G., the preclusive effect of a class action judgment p.819
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, See p.819 p.819
- whether a judgment in a class action ( determining that an employer did not engage in a general pattern or practice of racial discrimination against the certified class of employees ) precludes a class member from maintaining a subsequent civil action alleging an individual claim of racial discrimination against the employer.
Holding
- The crucial difference between an individual's claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest ; the inquiry regarding an individual's claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while "at the liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decision-making"
- See General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) -
o an individual employee's claim that he was denied a promotion on racial grounds did not necessarily make him an adequate representative of a class composed of persons who had allegedly been discriminated by policy or practice
- Here, Cooper and Russell had valid individual claims even though it had expressly found no proof of any class-wide discrimination above grade 5
Reasoning
- Res judicata (merger and bar ; claim preclusion) ; collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
Hypo
- e.g. class certification has some flaws, e.g. inadequacy of representation, but got to final judgment ;
- one of class member want to challenge the final judgment in other state, alleging the final judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit ;
- the class member in other state, can’t invoke Rule 23 to challenge the final judgment, instead, should invoke violation of due process (like a judgment without personal jurisdiction, thus, without due process, is not entitled to full faith and credit)
- once final judgment is made, can’t challenge the judgment by Rule 23, alleging that the certification procedure was flawed ; the class member should have challenged on appeal ;
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
- Medical provider brought putative class action against automobile insurer,.
Held
- NY law prohibiting class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages conflicted with the Rule 23 governing class actions ; the Rule is valid
- state law limiting the availability of the class action based on the relief sought did not apply under federal diversity jurisdiction
reasoning
- Federal courts sitting in diversity should read an ambiguous Rules to avoid substantial variations in outcomes between state and federal litigation, because it is reasonable to assume that Congress is concerned with avoiding significant differences between state and federal courts in adjudicating claims ; but, here, it is not ambiguous, coz Rule 23(a) “may sue” and Rule 23(b) “may be maintained” does not give discretion to court
- Under the “ Erie doctrine,” which involves the constitutional power of federal courts to supplant state law with judge-made rules, it makes no difference whether the rule is technically one of substance or procedure ; the touchstone is whether it significantly affects the result of a litigation
Prof.
- The majority – if NY wants to restrict class action on penalty, it could simply put a cap on damage, which is substantive, and, which, thus, overrides Rules ; prohibition of class action on penalty is procedural, thus, Rules override the NY law of prohibition ; this is not Erie problem, but a problem of direct collision under 헤나 , coz it is procedural
Sec. F. settlement classes p.796
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, p.796
- Rule 23(b)(1)(e.g. limited fund) is easier to be certified than Rule 23(b)(3)(e.g. mass tort)
- Here, the party take advantage of it ; make it eligible for Rule 23(b)(1) by creating limited fund ; the problem is that they created it after suit began ;
- The court held – to be eligible for Rule 23(b)(1), you should create limited fund before suit began
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, p.811
Motie , See 1261 , p.1261
Jones, See 1263
Cromwell , See p.1273
Russell See p.1279
Rios See 1281
- Setting – in 1st suit, two findings, and only one is relevant to verdict, whereas the other is not relevant to verdict (meaningless) ; then, issue preclusion is only as to the relevant finding
Patterson See 1281
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Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, See 1313
- Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when plaintiff seeks to foreclose defendant from litigating an issue the defendant previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party, whereas defensive use occurs when defendant seeks to prevent plaintiff from asserting a claim plaintiff previously litigated and lost against another defendant
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- <exception to mutuality doctrine> the general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to defendant, a trial judge in the exercise of his discretion should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel (if had full and fair opportunity to litigate in prior lawsuit, then, not unfair)
p.1260. state anti-trust law ; remove it to federal court under 1441 to adjudicate Sherman Act ? ; No, if the federal law claim is an anticipated defense
Jones v. bank , p.1263
- “acceleration clause” (one payment default à. All payment default)
- You can’t split your claim ; have to sue for entire amount of debt
- Suppose, notes of different due dates ; no claim preclusion, but issue preclusion
Same transaction under Rule 13(a) compulsory counter-claim
Same transaction under claim preclusion
Same case or controversy under 1367 (a) supplemental jurisdiction
p.669
- [subject matter jurisdiction ] s.1367 supplemental jurisdiction + [procedural rule] (Rule 13(h)+Rule (20))
- Subject matter jurisdiction cannot overcome personal jurisdiction à. s.1404 transfer of venue
- Cf. regarding subject matter jurisdiction, consider first 1331, and 1332
p.751
- individual claim that he was discriminated, a particular employment decision vs. practice or policy
(Hansberry), p.777,
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(martin)
- A party who seeks the judgment to bind on another person, cannot obligate the person to intervene (Rule 24), instead, the person must be joined (Rule 19)
- (i) textual (Rule 24 permissive term, Rule 19 mandatory joinder), (ii) a party to a suit know better than anyone else
(Shady Grove)
- NY law prohibiting class action conflicts with Rule 23
- It is not Erie problem, but a problem of direct collision of Hanna, ; here, procedural, not substantive, thus, Rule overrides NY law
- If NY law put a cap on damage, then, substantive, and NY law prevails ;
(Motie)
- Once you file a suit, appeal, as opposed to re-file in other court
(Cromwell)
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(Rios)
- Rios rule à. in 1.st suit, two findings, one is relevant to verdict, the other is not relevant, then, issue preclusion is only as to the relevant finding
(Patterson Rule)
- Two independent findings, both sustain judgment, then, both issues precluded (estoppel)
- Cf. restatement both issues are not precluded, so as to allow them to be litigated in appeal
- Patterson Rule trust trail judge
(Parklane)
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