What's The Truth About The War In Afghanistan?



Talk of the Nation, NPR
What's The Truth About The War In Afghanistan?
GUESTS: Jim McGovern, Jonathan Landay, Tom Donnelly.  Feb. 9, 2012

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis spent the last year in Afghanistan, where he hoped to find conditions matching the cautious optimism he heard from U.S. commanders. But in a recent piece in the Armed Forces Journal, he wrote that what he saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements, and the American people deserve better than what they've gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Colonel Davis concludes simply telling the truth would be a good start.

Congressman Jim McGovern, a Democrat from Massachusetts, one of four members briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Davis, and he joins us now from his office on the Capitol, and nice to have you with us.  

JIM MCGOVERN:  what he's asking for is more of an honest discussion, and he also expressed concern about the fact that more and more information about Afghanistan is being considered classified. So the Congress and the American people aren't getting as much access to what's really happening there

NEAL CONAN:  Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti, who said that the lieutenant colonel's view is one person's view and said Afghan forces will be good enough to take over from the American-led coalition as we pull out over the next couple of years.

JIM MCGOVERN:  By the accounts that I've heard when I've been over in Afghanistan and from accounts that I've heard from, soldiers who have returned don't have a lot of trust in the Afghan armed forces or security forces. And they don't have a lot of trust in the Afghan government
President Karzai is a crook, that the corruption is so deep in that country that, you know, it's not salvageable and that Americans are putting their lives on the line basically to defend a government that's not worth defending
purpose
we went there to go after al-Qaida. We got Osama bin Laden, not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan.  What is the mission? And to imply that somehow the Afghan security forces are ready to take over and have achieved an amount this professionalism is just plain wrong

People ought to know why we're spending billions and billions of dollars over in Afghanistan, nation-building and supporting a corrupt government. People ought to know the facts because their sons and daughters are the ones who are being sent over there to risk their lives on behalf of this policy.

we should be talking about this policy. We should be talking about the realities on the ground. But this kind of knee-jerk reaction that every time somebody within the military stands up and tells the truth that all of a sudden they're subject to an investigation, and their character is questioned. This is just wrong-headed.

Taliban still in Afghan waiting for the US to pull out
JONATHAN LANDAY:  I went down south to Kandahar, which is one of the two provinces where the U.S. surge went into.  how the Taliban have purposely not engaged the United States, they're not fighting face-to-face. Their leaders have gone to Pakistan to wait out the clock that President Obama himself set in December, 2009.
 
Tribal elders who are unable to go back to their villages, and as they drive down the main street, they see the Taliban dressed - obviously without their weapons. 
But one of them said to me I know that they're Taliban, it's just the Americans don't..

NEAL CONAN: If they're just waiting for the American forces to leave, does that not give the Afghan forces, and indeed the Afghan government, as corrupt and as inefficient it might be, time to start becoming less corrupt, less deficient and more trusted by the people of Afghanistan? 

Non-military part of the war
JONATHAN LANDAY: This is the non-military part of the war. The government is ridden with corruption. You have an army that does not reflect the geographical dispersion of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan.  It reflects the ethnic proportions, but a lot of the Pashtuns, which is the dominant ethnic group from the south, are not joining the army because they are simply waiting. They know, first of all, that they risk their lives doing that, and they risk the lives of their families, but also they're waiting - sitting on the fence because they know what's coming. 
And what's coming is, in fact, a reversion to the civil war that the United States interrupted in 2001 when it went in. Only this time, as another observer said, on - Somalia on steroids, given the amount of weaponry the United States has poured in there. And it risks turning into a proxy war between Pakistan, which backs the Taliban, and its foe for the last 67 years, India.
 
That threatens regional instability, and this is something that the Obama administration and the U.S. military refuse to talk about publicly. 


NEAL CONAN: And I wonder: There are two levels of which Lieutenant Colonel Davis writes about that are significant, one of which is his assessment that where he went, and that was a lot of different places, the tactical situation was from bad to abysmal. And the other was that we're not getting the truth from U.S. military commanders

TOM DONNELLY: Not immediately. The civil war of the 1990s between the departure of the Soviets and the attacks of 2001 was a bit of a unique beast. It's certainly the case that, of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the Tajiks and the Uzbek and the Hazara and, actually, a good slice of the Pashtuns - and when we treat the Pashtun as though they're kind of monolith and that's hardly the case - have no interest in Taliban rule and influence from Pakistan et cetera, et cetera. So there is a fairly solid anti-Taliban base that really accounts for the majority of the population and, actually, a majority of the country.
That said, in the southern and southeastern parts of the country, there are unreconstructed Taliban, with Pakistani help and under the directorship of the Quetta Shura or people like the Hakanis, for example, there are plenty of people who can make life in Afghanistan miserable for Afghans. Their ability to generate a large-scale civil war, I think, one should be somewhat skeptical about, at least in the foreseeable future.

What I would really be worried about is that they will become a fight amongst a whole host of interested parties. Your caller mentioned the Indians. The Iranians will be the same. The Uzbek and the Tajiks across the border would naturally support their brethren. So the potential is there, but one should not think that it will immediately go back to a late-'90s kind of situation where you have shelling of Kabul, for example.

JONATHAN LANDAY: I think it depends a great deal on Pakistan and what it wants and to a great deal on the - on what the Americans and the Afghan government are talking to the Taliban about in terms of a political settlement of the war. If that settlement ignores the deep concerns and redlines of the minorities, the formerly - the leaders of the former Northern Alliance, then I think that Afghanistan could see a resumption of that civil war. If there is an agreement among the Americans and the Karzai government to talk to the former Northern Alliance, find out what their concerns are about bringing the reconciliation and address those concerns, then I think the chance for civil war is a great deal diminished. Unfortunately, that is not happening right now.

NEAL CONAN: Jonathan Landay, thanks very much for your time. Our thanks as well to Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute's Center for Defense Studies. We were talking about an article called "Truth, Lies and Afghanistan" in the Armed Forces Journal by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis

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DEB RIECHMANN and RAHIM FAIEZ   02/25/12
KABUL, Afghanistan — A gunman killed two American military advisers .. inside a heavily guarded ministry building, and NATO ordered military workers out of Afghan ministries as protests raged for a fifth day over the burning of copies of the Quran at a U.S. army base.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the Interior Ministry attack, saying it was retaliation for the Quran burnings, after the U.S. servicemen – a lieutenant colonel and a major – were found dead on the floor of an office that only people who know a numerical combination can get into, Afghan and Western officials said.

The top commander of U.S. and NATO forces recalled all international military personnel from the ministries, an unprecedented action in the decade-long war that highlights the growing friction between Afghans and their foreign partners at a critical juncture in the war


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The International Herald Tribune
Kabul's stealth attack on human rights
PATRICIA GOSSMAN, December 27, 2011 Tuesday

Sadly, not rocking the boat has been the American mantra for the past decade, and has only worsened insecurity. From the outset, the military campaign in Afghanistan reflected the narrow U.S. objective of defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda and creating a government able to maintain stability following a troop withdrawal. Washington chose its allies among anti-Taliban forces, mostly comprising Northern Alliance warlords and their militias. The Pentagon consistently rebuffed concerns that these commanders, most with long records of war crimes, might prove to be a destabilizing factor. Ten years later, stability in Afghanistan is still an elusive goal.

But the past is not just the past in Afghanistan. In October, the United Nations published a report on rampant torture in Afghan government detention facilities. As a Western official who investigated torture under the Communist regime told me, just ''replace 2011 with 1979 and guess what?'' Things have barely changed. It is no surprise that the National Directorate of Security is known today by it's acronym from Soviet times, Khad. The practice of torture is the same, though it is not yet as pervasive.

That the past is repeating itself is no surprise to Afghans: When I was in Kabul in the late 1990s, people told me time and again that the only thing they feared more than the Taliban was that the warlords of the Northern Alliance might return to power.

The U.S. promise to build a democratic Afghanistan with respect for human rights seems all but forgotten, but it is still possible to salvage some measure of human rights protection. To start, the Obama administration and its European allies should raise concerns immediately with the Karzai government about the termination of the Human Rights Commissioners' appointments, and express strong support for the work Nadery and his colleagues have done.