Sec. 5 external limit on the commerce power : federalism and the 10th and the 11th Amend. p.127
- an exercise of congressional authority otherwise permissible under Art.1. and applicable to private parties might still be invalid, as applied to the state, because of an affirmative federalism-based immunity
- the 10th Amend. ; the 11th Amend. - The amendment's text does not mention suits brought against a state by its own citizens
- “in the end .. it makes no difference whether … as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by .. the Tenth Amendment. Either way, we must determine whether .. challenged provisions .. oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority” (New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144)
State autonomy and the tenth amendment p.127
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, p.127
- The power to locate its own seat of government (capital of the state), and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, …, are essentially and peculiarly state powers (federal government may not interfere with it)
Question èè. .
- DO- “to provide public service” could fall within purview of the 10.th, whereas comer power may regulate private parties
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, p.128
- Upheld a penalty imposed on a state-owned railroad for violation of the (federal) Safety Appliance Act, which was held applicable to state operating railroad as common carrier in interstate commerce
- CA (its operation of a railroad involved the exercise of a public function in its sovereign capacity) à. Court (“the sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution”)
- “plenary power to regulate commerce”
- Intention of Congress to make regulatory act applicable to states, if fairly inferred from act, cannot be disregarded because not explicitly stated
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, p.128
- Upheld, against a similar state immunity claim, the application of a federal tax to the NY’s sale of bottled mineral water from state-owned springs
- “so long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a State”
Dissent
- A State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 , p.129
- challenging the validity of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extended its minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all employees of states and their political subdivisions ;
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority , 469 U.S. 528, <political process designed to safeguard state’s sovereign interest > p.130
- overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,
- Metropolitan transit authority brought action seeking declaratory judgment that it was entitled to Tenth Amendment immunity from minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ;
- Held - that transit authority was not immune from minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Act, because traditional governmental functions that were immune from federal regulation had proved unworkable
- <abandon the rule of state immunity> No distinction that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society ; Any rule of state immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes ; thus, reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a *547 particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional.”
- <limitation of federal authority> Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself ; … by procedural safeguards … ; Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must .. be tailored “to compensate for possible failings in the national political process”
o <political process designed to safeguard state’s sovereign interest> The Framers thus gave the States (1) a role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives**1018 and the Presidency (2) by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, § 1. They were given more direct influence (3) in the Senate, where each State received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The significance attached to the States' equal representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any (4) constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation without the State's consent. Art. V
o The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent even today in the course of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues into their own treasuries in the form of general and program-specific grants in aid ; at the same time that the States have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce Clause
Dissent
- The States' role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace
- that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of their own power .. is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system
- but “a variety of structural and political changes occurring in this century have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values.” ; The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of Senators), the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of state and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various national constituencies
- the importance of state and local autonomy to “principles of democratic self-government”
note p.132 à.
p.132 à. <political safeguard of federalism> e.g. Garcia’s dissent
South Carolina v. Baker , 485 U.S. 505 , p.134
- upheld removal of an exemption from federal income tax for interest from bearer bonds issued by the states
- state (SC) argue that this is the case “to compensate for possible failings in the national political process”
<commandeering state government > p.134
- invalidating commandeering state legislatures, invalidating commandeering state executive officials
- unlike National League, which limited what subject matter Congress might regulate, these decisions merely limit by what method Congress may regulate the states
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, p.135
- Congress, in an effort to combat a burgeoning radioactive waste disposal problem, passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 ; required states to provide for the disposal of such waste, providing three “incentives” to states to comply with that obligation
- The Act included (1) monetary incentives, (2) access incentives, and (3) a take title provision, which offered states the option of taking title to and possession of low level radioactive waste generated within their borders and assuming liability for damages that waste generators suffer due to the states' tardiness ; upheld the first two, and the third unconstitutional
- while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to (provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders), the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so
- federalism questions can be viewed in either of two ways : Art.1 or the 10.th Amend.
o congress exercises its conferred power subject to limitations contained in Constitution
§ here, regulation of inter-state market in radioactive waste disposal is within commerce power
o the 10.th Amend. which restrains the power, not derived from the text of the 10.th, but rather the 10.th confirms
- Allocation of power contained in commerce clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly, but does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce
o Constitution does not give Congress authority to require states to regulate, .. rather, Constitution gives Congress authority to regulate matters directly and to preempt contrary state regulation
- constitutionally permissible methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge state to adopt legislative program consistent with federal interests include (i) attaching conditions to receipt of federal funds and, where Congress has authority to regulate private activity under commerce clause, (ii) offering states choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or (iii) having state law preempted by federal regulation as part of program of “cooperative federalism.”
o Under Congress' spending power, conditions attached by Congress to receipt of federal funds must bear some relationship to purpose of federal spending
o Where congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preference ; state officials remain accountable to the people è. ** P.126 Morrison, dual system of governments
- (money incentive) was within Congress' authority under spending clause
- (access incentive) represent authorized conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power
- (take title) neither of which options could be constitutionally imposed as freestanding requirement, was outside Congress' enumerated powers and infringed upon state sovereignty in violation of Tenth Amendment
o here, either accepting ownership or regulating,,, it is coercion (not encouragement) ; “such a forced transfer .. would in principle be no different .. compelled subsidy”
o inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority b/w federal and state government
- Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to states,, consent by state officials does not cure the unconstitutional act of Congress,, as Constitution does not protect sovereignty of states for benefit of states … but, rather, Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for protection of individuals
o State officials cannot consent to enlargement of powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in Constitution
-
- Commerce clause's limitation on states' ability to discriminate against interstate commerce may be lifted by expression of unambiguous intent of Congress
Dissent (I like it)
- The 1985 Act was very much the product of cooperative federalism in which the states bargained among themselves … (unlike) legislation that directs action from the federal government to the states
o DO- since state officials “consented,” local constituencies can hold them accountable if they do not like ; thus, the line is not blurred
- the entire structure of our federal constitutional government can be traced to an interest in establishing checks and balances to prevent the exercise of tyranny against individuals. But these fears seem extremely far distant to me in a situation such as this
Printz v. U.S. , 521 U.S. 898,, p.139
- Commandeering state executive branch officials ; invalidated federal law which required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers
-
- When a law for carrying into execution Commerce Clause violates principle of state sovereignty, it is not a law proper for carrying into execution Commerce Clause, and is thus not enforceable under Necessary and Proper Clause
- Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not, pursuant to Necessary and Proper Clause, authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce
- Federal government may not compel states to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs
Dissent
- By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself
- Garcia - laws regulating the state ; NY v. US - laws requiring the state to regulate their own citizens
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, New York or Printz OR South Carolina v. Baker , p,142
- alleging that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), violated U.S. Const. amends. X and XI ; which prohibited state motor vehicle department(DMVs) from knowingly disclosing or otherwise making available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record
- reject New York or Printz, instead, South Carolina v. Baker governs this case
- in Baker, we upheld a statute that prohibited state from issuing unregistered bonds coz the law regulated state activities rather than seeking to control or influence the manner in which states regulates private parties
- the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens ; rather, it regulates the States as the owners of databases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, as did the statute at issue in New York, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals, as did the law considered in Printz *****
o The (DPPA) which restricts the nonconsensual sale or release by a state of a driver's personal information does not violate the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment, as the Act does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens, but regulates the states as the owners of databases
- The (DPPA) which restricts the sale or release of a driver's personal information is a proper exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause
State sovereignty immunity and the 11th amend. ** , action against state ; alternative to action against state p.143
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
- The 11.th applied not only to cases within federal diversity jurisdiction but also to cases within the federal question jurisdiction of federal court
- The Constitution was not intended to raise up any proceedings against the States that were ‘anomalous and unheard of’ when the Constitution was adopted
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
- Federal court could issue an injunction against state officials who sought to enforce an unconstitutional state law, on the ground that the D was not really the State, but rather the official
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 , p.144
- Congress could abrogate the state’s the 11.th immunity , and allow states to be sued directly for retrospective damages pursuant to its enforcement power under s.5 of the 14.th
-
Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, < the art.1.sec.8 < the 11.th > p.144
- (Overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,) Congress, acting under commerce power (Art.1.sec.8), may not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity with the state’s consent
- The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, authorized a tribe to sue the state in a federal court, in order to compel performance of that duty
- The relief sought by a P suing a State, whether prospective injunctive relief or retroactive monetary relief, is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the 11.th ; Union Gas Co. deviates sharply from federalism jurisprudence
- (upholding Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer), the 14.th, which was adopted well after the 11.th, operated to alter the preexisting balance b/w state and federal power achieved by Art.3 and the 11.th
- The 11.th restricts the judicial power under Art.3 ; Art.1 cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitation placed upon federal jurisdiction (Art.3)
Dissent
- (providing a federal forum)
- The requirement – that congress make a plain statement of its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity – is an adequate check on congressional over-reaching
Note
- The principle in McCulloch that the power to tax is the power to destroy
3.. extending state sovereign immunity from federal to state courts p.145
Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706
-
- The state sovereignty immunity bar in Seminole Tribe from lawsuit against states in federal court, is extended to, (federal law) lawsuit against states in state court
- The state sovereignty immunity bar announced in Seminole Tribe , not derived from the 11.th, but from the Constitution’s structure and its history
o The constitution’s structure – the federal system preserves the sovereign status of the States ; history – in English law, crown could not be sued. When constitution was ratified, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal
- “A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other branches of the State .. is the power .. ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will ..” ; may threaten the financial integrity of the States
- Federal law (like here FLSA) remained binding on the states, even if not enforceable through private lawsuits
o E.g. (i) action brought by the federal government itself to enforce Art.1 legislation
o (ii) suit brought under federal statute authorized by sec.5 of the 14.th
o (iii) under Ex parte Young, action against state official for injunctive or declaratory relief
Dissent
-
-
4.. extending to other federal laws, p.147
- State entities (e.g. public universities) immune from patent and trademark infringement actions
5.. federal power vs. federal remedies
- The Seminole Tribe line of cases enforce a constitutional federalism, not by restricting the reach of congressional authority to regulate the state, but by limiting the remedial means
- alternatives whereby federal law is enforced against the states
o e.g. (i) individuals may obtain injunctions against state officials under Ex parte Young, (ii) federal official enforce federal statute through federal agency at federal expense, (iii) congress may condition federal spending programs on the states’ agreement to waive sovereign immunity
6.. extending state sovereign immunity to federal agency proceedings p.148
FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, - extended the reach of state sovereign immunity from judicial proceeding to adjudications within federal administrative agencies
- heard before the federal maritime commission, alleging that the state authority had violated federal law
- (i) this interest in protecting States’ dignity and (ii) the strong similarities b/w FMC proceedings and civil litigation
o .. dual sovereignty .. offend the sovereign immunity
o Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 – the Constitution was not intended to raise up any proceedings against the States that were ‘anomalous and unheard of’ when the Constitution was adopted
o FMC administrative proceedings = civil litigation in federal court
Dissent
- FMC is independent federal agency
7.. bankruptcy p.149
Cent. Va. Cmty. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,
- Art.1.Sec.8.cl.4. congress may subordinate a state entity to other creditors in a federal bankruptcy proceeding
Dissent
