sec.. J. jurisdictional reach of the federal district courts p.191
à. Rule 4 : service of process rule
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) –
- when federal statute does not otherwise authorize jurisdiction, the federal court “piggy-backs” on the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits
Rule 4 (k) Territorial Limits of Effective Service.
(1) In General.
Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant:
(A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located;
Q : federal court’s personal jurisdiction over state breach of contract action
- à. Rule 4.k.(1).(A) – importing state long arm statute ; use state long arm statute for service of process (Cf. Rule 4.k.(1).(C) - federal statute use federal long arm statute)
- why not allow P to sue in any federal dist. court in US under either (i) minimum contact with the US or (ii) citizenship of the US ? (under consent theory, DP concern is not raised) (why not let any US citizen be sued in any of federal court?)
- à. Congress chose to treat federal court to look like state court for the purpose of personal jurisdiction ; it is not a matter of DP
- à. Venue theory
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 1987, p.192
- Rule 4(k)(2) [ is a limited federal long-arm statute that establishes personal jurisdiction for a claim that arises under federal law if the D is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction … ] was promulgated partly in response to the present case
- Petitioners, corporate and individual investors, sued respondent corporation alleging … in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA, Fed. statute). Respondent corporation impleaded respondents, a broker and its agent who were in Britain.
o Though respondent Corp. was in NY, but it impleaded a broker and its agent who were in Britain ; thus, the broker and its agent has no minimum contact in U.S.
o in theory, ways to reach D : (i) in personam jurisdiction – minimum contact in international shoe standard, here, no, (ii) state long arm statute – here, no, (iii) authorization to serve process by CEA or F.R.Civ, here, no
- The court held (i) the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over respondents, (ii) no authorization to serve process is found in neither the CEA nor the state long-arm statute, (iii) the requirements of the long-arm statute were not met, (iv) declined to create a common law rule authorizing service of process ;
(k) Territorial Limits of Effective Service.
(2) Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction.
For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if:
(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and
(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.
Q : French corp. has no minimum contacts with any of state, but doing biz in US
- à. Rule 4.k.(2), a sort of safety valve,
Rule 1 scope and purpose
“(These rules) should be construed … to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”
* Q : NY defendant is sued in federal court in MO, how does D argue no personal jurisdiction ?
- Rule 12 (b) : raise the lack of personal jurisdiction either i) in the answer or ii) in a motion before filing an answer (Rule. 12.g), otherwise too late to raise it
- e.g. D contended lack of personal jurisdiction, lost, did not appear in court since then, got default judgment ; P goes to NY court ; NY court pursuant to Full Credit clause ; D cannot argue again that there was no personal jurisdiction in MO court ; (You can’t litigate twice)
- e.g. same above except that D did not contend and got default judgment ; D can argue in NY court that there was no personal jurisdiction in MO court (here, there was no litigation before, D has no obligation to fly to where place P filed a suit)
<Pendent personal jurisdiction> p.195
United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 2002, p.195
Pendent personal jurisdiction
- Once a (U.S.) district court has personal jurisdiction over a D for one claim, it may ‘piggyback’ onto that claims other claims over which it lacks independent personal jurisdiction, provided that all the claims arises from the same facts as the claim over which it has proper personal jurisdiction
- Justification : convenience, judicial economy, and fairness to the litigants
Sec. K. challenging a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the person or property p.195
1.. raising the jurisdictional issue directly
- Rule 12(b), (g), (h)
special appearance
- If he did anything else, deemed to have made a ‘general appearance,” constituting a voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction
2.. collateral attack on personal jurisdiction p.197
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso., 283 U.S. 522, 1931, p.197
- When a defendant in a federal court appears specially only for the sole purpose of quashing service for want of jurisdiction over his person, and is fully heard upon the question, and, upon the overruling of the objection, takes no further part in the case and seeks no review, a judgment subsequently entered against him on the merits is res judicata on the question of jurisdiction and is not subject to be collaterally attacked on that same ground when sued on in another State.
- The full faith and credit clause, Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, does not apply to the federal courts.
- No right to litigate the same question twice is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
- A defendant who makes no appearance whatsoever remains free to challenge a default judgment for want of personal jurisdiction
3.. the limited appearance problem p.198
A limited appearance
- Allows a D in an action commenced on a quasi-in-rem basis to appear for the limited purpose of defending his interest in the attached property without submitting to the full in personam jurisdiction of the court
- Without it, a D must choose between appearing , and thereby risking the possibility of an in personam judgment in excess of the value of the attached property, OR not appearing, thereby, as a practical matter suffering the forfeiture of his property
Ch..3.. providing notice and an opportunity to be heard p.199
DP (due process clause) requires several conditions for a valid judgment
- The court have jurisdiction over the parties
- The parties must have adequate notice of the commencement of the action and the issues involved in it
- The parties must have an adequate opportunity to present their side of the case to the court
Sec…A. the requirement of reasonable notice
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
Fact
- (D) bank and a trust company established a common trust fund that complied with N.Y. Banking Law ; D petitioned for a settlement ; beneficiary was appointed as the special guardian ;
- The only notice given to the beneficiaries was by a publication in a local newspaper that was in strict compliance with the NY banking law
- The beneficiary (P, appellant) contended the notice and statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries violated due process
Held
- The notice requirement under the NY banking law,,, sufficient as to beneficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not (with due diligence) be ascertained ,,, and as to those whose interests were conjectural or future or did not in the due course of business come to the knowledge of the trustee,,, but insufficient as to known present beneficiaries of a known place of residence
Reasoning
- A fundamental requisite of due process of law is “the opportunity to be heard”
- A fundamental requirement of due process of law … is notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections; and the notice must be of such nature that it reasonably conveys the required information, and must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance; but if, with due regard for practicalities and peculiarities of the case, those conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied
Note 5, p.207
- The Court has held that constructive notice does not satisfy Mullane’s due process mandate if the name and address of the D is known or available from public records
section B. the mechanics of giving notice p.213
- F.R.Civ. 4
- notice of a suit is given by the service of process upon the D
Maryland State Firemen's Ass'n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353, 1996, p.215
- Service of process must be effective before default or default judgment may be entered
- Sending summons and complaint by first class mail was ineffective service of process (when certified mail is required) and precluded entry of default or default judgment,
- even if defendant had actual notice of suit; defendant did not waive service as required to have effective service under federal rules and did not use certified mail as required for effective service under Maryland procedure
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. (NY) v. Szukhent (MI), in NY state court, 375 U.S. 311, 1964, p.221
Summary
- Rule 4.(e).(2).(c) “an agent authorized by appointment”
- rental company (NY) leased farm equipment to D (MI) ; D defaulted on the lease and P company filed suit in NY ; Pursuant to its contract agreement with D, P company served a summons upon D's agent in NY ; The agent forwarded the summons and D was aware of the lawsuit (D in fact received complete and timely notice of lawsuit)
- D objected to this service of summons under Rule 4(d), arguing that the agent was unknown to D
- Held – D had been properly served the summons for the lawsuit when the agent forwarded the summons to them, and they were aware of the lawsuit … it was irrelevant that the agent was unknown to D.
4.. service of process and statutes of limitation p.231
- Rule 3 : the suit is commenced when a copy of the complaint is filed with the district court
State ex rel. Sivnksty v. Duffield, 137 W. Va. 112, p.233
- because the driver (D) entered the county voluntarily at the time of his arrest and confinement, he was subject to service of process irrespective of the question of his residence
- incarceration in itself did not make a person immune from the service of process.
Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, p.237
- Appellant, who had been having an affair with a married man in New York, enticed him to travel to Florida with a false story that she was about to leave the United States. When appellee arrived in Florida, he was served with a complaint for seduction under promise of marriage. Appellee ignored the summons, and judgment was entered by default. Appellant attempted to enforce the judgment in New York. The trial court dismissed her case. The appellate court affirmed because the judgment was procured fraudulently and without jurisdiction
