Managing water in southern China;

Copyright 2009 International Herald Tribune
All Rights Reserved
The International Herald Tribune

December 31, 2009 Thursday
BYLINE: REENITA MALHOTRA HORA

BODY:


ABSTRACT

A series of droughts in China, including some earlier this year, has raised concerns that Hong Kong's water supply might not be as secure as had been thought.

FULL TEXT

Drinking water has rarely been a concern in Hong Kong, where the supply has historically been plentiful and affordable. But a series of droughts in China, including some earlier this year, has raised concerns that Hong Kong's water supply might not be as secure as had been thought.

Civic Exchange, a public policy research group based in Hong Kong, has released a report titled ''Liquid Assets,'' highlighting water security and management in the Pearl River Basin and Hong Kong.

The report warns that South China's supply of water - which comes from the Dongjiang, a major tributary of the Pearl River - is threatened by climate change and pollution. Additionally, there is growing competition from industries in the surrounding Guangdong wetlands.

Mike Kilburn, Civic Exchange's environmental program manager, said that ''while China protects classic farmlands, the story of Guangdong is relentless development.''

''Ecologically, the delta is not in good shape,'' Mr. Kilburn said.

The authors of the report said at a news conference that Hong Kong's water prices were a significant part of the problem, as low prices encouraged consumption.

The International Water Association reports that Hong Kong's water tariffs are among the lowest in the world, while its per capita consumption of water is among the highest.

According to Civic Exchange's representatives, the most immediate way to manage the use of water resources is to raise the price, but they acknowledged that political issues might make raising rates difficult.

They also believe that Hong Kong and Macao should be brought in on the discussions relating to water management in South China.

Currently Hong Kong's role is limited to ''water supplies management'' - negotiating long-term fixed rates for water - rather than ''total water management,'' which would look beyond the pricing issue at things like conservation, adaptation measures and preservation of South China's wetlands.

''Hong Kong does not have a water policy,'' said Christine Loh, a former Hong Kong legislator and the founder of Civic Exchange. ''What we have is a water department that looks at things like piping, cleaning and negotiating water prices with Guangdong, but this is a supply-led attitude.''

Ms. Loh said Hong Kong needed a demand-oriented water policy and total water management system that looked at broader factors to secure the long-term water supply. Factors include raising tariffs, increasing conservation measures, generating awareness campaigns and planning for alternative sources like desalination plants.

LOAD-DATE: December 30, 2009

Are condoms and birth control pills more cost-effective than windmills and solar panels as tools to curb global warming?

Copyright 2009 International Herald Tribune
The International Herald Tribune
December 24, 2009 Thursday


Birth control and climate change;
In the Blogs: Green Inc.

JOHN COLLINS RUDOLF

Are condoms and birth control pills more cost-effective than windmills and solar panels as tools to curb global warming?

Yes, and by a wide margin, contends Thomas Wire, a postgraduate researcher at the London School of Economics and author of a recent study asserting that family planning is nearly five times as cost-effective in mitigating global warming emissions as green energy technologies like wind and solar power.

''It's always been obvious that total emissions depend on the number of emitters as well as their individual emissions - the carbon tonnage can't shoot down, as we want, while the population keeps shooting up,'' Roger Martin, chairman of the Optimum Population Trust, the British environmental group that sponsored the study, said in a statement.

''The taboo on mentioning this fact has made the whole climate change debate so far somewhat unreal,'' he added.

Yet at the recent Copenhagen climate summit meeting - which failed to produce a binding resolution on curbing global warming emissions - population control was again the solution that dared not speak its name.

It is easy to see why. Population control measures like China's one-child policy and forced sterilization campaigns by various countries during the 20th century have led many to associate such efforts with racism and totalitarianism. Powerful institutions like the Roman Catholic Church continue to oppose contraception on religious grounds.

Yet while population control remains sidelined in official climate talks, the number of prominent voices calling for its recognition as an issue of concern is mounting. The United Nations Population Fund's most recent annual report explicitly linked slower population growth with reduced greenhouse-gas emissions.

In December, a group of more than 60 members of the U.S. Congress wrote to Peter R. Orszag, director of the Office of Management and Budget, urging the administration of President Barack Obama to improve financing for family planning, in part because of climate concerns.

''Family planning and reproductive health should be part of larger strategies for climate change mitigation and adaptation,'' said the letter, which was signed by several prominent Democrats.

''Slower population growth will make reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions easier to achieve,'' it continued.

Leading scientists, like Martin Rees, head of the Royal Society, Britain's academy of science, also assert that population growth must be constrained in order to confront climate change successfully.

But while fewer births would almost certainly result in less global warming emissions, some argue that population control will be less important for its impact on emissions than as an adaptation strategy for developing countries. There, growth rates are highest and the effects of climate change - from rising sea levels to increased droughts and floods - are likely to be the most severe.

Despite the obvious challenges, little research has focused on the intersection of demographics and climate change, states a recent World Health Organization study.

''The relevance of demographic trends to adaptation to climate change has meanwhile remained almost entirely unexplored by the scientific literature,'' wrote Leo Bryant, the lead researcher on the study.

손석희에 시선이 머무는 이유


이필재의 '사람의 향기'

http://blog.joins.com/jelpj

그는 "첫 학기 첫 시험 때 시간이 모자라 답안을 완성하지 못했고, 연구실로 돌아와 억울함에 겨워 찔끔 눈물을 흘렸다"고 썼다. 중학생이나 흘릴 법한 그런 눈물을 그 시절 흘린 건 자신이 그만큼 학업에 절실하게 매달려 있었다는 방증이고, 그래서 그 시절이 자신에게는 소중한 기억으로 남아 있다고 그는 회상했다.

손석희그의 이름은 손석희. 지난 2월 MBC 아나운서국장에 선임된 그는
애초 자신이 맡고 있는 프로그램 진행 문제 등으로 국장직을 고사했던 것으로 알려졌다.

앞서 인용한 글은 몇 년 전 <월간중앙>이 실은 '명사가 말하는 내 인생의 결단의 순간'에 그가 보내온 것이다. 2년 만에 부장에서 국장으로 승진한 그는 이 글에서 "남들은 어떻게 생각할지 몰라도 스스로 지각 인생을 살고 있다고 생각한다"고 털어 놓았다. 대학 진학이 남보다 늦었고 그 바람에 사회 진출도, 결혼도 남들보다 짧게는 1년, 길게는 3~4년 정도 늦은 편이기 때문이라고 했다. 이렇게 늦어진 이유에 대해 그는 능력이 부족했거나 다른 여건이 여의치 못했기 때문이었을 것이라고 덧붙였다.

모든 게 늦어지다 보니 그는 차라리 여유가 생겼고, 나이 마흔 셋에 유학을 떠난 것도 그래서 벌인 일이었다고 회고했다. 그는 미국 미네소타 주립대 대학원의 침침하고 퀴퀴한 연구실 구석에 처박혀 식은 도시락을 까먹고 저녁이면 근처에서 햄버거를 사다가 꾸역꾸역 먹으면서 공부해 그의 말마따나 '그 잘난' 석사 학위를 받았다.

그 무모했던 시절을 보내면서 그가 얻은 건 여전히 지각 인생을 살더라도 그런 절실함이 있는 한 후회할 필요가 없다는 깨달음이었다.

그가 그때 쓴 논문이 The Study of Public Broadcaster Labor Union Movement in Korea:The Resource Mobilization Strategies for the 1999 Strike(석사학위논문),Univ.of Minnesota,2000이다. 한국의 공영방송 노조운동 연구. 그의 논문은 푸른 수의를 입고 웃고 있는 그의 사진 한 장을 떠올리게 했다.

지난
92년 문화방송 파업 당시 그는 MBC 노조 집행부의 간부였다. 불법파업손석희 주동자로 몰린 그는 '쟁의조정법 위반 및 업무방해' 혐의로 구속되었고 20일 간 구치소에 수감된다. 이후 회사측의 소 취하로 석방된 그는 그때 일을 화제로 삼는 것을 불편해 한다고 한다.

그때의 행동이 후회스러워서는 아니다. 자신이 마치 민주화 투사라도 되는양 포장되는 게 부담스러워서다. 심지어 그는 자신이 노조 활동의 최대 수혜자였음을 부인할 수 없다고 말한다고 한다.

연예 프로그램에 기웃거리는 얼굴 반반한 아나운서에 그칠 수도 있었던 그는 '100분 토론' 사회자로 자리잡았다. 자기 이름을 건 라디오 시사 프로그램을 진행하면서 논객 소리도 듣고 있다.

선거 때면 정계 진출설에 시달리는 그는 "단지 방송에 얼굴이 나오고 이미지가 좋다고 정치 참여 얘기가 나오는 건 어색하다"고 말한 일이 있다.

그에 대해 대기만성형이라고 말하는 건 어쩐지 도식적이다. 스스로 "정치에 참여하지 않겠다고 여러 번 얘기했다"지만 그건 그의 선택일 뿐이다. 여전히 지각 인생을 살든, 출세가도를 달리든 자신의 방식대로 절실하게 살아가는 한 그에게 박수를 보내고 싶다.


Sleepless in Copenhagen

Posted: 19 Dec 2009 08:11 AM PST

by Dan Bodansky

(Cross posted on Smith School of Enterprise and Environment)

Copenhagen, December 19 – The Copenhagen conference limped to a finish mid-day Saturday after “working” throughout the night. These all night sessions on the closing day are becoming a COP ritual, with people spending most of their time waiting around the conference room while small huddles of key delegations try to find a face-saving way to declare victory and go home.

The issue last night was how the so-called Copenhagen Accord that President Obama had personally helped to broker during his 12 hour touchdown in Copenhagen on Friday would be reflected in the official decisions of the conference. The Danes proposed that the Copenhagen Accord be adopted as a COP decision, but a small group of countries that had played the spoiler role throughout the conference (Sudan, Venezuela, and Bolivia, joined last night by Cuba and Nicaragua) objected, arguing that the Copenhagen Accord be included simply in a “miscellaneous” (or “MISC”) document, with the same status as the submission, say, of Tuvalu. Ultimately, the impasse was broken through a decision to “take note of” the Copenhagen Accord, giving it some status in the UNFCCC process but not as much as approval by the conference of the parties.


The debate last night continued the theme of legitimacy that I discussed in my previous post. The spoiler countries couched their arguments in the language of legitimacy, arguing that adoption of an agreement made by a limited group of countries behind closed doors would be illegitimate and undemocratic. (The rhetoric on this was really quite amazing.) Since the Copenhagen Accord had been initially agreed among the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, joined later by the UK, Germany, and France, among others, and since the agreement had been endorsed by all of the UN regional groups, this led to the bizarre spectacle of a handful of countries essentially thumbing their nose (through UN procedures) at a decision personally agreed by the heads of state(or government) of all of the major world powers and endorsed by the vast majority of countries at the meeting.

Two other quick observations about Copenhagen. First, the Conference revealed the deep fissures among developing countries on the climate change issue and the complete breakdown of the G-77 as a negotiating block. In the closing plenary last night, Papua New Guinea openly said that in the Copenhagen Accord negotiations on Friday, proposals for stronger language about emissions reductions (which small island states had desperately sought) had been blocked by major developing country emitters (i.e., China and India), not by developed countries. He went on to chastise other developing countries for sending mid-level negotiators to the final meetings where the Copenhagen Accord was hammered out, rather than their heads of state – a signal of disrespect to the heads of state in the room working on the deal.

Second, the Conference brought home for me the power of the internet as a source of information. Throughout Friday, participants inside the Bella Center who had sweated blood to get their names on the small list of those who were admitted had virtually no idea what was going inside the building. This included not only environmental and business observers, but 99% of the government delegates – in essence, all but the extremely small number of people actually working on the deal. As the day unfolded, I found that the most reliable source of information was not what people were saying inside the conference hall (virtually all of which was simply rumor) but rather the AP pool twitter site, which came from reporters staked out around the room where the negotiations were actually being conducted. So, ironically, rather than spend the time, money, and carbon emissions to come to Copenhagen, one could have followed the conference equally well (or, in some respects, better) in the comfort of one’s own home!

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The Illegitimacy of “Legitimacy”

Posted: 17 Dec 2009 06:35 AM PST

by Dan Bodansky

[Professor Dan Bodansky is continuing his dispatches from the climate change talks. This post is cross-posted at the Smith School of Enterprise and Environment at Oxford.]

Copenhagen, December 17 – With the hours counting down to the end of the Copenhagen conference, real substantive negotiations have yet to begin. Instead, the focus has been almost exclusively on procedure. All week, the Danes have wanted to put forward their own compromise text, which would be negotiated in a smaller group – the approach typically used to hammer out an agreement. But some developing countries – most notably Sudan, Bolivia and Venezuela (apparently with the (at least) tacit support of China) — have rejected this approach, arguing that it lacks transparency and is hence illegitimate. Instead, they have insisted that the only “legitimate negotiating process” is to continue to negotiate on the basis of the heavily bracketed text that emerged over the last two years in the two ad-hoc working groups, in negotiating groups open to participation by all parties. In my view, this process virtually guarantees that the Copenhagen conference will not produce a meaningful agreement, since the texts emerging from the two ad hoc working groups are a mess, with multiple options within options, and negotiating them in an open-ended group, with hundreds of delegations, is a prescription for deadlock.

The refusal by some developing countries to allow the Danes to introduce a text or to negotiate in a smaller group is made in the name of ensuring a legitimate, transparent, democratic process. But another way of understanding it is as a cynical effort by certain countries to use procedural objections to prevent a substantive agreement. Yesterday, after the Danes said they would table new texts, developing countries objected and the formal meetings were suspended for most of the day while the Danes consulted with developing countries about how to proceed. Reportedly, the G-77 (the developing country negotiated group) refused to participate in a smaller group organized by the Danish presidency to have substantive negotiations.

Today, in a desperate effort to move from procedure to substance, the Danes accepted the procedural approach insisted upon by developing countries. They promised not to introduce any new texts, and convened two “contact groups” that are open-ended in participation, to consider the texts forwarded from the ad hoc working groups. Meanwhile, it appears increasingly likely that the conference outcome will be a short political declaration largely devoid of substance, and a procedural decision to continue the “process,” such as it is. The ultimate question, of course, is whether there is a deal to be had that bridges the gap between the US, which wants a common legal framework for developed and developing countries (including common provisions on monitoring, reporting and verification); the major developing country economies, which want to preserve the strong differentiation reflected in Kyoto; and the European Union, which would be willing to commit to another round of Kyoto-like targets, but only if the US is subject to a comparable regime and developing countries are willing to join a new legal agreement that subjects them to stronger commitments.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copenhagen Accord

The Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of delegation present at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen,


In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2, Being guided by the principles and provisions of the Convention, Noting the results of work done by the two Ad hoc Working Groups,
Endorsing decision x/CP.15 on the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action and decision x/CMP.5 that requests the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to continue its work,

Have agreed on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately.

1. We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including international support.

2. We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.

3. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries.

4. Annex I Parties commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy- wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF document. Annex I Parties that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol. Delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent.

5. Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in the context of sustainable development. Least developed countries and small island developing States may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support. Mitigation actions subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through national communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in national communications or otherwise communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix II. Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years. Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

6. We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.

7. We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing countries, especially those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway.

8. Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 ñ 2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.

9. To this end, a High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal.

10. We decide that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund shall be established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity- building, technology development and transfer.

11. In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide to establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities.

12. We call for an assessment of the implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015, including in light of the Conventionís ultimate objective. This would include consideration of strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/19copenhagen.pdf



Toast Remarks by the President at the 2009 Nobel Banquet

White House Press Releases,

December 10, 2009

TOAST REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE 2009 NOBEL BANQUET

The Grand Hotel

Oslo, Norway

9:48 P.M. CET

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Your Majesties, Your Excellencies, Your Royal Highnesses -- to all my friends, my family. This is obviously an extraordinary evening, and I must say -- I was telling the committee members that, having entirely exhausted myself with the speech this afternoon -- (laughter and applause) -- I have -- I spoke for a very long time. (Laughter.) I have only a very few words to say.

... As I indicated before, no one was more surprised than me. (Laughter.) And I have to say that when the chairman spoke introducing me, I told him afterwards that I thought it was an excellent speech and that I was almost convinced that I deserved it. (Laughter and applause.)


You know, it's obviously one of life's great ironies that Alfred Nobel, the man responsible for inventing dynamite -- (laughter) -- helped to establish this extraordinary moral force in the world. He bequeathed his largest share of fortune to the Nobel prizes and the roster of Nobel laureates has grown to include not only the finest minds in science and literature and economics, but I think what captivates people most is the giants of peace that it has acknowledged.

When Alfred Nobel signed his last will and testament on November 27, 1895, it's not entirely clear that he could have foreseen the impact that his prizes would have. But he did know this truth: that our destinies are what we make of them, and that each of us in our own lives can do our part in order to make a more just and lasting peace and forge the kind of world that we want to bequeath to our children and our grandchildren.


The world thanks you for the work that you do. And as a consequence, what I'd like to do is to propose a toast -- once I get some wine. (Laughter.)

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December 11, 2009

Statement by the Press Secretary on the European Council Declaration on Iran

The United States echoes the grave concerns expressed by the European Council today regarding Iran's nuclear program, and is united with our international partners in calling on Iran to comply fully with its international obligations.

Iran has also failed to uphold its Geneva commitment to have a further meeting with the P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program. The offer of constructive engagement remains on the table, and we urge Iran to take concrete steps toward this course.

However, if Iran continues to fail to bring its nuclear program into full compliance with the requirements of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA, there will be consequences and we will be consulting closely with our partners to ensure those consequences are credible. We will continue to assess Iran's responses, and together with our partners will take appropriate measures in keeping with our common approach to the Iranian nuclear program.

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December 10, 2009

Statement by National Security Advisor General James L. Jones on International Human Rights Day

Today, on the occasion of International Human Rights Day, I welcomed distinguished representatives of leading human rights and democracy promotion groups in the United States to the White House for a meeting with me and senior representatives from over a dozen offices of the National Security Staff.


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got zip drive for
IHL workshop
5-day program on syllabus looks interesting
two students are accepted from st.Luois
blocked the hotel 10-min distance from the school
and booked the plane ticket

spring semester, couple of negotiation sessions are waiting for me: biz governance by Prof. Sales as well as IHL workshop

hope to transform silent DOng into succinct speech

When Playing Call of Duty 4, Don’t Forget to Consult the Laws of War, START,

Posted: 22 Nov 2009 08:57 PM PST

by Julian Ku

I don’t know what I think about this report by two Switzerland-based NGOs analyzing a number of popular video games for their consistency with rules of international humanitarian law (h/t kotaku). Apparently, many video games encourage blatant and unrepentant violations of the laws of war.

...

There is something to this. Check out this photo from Call of Duty 4. Looks like a war crime to me. Do we need international law requiring video game makers to follow international law in their video games? Sure, as long as this resulted in lucrative consulting gigs for law professors….

NPR All Things Considered
Copyright 2009 National Public Radio®. All rights reserved.

December 4, 2009



Time Runs Out On U.S.-Russia Arms Control Treaty
MICHELE NORRIS, host:


The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expires tonight. That's the landmark arms control treaty that brought the Cold War nuclear arms race to an end. The U.S. and Russia have been working round-the-clock to replace the treaty with a new one, but that work is not yet completed. In the meantime, both governments say they will abide by the terms of the current treaty.


NPR's Mike Shuster explains.

MIKE SHUSTER: U.S. and Russian negotiators have been working for months on a replacement for the START treaty, especially some way to extend key verification measures that have allowed each side to maintain a timely and accurate accounting of the strategic nuclear weapons the other side has deployed. The START treaty called for the reduction of each side's deployed strategic nuclear arsenal on long-range bombers, missiles and submarines to about 6,000. Those targets were reached years ago, and now the U.S. and Russia each deploy less than 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads. But maintaining the verification measures of the START treaty is very important to the Obama administration. It was on the agenda today when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Brussels.

Secretary HILLARY CLINTON (State Department): We always knew this would be very difficult. Remember, the prior administration didn't believe in arms control treaties.

(Soundbite of laughter)

Sec. CLINTON: And so we were pretty much starting from scratch. And these are highly complex, technical negotiations.

SHUSTER: The George W. Bush administration did sign the Moscow Treaty that brought the nuclear arsenal of both sides down to current levels, but President Obama has mapped out far more ambitious goals for the reduction of nuclear weapons. Clinton explained the rationale for this in a speech on arms control this fall.

Sec. CLINTON: Clinging to nuclear weapons in excess of our security needs does not make the United States safer, and the nuclear status quo is neither desirable nor sustainable. It gives other countries the motivation or the excuse to pursue their own nuclear options.

SHUSTER: Russia and the U.S. have already agreed to new levels for nuclear warheads, roughly 1,600. That turns out to have been the easy part.

Verification has been one of the hard parts, in particular, reciprocal verification. The U.S. stopped making long-range missiles years ago, and Russian personnel who monitored that production in the U.S. returned home. But the Russians continue to produce long-range missiles at a facility at Votkinsk on the Volga River, about 800 miles east of Moscow.

With the expiration of the START treaty tonight, about 20 American monitors at Votkinsk were set to leave. Arms control experts argue that even though the U.S. and Russia are no longer enemies or adversaries, verification measures like this are still very important.

Mr. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE (President, Ploughshares Fund): The lower you go on nuclear weapons, the more verification matters.

SHUSTER: Joe Cirincione is president of the Ploughshares Fund.

Mr. CIRINCIONE: Once you start going down to, say, a thousand or a few hundred deployed weapons, then it really starts to matter. You want to be sure that you can account for those weapons, that there's no secret stock of weapons that the other side is using, that there's no breakout capability where one side could suddenly double or triple the number of weapons they have.

SHUSTER: The possibility of miscalculation is another good reason to maintain verification measures, says Jeffrey Lewis, who runs the Web site armscontrolwonk.com.

Mr. JEFFREY LEWIS (Armscontrolwonk.com): We do constantly see on the Russian side and on the American side ridiculous overestimates of each other. You know, the Russians think the United States is 10 feet tall, and sometimes we think the same thing about them.

SHUSTER: There are other issues that still divide the U.S. and Russia. There are disagreements about how deployed nuclear warheads and their delivery systems are counted. Russia wants to include missile defenses. The U.S. does not.

Despite the expiration of the START treaty tonight, it looks like the U.S. and Russia will continue working on these issues. Any new treaty to replace START will have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma.

Mike Shuster, NPR News.

Garzon Goes After Another Pinochet

Posted: 03 Dec 2009 07:00 AM PST

by Gregory Gordon

[This is a guest post by Professor Greg Gordon of the University of North Dakota. Professor Gordon is the Director of the UND Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies, an expert on international criminal law and a past guest blogger at Opinio Juris.]

Earlier this week, Spanish National Court Judge Balthazar Garzon initiated money laundering proceedings against the widow of deceased Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, as well as Pinochet’s former lawyer and two of his bankers. In connection with the probe, Garzon has ordered the suspects to post a $77 million bond, indicating the bond is to “cover whatever financial liabilities might arise” in his probe. The four suspects, along with Banco de Chile, have ten days to pay the bond. If they fail to pay, Garzon has threatened to seize from their bank accounts the amount of the bond, plus an extra third – a total of approximately $103 million. The order, which did not reveal where the accounts are held, is meant to extract payment to “cover whatever financial liabilities might arise” in Garzon’s probe.

Judge Garzon’s actions raise a slew of interesting legal questions, both substantive and procedural, as well as policy questions about the appropriate scope of universal jurisdiction. First, and most fundamentally, under what authority is Garzon proceeding? Reports indicate that the probe arises out of Garzon’s original 1990s human rights universal jurisdiction (UJ) case against Pinochet that resulted in the Chilean dictator’s 1998-1999 detention in the United Kingdom. I have been unable to access Judge Garzon’s order but it is not readily apparent from the 1990s charges, which included allegations of genocide, torture, terrorism, and crimes related to forced disappearances, how the money laundering piece fits in.

Spain’s original 1985 UJ law, recently amended, extended the courts’ criminal jurisdiction to certain named crimes, for example genocide, terrorism and piracy, as well as “any other [criminal act] which, according to international covenants and treaties, should be prosecuted in Spain.” According to the Center for Justice and Accountability, pursuant to this law, “any serious crime that violated international law could be heard in Spanish courts as long as it met certain procedural safeguards.” Should money laundering be considered a “serious” violation of international law?

Perhaps the money laundering is linked to terrorism financing but that raises a whole host of separate questions. Pinochet’s financial crimes appeared to be strictly self-enrichment motivated but, even it they weren’t, can over $100 million legitimately be tied to DINA human rights depredations or Operation Condor? This amount seems more likely tied to Pinochet’s personal plundering of the Chilean fisc – not disappearances and torture. And the bond seems like a strange way to go about things. Garzon is essentially telling the suspects they need to freeze their own assets. If there is probable cause to believe the accounts have criminal proceeds in them, why not just seize them? In legitimate money-laundering cases, one would think officials would be loath to tip off suspects trying to sequester ill-gotten funds in the first place. Apparently, Spain’s MLAT options are quite limited.

In any event, assuming the money can be reasonably connected to jus cogens crimes, the case seems to raise pretty compelling issues regarding the scope of universal jurisdiction. Critics have pointed to cases initiated against figures such as Colin Powell and charged that UJ is being abused, with too few procedural or equitable restraints. In light of these concerns, should we also consider an expansion of UJ’s rationae materiae? Should offenses ancillary to jus cogens crimes, such as money laundering, be the subject of universal jurisdiction? If the answer is yes, how closely should the assets be connected to the crimes? Moreover, should a judge in a universal jurisdiction case be able to seize allegedly tainted assets in advance of rendering a judgment on the merits? If so, what should be the standard of proof justifying pre-trial seizure? Garzon has threatened to seize an extra third of the account contents if the bond is not posted by the requested date. This seems excessive and arbitrary. Bonds should be used to secure personal presence; not to mete out punishment.

Finally, I also wonder whether we should be concerned that the 1998 case lingers on. Reports state that the money laundering portion of the case was initiated in 2007, a year after the death of Augusto Pinochet, the principal target of the 1998 case. The 1998 case included other defendants but their relationship to Pinochet’s widow and the allegations of money laundering is not yet clear.

This may be more than an academic point since Spain’s recently amended UJ law is much more restrictive — requiring, inter alia, relevant links to Spain. In particular, the new law bars jurisdiction if another “competent court or international Tribunal has begun proceedings that constitute an effective investigation and prosecution of the punishable acts.” Chile has been conducting its own investigation into the Pinochet family’s finances. Perhaps the defendants could move to sever the 2007 claims from the 1998 case due to the tenuous connection to a deceased defendant. Although this seems like a stretch, if there were a dismissal without prejudice of the 2007 claims and a new case were filed (not tethered to the 1998 matter), Chile’s ongoing Pinochet family financial investigation might then foreclose Garzon’s money-laundering inquiry under the new Spanish UJ law.

Of course, none of this means that authorities should not pursue legitimate avenues of redress. Augusto Pinochet was a brutal dictator who tortured and murdered thousands of innocent civilians during his bloody seventeen-year reign of terror. It is deeply disturbing that he died before he could be tried for his crimes in a court of law. And it would be wonderful if his surviving victims could, as Garzon intends, share as reparations the money Pinochet looted from the Chilean people. But basic principles of fairness and justice should never be trampled on in the process. As Spain and Chile go forward, let us hope the proper balance can be struck.

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spanish UJ law v. ATS in US ?



FACT SHEET: THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

December 1, 2009

Section: Executive Office of the President



FACT SHEET: THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN


THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

December 1, 2009

FACT SHEET: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan

OUR MISSION:
The President's speech reaffirms the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key population centers, training Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with Pakistanis who are facing the same threats.

This region is the heart of the global violent extremism pursued by al Qaeda, and the region from which we were attacked on 9/11. New attacks are being planned there now, a fact borne out by a recent plot, uncovered and disrupted by American authorities. We will prevent the Taliban from turning Afghanistan back into a safe haven from which international terrorists can strike at us or our allies. This would pose a direct threat to the American homeland, and that is a threat that we cannot tolerate. Al Qaeda remains in Pakistan where they continue to plot attacks against us and where they and their extremist allies pose a threat to the Pakistani state. Our goal in Pakistan will be to ensure that al Qaeda is defeated and Pakistan remains stable.

REVIEW PROCESS:
The review was a deliberate and disciplined three-stage process to check alignment of goals, methods for attaining those goals, and finally resources required. Over ten weeks, the President chaired nine meetings with his national security team, and consulted key allies and partners, including the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President focused on asking the hard questions, took the time to carefully consider all of the options, and united a variety of competing views in his cabinet before agreeing to send any additional Americans to war.

As a result of the review, we have focused our mission and developed a common understanding regarding our regional approach and the need for international support. We will deploy forces into Afghanistan rapidly and will take advantage of these additional resources to create the conditions to begin to draw down combat forces in the summer of 2011, while maintaining a partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan to protect our enduring interests in that region.

The meetings were focused on how best to ensure the al Qaeda threat is eliminated from the region and that regional stability is restored. We looked closely at the alignment of our efforts and the balance between civilian and military resources, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the efforts of the U.S. and the international community.

A number of issues were explored in depth: national interests, core objectives and goals, counterterrorism priorities, safe havens for terrorist groups in Pakistan, the health of the global U.S. military force, risks and costs associated with troop deployments, global deployment requirements, international cooperation and commitments for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Afghan capacity in all areas to include Afghan security forces, central and sub-national governance and corruption (including the narcotics trade), and development and economic issues.

WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE March:
Since the President announced our renewed commitment in March, a number of key developments led the Administration to review its approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan: new attention was focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, new U.S. leadership was established in Afghanistan, Pakistan increased its efforts to combat extremists, and the situation in Afghanistan has become more grave.

The United States assigned new civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan, with the appointments of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and General Stanley McChrystal as the new Commander of ISAF military forces in Afghanistan. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal recognized that after eight years of underresourcing, the situation was worse than expected. Together, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChyrstal published a new Civilian-Military Campaign Plan to integrate U.S. efforts across the country.

Afghanistan's difficult, extended election process and evident signs of the absence of rule of law made clear the limits of the central government in Kabul.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the Pakistanis showed new resolve in defeating militants who had taken control of the Swat Valley, just 60 miles from Islamabad. Pakistani political leaders--including opposition party leaders--came together to support the Pakistani military operations. This fall, the Pakistanis expanded their fight against extremists into the Mehsud tribal areas of South Waziristan along the border with Afghanistan.

THE WAY FORWARD:

The President has decided to deploy an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. These troops will deploy on an accelerated timeline to reinforce the 68,000 Americans and 39,000 non-U.S. ISAF troops already there, so that we can target the insurgency, break its momentum, and better secure population centers. These forces will increase our capacity to train effective Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans get into the fight. And by pursuing these partnerships, we can transition to Afghan responsibility, and begin to reduce our combat troops in the summer of 2011. In short, these resources will allow us to make the final push that is necessary to train Afghans so that we can transfer responsibility.

We will maintain this increased force level for the next 18 months. During this time, we will regularly measure our progress. And beginning in July 2011, we will transfer lead security responsibility to Afghans and start to transition our combat forces out of Afghanistan. As Afghans take on responsibility for their security, we will continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's Security Forces, and maintain a partnership on behalf of their security so that they can sustain this effort. Afghans are tired of war and long for peace, justice, and economic security. We intend to help them achieve these goals and end this war and the threat of reoccupation by the foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda.

We will not be in this effort alone. We will continue to be joined in the fight by the Afghans, and the aggressive partnering effort envisioned by General McChrystal will get more Afghans into the fight for their country's future. There will also be additional resources from NATO. These allies have already made significant commitments of their own in Afghanistan, and we will be discussing additional alliance contributions - in troops, trainers, and resources - in the days and weeks ahead. This is not simply a test of the alliance's credibility - what is at stake is even more fundamental. It is the security of London and Madrid; of Paris and Berlin; of Prague, New York, and our broader collective security.

We will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to strengthen our civilian effort, so that Afghanistan's government can step in as we establish better security. President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction, including his commitment to reintegration and reconciliation, improving relations with Afghanistan's regional partners, and steadily increasing the security responsibilities of Afghan security forces. But we must see action and progress. We will be clear about our expectations, and we will encourage and reinforce Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders who deliver for the people and combat corruption. We will not reinforce those who are not accountable and not acting in the service of the Afghan people and the state. And we will also focus our assistance in areas - such as agriculture - that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE:

A continuing significant increase in civilian experts will accompany a sizable infusion of additional civilian assistance. They will partner with Afghans over the long term to enhance the capacity of national and sub-national government institutions and to help rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors so that Afghans can defeat the insurgents who promise only more violence.

Growth is critical to undermine extremists' appeal in the short term and for sustainable economic development in the long term. Our top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture sector. This will help sap the insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy cultivation.

An emphasis of our governance efforts will be on developing more responsive, visible, and accountable institutions at the provincial, district, and local level, where everyday Afghans encounter their government. We will also encourage and support the Afghan Government's reinvigorated plans to fight corruption, with concrete measures of progress toward greater accountability.

A key element of our political strategy will be supporting Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al Qaeda, lay down their arms, and engage in the political process.

OUR PARTNER IN PAKISTAN:

Our partnership with Pakistan is inextricably linked to our efforts in Afghanistan. To secure our country, we need a strategy that works on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The costs of inaction are far greater.

The United States is committed to strengthening Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that pose the greatest threat to both of our countries. A safe haven for those high-level terrorists whose location is known, and whose intentions are clear, cannot be tolerated. For Pakistan, we continue to encourage civilian and military leadership to sustain their fight against extremists and to eliminate terrorists' safe havens in their country.

We are now focused on working with Pakistan's democratic institutions, deepening the ties among our governments and people for our common interests and concerns. We are committed to a strategic relationship with Pakistan for the long term. We have affirmed this commitment to Pakistan by providing $1.5 billion each year over the next five years to support Pakistan's development and democracy, and have led a global effort to rally additional pledges of support. This sizable, long-term commitment of assistance addresses the following objectives:

(1) Helping Pakistan address immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, thereby deepening our partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists;

(2) Supporting broader economic reforms that are necessary to put Pakistan on a path towards sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress; and

(3) Helping Pakistan build on its success against militants to eliminate extremist sanctuaries that threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the wider region, and people around the world.

Additional U.S. assistance will help Pakistan build a foundation for long-term development, and will also strengthen ties between the American and Pakistani people by demonstrating that the United States is committed to addressing problems that most affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis as we work together to defeat the extremists who threaten Pakistan as they also threaten the United States.

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Lord Goldsmith told Blair Invading Iraq Was Illegal

by Kevin Jon Heller

Americans who defend the legality of the invasion of Iraq almost invariably point to the fact that Britain’s Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, also approved the invasion. That argument has always been questionable; rumours have long circulated that Lord Goldsmith did not believe that the invasion was legal, but was pressured by Downing Street into approving it anyway.

According to an explosive new report the by Daily Mail, hardly a lefty newspaper, that is exactly what happened. And there’s even written proof that Lord Goldsmith told Blair that invading Iraq would be illegal:

The Mail on Sunday can disclose that Attorney General Lord Goldsmith wrote the letter to Mr Blair in July 2002 - a full eight months before the war - telling him that deposing Saddam Hussein was a blatant breach of international law.

It was intended to make Mr. Blair call off the invasion, but he ignored it. Instead, a panicking Mr Blair issued instructions to gag Lord Goldsmith, banned him from attending cabinet meetings and ordered a cover-up to stop the public finding out.

He even concealed the bombshell information from his own Cabinet, fearing it would spark an anti-war revolt.

[snip]

Lord Goldsmith gave qualified legal backing to the conflict days before the war broke out in March 2003 in a brief, carefully drafted statement. As The Mail on Sunday disclosed three years ago, even that was a distortion as Lord Goldsmith had told Mr Blair a week earlier he could be breaking international law.

But today’s revelations show that Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair at the outset, and in writing, that military action against Iraq was totally illegal.

The disclosures deal a massive blow to Mr Blair’s hopes of proving he acted in good faith when he and George Bush declared war on Iraq. And they are likely to fuel further calls for Mr Blair to be charged with war crimes.

Lord Goldsmith’s ’smoking gun’ letter came six days after a Cabinet meeting on July 23, 2002, at which Ministers were secretly told that the US and UK were set on ‘regime change’ in Iraq.

The peer, who attended the meeting, was horrified. On July 29, he wrote to Mr Blair on a single side of A4 headed notepaper from his office.

Friends say it was no easy thing for him to do. He was a close friend of Mr Blair, who gave him his peerage and Cabinet post. The typed letter was addressed by hand, ‘Dear Tony’, and signed by hand, ‘Yours, Peter’.

In it, Lord Goldsmith set out in uncompromising terms why he believed war was illegal. He pointed out that:

  • War could not be justified purely on the grounds of ‘regime change’.
  • Although United Nations rules permitted ‘military intervention on the basis of self-defence’, they did not apply in this case because Britain was not under threat from Iraq.
  • While the UN allowed ‘humanitarian intervention’ in certain instances, that too was not relevant to Iraq.
  • It would be very hard to rely on earlier UN resolutions in the Nineties approving the use of force against Saddam.

Lord Goldsmith ended his letter by saying ‘the situation might change’ - although in legal terms, it never did.

The letter caused pandemonium in Downing Street. Mr Blair was furious. No10 told Lord Goldsmith he should never have put his views on paper, and he was not to do so again unless told to by Mr Blair.

The reason was simple: if it became public, Lord Goldsmith’s letter could make it impossible for Mr Blair to fulfil his secret pledge to back Mr Bush in any circumstances. More importantly, it could never be expunged from the record as copies were stored in No10 and in the Attorney General’s office.

I don’t know who comes off worse: Blair, whose slavish devotion to Bush led him to support an invasion he knew full well was illegal, or Lord Goldsmith, who allowed himself — for reasons unknown — to be bullied into providing Blair and Bush with legal cover for the invasion. Either way, it’s difficult to see either of them ever having a signficant role in government ever again. And that’s a very good thing.