contracts outline -3

Ch. 3 statute of fraud (p.257)

REST 2d (Chapter 5. The Statute Of Frauds) § 110. Classes Of Contracts Covered

(1) The following classes of contracts are subject to the Statute of Frauds, forbidding enforcement unless there is a written memorandum

- (a) (the executor-administrator provision); (b) (the surety-ship provision); (c) (the marriage provision); (d) (the land contract provision); (e) not to be performed within one year from the making thereof (the one-year provision). (f) DO – gift

(2) The following classes of contracts, which were traditionally subject to the Statute of Frauds, are now governed by Statute of Frauds provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code:

- (a) a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201);

- (b) a contract for the sale of securities (Uniform Commercial Code § 8-319);

- (c) a contract for the sale of personal property not otherwise covered, to the extent of enforcement by way of action or defense beyond $5,000 in amount or value of remedy (Uniform Commercial Code § 1-206).

UCC § 2-201, Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.

- (1) a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $5,000 or more is not enforceablesigned by the party against which enforcement is sought ; (4) (one-year provision is not applicable)

Rest, § 112. Requirement Of Surety-ship (p.257)

- A contract is not within the Statute of Frauds as a contract to answer for the duty of another unless the promisee is an obligee of the other's duty, the promisor is a surety for the other, and the promisee knows or has reason to know of the suretyship relation.

DO

- promisor promises promisee to pay some money which the other has to pay to promisee ;; the other has a duty to pay money to promisee, promisee is obligee of the other’s duty, promisor tells promisee “I will pay money for the other” )

- e.g. a contract is within Statute of Frauds ; a promise is within Statute of Frauds

Rest § 115. Novation (p.257)

- A contract that is itself accepted in satisfaction of a previously existing duty of a third person to the promisee is not within the Statute of Frauds as a contract to answer for the duty of another.

- Exam - Novation is not within Statute of Frauds

Rest § 121. Contract Of Assignor Or Factor

- (1) A contract by the assignor of a right that the obligor of the assigned right will perform his duty is not within the Statute of Frauds as a contract to answer for the duty of another.

- Exam - Assignment of right is NOT within Statute of Frauds

Rest § 125. Contract To Transfer, Buy, Or Pay For An Interest In Land

- (1) A promise to transfer to any person any interest in land is within the Statute of Frauds.

- . A promises B to transfer Blackacre to B, in consideration of B's promise to pay A $5,000. A tenders a deed of Blackacre to B and B accepts the deed. B's promise (to pay $5,000 to A) is no longer within the land contract provision of the Statute of Frauds.

- the vendee … both furnish evidence that the oral contract was in fact made and also create a reliance interest on the part of the vendee in having the contract enforced … he may be able to have the contract enforced through specific performance

Rest § 131. General Requisites of A Memorandum

- …, a contract within the Statute of Frauds is enforceable ifby any writing, signed bythe party to be charged, which

- (a) … the subject matter of the contract, (b) … the parties (c) … the essential terms of the unperformed promises in the contract

Rest § 136. Time of Memorandum

- A memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute may be made or signed at any time before or after the formation of the contract.

§ 148. Rescission by Oral Agreement (p.257)

- Notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, all unperformed duties under an enforceable contract may be discharged by an oral agreement of rescission. The Statute may, however, apply to a contract to rescind a transfer of property.

- (DO – unless transfer of property, unperformed duty may be discharged by oral agreement)

§ 149. Oral Modification

- (DO- unless transfer of property, the originally agreed terms may be modified orally)

Ch. 4. Policing bargaining process (p.310)

1., capacity

Rest § 12. Capacity to Contract

- (1) No one can be bound by contract who has not legal capacity to incur at least voidable contractual duties. .

- (2) A natural person (a) under guardianship, or ; (b) an infant, or (c) mentally ill or defective, or (d) intoxicated.

§ 14. Infants (p.310)

- Unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person's eighteenth birthday.

§ 16. Intoxicated Persons

- A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if the other party has reason to know that by reason of intoxication

- (a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.

Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 39 Wis. 2d 20, (p.312)

- Generally, minor's contract, other than for necessaries, is either void or voidable at his option

- General rule permitting dis-affirmance of contract is not affected by minor's status as emancipated or un-emancipated

- Minor buyer's request that seller take automobile back and,, letter from minor's attorney advising seller of buyer's minority, declaring contract void, tendering return of automobile, and demanding repayment, was effective dis-affirmance.

- Seller under contract disaffirmed by minor has tort remedy for minor's misrepresentation of his age

pressure, concealment, misrepresentation in bargaining (p.322)

- A mid-marriage agreement which resolves the issue of equitable distribution and alimony in the event of divorce. P (husband) threatened wife to divorce if wife refused to make the contract. Refusal to make the contract would have cost the wife divorce, break-up of a family with two sons, which she wanted to avoid. P.324

- Issue : whether the agreement is enforceable – whether it is unfair, it result from coercion or duress ;; held that the mid-marriage agreement was coercive.

In pre-nuptial agreement - no risk of divorce yet, no risk of destroying family

In agreement at a marriage’s termination - each party can look to his or her economic rights, the relationship is adversarial

In a mid-marriage agreement in the present case - (i) marriage does not lose all of its vitality, (ii) at least one party wanted marriage to survive, (iii) cost to divorce is destruction of family with two sons, and stigma of a failed marriage,

- Exam ** coercive + under duress + unfair

Alaska Packers' , <pre-existing duty rule> p.325

- Held : the promise to pay additional wage is not legally enforceable

- (1) <consideration> - a promise to pay an additional sum for pre-existing duty under contract is without consideration”; (a contract is void under which owner of a building agreed to pay contractor an additional sum because of his refusal to otherwise proceed with the contract) ; – it is taking advantage of the necessities of his adversary = opportunism : wait until the other party get weaker

- , (i) the season is extremely short, (ii) impossible to secure replacement workers, (iii) the new promise is based upon the exact service,

- (2) <breach of original contract> no waiver of the breach of the original contract – here, (i) the workers breached the contract, and the company did not waive it, (ii) the supervisor had no authority to modify the original contract

- (Prof.) (i) pricing differentiation – incentive for workers to move to Chicago, for industry to invest in SF for cheap labor, (ii) Alaska packers had awesome lawyers

p.329

- employee was offered more money from another employer. Original employment contract was destroyed. Second employment contact was made to increase employee’s salary. à. full rescission of original contract, the new contract with only difference of increased salary

- if full rescission of the original contract is (i) by mutual consent and (ii) valid,, .. the parties can make a new one to complete the same work at a different rate of compensation. Here, the new contract is enforceable.

- practical reason, otherwise, parties having once made a contract would be prevented from changing it no matter how willing they might be to do so.

- distinction between here and Loral,(p.340) in terms of duress - unlike Loral, here, the employee was offered more money from another employer ; like in Loral, here, employer couldn’t get a designer now.

Watkins & Son v. Carrig , modification> p.331

- contract for excavation to remove “all materials” ; no understanding that no rock would be found ; contractor (P)’s manager improvident ; rock was found ; D agreed to pay additional price for the removal of the rock

- if the process in reaching the new arrangement is inoffensive to the doctrine of consideration

- changes to meet changes in circumstances should be valid,

- creditor may make voluntary and gratuitous concession to his debtor,,

- D yielded to the demand without protest ,

- defense of <mutual mistake> not available, here, coz pacta sunt servanda ,”all materials”

- Exam - modification of original contract (i) consideration, (ii) changes to meet changes in circumstances, (iii) intentional and voluntary concession, (iv) duress,(v) mutual mistake

C.C. King Co. v. Aldrich

- contract for a sale of “two good large hogs” ; D knew that P were buying the hogs for food ; P paid and discovered the hogs delivered were with disease ;

- both parties thought (at the time of contract formation) the hogs should be free from disease

Austin v. Loral Corp, p.340

- Loral contractor; Austin sub-contractor ; Loral contracted with Navy to supply radar during Vietnam war ; Austin supply precision gear to Loral ; Austin demanded increase in the price

- “ a contract is voidable on the ground of duress when a party was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of his free will “ ; a mere threat to breach a contract, though wrongful, not duress ; when a party threatens to breach a contract, (i) the threaten party could not obtain substitute goods, (ii) the ordinary remedy for breach of contract would not be adequate,

- contractor Loral could not fine substitute sub-contractor, facing liquidated damage (imposed by Navy), jeopardize a chance for future contract (with Navy),,, thus, Loral had no choice but to accept the increase in price

- (DO- if apply under duress to Alaska packers case ? here, pre-existing duty rule )

Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist, p.346

- <under duress> “by means of wrongful threat” - here, dismiss the employment of teacher is not only lawful, but obligation of the school,

- <actual fraud> actual fraud, conscious mis-representation, concealment, or non-disclosure of material fact , here, lacked (i) knowledge of falsity, (ii) intent to induce reliance, (iii) justifiable reliance

- <constructive fraud> in a confidential or fiduciary relationship , here, just employee and employer, not fiduciary relationship

- <mistake> consent was obtained through a mistake of fact or law , here, no

- <undue influence> a use of excessive pressure, to one vulnerable to such a pressure, usually in a confidential relationship ; however, no excuse for bad bargaining ;; over-persuasion is inferred from unusual time, unusual place of negotiation, urge that the biz should be done at once, no time to consult adviser or attorney,

- taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind is undue influence,

<to what extent, information should be disclosed to the other party during negotiation> Laidlaw case p.352

- The buyer, having learned earlier that the British blockade … was to be lifted …, bought a huge quantity of tobacco at a cheap price from a seller without this information, the seller later sought to have the transaction rescinded for fraud

- The vendee is not bound to communicate to the vendor of goods the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and which is exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, particularly where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties

entrepreneurial information (productive information)

- parties should have a right-not-to-disclose productive information, which is information that is costly to produce, impossible to protect via intellectual property rights, and valuable to other market player, ;; so that without the right-not-to-disclose, free-rider problem will discourage the production of the information

Swinton termite case p.353

- infested with termites, knowing the internal destruction. The vendee (P) could not readily observe this condition upon inspection..

- non-liability for bare non-disclosure ; (Laidlaw = Swinton)

- (i) infestation of building by termite has not been common in MA, (ii) the law does not expect idealistic standard of human nature

- (i) no affirmative mis-representation, (ii) no half-truth ; (iii) no intimation that the vendor prevented the vendee from acquiring information as to the condition of the house ; (iv) no fiduciary relationship ; (v) no duty to speak ;

- ** non-liability for bare non-disclosure ; half truth ; affirmative misrep ; (iv) intimation that vendor prevents vendee from getting information, (v) fiduciary relationship, (vi) duty to speak **

- <least cost info gathering>

Kannavos p.356

- vendee purchased a property from vendor to invest as multi-family house, which was prohibited by local zoning, vendee sought to rescind the purchase.

(1), when duty to disclose more arise, so as to avoid deception and reliance on a half-truth? ;

- despite the rule of non-liability for bare non-disclosure, … if vendor does speaka given point of information,, voluntarily or at the other’s request,, he is bound to speak all the material facts bearing on the point that lie within his knowledge ; (duty to disclose all material facts relevant to the point within his knowledge) ; (fragmentary information may be as misleading as active misrepresentation, and half-truth may be as actionable as whole lies)

- vendor made a representation that the property was to be used as multi-family housing for investment. The vendor knew that the vendee relied on it and it was prohibited by zoning.

- half-truth : rescind the contract – contract is voidable,

(2), whether vendee (P) is barred from recovery merely because the vendee did not use due diligence when could readily have discovered the defect

- the zoning violation could have been discovered by exercising due diligence through public record (whereas, the termite would have been discovered only by retaining expert investigators )

- (Where there is reliance on fraudulent representations, under MA cases) (P) is not barred from recovery merely because he did not use due diligence when they could readily have discovered from records defects (what the true facts were.)

- DO- in Swinton no affirmative statement ; whereas, in Kannavos, the vendor made statement as to the state of the property - multi-family purpose in violation of the ordinance with knowledge of the purpose of the vendee - income property of multi-family use.

- Prof, GDG – “least cost information gathering

Vokes v, trade puffing> p.362

- (P) dance student, (D) dance studio ; the dance studio induced her to sign a series of the contract, lying that she was improving and has potential ; Held, Vokes old woman could avoid contract on the ground of misrepresentation

- (1) misrepresentation on opinion not on fact ; (2) distinction between “trade puffing” and misrepresentation,

- generally misrepresentation is one of fact, not one of opinion … however, (i) fiduciary relationship, or (ii) trick employed by representer or (iii) parties do not deal at arm’s length, or (iv) where the representee does not have equal opportunity to become apprised of the truth of the fact represented

- “a statement of a party having superior knowledge, regarded as a statement of fact,, although considered as opinion if the parties were dealing at arm’s length”

- If contracting party who owes no duty to disclose facts within his knowledge or to answer inquiries respecting such facts undertakes to disclose, he must disclose whole truth. “

- (2) DO- whether (trade puffing) and (misrepresentation),,, here, sole intent was to induce her to buy addition hours of lessons

- (a) the dance studio had superior knowledge as to whether dance student had potential or improved, (b) the deception was made solely to induce her to buy additional hours of lessons. Cf. “least cost information gathering