The Efficacy and
Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy EVENT
Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars
DATE / TIME Monday, April 30 / 12:00pm - 1:00pm
LOCATION
Woodrow Wilson Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave.,
NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
DESCRIPTION
One year after the
raid that delivered justice to Osama Bin Laden, John Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, will deliver remarks on
the Efficacy and Ethics of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.
Speakers:
John O. Brennan,
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
(DO -
I found nothing new in
terms of making public Obama administration’s policy on counter-terrorism,
particularly the use of drone. He said he was here to share more information
with people. When it comes to the purpose of his speech at the Center, it was
not effective at all. He reiterated Obama administration is doing what is right
and legal, yet providing new info as to in what sense or how. He basically refers the
audience to previous speeches by Harold Koh, Holder and Johnson.
He had chances to
achieve the purpose of his visit when asked some questions from audience. As
expected, he answered the question by not hitting the point.
There was one
interesting question after the speech, which was about surrender. The killing
of OBL also raised the same question. Basically, the question was how the
policy on drone killing incorporates surrender. Brennan responded to it by
reiterating "feasibility of capture." I don't know that "feasibility
of capture" can be equated with surrender.
I still have the question: what if the killed by drone could have surrendered?
I still have the question: what if the killed by drone could have surrendered?
Muslim are taking power in Arab. How will it play out in the US counter-terrorism efforts?
another interesting thing -- the young woman who obviously had a different view from Obama
administration’s and was forced out.
John Brennan was the one who brokered the deal that provided breakthrough in Yemen. That was interesting. )
As Prepared for Delivery –
Thank you, Jane, for
your very kind introduction and for your leadership, here at the Woodrow Wilson
Center and in your decades of public service. Few individuals can match the
range of Jane Harman’s expertise—from the armed services to intelligence to
homeland security. And anyone who ever appeared before her committees knew it.
So Jane, I’ll just say that I’m finally glad to be sharing the stage with you
instead of testifying before you.
To you and everyone
here at the Woodrow Wilson Center, thank you for your invaluable
contributions—your research, your scholarship—which help further our national
security every day. I very much appreciate this opportunity to discuss
President Obama’s counterterrorism strategy, in particular, its ethics and
efficacy.
It is fitting that we
have this discussion here at the Woodrow Wilson Center. It was here in August
2007 that then-Senator Obama described how he would bring the war in Iraq to a
responsible end and refocus our efforts on “the war that has to be won”—the war
against al- Qa’ida, particularly in the tribal regions of Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
He said that we would
carry on this fight while upholding our laws and our values and that he would
work with allies and partners whenever possible. But he also made it clear that
he would not hesitate to use military force against terrorists who pose a
direct threat to America. And he said that if he had actionable intelligence
about high-value terrorist targets, including in Pakistan, he would act to
protect the American people.
So it is especially
fitting that we have this discussion today. One year ago today, President Obama
faced the scenario that he discussed here at the Wilson Center five years ago,
and he did not hesitate to act. Soon thereafter, our Special Operations Forces
were moving toward that compound in Pakistan where we believed Usama bin Laden
might be hiding. By the end of the next day, President Obama could confirm that
justice had finally been delivered to the terrorist responsible for the attacks
of September 11, 2001, and for so many other deaths around the world.
The death of bin Laden
was our most strategic blow yet against al-Qa’ida. Credit for that success
belongs to the courageous forces who carried out that mission, at extraordinary
risk to their lives; to the many intelligence professionals who pieced together
the clues that led to bin Laden’s hideout; and to President Obama, who gave the
order to go in.
One year later, it’s
appropriate to assess where we stand in this fight. We’ve always been clear
that the end of bin Laden would neither mark the end of al-Qa’ida, nor our
resolve to destroy it. So along with allies and partners, we’ve been
unrelenting. And when we assess the al-Qa’ida of 2012, I think it is fair to
say that, as a result of our efforts, the United States is more secure and the
American people are safer. Here’s why.
In Pakistan,
al-Qa’ida’s leadership ranks have continued to suffer heavy losses. This
includes Ilyas Kashmiri, one of al-Qa’ida’s top operational planners, killed a
month after bin Laden. It includes Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, killed when he
succeeded Ayman al-Zawahiri as al-Qa’ida’s deputy leader. It includes Younis
al-Mauritani, a planner of attacks against the United States and Europe—until
he was captured by Pakistani forces.
With its most skilled
and experienced commanders being lost so quickly, al-Qa’ida has had trouble
replacing them. This is one of the many conclusions we have been able to draw
from documents seized at bin Laden’s compound, some of which will be published
online, for the first time, this week by West Point’s Combating Terrorism
Center. For example, bin Laden worried about—and I quote—“the rise of lower
leaders who are not as experienced and this would lead to the repeat of
mistakes.”
Al-Qa’ida leaders
continue to struggle to communicate with subordinates and affiliates. Under
intense pressure in the tribal regions of Pakistan, they have fewer places to
train and groom the next generation of operatives. They’re struggling to
attract new recruits. Morale is low, with intelligence indicating that some
members are giving up and returning home, no doubt aware that this is a fight
they will never win. In short, al-Qa’ida is losing, badly. And bin Laden knew
it. In documents we seized, he confessed to “disaster after disaster.” He even
urged his leaders to flee the tribal regions, and go to places, “away from
aircraft photography and bombardment.”
For all these reasons,
it is harder than ever for the al-Qa’ida core in Pakistan to plan and execute
large-scale, potentially catastrophic attacks against our homeland. Today, it
is increasingly clear that—compared to 9/11—the core al-Qa’ida leadership is a
shadow of its former self. Al-Qa’ida has been left with just a handful of
capable leaders and operatives, and with continued pressure is on the path to
its destruction. And for the first time since this fight began, we can look
ahead and envision a world in which the al-Qa’ida core is simply no longer
relevant.
Nevertheless, the
dangerous threat from al-Qa’ida has not disappeared. As the al-Qa’ida core
falters, it continues to look to its affiliates and adherents to carry on its
murderous cause. Yet these affiliates continue to lose key commanders and
capabilities as well. In Somalia, it is indeed worrying to witness al-Qa’ida’s
merger with al-Shabaab, whose ranks include foreign fighters, some with U.S.
passports. At the same time, al-Shabaab continues to focus primarily on
launching regional attacks, and ultimately, this is a merger between two
organizations in decline.
In Yemen, al-Qa’ida in
the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, continues to feel the effects of the death last
year of Anwar al-Awlaki, its leader of external operations who was responsible
for planning and directing terrorist attacks against the United States.
Nevertheless, AQAP continues to be al-Qa’ida’s most active affiliate, and it
continues to seek the opportunity to strike our homeland. We therefore continue
to support the government of Yemen in its efforts against AQAP, which is being
forced to fight for the territory it needs to plan attacks beyond Yemen.
In North and West
Africa, another al-Qa’ida affiliate, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM,
continues its efforts to destabilize regional governments and engages in
kidnapping of Western citizens for ransom activities designed to fund its
terrorist agenda. And in Nigeria, we are monitoring closely the emergence of
Boko Haram, a group that appears to be aligning itself with al-Qa’ida’s violent
agenda and is increasingly looking to attack Western interests in Nigeria in
addition to Nigerian government targets.
More broadly,
al-Qa’ida’s killing of innocents—mostly Muslim men, women and children—has
badly tarnished its image and appeal in the eyes of Muslims around the world.
Even bin Laden and his lieutenants knew this. His propagandist, Adam Gadahn,
admitted that they were now seen “as a group that does not hesitate to take
people’s money by falsehood, detonating mosques, [and] spilling the blood of
scores of people.” Bin Laden agreed that “a large portion” of Muslims around
the world “have lost their trust” in al-Qa’ida.
So damaged is
al-Qa’ida’s image that bin Laden even considered changing its name. And one of
the reasons? As bin Laden said himself, U.S. officials “have largely stopped
using the phrase ‘the war on terror’ in the context of not wanting to provoke
Muslims.” Simply calling them al-Qa’ida, bin Laden said, “reduces the feeling
of Muslims that we belong to them.” To which I would add, that is because
al-Qa’ida does not belong to Muslims. Al-Qa’ida is the antithesis of the peace,
tolerance and humanity that is at the heart of Islam.
Despite the great
progress we’ve made against al-Qa’ida, it would be a mistake to believe this
threat has passed. Al-Qa’ida and its associated forces still have the intent to
attack the United States. And we have seen lone individuals, including American
citizens—often inspired by al-Qa’ida’s murderous ideology—kill innocent
Americans and seek to do us harm.
Still, the damage that
has been inflicted on the leadership core in Pakistan, combined with how
al-Qa’ida has alienated itself from so much of the world, allows us to look
forward. Indeed, if the decade before 9/11 was the time of al-Qa’ida’s rise,
and the decade after 9/11 was the time of its decline, then I believe this
decade will be the one that sees its demise.
This progress is no
accident. It is a direct result of intense efforts over more than a decade,
across two administrations, across the U.S. government and in concert with
allies and partners. This includes the comprehensive counterterrorism strategy
being directed by President Obama, a strategy guided by the President’s highest
responsibility—to protect the safety and security of the American people.
In this fight, we are
harnessing every element of American power—intelligence, military, diplomatic,
development, economic, financial, law enforcement, homeland security and the
power of our values, including our commitment to the rule of law. That’s why,
for instance, in his first days in office, President Obama banned the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques, which are not needed to keep our country
safe.
Staying true to our
values as a nation also includes upholding the transparency upon which our
democracy depends. A few months after taking office, the President travelled to
the National Archives where he discussed how national security requires a delicate
balance between secrecy and transparency. He pledged to share as much
information as possible with the American people “so that they can make
informed judgments and hold us accountable.” He has consistently encouraged
those of us on his national security team to be as open and candid as possible
as well.
Earlier this year,
Attorney General Holder discussed how our counterterrorism efforts are rooted
in, and are strengthened by, adherence to the law, including the legal
authorities that allow us to pursue members of al-Qa’ida—including U.S.
citizens—and to do so using “technologically advanced weapons.”
In addition, Jeh
Johnson, the general counsel at the Department of Defense, has addressed the
legal basis for our military efforts against al-Qa’ida. Stephen Preston, the
general counsel at the CIA, has discussed how the Agency operates under U.S.
law. These speeches build on a lecture two years ago by Harold Koh, the State
Department Legal Adviser, who noted that “U.S. targeting practices, including
lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply
with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”
Given these efforts, I
venture to say that the United States government has never been so open
regarding its counterterrorism policies and their legal justification. Still,
there continues to be considerable public and legal debate surrounding these
technologies and how they are sometimes used in our fight against al-Qa’ida.
Now, I want to be very
clear. In the course of the war in Afghanistan and the fight against al-Qa’ida,
I think the American people expect us to use advanced technologies, for
example, to prevent attacks on U.S. forces and to remove terrorists from the
battlefield. We do, and it has saved the lives of our men and women in uniform.
What has clearly
captured the attention of many, however, is a different practice, beyond hot
battlefields like Afghanistan—identifying specific members of al-Qa’ida and
then targeting them with lethal force, often using aircraft remotely operated
by pilots who can be hundreds if not thousands of miles away. This is what I
want to focus on today.
Jack Goldsmith—a
former assistant attorney general in the administration of George W. Bush and
now a professor at Harvard Law School—captured the situation well. He wrote:
The government needs a
way to credibly convey to the public that its decisions about who is being
targeted — especially when the target is a U.S. citizen — are sound…. First,
the government can and should tell us more about the process by which it
reaches its high-value targeting decisions…The more the government tells us
about the eyeballs on the issue and the robustness of the process, the more
credible will be its claims about the accuracy of its factual determinations
and the soundness of its legal ones. All of this information can be disclosed
in some form without endangering critical intelligence.
Well, President Obama
agrees. And that is why I am here today.
I stand here as
someone who has been involved with our nation’s security for more than thirty
years. I have a profound appreciation for the truly remarkable capabilities of
our counterterrorism professionals—and our relationships with other nations—and
we must never compromise them. I will not discuss the sensitive details of any
specific operation today. I will not, nor will I ever, publicly divulge
sensitive intelligence sources and methods. For when that happens, our national
security is endangered and lives can be lost.
At the same time, we
reject the notion that any discussion of these matters is to step onto a
slippery slope that inevitably endangers our national security. Too often, that
fear can become an excuse for saying nothing at all—which creates a void that
is then filled with myths and falsehoods. That, in turn, can erode our
credibility with the American people and with foreign partners, and it can
undermine the public’s understanding and support for our efforts. In contrast,
President Obama believes that—done carefully, deliberately and responsibly—we can
be more transparent and still ensure our nation’s security.
So let me say it as
simply as I can. Yes, in full accordance with the law—and in order to prevent
terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives—the United
States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qa’ida
terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to
publicly as drones. And I’m here today because President Obama has instructed
us to be more open with the American people about these efforts.
Broadly speaking, the
debate over strikes targeted at individual members of al-Qa’ida has centered on
their legality, their ethics, the wisdom of using them, and the standards by
which they are approved. With the remainder of my time today, I would like to
address each of these in turn.
First, these targeted
strikes are legal. Attorney General Holder, Harold Koh and Jeh Johnson have all
addressed this question at length. To briefly recap, as a matter of domestic
law, the Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any
imminent threat of attack. The Authorization for Use of Military Force—the
AUMF—passed by Congress after the September 11th attacks authorizes the
president “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those nations,
organizations and individuals responsible for 9/11. There is nothing in the
AUMF that restricts the use of military force against al-Qa’ida to Afghanistan.
As a matter of
international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida,
the Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may
also use force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense.
There is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted
aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against
our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country
involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.
Second, targeted
strikes are ethical. Without question, the ability to target a specific
individual—from hundreds or thousands of miles away—raises profound questions.
Here, I think it’s useful to consider such strikes against the basic principles
of the law of war that govern the use of force.
Targeted strikes
conform to the principle of necessity—the requirement that the target have
definite military value. In this armed conflict, individuals who are part of
al-Qa’ida or its associated forces are legitimate military targets. We have the
authority to target them with lethal force just as we targeted enemy leaders in
past conflicts, such as German and Japanese commanders during World War II.
Targeted strikes conform
to the principle of distinction—the idea that only military objectives may be
intentionally targeted and that civilians are protected from being
intentionally targeted. With the unprecedented ability of remotely piloted
aircraft to precisely target a military objective while minimizing collateral
damage, one could argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows
us to distinguish more effectively between an al-Qa’ida terrorist and innocent
civilians.
Targeted strikes
conform to the principle of proportionality—the notion that the anticipated
collateral damage of an action cannot be excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage. By targeting an individual terrorist or small
numbers of terrorists with ordnance that can be adapted to avoid harming others
in the immediate vicinity, it is hard to imagine a tool that can better
minimize the risk to civilians than remotely piloted aircraft.
For the same reason,
targeted strikes conform to the principle of humanity which requires us to use
weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering. For all these reasons, I
suggest to you that these targeted strikes against al-Qa’ida terrorists are
indeed ethical and just.
Of course, even if a
tool is legal and ethical, that doesn’t necessarily make it appropriate or
advisable in a given circumstance. This brings me to my next point.
Targeted strikes are
wise. Remotely piloted aircraft in particular can be a wise choice because of
geography, with their ability to fly hundreds of miles over the most
treacherous terrain, strike their targets with astonishing precision, and then
return to base. They can be a wise choice because of time, when windows of
opportunity can close quickly and there may be just minutes to act.
They can be a wise
choice because they dramatically reduce the danger to U.S. personnel, even
eliminating the danger altogether. Yet they are also a wise choice because they
dramatically reduce the danger to innocent civilians, especially considered
against massive ordinance that can cause injury and death far beyond its
intended target.
In addition, compared
against other options, a pilot operating this aircraft remotely —with the
benefit of technology and with the safety of distance—might actually have a
clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, including the presence of
innocent civilians. It’s this surgical precision—the ability, with laser-like
focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qa’ida terrorist while
limiting damage to the tissue around it—that makes this counterterrorism tool
so essential.
There’s another reason
that targeted strikes can be a wise choice—the strategic consequences that
inevitably come with the use of force. As we’ve seen, deploying large armies
abroad won’t always be our best offense. Countries typically don’t want foreign
soldiers in their cities and towns. In fact, large, intrusive military
deployments risk playing into al-Qa’ida’s strategy of trying to draw us into
long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment
and inspire the next generation of terrorists. In comparison, there is the
precision of targeted strikes.
I acknowledge that
we—as a government—along with our foreign partners, can and must do a better
job of addressing the mistaken belief among some foreign publics that we engage
in these strikes casually, as if we are simply unwilling to expose U.S forces
to the dangers faced every day by people in those regions. For, as I’ll
describe today, there is absolutely nothing casual about the extraordinary care
we take in making the decision to pursue an al-Qa’ida terrorist, and the
lengths to which we go to ensure precision and avoid the loss of innocent life.
Still, there is no
more consequential a decision than deciding whether to use lethal force against
another human being—even a terrorist dedicated to killing American citizens. So
in order to ensure that our counterterrorism operations involving the use of
lethal force are legal, ethical and wise, President Obama has demanded that we
hold ourselves to the highest possible standards and processes.
This reflects his
approach to broader questions regarding the use of force. In his speech in Oslo
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, the President said that “all nations, strong
and weak alike, must adhere to standards that govern the use of force.” And he
added:
Where force is
necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to
certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that
abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a
standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from
those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength.
The United States is
the first nation to regularly conduct strikes using remotely piloted aircraft
in an armed conflict. Other nations also possess this technology. Many more
nations are seeking it, and more will succeed in acquiring it. President Obama and
those of us on his national security team are very mindful that as our nation
uses this technology, we are establishing precedents that other nations may
follow, and not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the
premium we put on protecting human life, including innocent civilians.
If we want other
nations to use these technologies responsibly, we must use them responsibly. If
we want other nations to adhere to high and rigorous standards for their use,
then we must do so as well. We cannot expect of others what we will not do
ourselves. President Obama has therefore demanded that we hold ourselves to the
highest possible standards—that, at every step, we be as thorough and
deliberate as possible.
This leads me to the
final point I want to discuss today — the rigorous standards and process of
review to which we hold ourselves today when considering and authorizing
strikes against a specific member of al-Qa’ida outside the “hot” battlefield of
Afghanistan. What I hope to do is to give you a general sense, in broad terms,
of the high bar we require ourselves to meet when making these profound
decisions today. That includes not only whether a specific member of al-Qa’ida
can legally be pursued with lethal force, but also whether he should be.
Over time, we’ve
worked to refine, clarify, and strengthen this process and our standards, and
we continue to do so. If our counterterrorism professionals assess, for
example, that a suspected member of al-Qa’ida poses such a threat to the United
States as to warrant lethal action, they may raise that individual’s name for
consideration. The proposal will go through a careful review and, as
appropriate, will be evaluated by the very most senior officials in our
government for decision.
First and foremost,
the individual must be a legitimate target under the law. Earlier, I described
how the use of force against members of al-Qa’ida is authorized under both
international and U.S. law, including both the inherent right of national
self-defense and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which courts
have held extends to those who are part of al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and
associated forces. If, after a legal review, we determine that the individual
is not a lawful target, end of discussion. We are a nation of laws, and we will
always act within the bounds of the law.
Of course, the law
only establishes the outer limits of the authority in which counterterrorism
professionals can operate. Even if we determine that it is lawful to pursue the
terrorist in question with lethal force, it doesn’t necessarily mean we should.
There are, after all, literally thousands of individuals who are part of
al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, or associated forces—thousands. Even if it were
possible, going after every single one of these individuals with lethal force
would neither be wise nor an effective use of our intelligence and
counterterrorism resources.
As a result, we have
to be strategic. Even if it is lawful to pursue a specific member of al-Qa’ida,
we ask ourselves whether that individual’s activities rise to a certain
threshold for action, and whether taking action will, in fact, enhance our
security.
For example, when
considering lethal force we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a
significant threat to U.S. interests. This is absolutely critical, and it goes
to the very essence of why we take this kind of exceptional action. We do not
engage in lethal action in order to eliminate every single member of al-Qa’ida
in the world. Most times, and as we have done for more than a decade, we rely
on cooperation with other countries that are also interested in removing these
terrorists with their own capabilities and within their own laws. Nor is lethal
action about punishing terrorists for past crimes; we are not seeking
vengeance. Rather, we conduct targeted strikes because they are necessary to
mitigate an actual ongoing threat — to stop plots, prevent future attacks, and
save American lives.
And what do we mean by
a significant threat? I am not referring to some hypothetical threat—the mere
possibility that a member of al-Qa’ida might try to attack us at some point in
the future. A significant threat might be posed by an individual who is an
operational leader of al-Qa’ida or one of its associated forces. Or perhaps the
individual is himself an operative—in the midst of actually training for or
planning to carry out attacks against U.S. interests. Or perhaps the individual
possesses unique operational skills that are being leveraged in a planned
attack. The purpose of a strike against a particular individual is to stop him
before he can carry out his attack and kill innocents. The purpose is to
disrupt his plots and plans before they come to fruition.
In addition, our
unqualified preference is to only undertake lethal force when we believe that
capturing the individual is not feasible. I have heard it suggested that the
Obama Administration somehow prefers killing al-Qa’ida members rather than
capturing them. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is our preference
to capture suspected terrorists whenever feasible.
For one reason, this
allows us to gather valuable intelligence that we might not be able to obtain
any other way. In fact, the members of al-Qa’ida that we or other nations have
captured have been one of our greatest sources of information about al-Qa’ida,
its plans, and its intentions. And once in U.S. custody, we often can prosecute
them in our federal courts or reformed military commissions—both of which are
used for gathering intelligence and preventing terrorist attacks.
You see our preference
for capture in the case of Ahmed Warsame, a member of al-Shabaab who had
significant ties to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. Last year, when we
learned that he would be traveling from Yemen to Somalia, U.S. forces captured
him in route and we subsequently charged him in federal court.
The reality, however,
is that since 2001 such unilateral captures by U.S. forces outside of “hot”
battlefields, like Afghanistan, have been exceedingly rare. This is due in part
to the fact that in many parts of the world our counterterrorism partners have
been able to capture or kill dangerous individuals themselves.
Moreover, after being
subjected to more than a decade of relentless pressure, al-Qa’ida’s ranks have
dwindled and scattered. These terrorists are skilled at seeking remote,
inhospitable terrain—places where the United States and our partners simply do
not have the ability to arrest or capture them. At other times, our forces
might have the ability to attempt capture, but only by putting the lives of our
personnel at too great a risk. Often times, attempting capture could subject
civilians to unacceptable risks. There are many reasons why capture might not
be feasible, in which case lethal force might be the only remaining option to
address the threat and prevent an attack.
Finally, when
considering lethal force we are of course mindful that there are important
checks on our ability to act unilaterally in foreign territories. We do not use
force whenever we want, wherever we want. International legal principles,
including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose
constraints. The United States of America respects national sovereignty and
international law.
Those are some of the
questions we consider; the high standards we strive to meet. And in the end, we
make a decision—we decide whether a particular member of al-Qa’ida warrants
being pursued in this manner. Given the stakes involved and the consequence of
our decision, we consider all the information available to us, carefully,
responsibly.
We review the most
up-to-date intelligence, drawing on the full range of our intelligence
capabilities. And we do what sound intelligence demands—we challenge it, we
question it, including any assumptions on which it might be based. If we want
to know more, we may ask the Intelligence Community to go back and collect
additional intelligence or refine its analysis so that a more informed decision
can be made.
We listen to
departments and agencies across our national security team. We don’t just hear
out differing views, we ask for them and encourage them. We discuss. We debate.
We disagree. We consider the advantages and disadvantages of taking action. We
also carefully consider the costs of inaction and whether a decision not to
carry out a strike could allow a terrorist attack to proceed and potentially
kill scores of innocents.
Nor do we limit
ourselves narrowly to counterterrorism considerations. We consider the broader
strategic implications of any action, including what effect, if any, an action
might have on our relationships with other countries. And we don’t simply make
a decision and never revisit it again. Quite the opposite. Over time, we
refresh the intelligence and continue to consider whether lethal force is still
warranted.
In some cases—such as
senior al-Qa’ida leaders who are directing and planning attacks against the
United States—the individual clearly meets our standards for taking action. In
other cases, individuals have not met our standards. Indeed, there have been
numerous occasions where, after careful review, we have, working on a consensus
basis, concluded that lethal force was not justified in a given case.
Finally, as the
President’s counterterrorism advisor, I feel that it is important for the
American people to know that these efforts are overseen with extraordinary care
and thoughtfulness. The President expects us to address all of the tough
questions I have discussed today. Is capture really not feasible? Is this
individual a significant threat to U.S. interests? Is this really the best option?
Have we thought through the consequences, especially any unintended ones? Is
this really going to help protect our country from further attacks? Is it going
to save lives?
Our commitment to
upholding the ethics and efficacy of this counterterrorism tool continues even
after we decide to pursue a specific terrorist in this way. For example, we
only authorize a particular operation against a specific individual if we have
a high degree of confidence that the individual being targeted is indeed the terrorist
we are pursuing. This is a very high bar. Of course, how we identify an
individual naturally involves intelligence sources and methods, which I will
not discuss. Suffice it to say, our Intelligence Community has multiple ways to
determine, with a high degree of confidence, that the individual being targeted
is indeed the al-Qa’ida terrorist we are seeking.
In addition, we only
authorize a strike if we have a high degree of confidence that innocent
civilians will not be injured or killed, except in the rarest of circumstances.
The unprecedented advances we have made in technology provide us greater
proximity to targets for a longer period of time, and as a result allow us to
better understand what is happening in real time on the ground in ways that were
previously impossible. We can be much more discriminating and we can make more
informed judgments about factors that might contribute to collateral damage.
I can tell you today
that there have indeed been occasions when we have decided against conducting a
strike in order to avoid the injury or death of innocent civilians. This
reflects our commitment to doing everything in our power to avoid civilian
casualties—even if it means having to come back another day to take out that
terrorist, as we have done. And I would note that these standards—for
identifying a target and avoiding the loss of innocent civilians—exceed what is
required as a matter of international law on a typical battlefield. That’s
another example of the high standards to which we hold ourselves.
Our commitment to
ensuring accuracy and effectiveness continues even after a strike. In the wake
of a strike, we harness the full range of our intelligence capabilities to
assess whether the mission in fact achieved its objective. We try to determine
whether there was any collateral damage, including civilian deaths. There is,
of course, no such thing as a perfect weapon, and remotely piloted aircraft are
no exception.
As the President and
others have acknowledged, there have indeed been instances when—despite the
extraordinary precautions we take—civilians have been accidently injured, or
worse, killed in these strikes. It is exceedingly rare, but it has happened.
When it does, it pains us and we regret it deeply, as we do any time innocents
are killed in war. And when this happens we take it seriously. We go back and
review our actions. We examine our practices. And we constantly work to improve
and refine our efforts so that we are doing everything in our power to prevent
the loss of innocent life. This too is a reflection of our values as Americans.
Ensuring the ethics
and efficacy of these strikes also includes regularly informing appropriate
members of Congress and the committees who have oversight of our
counterterrorism programs. Indeed, our counterterrorism programs—including the
use of lethal force—have grown more effective over time because of
congressional oversight and our ongoing dialogue with Members and staff.
This is the
seriousness, the extraordinary care, that President Obama and those of us on
his national security team bring to this weightiest of questions—whether to
pursue lethal force against a terrorist who is plotting to attack our country.
When that person is a
U.S. citizen, we ask ourselves additional questions. Attorney General Holder
has already described the legal authorities that clearly allow us to use lethal
force against an American citizen who is a senior operational leader of
al-Qa’ida. He has discussed the thorough and careful review, including all
relevant constitutional considerations, that is to be undertaken by the U.S.
government when determining whether the individual poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States.
To recap, the
standards and processes I’ve described today—which we have refined and
strengthened over time—reflect our commitment to: ensuring the individual is a
legitimate target under the law; determining whether the individual poses a
significant threat to U.S. interests; determining that capture is not feasible;
being mindful of the important checks on our ability to act unilaterally in
foreign territories; having that high degree of confidence, both in the
identity of the target and that innocent civilians will not be harmed; and, of
course, engaging in additional review if the al-Qa’ida terrorist is a U.S.
citizen.
Going forward, we’ll
continue to strengthen and refine these standards and processes. As we do,
we’ll look to institutionalize our approach more formally so that the high
standards we set for ourselves endure over time, including as an example for
other nations that pursue these capabilities. As the President said at Oslo, in
the conduct of war, America must be the standard bearer.
This includes our
continuing commitment to greater transparency. With that in mind, I have made a
sincere effort today to address some of the main questions that citizens and
scholars have raised regarding the use of targeted lethal force against
al-Qa’ida. I suspect there are those, perhaps some in this audience, who feel
we have not been transparent enough. I suspect there are those—both inside and
outside our government—who feel I have been perhaps too open. If both groups
feel a little unsatisfied, then I’ve probably struck the right balance.
Again, there are some
lines we simply will not and cannot cross because, at times, our national
security demands secrecy. But we are a democracy. The people are sovereign. And
our counterterrorism tools do not exist in a vacuum. They are stronger and more
sustainable when the American people understand and support them. They are
weaker and less sustainable when the American people do not. As a result of my
remarks today, I hope the American people have a better understanding of this
critical tool—why we use it, what we do, how carefully we use it, and why it is
absolutely essential to protecting our country and our citizens.
I would just like to
close on a personal note. I know that for many people—in our government and across
the country—the issue of targeted strikes raised profound moral questions. It
forces us to confront deeply held personal beliefs and our values as a nation.
If anyone in government who works in this area tells you they haven’t struggled
with this, then they haven’t spent much time thinking about it. I know I have,
and I will continue to struggle with it as long as I remain involved in
counterterrorism.
But I am certain about
one thing. We are at war. We are at war against a terrorist organization called
al-Qa’ida that has brutally murdered thousands of Americans—men, women and
children—as well as thousands of other innocent people around the world. In
recent years, with the help of targeted strikes we have turned al-Qa’ida into a
shadow of what it once was. They are on the road to destruction.
Until that finally
happens, however, there are still terrorists in hard-to-reach places who are
actively planning attacks against us. If given the chance, they will gladly
strike again and kill more of our citizens. And the President has a
Constitutional and solemn obligation to do everything in his power to protect
the safety and security of the American people.
Yes, war is hell. It
is awful. It involves human beings killing other human beings, sometimes innocent
civilians. That is why we despise war. That is why we want this war against
al-Qa’ida to be over as soon as possible, and not a moment longer. And over
time, as al-Qa’ida fades into history and as our partners grow stronger, I’d
hope that the United States would have to rely less on lethal force to keep our
country safe.
Until that happens, as
President Obama said here five years ago, if another nation cannot or will not
take action, we will. And it is an unfortunate fact that to save many innocent
lives we are sometimes obliged to take lives—the lives of terrorists who seek
to murder our fellow citizens.
On behalf of President
Obama and his administration, I am here to say to the American people that we
will continue to work to safeguard this Nation and its citizens responsibly,
adhering to the laws of this land and staying true to the values that define us
as Americans.
Thank you very much.
Jane Harman Resigning
From Congress , 02/07/11
Rep. Jane Harman
(D-Calif.) is expected to announce on Tuesday that she will resign from her
post in congress to serve as president and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson Center,
NBC News reports.
NBC's Andrea Mitchell reports:
Harman will succeed
the current leader, former Rep. Lee Hamilton, who has led the bipartisan think
tank for 12 years.
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Initial Reaction to Brennan’s Speech
by Michael W.
Lewis , May 1st, 2012 - 8:44 AM EDT
At least from the
text, John Brennan seems to have positioned the speech that he delivered
yesterday at the Wilson Center (that Marty linked to) as the capstone of
the Obama Administration’s transparency campaign on drones and targeted
killings in the conflict with al Qaeda. He made a point of referencing the
string of other Administration figures that have addressed various aspects of
this issue (Koh, Johnson, Holder and Preston) before expanding (albeit
marginally) upon what had gone before.
There was little truly
new in this speech, but it did in many instances confirm things
that had previously been only obliquely referenced in a way that crystallizes
the US position on a variety of matters. In contrast to his rather cagey
discussion of drones several months ago at Harvard, Brennan conclusively
acknowledged that the United States is using drones to conduct targeted
killings in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Although he did not include an
acknowledgement of the CIA’s drone program, this was a far more forthright
discussion of drones and their role in counterinsurgencies than we have seen
before.
Brennan also
reiterated the need to respect international law and sovereignty that we first
heard in Koh’s speech two years ago. He made it clear that these strikes are
conducted either with the consent of the state on whose territory they occur or
in cases in which the “host” state has proven unwilling or unable to
incapacitate the threat. His lengthy description of the principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity made it apparent that the
US views the law of armed conflict as the governing law applicable to such
strikes based on an ongoing conflict with al Qaeda.
Building on Holder’s
speech at Northwestern last month about the standards for targeting
individuals, Brennan confirmed the importance of only targeting those with an
operational involvement in al Qaeda and he emphasized that the “feasibility of
capture” requirement is taken very seriously. Although he did note that
feasibility of capture is determined not only by the physical/logistical
difficulty in effecting capture but also with reference to the risks that our
soldiers would have to face in completing the task.
Perhaps the most
important amplification on previous positions that Brennan gave put the use of
lethal force within the context of the larger goal, which is the defeat of al
Qaeda. “We do not engage in lethal action in order to eliminate every single
member of al-Qa’ida in the world.” Rather, he stated that on a number of
occasions the opportunity to employ lethal force was passed up because it would
not further that goal. This seemed to be the Administration’s way of telling
critics that it takes the concept of blowback seriously and that each decision
to employ lethal force is taken with the larger strategic picture in mind. But
it also leaves no doubt that the Administration considers that decision to be
one of Executive discretion.
The one piece of new
ground that Brennan did cover was his acknowledgment that some form of
post-action review is taken for every strike. This is something that a number
of people, including myself, have said was a necessary component of any
targeted killing program. Brennan did not provide details about the
independence of such a review and others have led me to believe that it is not
as independent or robust as many would wish, but the existence of post-action
review has been confirmed.
My final overall
observation is that this seemed to be a finale. We have had a four or five major
speeches on this topic since the beginning of the year and my sense is that
this was the last one for awhile. By referencing the other speeches and closing
with an explicit discussion of the balance between transparency and national
security (which Brennan claims to have struck by making all sides of the
transparency debate uneasy) I believe he was signaling that this is as much as
the Administration is willing to say for now on this issue
