Sec. B.. the problem of ascertaining state law p.466
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, p.466
- “It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent "general law" of conflict of laws .. the proper function of the Delaware federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be”
- Federal court must apply the conflict-of-law rules of the states in which they sit
Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, p.468
- Appellant injured party filed suit against appellee manufacturer to recover damages he sustained when a negligently manufactured grinding wheel exploded in his face and caused him to suffer serious injury.
- The trial court applied the substantive law of Mississippi and determined, reluctantly, that appellant could not recover because he was not in privity of contract with appellee.
- The court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded. The court held that the rule in Mississippi was against the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions which had adopted the modern rule of allowing third-parties, not in privity of contract with manufacturers, to recover for injuries which resulted from the negligence of manufacturers. The court found that the Mississippi Supreme Court had not addressed the issue for some years, and concluded that the Mississippi Court was ready to adopt the modern rule because it had favorably discussed it in dicta contained in a recent opinion.
Ch.8 modern pleading p.554
Four functions of pleading rules
- (i) providing notice of the nature of a claim or defense, (ii) weed out baseless claims, (iii) setting each party’s view of the facts, (iv) narrowing the issue ; (iii) and (iv) through discovery
Sec.. A. complaint
Rule 8 – general rules of pleading
- (a) claim for relief – a pleading must contain (i) grounds, (ii) claim, (iii) relief
Rule 12(b) – defense – failure to state a claim
Dioguardi v. , p.559
- P brought a negligence action against D (Collector of Customs), alleging that (i) D sold P’s merchandise at a lower price and that (ii) D was somehow responsible for the disappearance of some of P’s goods ;
- P’s complaint was dismissed for failing to state a cause of action, and P appealed
- there is no pleading requirement of stating "facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," (X, old model) but only that there be "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Rule 8(a), (under “notice pleading system”) and the motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b) is for failure to state "a claim upon which relief can be granted"
- here, the P has disclosed his claims that (i) the collector has converted two cases of tonics, (ii) the collector sold the rest in a manner incompatible with the public auction
Swierkiewicz v. , p.565,
- Held : employment discrimination complaint need not include specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, but contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” Rule 8(a)(2)
- Rationale : (i) facts establishing a prima facie case are to succeed on the merits, (ii) Rule 8(a)(2) textual approach, (iii) the notice pleading system relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, p.568
- P, subscribers to local telephone services ; D, the major telephone companies ; class action ; for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust act
- Allegation (1) inhibit the growth of local phone companies, (2) eliminate competition among themselves in territories where any one was dominant
Held
- On certain subject understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a P must state factual allegations with greater particularity than that required by general rule governing pleadings
o Rationale : (i) a P with a largely groundless claim uses a suit as a threat to settle, (ii) anti-trust discovery is expensive, the discovery process cannot weed out groundless claim (iii)
- Stating a claim under Sherman Act’s restraint of trade provision requires factual matter enough to suggest that an agreement was made ; an allegation of parallel business conduct will not alone suffice to state a claim under the Sherman Act
o Crucial question is whether the challenged anti-competitive conduct stems from independent decision (that the parallel conduct is in best interest of the company) or from an agreement ; (DO- thus, pleading requires allegation of an agreement, as opposed to bare assertion of agreement)
- Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted does not require appearance that P can prove no set of facts in support of claim that would entitle him to relief (DO- even though P appears to be able to prove the necessary facts, dismissal under Rule 12(b) still can be granted)
Twombly’s plausibility standard
- the federal appellate courts had invoked Twombly’s plausibility standard in cases on a wide variety of non-anti-trust topics , See, Ashcroft case (the US Supreme Court case)
- DO- law is not settled as to whether “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” or “facial plausibility standard”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
- Muslim Pakistani pretrial detainee brought action against current and former government officials, alleging that they took series of unconstitutional actions against him ; Held that detainee’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination
- To survive motion to dismiss, complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face ; claim has “facial plausibility” when P pleads factual matter that allows court to draw reasonable inference that D is liable for misconduct alleged (Rule 12(b)(6))
Garcia v. Hilton Hotels , p.579
- Garcia sued Hilton Hotels, for defamation ; D moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted
Held
- “a short and plain statement of claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief”
- Motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be filed and granted prior to responsive pleading only when it appears to certainty that P would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim
- Complaint, alleging that P had been (i) violently discharged and (ii) falsely and slanderously accused of procuring for prostitution, stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, notwithstanding the failure to state that there was a publication of the alleged slanderous utterance (DO- in a suit for defamation, the failure to state publication survives the motion under Rule 12(b)(6))
- In action for slander, when complaint fails to set out substantially utterance alleged to have been slanderously made OR facts relied upon to establish publication of such utterance, such omission constitutes vagueness such as is ground for granting motion for more definite statement under Rule 12(e)(Motion for a more definite statement)
o DO- in action for slander, if slanderous utterance is not sufficiently stated OR publication is not stated at all, motion under Rule 12(e) may be granted (not Rule 12(b)(6))
- absolute privilege constitutes conclusive defense to action based on privileged utterance ; when absolute privilege exist in action for defamation, motion (or defense) under Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted ;
- as a matter of law, availability of defense of conditional privilege does not necessarily lead to dismissal on motion under Rule 12(b)(6), since factual question remains as to whether D abused privilege
3.. burden of pleading and the burden of production p.584
Sec. B. responding to the complaint p.602
1.. time for response
- Rule 12(a) gives D 21 days from the service of the complaint to respond either by a motion or by answering the complaint ; Rule 6(b) extending time
American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, p.603
- The state employees contended that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim Rule 12(b)(6) ;
- The complaint charged (1) that D State of Illinois had intentionally discriminated by departing from the market measure of salaries on the grounds of sex and (2) that the State of Illinois had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by merely failing to pay comparable wages for comparable work
- While the latter (2) allegation was not actionable under Title VII, the former (1) allegation was ; the complaint was not to be dismissed merely because it included invalid claims along with a valid one
- the requisite proof of (1) intentional discrimination was not to be inferred merely from the results of a comparable worth study and from the refusal of an employer to implement the study's recommendations ; though P had no cause of action against D IL based strictly on “comparable worth” study, P further alleged intentional discrimination sufficient to state sex discrimination cause of action ; the court remanded for further proceeding
- when D is unclear about meaning of particular allegation in complaint, proper course is not to move to dismiss, but to move for more definite statement - Rule 12(e)
4.. answering the complaint p.612
Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., <P.P.I. case> p.612
- P was injured when the forklift he was operating collided with another forklift ; P sued wrong D supposing it to be employer of the other forklift (vicarious liability) ; D’s answer contained a general denial, (as opposed to a specific denial only as to the employment relationship allegation), though D did not contest P’s injury or the fact of collision ;
- P was not in bad faith in suing wrong D employer ; rather it was easy to misunderstood ; in the mean while statute of limitation expires, thus, P cannot sue true employer
- Held – the wrong had admitted that the forklift operator was its own agent (employee), (despite a general denial) = (the general denial was ineffective) ; since insurance company has been representing the wrong D, wrong D and true D was insured by same insurance company, thus, no prejudice to true D ;
- (prof. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) (relation back of amendment) could have been better way to solve this problem – P.P.I (true employer) should have known the action)
B.. affirmative defense - Rule 8.(c)
Ingraham v. U.S., p.618
- P patients were injured by the negligence of D government's physicians ; P filed suit and were awarded millions of dollars ; D did not pleaded statute of limitation in trial court ;
- D filed a motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59, which was denied ; …
- Held : an affirmative defense has been waived by D due to its failure to timely plead the defense ;; Statute of limitation is affirmative defense which must be pleaded timely - Rule 8(c) ; the failure to raise statutory limitation as affirmative defense constituted waiver of that defense
o Rationale – the prevention of unfair surprise
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- Cf. Rule 59 - motion to amend judgment : once filing a notice of appeal, no longer Rule 59, coz case went up to appellate level, thus use Rule 60 – relief from a judgment
Taylor v. United States, p.621
- District court awarded a patient’s wife $500,000 in damages ; the D government moved under Rule 59(a), 59(e), and 60(b), for a reduction in damages to $250,000 under CA law, as incorporated by the FTCA ; the CA law limits recovery for non-economic injuries in actions based on professional negligence to $250,000 ;
- The court (9th Cir.) Held - the CA law is limitation of liability , not an affirmative defense ; D should not be required to plead the limitation of damages ; Cf. Rule 8(b)(6) specifies that averments as to the amount of damage are not deemed admitted
Sec. D. amendment p.623
Beeck v. Aquaslide., p.623
- P was seriously injured while using a water slide ; P sued D who P believed was manufacturer ; D initially admitted manufacture of the slide in answer (pleading) ;
- After the statute of limitation on P’s personal injury claim expired, D moved to amend its answer to deny manufacture ; P resisted the motion ; the district court granted leave to amend
- A separate trial was held on the issue of “whether the D manufactured the slide in question” ; the jury returned a verdict for the D, i.e. D did not manufactured
Question presented
- whether it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to grant leave to amend to the manufacturer in order to deny these admissions after the running of the statute of limitation
Held
- Rule 15(a)(2) – before trial, a party may amend its pleading with court’s leave when “the court should freely give leave when justice so requires” ;
- Rule - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part or the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment - the leave sought should be “freely given.”
- The grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the district court ; reviewable only for an abuse of discretion
Here
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Moore v. p.627
- A father brought suit for custody ; after trial, the mother filed a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence
Question
- The meaning of “implied consent” under Rule 15(b)(2)
Held
- Rule - implied consent – “the party contesting the amendment received actual notice of the injection of the unpleaded matters, as well as an adequate opportunity to litigate such matters and to cure any surprise from their introduction”
- e.g. the failure to object to evidence, or the introduction of evidence which is clearly apposite to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings
Custody ; Child support ; Visitation rights and bond ; Attorney fee ; Separate maintenance
Hypo – Rule 15(c)(1) relation back of amendment
- P v. D – compensatory damage awarded ; S.O.L. expires ; P moves to amend complaint to claim punitive damage (or for wrongful death of father)
o DO- if amendment is not allowed, punitive damage is barred in the second suit by claim preclusion
- This satisfies Rule 15(c)(1)(B) : claim that arose out of the occurrence set out in the original pleading
Krupski v. Costa Crociere , 2010, p.517
- Krupski sought compensation for injuries she suffered on a cruise ship ;
- Her passenger ticket, which was issued by Costa Cruise Lines, identified Costa Crociere as the carrier; required an injured party to submit to the carrier or its agent written notice of a claim ;
- Three weeks before S.O.L. expires, Krupski filed a negligence action against Costa Cruise Lines, alleging Cost Cruise owned, operated, … controlled the ship
- After S.O.L. expired, Costa Cruise brought Costa Crociere’s existence to Krupski’s attention three times ; after the three occasions, Krupski move to amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere as a D ;
Held
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o DO- post-filing conduct (after Rule 4(m) period) serves as just one factor used in determining whether P made a deliberate decision or mistake
o Here, Krupski’s failure to add Costa Crociere during the Rule 4(m) period does not necessarily mean that she had made a deliberate and informed decision not to sue Costa Crociere in the first time
“the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party” under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
- e.g. P sue Fortune Magazine, which is published by Time Inc. The Time Inc. rejected the service because it is not fortune magazine. P was entitled to change party or naming of the party
p.612 P.P.I case
- the court could have used Rule 15(c)(1)(C), instead of sanction
