The DPRK Rocket and Korean Peace
Posted By Georgy Toloraya On April 4, 2012 @
6:19 pm In Commentary | 2
Comments
Why would North Korea sacrifice its long-cherished dream of
improving relations with the United States for such a trivial thing as
“fireworks” for a national holiday? Around the world, people are wracking their
brains trying to explain this seemingly sudden “satellite launch” decision, and
the theories that have emerged so far can be grouped as follows:
1. 
[1]The
DPRK had a calculated plan: first, reach an agreement that is attractive to
the United States; then do something highly provocative to raise the stakes
and create crisis; and finally, after the dust settles, negotiate from a
position of strength to get more. In the process, North Korea also planned to
confirm its status as a nuclear power and undermine the position of South
Korean conservatives.[1] [2]
(DO- why undermine K. conservative ? )
2. The decision to launch a rocket is the
result of a rift between “soft-liners” and “hard-liners” in Pyongyang,
in the absence of strong leadership (as President Obama said, “we don’t know,
who’s calling the shots”). The North Korean negotiators did not know about the
launch plan and did not discuss this issue with their American interlocutors
when working out the “Leap Day” agreement.
3. There are even more exotic theories that
imply it was a US plot to reach an agreement that demonstrated its
desire for peace, while fully understanding that a satellite launch, about the
right to which North Koreans have warned, would break the deal. As a result,
there would be no need to fulfill controversial US obligations (like discussing
the provision of an LWR and the lifting of sanctions), and they would gain
new leverage to pressure an inexperienced North Korean leader to the brink
of surrender. Paradoxically, the events unfolding so far fall well into such a
scenario.
I believe, however, as often happens when real-world politics are analyzed by
theoreticians, that
the extent to which multistage planning was involved has been exaggerated,
and that the influence of
chaotic factors has been largely underestimated. (conclusion on why) In all likelihood, this is probably a case of diplomatic mishap,
where both sides—both well intentioned to achieve meaningful results and
promptly report them—due to internal policy considerations (the election
campaign in United States and the official announcement of Kim Jong Un’s
status on Kim Il Sung’s centenary birthday), pushed their luck too far.
(evidence) In fact, they did not quite grasp each others’
real intentions or reach the right conclusions. It has been reported that in the talks, the
North Koreans repeatedly said that the DPRK reserved the right to a peaceful satellite
launch, and although the American side warned that any such action would be a
deal-breaker, the North Koreans probably regarded these warnings as merely
rhetoric, while the Americans believed their message had hit home.
The United States probably should have paid closer attention
to the language and signals the North Koreans used. The issue of “long-range
ballistic missiles” versus “missiles of any kind” has been discussed between
the US and DPRK for years (see a wonderful analysis by Jeffrey
Lewis [3]) and the North Koreans presumed it was clear to
their American interlocutors that a “satellite launch” was not included in the
“Leap Day” deal. North Koreans have consistently argued that the right to
launch a satellite for “peaceful purposes” is sovereign and not subject to
negotiation. Moreover, some reports have indicated that the North Koreans told
US experts even before Kim Jong Il’s death that the satellite launch would take
place in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth.[2] [4]
(why can’t contest the
decision of “firework” – in terms of domestic politics)
Anyone even slightly acquainted with North Korea’s ideology
and system would immediately grasp there is no way Kim Jong Un would have
contested his father’s decision. Especially since this deed was about the
only one he could present to a starving population as proof of the DPRK
becoming “strong and prosperous.” As a former citizen of the USSR (which
was much less indoctrinated in the final stages of its existence than the DPRK
is today), I well remember the mass propaganda campaigns that would ensue
around jubilees (such as the centenary anniversary Lenin’s Bolshevik
Revolution), for which enterprises were supposed to increase their “labor
achievements.” I simply do not accept the possibility that North Koreans
would have agreed to discard such a powerful symbol without even
discussing a “reward” for it. It was well known that the North Koreans have
been constructing their launch pad for over a decade.[3] [5] Was
anybody so naive as to presume the North would cancel such a prestigious
project by silently including its “cost” into the ridiculously low price of
240,000 tons of food?
(why choose not to contest
the decision of “firework” – at the international level )
At the same time, the North Koreans seem to not take
seriously the US argument that such launches are prohibited by UN Security
Council Resolution 1874. Their behavior reflects a presumption that this
resolution does not prohibit peaceful launches. They also tend to not
pay much attention to UN Resolutions in general (which are rarely
implemented anyway), especially when talking to the superpower they believe can
bend international law to its needs.
Or maybe they just saw a loophole and decided to
use it in order to blame the United States for yet again complicating the
implementation of a deal made in good faith. To prevent any claims against
them, aware of possible US displeasure, the North Koreans did all they could to
“sweeten the pill.” They informed all the required international bodies in
advance of their plan and even invited foreign experts and correspondents to
witness the launch,[4] [6] perhaps
hoping such unprecedented transparency would earn them some good marks.
(hysterical reactions from S. Korea, Japan and US, along with
reluctant Russia and China, is not a practical option in dealing with N. Korea)
Hysterical reactions from South Korea, Japan and the United
States, along with efforts at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to
mobilize condemnation of this act by all the leading states, including a
reluctant China and Russia, was considered in Pyongyang as proof
of the “hostile intent” of both ROK and US conservatives. At the same
time, North Korean diplomats who also need to get out of this awkward situation
and justify themselves, have blamed the situation on “hypocritical imperialists
and their puppets,” and the military and regime loyalists gladly support them.
This is a hard lesson for the young leader, and it will not make him any
more receptive to concessions in the future, depending, of course, on what
happens in the next few months.
(again, can’t expect N. Korea to contest the
plan for “firework”) (proposing two options)
It should be clearly understood that there is absolutely no
way North Korea can give up its launch at this stage—even if they wished to—and
that any appeals or pressure aimed at them on this subject are useless and will
not only irritate Pyongyang, but will also be seen as a plot to further
isolate and undermine the regime. Given that, two scenarios for moving
forward are possible.
One scenario is that before and after the launch, the familiar spiral of
condemnation, pressure and sanctions against North Korea will unfold. The issue
will be discussed in the UN, some kind of resolution will be adopted, and an
indignant North Korea will stop fulfilling its recently agreed to obligations
under the “Leap Year” deal and restart its uranium enrichment program or even
other aspects of its nuclear program. A new nuclear test—uranium-based or even
thermonuclear (North Koreans have warned about such a possibility)—may follow.
That would in turn bring more sanctions, isolation and other “measures,” which
could result in new military demarches by the North against the South.
Another option is to try to be pragmatic and prevent all of the above from
happening by remaining calm, even with the feeling of having been cheated by
the North Koreans. The new leader should be given a chance to get out of this
confrontational impasse. The international community should, of course,
criticize Pyongyang for this unfortunate plan and its even worse timing, but the criticism should be constructive, not offensive.
The modalities of implementing UN Security Council Resolutions (whip) and the “right” of the DPRK to a space research program
(carrot) might be discussed in the UN with DPRK
participation. The invitation to the test site to observe the launch should be
accepted, and this occasion should be used to both increase the transparency of
North Korea’s “space research program” and to start monitoring it.
Later, this program might become an issue to be discussed
on a separate track—perhaps a special working group of the Six Party Talks
(thus increasing their relevance). For example, the idea has been proposed for
other countries offer to launch the satellites that North Korea claims it needs
(actually dating back to Putin-Kim Jong Il meeting in 2000). Given the fact
that the Six Party Talks include the leading space countries, the idea of
forming an international consortium (a la KEDO) to utilize DPRK space launch
facilities on a commercial basis (which might become profitable in the long
run) could also be discussed. In any case, (strategic goal) the North Korean space program would be tamed.
Russia is in a good
position to implement the option two
I believe Russia could use its clout to promote such a
vision, probably with the help of China. Although the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has expressed “serious concern” with North Korea’s planned
launch and has urged Pyongyang not to “contra pose itself to the international
community,” Moscow has stressed that it has “never put to doubt DPRK’s
sovereign right” for peaceful space research. At the same time, to exercise
such a right, the political and diplomatic means should be employed for
improving the situation on the Korean peninsula and the gradual lifting of
sanctions, including prohibition of launches.[5] [7] I
believe, as a first step, Russia should use this opportunity to directly
discuss these choices with North Korea by sending a high-level delegation to
the Kim Il Sung’s centennial celebrations in mid-April.
After the launch (hopefully without any accidents, if we are
lucky) is behind us, multilateral talks should be resumed to include the
missile issue in a “package solution” promoted by Russia for years to come.
[1] [8] This
is part of a strategy in which quickly backsliding on the deal was
premeditated. In this scenario, North Korea has set something of a trap for the
United States. Seehttp://38north.org/2012/03/aabrahamian0319/ [9].
[3] [12] http://cisac.stanford.edu/events/analysis_of_the_new_north_korean_missile_launch_complex [13].
Article printed from
38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea: http://38north.org
URL to article: http://38north.org/2012/04/gtoloraya040412/
URLs in this post:
[1] Image: http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/HiRes.jpg
[2] [1]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftn1
[3] Jeffrey Lewis: http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5083/long-range-missiles-of-any-kind
[4] [2]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftn2
[5] [3]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftn3
[6] [4]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftn4
[7] [5]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftn5
[8] [1]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftnref1
[9]
http://38north.org/2012/03/aabrahamian0319/: http://38north.org/2012/03/aabrahamian0319/
[10] [2]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftnref2
[11]
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120321000992: http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120321000992
[12] [3]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftnref3
[13]
http://cisac.stanford.edu/events/analysis_of_the_new_north_korean_missile_launch_complex:http://cisac.stanford.edu/events/analysis_of_the_new_north_korean_missile_launch_complex
[14] [4]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftnref4
[15]
http://wlna.info/lenta/40166-kndr-nazval-datu-zapuska-svoego-sputnika.html: http://wlna.info/lenta/40166-kndr-nazval-datu-zapuska-svoego-sputnika.html
[16] [5]: http://38north.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftnref5
[17]
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/E53865732B5BCA65442579C30055D137: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/E53865732B5BCA65442579C30055D137
