Immunity Deal in Yemen - President Ali Abdullah Saleh


Immunity Deal in Yemen
BY ALIREZA AZIZI , November 28, 2011 

After many months of back and forth negotiations, last week President Ali Abdullah Saleh, finally singed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement for a power-transfer. Even though the details of the full agreement have not been made public, it is widely believed that the agreement offers the president and some others government officials immunity from criminal investigation and prosecution.

Under the GCC agreement, president Saleh will retain the title of president until the new presidential election takes place within 90 days. But he will hand over some of the presidential powers to Vice-president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, to implement the agreement. A member of the opposition will head a government of national reconciliation for the next two years. President Saleh, who has been in power for 33 years and has hinted at stepping down several times in the past several months, only to change course later.

Unarmed protesters have marched in different cities in Yemen opposing the deal, calling for Saleh and other officials to stand trial for their role in abuses. Over the past 10 months, more than 200 people have been killed and thousands injured as security forces and armed supporters of the president Saleh attempted to quell mostly peaceful pro-reform demonstrators.

Amnesty International and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have called for an independent, international investigation into Yemen’s ongoing human rights violations.

There cannot be a true reform and justice without accountability, and the only way to ensure accountability is to carry out an independent, international investigation into the allegations of serious crimes under international law.

As Amnesty International has said “immunity leads to impunity” 

Senegal Told to Prosecute Ex-President of Chad (ICJ Judgment)


Senegal Told to Prosecute Ex-President of Chad (ICJ Judgment)
July 20, 2012   By MARLISE SIMONS

PARIS — The International Court of Justice on Friday ordered Senegal to prosecute the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, who has lived comfortably for two decades in Senegal despite indictments in connection with political killings, torture and a host of other brutalities.

The court decision, which could affect exiled leaders in other countries, found that Senegal had breached the 1984 Convention Against Torture by ignoring charges against Mr. Habré. The ruling ordered the Senegalese authorities either to prosecute him “without further delay” or to extradite him for trial elsewhere.

In Senegal, the government sent extra security to Mr. Habré’s luxury villa on the outskirts of Dakar, the capital, where he has lived undisturbed since he fled a rebellion at home in 1990.

His fearsome rule, from 1982 to 1990, has been largely forgotten in North Africa, overtaken by other strongmen and conflicts.

If a trial does go ahead in Senegal, it will be the first time the president of one country is tried before in another country’s (domestic) court on charges of crimes committed at home, officials said.  Other heads of state who have been prosecuted have appeared before international courts or tribunals.

Justice Minister Aminata Touré, reached by telephone in Dakar, said Senegal would abide by the court’s order.

He would be tried under Senegalese law by a panel of local and African judges set up in agreement with the African Union, an arrangement Ms. Touré called “a novelty in international law.”

Neither Mr. Habré nor his lawyer could be reached for comment, but his comfortable exile may be coming to an end. Although Chad is among the world’s poorest nations, Mr. Habre is said to have acquired a sizable fortune. The Chad Truth Commission said in 1992 that even during the final days of his rule, he stole more than $11 million from the country’s treasury and central bank.

Mr. Habré came to power reportedly backed by covert support from the United States, during the Reagan administration, and other Western countries that wanted a counterweight in Chad to its troublemaking neighbor, Libya, at the time under the leadership of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The truth commission said Mr. Habré’s government had killed up to 40,000 opponents and tortured many others.

A court in Chad has sentenced him to death in absentia, and courts in Belgium and Senegal have sentenced him for crimes against humanity, including torture, but Senegalese politicians presented numerous obstacles to his prosecution. It was Belgium that filed the case against Senegal at the court in The Hague, arguing that he should either be tried in Senegal or extradited to Belgium. It denounced Senegal for turning down four Belgian extradition requests.


Antigone, jus cogens and the International Court of Justice   July 22, 2012

Friday’s judgment of the International Court of Justice says:

99. In the Court’s opinion, the prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens).
That prohibition is grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of States. It appears in numerous international instruments of universal application (in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; General Assembly resolution 3452/30 of 9 December 1975 on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), and it has been introduced into the domestic law of almost all States; finally, acts of torture are regularly denounced within national and international fora.

Administration Eases Financial and Investment Sanctions on Burma, July 11, 2012 - state.gov


Administration Eases Financial and Investment Sanctions on Burma, July 11, 2012

President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton announced in May that the United States would ease certain financial and investment sanctions on Burma in response to the historic reforms that have taken place in that country over the past year. Today, the U.S. Government has implemented these changes to permit the first new U.S. investment in Burma in nearly 15 years, and to broadly authorize the exportation of financial services to Burma. The United States supports the Burmese Government’s ongoing reform efforts, and believes that the participation of U.S. businesses in the Burmese economy will set a model for responsible investment and business operations as well as encourage further change, promote economic development, and contribute to the welfare of the Burmese people.

(July 11 – implement the changes.  Two components (i) U.S. investment in Burma, and (ii) the exportation of financial service to Burma.  In response to and to encourage the historic reform )

As these vital economic and political reform efforts move forward, the United States will continue to support and monitor Burma’s progress. We have and will continue to urge the Burmese Government to continue its reform process and we expect the Burmese Government to implement measures that increase socio-economic development and safeguard the human rights of all its people, including political rights and civil liberties.

The United States remains concerned about the protection of human rights, corruption, and the role of the military in the Burmese economy. Consequently, the policy we are announcing today is carefully calibrated and aimed at supporting democratic reform and reconciliation efforts while aiding in the development of an economic and business environment that provides benefits to all Burma’s people. A key element of this policy is that we are not authorizing new investment with the Burmese Ministry of Defense, state or non-state armed groups (which includes the military), or entities owned by the foregoing. Moreover, the core authorities underlying our sanctions remain in place. U.S. persons are still prohibited from dealing with blocked persons, including both listed Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) as well as any entities 50 percent or more owned by an SDN. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) publishes a list of SDNs available here.

(remains concerned about human rights and corruption
-       not authorizing new investment with the Burmese Ministry of Defense, state or non-state armed groups
-       sanction laws are still in place, in book ; executive branch using waiver authority or block authority so that it maintains readiness to roll back if things turn out negatively, e.g., in terms of human rights concerns  
-       U.S. persons are still prohibited from dealing with blocked persons, including both listed Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)

Also today, the President issued a new Executive Order that will allow the U.S. Government to sanction individuals or entities that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Burma, including those who undermine or obstruct the political reform process or the peace process with ethnic minorities, those who are responsible for or complicit in the commission of human rights abuses in Burma, and those who conduct certain arms trade with North Korea. Individual or entities engaging in such activities would be subject to Treasury action that would cut them off from the U.S. financial system.

(Executive Order, July 11, 2012)
-       a new Executive Order that will allow the U.S. Government to sanction individuals or entities that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Burma

OFAC General License No. 16 Authorizes the Exportation of Financial Services to Burma

  • OFAC has issued General License No. 16 (GL 16) authorizing the exportation of U.S. financial services to Burma, subject to certain limitations. Reflecting particular human rights risks with the provision of security services, GL 16 does not authorize, in connection with the provision of security services, the exportation of financial services to the Burmese Ministry of Defense, state or non-state armed groups (which includes the military), or entities owned by the foregoing. GL 16 also does not authorize the exportation of financial services to any person blocked under the Burma sanctions program. Transfers of funds to or from an account of a financial institution that is blocked under the Burma sanctions program are authorized, however, provided that the account is not on the books of a U.S. financial institution.
     
  • Because the transactions authorized by GL 16 include activities formerly authorized by other general licenses (such as financial transactions in support of humanitarian, religious, and other not-for-profit activities in Burma, and noncommercial, personal remittances to Burma), General License No. 14-C and General License No. 15 are replaced and superseded by GL 16.

OFAC General License No. 17 Authorizes New Investment in Burma

  • The Secretary of State, pursuant to a delegation of authority from the President, has waived the ban on new U.S. investment in Burma set forth in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997.
     
  • Consistent with this waiver, OFAC has issued General License No. 17 (GL 17) authorizing new investment in Burma, subject to certain limitations and requirements. GL 17 does not authorize new investment pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement, that is entered into with the Burmese Ministry of Defense, state or non-state armed groups (which includes the military), or entities owned by the foregoing, or any person blocked under the Burma sanctions program.

Reporting Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma

  • Any U.S. person (both individuals and entities) engaging in new investment in Burma pursuant to GL 17 whose aggregate new investment exceeds $500,000 must provide to the State Department the information set forth in the State Department’s “Reporting Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma,” available here.
     
  • These reporting requirements will undergo public notice and comment in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The Department of State expects to issue its 60-day Federal Register notice of proposed information collections in the coming days.
     
  • There are several components to these new reporting requirements, which will apply to investors with more than $500,000 in aggregate new investment in Burma. Investors will be required to file reports with the State Department on an annual basis, and will include a version that the Department will make publicly available, consistent with relevant U.S. law. Key information that companies will report on include information regarding policies and procedures with respect to human rights, workers’ rights, environmental stewardship, land acquisitions, arrangements with security service providers, and, aggregate annual payments exceeding $10,000 to Burmese government entities, including state-owned enterprises. The purpose of the public report is to promote greater transparency and encourage civil society to partner with our companies toward responsible investment. The above reporting requirements apply to any new investment, whatever corporate form it might take.
     
  • In addition, individuals or entities undertaking new investment pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement, that is entered into with the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) must notify the State Department within 60 days of their new investment.

New Executive Order Targeting Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Burma

  • In signing this Executive Order, the President has provided the United States Government with additional tools to respond to threats to the peace, security, or stability of Burma, and to encourage further reform in Burma. The order provides new authority to impose blocking sanctions on persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of State: to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Burma, such as actions that have the purpose or effect of undermining or obstructing the political reform process or the peace process with ethnic minorities in Burma; to be responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, or to have participated in, the commission of human rights abuses in Burma; to have, directly or indirectly, imported, exported, reexported, sold or supplied arms or related materiel from North Korea or the Government of North Korea to Burma or the Government of Burma; to be a senior official of an entity that has engaged in the foregoing acts; to have materially assisted any of the foregoing acts, or a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the order; or to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted for or on behalf of, such a person.

Designation of the Directorate of Defense Industries

  • The Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI) carries out missile research and development at its facilities in Burma, where North Korean experts are active. During a trip to Pyongyang in November 2008, Burmese military officials, including the head of the Directorate of Defense Industries, signed a memorandum of understanding with the DPRK to provide assistance to Burma to build medium range, liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. In the past year, North Korean ships have continued to arrive at Burma’s ports carrying goods destined for Burma’s defense industries.
     
  • DDI has been designated pursuant to Executive Order ________ of July 11, 2012 (“Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Stability, or Security of Burma”), which provides the authority to block the property and interests in property of persons determined to have, directly or indirectly, imported, exported, reexported, sold or supplied arms or related materiel from North Korea or the Government of North Korea to Burma or the Government of Burma or to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, such acts.

Designation of Innwa Bank

  • Innwa Bank has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 13464 as an entity that is owned or controlled by Myanmar Economic Corporation, a company previously designated by OFAC pursuant to Executive Order 13464. The Myanmar Economic Corporation is a conglomerate owned by the Ministry of Defense that has extensive interests in a variety of Burmese economic sectors.


Reporting Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma

8.  transparency
-       Not clear as to whether at the country level or the project level
-       each separate payment type, including but not limited to royalties, tax obligations, and fees.  
-       Property acquisition
-       Security arrangement
In sum, the mandate is broader than Section 1504 is

Frakt on Direct Participation as a War Crime (- does DPH constitute (international) war crime?)


Frakt on Direct Participation as a War Crime  (- does DPH constitute (international) war crime?)  
by Kevin Jon Heller  July 18th, 2012

I want to call readers’ attention to David Frakt’s excellent essay on direct participation in hostilities as a war crime.  Here is the abstract:

This article addresses, in part, the question of what to do with civilian (DPH) direct participants in hostilities who are not killed by opposing armed forces, but are captured. Specifically, the article address the potential criminal prosecution of detained DPHs. The ability to detain provides an opportunity to the detaining power to prosecute the DPH “for an offence arising out of the hostilities.” But is it a crime for someone who does not meet the Geneva Convention requirements for POW status to directly participate in hostilities? In other words, are all DPHs criminals? If so, are they war criminals, or, rather, common domestic criminals? The prevailing international view is that direct participation in hositilities in and of itself is not a war crime. Contrary to the prevailing international view, the United States has attempted, through the military commissions of Guantánamo, to treat direct participation in hostilities as a war crime. This article examines that effort, including the prosecutions of David Hicks and Omar Khadr, and the failed prosecution of Mohammed Jawad for alleged direct participation in hostilities. The article concludes that America’s effort to convert all fighting against the U.S. by unprivileged enemy belligerents into a war crime has been a failure.

I’ve spent a great deal of time over the years criticizing the US government for attempting to invent war crimes — and criticizing courts for all too often permitting those attempts to succeed.  Frakt’s essay addresses one of the government’s rare failures, and it is a model of clarity, fairness, and analytic precision.  I was particularly struck by the force of his conclusion that “[i]n the future, if the United States seeks to create new customary international law, it should focus on criminalizing acts that are of greater global concern than routine attacks on U.S. troops.”  That seems like very good advice indeed.

==== ==== ==== ===

John C. Dehn
 the U.S. government is currently charging this offense and argues that participation in hostilities without the combatant’s privilege is an American, domestic common-law-of-war offense rather than an “international” war crime
Frakt takes as given a different view of the subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions (as encompassing only “international” war crimes) than is currently being asserted by the government prosecutors (that it also includes violations of international humanitarian law historically treated as crimes in the U.S. “common law of war”). 

David Frakt
You are absolutely correct that the U.S. is now treating direct participation in hostilities as a common law domestic war crime rather than as an international war crime.  I view the Law of War as a body of international law (IHL)
The primary vehicle for prosecuting direct participation in hostilities has been the offense of “murder in violation of the law of war” in the Military Commissions Act.  According to the latest version of the manual for military commissions, in order to commit murder in violation of the law of war, one need not actually violate the international law of war.
The shift from treating this offense as an international war crime to a common law domestic war crime was motivated by a desire to protect CIA drone operators from charges that they are violating the law of war as civilians directly participating in hostilities. 

John C. Dehn
“The shift from treating this offense as an international war crime to a common law domestic war crime was motivated by a desire to protect CIA drone operators from charges that they are violating the law of war as civilians directly participating in hostilities.”
But I also suspect that it was in part a response to the reality that this issue is unsettled in international law.

As I have stated numerous times here and elsewhere, there were “war crimes” before the Nuremberg IMT, but there were no “international war crimes” as that term is today understood (crimes defined as such by international law).

we are not only discussing civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.  We are also discussing individuals possessed of a continuous combat function for a non-state party to an armed conflict.

Combatant immunity for acts of war is derivative of a state’s sovereign immunity.  As such, it is not available to members of a non-state organized armed group engaged in armed conflict.  Such individuals may legitimately be targeted, and have historically been potentially subject to prosecution for their acts of violence, even those forming a part of the hostilities of an armed conflict that would be immunized if engaged in by a member of a state’s armed forces.

David Frakt
The other reason they changed the commentary describing the offense may have been the rejection by the military judges at Guantanamo of the government’s theory of the offense of murder in violation of the law of war in the Hamdan, Jawad and al Bahlul cases

Dwayne
The notion that a civilian participating directly in hostilities could, in and of itself, be a war crime, is plainly ludicrous.
If an American person woke up one morning and found the USA had been invaded by China, is there seriously an academic in the entire USA who would call him a _war criminal_ for engaging in a guerilla defence of his homeland?

John C. Dehn
The Geneva Conventions account for the spontaneous taking up of arms by the civilian population in immediate response to an imminent or actual invasion by granting prisoner of war status to those who do so.  However, it does not and should not apply to Al Qaeda or its off-shoots for what I would think are obvious reasons, even if those groups recruit from an effected civilian population.

Apocalypse Fairly Soon By PAUL KRUGMAN



May 17, 2012

Suddenly, it has become easy to see how the euro that grand, flawed experiment in monetary union without political union could come apart at the seams. Were not talking about a distant prospect, either. Things could fall apart with stunning speed, in a matter of months, not years. And the costs both economic and, arguably even more important, political could be huge.

This doesnt have to happen; the euro (or at least most of it) could still be saved. But this will require that European leaders, especially in Germany and at the European Central Bank, start acting very differently from the way theyve acted these past few years. They need to stop moralizing and deal with reality; they need to stop temporizing and, for once, get ahead of the curve.

I wish I could say that I was optimistic.

The story so far: When the euro came into existence, there was a great wave of optimism in Europe and that, it turned out, was the worst thing that could have happened. Money poured into Spain and other nations, which were now seen as safe investments; this flood of capital fueled huge housing bubbles and huge trade deficits. Then, with the financial crisis of 2008, the flood dried up, causing severe slumps in the very nations that had boomed before.

At that point, Europes lack of political union became a severe liability. Florida and Spain both had housing bubbles, but when Floridas bubble burst, retirees could still count on getting their Social Security and Medicare checks from Washington. Spain receives no comparable support. So the burst bubble turned into a fiscal crisis, too.

Europes answer has been austerity: savage spending cuts in an attempt to reassure bond markets. Yet as any sensible economist could have told you (and we did, we did), these cuts deepened the depression in Europes troubled economies, which both further undermined investor confidence and led to growing political instability.

And now comes the moment of truth.

Greece is, for the moment, the focal point. Voters who are understandably angry at policies that have produced 22 percent unemployment more than 50 percent among the young turned on the parties enforcing those policies. And because the entire Greek political establishment was, in effect, bullied into endorsing a doomed economic orthodoxy, the result of voter revulsion has been rising power for extremists. Even if the polls are wrong and the governing coalition somehow ekes out a majority in the next round of voting, this game is basically up: Greece wont, cant pursue the policies that Germany and the European Central Bank are demanding.

So now what? Right now, Greece is experiencing whats being called a bank jog a somewhat slow-motion bank run, as more and more depositors pull out their cash in anticipation of a possible Greek exit from the euro. Europes central bank is, in effect, financing this bank run by lending Greece the necessary euros; if and (probably) when the central bank decides it can lend no more, Greece will be forced to abandon the euro and issue its own currency again.

This demonstration that the euro is, in fact, reversible would lead, in turn, to runs on Spanish and Italian banks. Once again the European Central Bank would have to choose whether to provide open-ended financing; if it were to say no, the euro as a whole would blow up.

Yet financing isnt enough. Italy and, in particular, Spain must be offered hope an economic environment in which they have some reasonable prospect of emerging from austerity and depression. Realistically, the only way to provide such an environment would be for the central bank to drop its obsession with price stability, to accept and indeed encourage several years of 3 percent or 4 percent inflation in Europe (and more than that in Germany).

Both the central bankers and the Germans hate this idea, but its the only plausible way the euro might be saved. For the past two-and-a-half years, European leaders have responded to crisis with half-measures that buy time, yet they have made no use of that time. Now time has run out.

So will Europe finally rise to the occasion? Lets hope so and not just because a euro breakup would have negative ripple effects throughout the world. For the biggest costs of European policy failure would probably be political.

Think of it this way: Failure of the euro would amount to a huge defeat for the broader European project, the attempt to bring peace, prosperity and democracy to a continent with a terrible history. It would also have much the same effect that the failure of austerity is having in Greece, discrediting the political mainstream and empowering extremists.

All of us, then, have a big stake in European success yet its up to the Europeans themselves to deliver that success. The whole world is waiting to see whether theyre up to the task.

Before The Throne - Shane and Shane; The Civil Wars: NPR Music Tiny Desk Concert

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Matthew 6:25 Do Not Be Anxious


Matthew 6
English Standard Version (ESV)

Giving to the Needy

“Beware of practicing your righteousness before other people in order to be seen by them, for then you will have no reward from your Father who is in heaven.
 “Thus, when you give to the needy, sound no trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be praised by others. Truly, I say to you, they havereceived their reward. But when you give to the needy, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing, so that your giving may be in secret. And your Father who sees in secret will reward you.

The Lord's Prayer

“And when you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites. For they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, that they may be seen by others. Truly, I say to you, they have received their reward. But when you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret. And your Father who sees in secret will reward you.
“And when you pray, do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do, for they think that they will be heard for their many words. Do not be like them, for your Father knows what you need before you ask him.  Pray then like this:
“Our Father in heaven,
hallowed be your name.[a]
10 Your kingdom come,
your will be done,[b]
     on earth as it is in heaven.
11 Give us this day our daily bread,[c]
12 and forgive us our debts,
    as we also have forgiven our debtors.
13 And lead us not into temptation,
    but deliver us from evil.[d]
14  For if you forgive others their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you, 15  but if you do not forgive others their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.

Fasting

16 “And when you fast, do not look gloomy like the hypocrites, for they disfigure their faces that their fasting may be seen by others. Truly, I say to you, they have received their reward. 17 But when you fast, anoint your head and wash your face, 18 that your fasting may not be seen by others but by your Father who is in secret. And your Father who sees in secret will reward you.

Lay Up Treasures in Heaven

19  “Do not lay up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust[e] destroy and where thievesbreak in and steal, 20  but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust destroys and where thieves do not break in and steal. 21 For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.
22  “The eye is the lamp of the body. So, if your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light,23  but if your eye is bad, your whole body will be full of darkness. If then the light in you is darkness, how great is the darkness!
24  “No one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and money.[f]

Do Not Be Anxious

25  “Therefore I tell you, do not be anxious about your life, what you will eat or what you will drink, nor about your body, what you will put on. Is not life more than food, and the body more than clothing? 26  Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they? 27 And which of you by being anxious can add a single hour to his span of life?[g] 28 And why are you anxious about clothing? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they neither toil nor spin, 29 yet I tell you, even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. 30 But if God so clothes the grass of the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, will he not much more clothe you, O you of little faith? 31 Therefore do not be anxious, saying, ‘What shall we eat?’ or ‘What shall we drink?’ or ‘What shall we wear?’ 32 For the Gentiles seek after all these things, and your heavenly Father knows that you need them all. 33 But seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be added to you.
34  “Therefore do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Sufficient for the day is its own trouble.

where the strength of the U.S. comes from

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completely forgot the words out there in front of thousands of people and millions of on T.V.
Mr. Cheeks helped her and sang with her.

2012.07.12 DPRK Daily


N. Korea tells Asia meet it needs nukes to deter U.S

North Korea insisted Thursday it needs atomic weaponry to deter a U.S. nuclear threat, and vowed never to give up its right to launch rockets as part of what it called a peaceful space program.

Washington's aim is to "eliminate the political ideology and system our people have opted for", Foreign Minister Pak Ui-Chun told a regional Asian gathering in Cambodia.

Pak told fellow foreign ministers at the ASEAN Regional Forum that it was the U.S. which scuppered the February 29 deal and was to blame for tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The United States, Japan and South Korea held a joint meeting on Thursday which warned that "any provocation by North Korea... will be met with a resolute and coordinated response from the international community."

Pyongyang says its uranium enrichment plant is intended to fuel light water reactors to generate power. Scientists say the plant could easily be reconfigured to produce bomb-making material, supplementing its current plutonium program

Pyongyang's atomic deterrent had helped maintain the regional nuclear balance and reduced the risk of atomic war, it said.

The paper reiterated calls for a peace treaty with the United States to replace the armistice which ended the 1950-1953 Korean War.

Six-party talks, which envisage a peace treaty and other benefits if the North scraps its atomic weaponry, have been stalled since December 2008. (AFP)


S. Korea, U.S. press N. Korea to give up policy of confrontation

PHNOM PENH, July 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korean and U.S. nuclear envoys discussed North Korea and reaffirmed they will not ease pressure on Pyongyang's new leadership until it gives up a policy of confrontation, a senior Seoul diplomat said Thursday.

Cho Hyun-dong, deputy South Korean envoy to the six-party talks on ending North Korea's nuclear program, held talks with his U.S. counterpart Clifford Hart on Wednesday evening ahead of the ASEAN Regional Forum, an annual venue for talks on security in Asia,

The talks between Cho and Hart came a day before South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba are scheduled to hold a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the forum.


S. Korea, U.S., Japan move closer to building trilateral alliance

PHNOM PENH (Yonhap News) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan announced Thursday the establishment of a three-way security consultative body, laying the groundwork to build a trilateral alliance in the face of North Korean aggression.

The announcement was made after South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba held a trilateral meeting earlier in the day on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

 Clinton hailed the new organization, named the Steering Group and to be based in Washington, as an initiative to "build even deeper connection" among the three nations and across the Asia-Pacific region to "bring even greater order and structure to our three-way partnership."

The launch of the consultative body reflected Washington's plan to reinforce trilateral policy coordination with Seoul and Tokyo and more efficiently deal with North Korea's growing threats as well as China's rising military influence in the region, Seoul officials said

"It is the first time that South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have formed such a trilateral consultative body,"


(Yonhap Interview) U.S. not 'sandwiched' between Korea, Japan: Stephens

Kathleen Stephens, an iconic figure in recent South Korea-U.S. ties, emphasized Wednesday that Washington's alliances with Seoul and Tokyo are not a zero-sum game.  Japan's gain does not have to be Korea's loss, or vice versa, she said.

She dismissed a view that the U.S. is sandwiched between Japan, apparently seeking to expand the role of its self-defense forces, and South Korea, which remains wary of Japan's possible return to military imperialism.

Japan seems intent on building up its military power, putting South Korea and other Asian neighbors on alert.  Critics accuse the U.S. of maintaining a lukewarm stance on the matter.


China in Huge Infrastructure Projects Near N.Korean Border

China is building a massive highway and rail network in Liaoning and Jilin provinces near the border with North Korea. Beijing is expected to spend more than US$10 billion on the project by 2015.

Experts believe the aim is not only to tap into North Korea's mineral resources but to secure easy access for Chinese troops in case of an emergency in the North.


How and Why North Korea Could Experience Economic Reform

David Matthew is pursuing a Master’s degree in Public Policy at Edinburgh University in the UK with a focus on security, trade, and technology in the Asia-Pacific.  7/12/12

In a recent interview with the Korean Economic Institute scholar Andrei Lankov argued that North Korea is not in a position to follow the path of economic reform witnessed in countries like China due to the onerous presence of South Korea. As he put it, “In China, reforms are possible because there is no South China.” But the notion that China was able to undertake economic reforms in a cultural or geographic vacuum does not seem well-supported by evidence.

What we do know is that when Deng Xiaoping started instituting economic reforms in China in 1978, the various countries with high populations of ethnic Chinese in the region – Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan among others – had per capita GDPs as high as 15 times that of mainland China. Moreover, there was a sizable Chinese diaspora around the world numbering as many as 50,000,000 – a number of whom we might imagine would have been in contact with citizens of the mainland about outside levels of prosperity and opportunity. All of which is to say that an economically opened China, where the citizens often still live below the prosperity of ethnic Chinese elsewhere in the world or even in nearby Asian nations, is not experiencing the type of dramatic revolution that many like Lankov forecast for an economically opened North Korea.

The method of China’s reform could be valuable for the DPRK, not least of all because China has the organizational capacity to help achieve it in North Korea. Deng started reforms with what was referred to as the Household-responsibility system that partially privatized agriculture and provided people with ownership of plots of land. This increased agricultural output dramatically and was popular enough to have been adopted by 93 percent of the agriculture-based production teams by 1983. This has short term attractiveness in regard to boosting the food supply and making the country less reliant on foreign food aid, but it is also a good place to start economic liberalization because rural communities are the least likely to reach a critical mass of revolution and the most likely to be in the dark about outside prosperity differences.

Information Flows and the Nexus of Revolution

Of course information flows are capable of subverting regimes by virtue of connecting people both within a state and between states. Additionally, information can travel faster and farther than ever before in history, and North Korea does possess some of the physical infrastructure to facilitate such movement. But while this might be the source of a large existential problem for the Kim regime, the government has demonstrated before its ability to circumscribe the amount and type of information that permeates its borders. There is no reason to suspect that economic liberalization would equally demand full or even partial openness. China is a clear example of a country that thrives on market principles but has restricted access to information. The Great Firewall of China being one example, but the quick scrub job by the online censors of the Bo Xilai scandal is one too. There are plenty of other instances where regimes maintain tight control of information in conjunction with high levels of economic competitiveness and growth, such as Bahrain and Vietnam.

Even within the implausible context of everyone in North Korea becoming fully informed about the disparity in prosperity between themselves and the rest of the world, it would not necessarily indicate the undoing of the government. On the contrary, it might be sold to citizens as further evidence not only of the immoral culture of consumption that drives the West, but also of the past and continuing efforts of North Korea’s enemies to deprive the country of goods and resources. As North Korean defector Sohn Jung-hoon noted in a post by Reuters, “[The] regime won’t stop brainwashing and saying that poverty is because of our enemies.”

Additionally, the notion that rebellion would more easily foment, or would be guaranteed to foment, at the point where North Koreans are fully informed about the disadvantaged position is disputable. The Arab Spring was a pan-cultural idea that captivated and moved forward the spirit of an entire geographic region. While this is assuredly true, the number of countries that witnessed regime change as a result of popular uprising comprise a tiny margin of the whole. In very poor Sudan, where per capita GDP is around $3,200, protests have been minimal and the Arab Spring has been largely absent. This, despite the fact that the Sudanese are primarily ethnically Arabic like their neighbors in Egypt, a full magnitude poorer than their neighbors in Egypt, and reasonably aware of their relative poverty and lack of democratic process. While it is not necessarily fair to use another part of the world as analogous for the Korean situation, the landscape in the wake of the Arab Spring does provide some clarity about the reasons and incentives for outright revolution.

As it stands now though, many in North Korea are increasingly aware of South Korea’s wealth and material success. A number of recent reports, mostly stemming from a  recent Intermedia study,  indicate that “a substantial, consistently measurable portion of the population has direct access to outside media”. This has come through highly fictionalized accounts of life like South Korea’s famous dramas, but also through illegal file sharing, news reports and films. Whether or not citizens in the DPRK take these at face value is difficult to ascertain, but they do not seem to be pushing the country toward revolution. B.R. Myers and others have well-documented the cultural superiority that North Koreans are indoctrinated with by the state. It may be the case that this sense of cultural superiority can carry the country through a transition from an autarky to a developmental state.

How Liberalization Could Look

It is possible that North Korea could reform its economic engine relatively quickly. As Orascom figured out when implementing North Korea’s mobile network, the absence of many technologies and logistics frameworks means that upgrading the country to a high level of quality is not as difficult as it would be in, say, the United States or Western Europe where pre-existing redundancies slow down adoption and change. As China and East Asia’s other developmental states have shown, rapid economic growth can paper over weaknesses of governance or a lack of freedoms.

From a development standpoint, North Korea may well be in a fortuitous geographic location. Undoubtedly China and South Korea are interested in developing its economy and stabilizing the country, but it is also neighbors with Russia and Japan. In other words, it is surrounded by some of the largest exporters of both raw and manufactured goods in the world, as well as some of the largest markets.

The opening of trade financing opportunities and FDI could also see the government in a position of strength in terms of offering more welfare options for citizens in exchange for steady control over the population. While some countries would surely not go along with this set of circumstances unless there were promises for political reform alongside proposed economic reform, it is highly unlikely that its potential primary investment and trade partners – Russia and China in particular – would ask for these same conditions.

With the North Korean population constantly on the verge of famine due to poor resource allocation and the systemic inefficiency of the Korean economic model, Pyongyang has almost always relied on aid from other countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union this was largely achieved through regional belligerence. But if March’s incidents were anything to go by, the current government may not as deft at pulling the levers of global economic manipulation as the previous one. The next time talks of providing aid are conducted the United States and others will be even more wary that Pyongyang will immediately renege on the agreement. If Kim Jong-un cannot effectively harass and cajole the United States and others into providing aid, his government may find that it has little other option but to liberalize the economy.