North Korea's Missiles Displayed At Parade Are Fake ; whether China violated UNSC Res

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/26/north-korea-missiles-fake_n_1455004.html

North Korea's Missiles Displayed At Parade Are Fake

By ERIC TALMADGE 04/26/12

TOKYO -- Analysts who have studied photos of a half-dozen ominous new North Korean missiles showcased recently at a lavish military parade say they were fakes, and not very convincing ones, casting further doubt on the country's claims of military prowess.

Since its recent rocket launch failure, Pyongyang's top military leaders have made several boastful statements about its weapons capabilities. On Wednesday, Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho claimed his country is capable of defeating the United States "at a single blow." And on Monday, North Korea promised "special actions" that would reduce Seoul's government to ashes within minutes.

But the weapons displayed April 15 appear to be a mishmash of liquid-fuel and solid-fuel components that could never fly together. Undulating casings on the missiles suggest the metal is too thin to withstand flight. Each missile was slightly different from the others, even though all were supposedly the same make. They don't even fit the launchers they were carried on.

"There is no doubt that these missiles were mock-ups," Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker, of Germany's Schmucker Technologie, wrote in a paper posted recently on the website Armscontrolwonk.com that listed those discrepancies. "It remains unknown if they were designed this way to confuse foreign analysts, or if the designers simply did some sloppy work."

The missiles, called KN-08s, were loaded onto the largest mobile launch vehicles North Korea has ever unveiled. Pyongyang gave them special prominence by presenting them at the end of the parade, which capped weeks of celebrations marking the 100th anniversary of the country's founding father, Kim Il Sung.

The unveiling created an international stir. The missiles appeared to be new, and designed for long-range attacks.

That's a big concern because, along with developing nuclear weapons, North Korea has long been suspected of trying to field an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, capable of reaching the United States. Washington contends that North Korea's failed April 13 rocket launch was an attempt to test missile technology rather than the scientific mission Pyongyang claims.

But after pouring over close-up photos of the missiles, Schiller and Schmucker, whose company has advised NATO on missile issues, argue the mock-ups indicate North Korea is a long way from having a credible ICBM.

"There is still no evidence that North Korea actually has a functional ICBM," they concluded, adding that the display was a "dog and pony show" and suggesting North Korea may not be making serious progress toward its nuclear-tipped ICBM dreams.

North Korea has a particularly bad track record with ICBM-style rockets.  Its four launches since 1998 – three of which it claimed carried satellites – have all ended in failure.

Though North Korea frequently overstates its military capabilities, the missiles displayed this month might foreshadow weapons it is still working on.

David Wright, a physicist with the Union of Concerned Scientists who has written extensively about North Korea's missile program, said he believes the KN-08s could be "somewhat clumsy representations of a missile that is being developed."

Wright noted that the first signs the outside world got of North Korea's long-range Taepodong-2 missile – upon which the recent failed rocket was based – was from mock-ups seen in 1994, 12 years before it was actually tested on the launch pad.

"To understand whether there is a real missile development program in place, we are trying to understand whether the mock-ups make sense as the design for a real missile," he said. "It is not clear that it has a long enough range to make sense for North Korea to invest a lot of effort in."

Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former scientific adviser to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, said the Taepodong-2 design remains the more real future threat – though even that remains at least a decade away – and the KN-08 is simply a smoke screen.

"I believe that these missiles are not only mock-ups, but they are very unlikely to be actual mock-ups of any missiles in design," he said. "Fabricating a missile like the KN-08 would require a gigantic indigenous technical effort. ... The only way North Korea could develop such a missile with its pitiful economy would be if someone gave it to them."

He noted that a comparable U.S. missile, the Minuteman III, required "decades of expertise in rocket motors, and vast sums of intellectual, technological and financial capital."

Much attention, meanwhile, has been given to the 16-wheel mobile launchers that carried the missiles during the parade, which experts believe may have included a chassis built in China. That raises questions of whether China has violated U.N. sanctions against selling missile-related technology to Pyongyang.

Some missile experts say the launchers were designed to carry a larger missile than the 18-meter-long KN-08, and argue that North Korea would not have spent millions of dollars on them unless it has, or intends to have, a big missile to put on them.

But Wright said the launchers, like the missiles they carried, could also have been more for show than anything else.

"Given the international attention it has gotten from parading these missiles you could argue that the cost of buying the large trucks – which add a lot of credibility to the images of the missiles – was money well spent in terms of projecting an image of power," he said.

http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5150/dprk-icbm-items

DPRK ICBM Items

BY JEFFREY | 19 APRIL 2012

I am a little baffled that the media isn’t making a bigger deal out of the fact that North Korea paraded six road-mobile ICBMs through Pyongyang.  Six road-mobile ICBMs.  Hey!  Look!  ICBMs!  Road-mobile ICBMs! Just like Gates said!

As best I can tell, reporters don’t really understand that this isn’t the same missile as the Unha-3.

It’s not.  It’s different.  This is important.

1.

One set of issues relates to whether the missiles were real, or simply aspirational mock-ups.  I am uploading a paper — “Dog and Pony Show” — by Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker that is strongly of the view that we are looking at mockups.  Some commenters may disagree, especially about the little white straps.

(Schiller and Schmucker are skeptical that this will ever be a real missile, although I hasten to add that the United States saw a pair of “missile simulators” — better known as  mockups — in 1994 that gave us the TD-1 and -2 names we use today. See: Barbara Starr, “N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow with the TD-2,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 12, 1994.)

2.

To the extent that this new missile has received any attention at all, it is the truck that seems to interest reporters.  I find that fascinating.  Normally, I’d be impressed, but stop ignoring the missile!

The TEL is an important part of the weapons system (unless you plan to strap the missile to a donkey) and North Korea is dependent on foreign suppliers for heavy-duty vehicle chassis (warning: wikileaks cable).

China appears to be the supplier, in violation of existing sanctions on North Korea.

There seems to be some confusion about the basis for stating that the export of  TEL is a violation of the Security Council Resolution.  UNSCR1718 and UNSCR 1874 are actually pretty clear about this. All member states are obligated to prevent the supply to the DPRK of a number of items, including:

(ii)  all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;

S/2006/815 defines ballistic missile programs list pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).  It is identical to the MTCR Annex. Both list “Vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation and launching of the systems specified in 1.A” as controlled items.  Although such a vehicle is a less-sensitive Category II transfer under the MTCR, there is little doubt it violates the sanctions resolution. (UNSCR 1874 expanded these obligations and provided the opportunity for an updated statement of controlled items.  Short version: TELs still not okay to transfer.)

If China exported the trucks after 2006, this is a clear violation of sanctions. The resemblance between the DPRK TEL and two Chinese models — WS2600 and the WS51200–  are obvious.

I think it is a WS51200.  The little face plate to hide the notch in the cab doesn’t fool me any more than the bright red paint job.  That sucker is designed to carry very large missiles. There are a series of interesting Chinese announcements about initial production of the WS51200 (1|2) including one that has been taken down.

Why the rush boys?  Have an export order that needed to be filled before a parade?

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Sam |    April 19, 2012

So would this be a more serious MTCR violation than UK sending cruise missiles to Saudis?

Does the relevant UNSCR say “calls on” nations to refrain from such exports to NK or does it say “decides” ? The “calls on” are kind of optional non-enforceable nice things that UNSC would like. e.g. UNSCR 487 also has some “calls on”

joshua |  April 19, 2012

Good question. China is not a member of the MTCR, but has undertaken its own, similar commitments in parallel to the MTCR. Which is in any case not binding in the manner of a Security Council resolution, but rather a voluntary commitment.

Regardless, it’s not such a good development

George William Herbert | April 19, 2012

One note -

I believe they have a real program here, even if the missiles are mockups.  The TELs seem to have cost around $1 million each (30 million Yuan for 6, total US dollar value about $4.7 million at current exchange rates). The TELs are also bigger than we think they’d need to be for this missile (max weight rating 122 tons or so), which seems to indicate they intentionally overbuilt the TEL for performance reasons.

That’s a lot of money to spend on a masrikova activity.

It’s not that big in comparison with their total imports ($3.7 billion or so) or export ($2 billion or so), but it’s big enough in their total budget that it seems unlikely they’d do it just for show.

Reply  P | April 20, 2012

Don’t think the ‘cost much = real’ argument holds.

‘Careful spending’ and ‘show’ are two concepts which do not usually seem to be connected in North Korea. The massive military parade itself is an example in itself.
Or this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZQDWV_0nOM&feature=related
or this
http://atlasobscura.com/place/ryugyong-hotel

Pieter | April 20, 2012

The sanctions against North Korea are certainly pretty restrictive of just about anything that could be used or adapted in any way by North Korea, for carrying ballistic missiles but also for most types of major conventional weapons. Which basically means that no truck whatsoever could be supplied to North Korea, because almost any truck can be adapted as carrier of ballistic missiles or major conventional arms. But that is not really the intention of the UN sanctions on the country.
I mentioned it before, in the case of Iran we have seen the same issue some years ago. In that case it German trucks were used and in reaction the German government tried to stop the export of relevant trucks.
In at least one other UN sanction regime (Darfur) not related to nuclear programmes similar issues relating to dual-use/civilian vehicles used for military use have arisen.

Article.aspx?id=173275
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,630778,00.html

Peter Brown | April 20, 2012

Let me see if I get this straight. The China-Iran-Pakistan-North Korea missile club is providing substantial momentum to a broadening and serious deterioration of the MTCR’s effectiveness.  Meanwhile, Russian bombers are more active over the western Pacific now than they were in the closing hours of the Soviet Union. And the U.S. seems willing to not only extend a pass to India on both the nuclear and missile front,  but to reinforce Japan’s remilitarization as well.

Seems to me that Asia is doomed to continue down this precarious path until it is too late to reverse course.

George William Herbert | April 21, 2012

Jeffrey writes:

Neither the MTCR nor the sanctions have an exception for dual-use vehicles. The important word is “designed or modified.” The MTCR guidelines (and sanctions) are quite clear thst such items could be used in other applications.
There is another phrase — “specially designed” — to describe goods for which there are no civilian applications.
All of this discussion about possible civilian uses is interesting, but quite irrelevant from an MTCR perspective.

I think the point is whether the Chinese bear much culpability.

For stuff I routinely see on US roads in a civilian capacity…

I think it should be investigated, but if they thought they were going to be construction cranes that’s not obviously just a cover story.

Caterpillar’s mining trucks could similarly be converted for TEL use. They don’t ask export customers about missile support end user conversions.

P | April 22, 2012

The UNSC resolutions ‘decide’ that UN Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in the MTCR annex, which includes ‘vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation AND launching of the systems specified in 1.A.’

However the WS2600 or WS51200 we know of are not such vehicles. They are chassis only without all the other bits which makes them TELs. Also note the use of ‘and’ not ‘or’, indicating that a vehicle which incorporates all the functions. (Unless we assume that the whole TEL had been delivered from China, but there is no indication for that whatsoever.)

It can also be argued that if the missiles are real the vehicles should not have been delivered because the UN sanctions prohibit the supply to DPRK of ‘all arms and related materiel’.

But as they are chassis only and seem to have civilian applications also this is not so straightforward. After all, many, many materiel of all sorts is ‘related to arms’. I’d say that if it was known or could be suspected based on available information about the end-user that they would be used for building a TEL or if the buyer was one of the DPRK entities that are under UN embargoes the delivery it would be a deliberate violation of the UN sanctions. Otherwise it is just something to learn from and to prevent in future and raises questions about how China makes assessments regarding exports of strategic goods.

For me the whole point of this discussion is to counter anyone jumping the gun and suggesting that the Chinese government deliberately helped the DPRK with building an ICBM. Why potentially piss off the Chinese if the evidence is so weak? Based on the information we have the allegation is about as valid as claiming that in violation of UN sanctions Germany helped Iran with its Shahabs because the Shahabs are pulled around by Mercedes Benz Trucks or Sweden ‘violated’ its MTCR commitments because the AGNI-4 is pulled around by a Volvo truck.   Important will be if China will investigate the matter, will provide full assistance to the the UN panel on the DPRK which is investigating the matter and if China and will take action to prevent future similar violations of the UN sanctions. If they don’t or if someone will come up with proper evidence that the Chinese government has deliberately and for reasons unclear to me supported the DPRK ICBM effort, we have reason tho complain and should really wonder what the Chinese are up to.

But as someone here argued before, until then, the questions if these missiles are real is may be more important.

Jeffrey | April 22, 2012

This only makes sense if you don’t read the actual sanctions documents, which make clear that civilian applications are not an exception for goods “designed or modified” for certain purposes, like TELs. There is a special phrase, “specially designed”, that describes goods with no other purpose.

The wording of the MTCR and the sanctions are very clear that the existence of civilian applications does not change the controlled nature of the item. There is even a nice example of titanium coating (I think; I am working from memory) provided to make this clear.

I don’t know whether the transfer is deliberate or not, but I’d love to know what the civilian/defense ratio for WS52100 is. The company certainly knew that North Korea might use this equipment in a missile program. After all, the Chinese missile progr appears to be their primary customer.

I meant to add that the suspension alone — an off-road vehicle capable of carrying tens of tons — ought to meet the standard, to say nothing of other little details right down to the notch in the cab.

Or is that purely stylistic? Or to carry very pointy cranes?

Markus Schiller | April 23, 2012

There seems to be some confusion on the liquid/solid issue, as well as on the cable ducts. Let me try to clarify this.

Cable ducts are always external at a certain point, for both solid- and liquid-fueled missiles. It is the location of their endings that is important – these positions hint at the missile’s inner configuration. It is too risky (or impossible) to have the cables inside the combustion chamber (solid-fueled) or inside the tanks (liquid-fueled) for various reasons: A spark might ignite the propellants, the breach in the tank wall/chamber wall is a potential source for leakage, and so on. The cables are then routed back inside the airframe as soon as possible for several reasons – the cable covers are unnecessary extra mass, for example, as are the cables if you have them extending to the aft skirt and then leading back up again inside the missile.

True, the cable ducts at the UR-200 (and the R-36) lead down to the very end of the aft skirt. But there is still more than 1 m of engines sticking out behind the aft skirt. The UR-200 and R-36 were developed for silo use – they did not have to be protected against dust and dirt and weather, allowing for an “open skirt” design with exposed engines. And at the UR-200′s upper stage, the cable is routed back into the missile at the end of the tank section (the conical section houses the propulsion unit).

We forgot to add one other observation: North Korean rocket engineers certainly are not stupid, especially when they are designing and developing a road-mobile ICBM. In that case, they should know that a liquid-fueled ICBM is better designed as a two stage rocket, while a three stage design is great for a solid-fueled missile (simply look how many three stage liquid-fueled ICBMs there are, and how many solid ones).

Things just don’t add up on the presented configuration.