years under
house arrest, are now for sale in markets not only in the former capital Yangon
but also in small upcountry towns.
The United States
government, for more than two decades the fiercest critic of successive
military-dominated regimes in Myanmar, promised enhanced engagement in exchange
for "further reforms" immediately after Friday's prison release. As a
first step, the US is going to send an ambassador to its embassy in
Yangon, which has been headed by a charge d'affaires since Washington
decided to downgrade relations with Myanmar in 1990 in response to a
brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators.
Many Myanmar citizens
undoubtedly welcome the easing of the extreme authoritarian pressure they have
lived under as long as they can remember. But critics maintain the loosening is not tantamount to a
"reform process", which would require changes in the
country's fundamental power structure, and that the US may have other
diplomatic objectives in mind over concerns for human rights and
democracy.
Meanwhile, some
Myanmar dissidents are beginning to ask, albeit in hushed tones, the hitherto
unthinkable: is Suu Kyi being used by the Thein Sein's military-backed,
civilianized government as a pawn in
its efforts to break the country's long isolation from the West ?
And, has she come under pressure from the US and possibly other Western powers
with a stake in Myanmar's future geopolitical role to strike a deal with her
former military adversaries?
(DO- Thein Sein weighs
the need for breaking Burma’s isolation from the West against risking
confrontation with its dissidents and Karen’s relentless efforts toward
independence ? )
Less than a year ago,
Suu Kyi was known to have said to visiting foreign diplomats that she was
apprehensive about talking to the new government that assumed office after a
blatantly rigged November 2010 election. At the time, she reportedly said
that the main problem was the new constitution, which was adopted
after an equally fraudulent referendum in May 2008 and guarantees the
military 25% of the seats in parliament.
(ß DO- why there is no change in Burma’s
fundamental power structure)
For instance, the
charter's Chapter 12 lays out the complicated rules for constitutional
amendments, which effectively give the military veto power over any
proposed changes. The upper house currently consists of 168 elected
representatives with a quarter, or 56 delegates, directly representing the
defense services; the lower house is made up of 330 elected MPs and 110
appointed to represent the military. The ruling Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP), meanwhile, is widely viewed as a vehicle for the
military's political interests.
Minor constitutional
changes may be considered by the bicameral parliament if 20% of MPs submit a
bill. However, a tangle of 104 clauses mean that major charter
changes can not be made without the prior approval of more than 75% of
all MPs, after which a nationwide referendum must be held where more than
half of all eligible voters cast ballots.
This complicated procedure (DO- laid out in its Constitution), coupled with Myanmar's record of holding bogus referendums - the first in
1973 for the 1974 constitution was as lacking in credibility as the one held in
2008 - make is virtually impossible to change those clauses, which in various
ways and means legally safeguard the
military's now indirect hold on power.
For instance, one of
the first sections of the constitution guarantees the military's "national
political leadership role of the State" and, in case of an
"emergency", the "Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services has
the right to take over and exercise State sovereign power" after
consulting the president. "No legal action" can be taken against the
military for what it does while exercising such emergency powers, according to
the constitution.
Another clause bars
anyone whose parents, spouse or children who "owe allegiance to a foreign
power" from becoming president. Suu Kyi's late husband, Michael Aris, was
a British citizen, as are their two sons. The military's right to appoint a
quarter of all seats in what is otherwise an elected parliament is also
guaranteed, as is military control of one-third of all seats in local
assemblies.
(the constitution bars
Suu Kyi from becoming president)
In 2008, Myanmar's
generals got the constitution
they wanted and through
rigged elections now controls a solid majority of all seats in the parliament.
Consequently, they can
now afford to make some minor political concessions in response to
international pressure. Allowing MPs from
Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) to take part in a by-election on
April 1 for 40 seats in the lower house and six in the upper chamber left
vacant by the appointment of ministers, will not affect Myanmar's fundamental
power structure with the military at its apex.
Reversible reform
The semblance of
reform, however, has improved Myanmar's standing in the international community, as are other steps expected to be taken
by Thein Sein's government, including new laws allowing for limited public
protests and the creation of labor unions.
Since the constitution
bars Suu Kyi from becoming president, some observers speculate that if she wins
a seat in parliament she will be appointed minister of health or education, two
positions which she would consider important but will not give her substantial
political power and certainly no influence over the military.
"She would be
an excellent choice for a person to be sent abroad to solicit aid for health
and education programs and to attend international AIDS conferences and the
like," says a veteran Myanmar politician who spoke on condition of
anonymity.
Few would doubt that
Suu Kyi remains Myanmar's most popular politician - and for many the country's
main hope for a better future. But for the first time critical voices of her role are also being heard. In an unusually
candid interview with The Australian on January 6, Win Tin, one of
the original founders of the NLD in 1988 who was imprisoned for 19 years
for his beliefs, said that the
"reforms" taking place in Myanmar "are a ploy by the
country's dictatorship to seduce foreign governments and neutralize
Aung San Suu Kyi".
Other dissidents
- former political prisoners and leaders of local civil society groups -
complain that Suu Kyi meets readily with one foreign visitor after another
but has no time to see them. "One comment I hear frequently
is, 'what was the NLD fighting for if Daw Suu [Aung San Suu Kyi] will
run for the by-elections and by that accepting the 2008 constitution'?"
lamented one non-governmental organization worker in Yangon.
Ongoing fighting between ethnic rebels and government forces are another point of division. "In
particular the Kachin are disillusioned that there is no compassionate
speech or letter [from Suu Kyi] to their community, although some of the
Catholic Bishops have explicitly asked Daw Suu to send such a message,"
said one civil society activist. Since June last year, heavy fighting has been
raging between government troops and the rebel Kachin Independence Army in the
country's far north.
Tens of thousands of
civilians have fled the fighting to the Chinese border, or taken refuge in
churches and community halls in towns in the predominantly Christian state of
the Union. Farmers have been forced to abandon their crops and most refugees
are living as destitutes in border areas under constant threat of being pushed
back by unsympathetic Chinese authorities.
Some critics argue
that Suu Kyi has grown old and tired - she will turn 67 this year
- and the present, slight opening, however flawed, may be her last chance to
achieve her vision of a more democratic Myanmar. But it is equally plausible
that Myanmar's close relationship with China, and, more menacingly, its military
partnership with North Korea, have prompted Western powers to
push her into accepting some kind of accommodation with Thein Sein's
government. Without her engagement with the new regime, it would be hard for
the US and European Union to justify a dramatic change in policy towards
Myanmar.
(Do- To some critics, Suu
Kyi is a leverage for the US and EU to use against Burmese government that has
close relationship with China and military partnership with N.Korea)
When US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton met Thein Sein during her historic visit to Myanmar last
December - the first by such a high-ranking US official in half a century -
China was tellingly high on her diplomatic agenda. The first agenda item
raised by Thein Sein during the meeting was the importance of
Myanmar's relationship with China, which Clinton apparently did not
object to. However, she emphasized that relations with the US would
"if reforms maintain momentum" - thus leaving the door open for
Myanmar to diversify its foreign relations.
After Washington
decided in mid-January to establish full diplomatic ties with Myanmar, Clinton
said the US "will further embrace" Myanmar if "the government (1) releases all remaining
political prisoners, (2) ends
violence against minorities and (3)
cuts military ties with North Korea". After her December visit, she
said that the US would agree to and support assessment missions to Myanmar by
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, a first step
toward renewed multilateral lending for badly needed infrastructure.
(DO – speaking of (3),
there is clear evidence on cooperation b/w Burma and N. Korea on missile development,
whereas only one testimony by a defector from Burma support the allegation that
N. Korea helps Burma with nuclear program)
Myanmar's staunchly
nationalistic military may be willing to lessen its dependence on China, and
even cut its ties with North Korea, provided the US and its allies can offer
something substantial in return, including an eventual removal of economic
sanctions. However, if one reads the 2008 constitution carefully, Myanmar
will not become a genuine democracy any time soon, but rather a thinly disguised authoritarian state that the US and the West can cynically live with to counterbalance China's influence.
That is not what many
pro-democracy activists, both at home and in exile, have been fighting for
since the bloody, nationwide uprising against military-dominated rule in
1988, when thousands of protesters were mowed down by the military, and
when they overwhelmingly voted for the NLD in the 1990 election,
a democratic result that the military refused to honor. In the case of any future
"emergency", the limited new freedoms that Myanmar's people are now
enjoying can also be curtailed, perhaps next time by constitutional means
rather than the barrel of a gun.
Bertil Lintner is a
former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and author of several
books on Burma/Myanmar, including Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's Struggle for
Democracy (Published in 2011). He is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media
Services.
