back and forth on "the other side of Chevron"


Chevron in Ecuador: Doug Cassel Responds to Kevin Jon Heller
by Doug Cassel , March 27th, 2012
[Doug Cassel is Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School]

Heller’s reply misses the point of my post, Suing Chevron in Ecuador: Do the Ends Justify the Means? I did not ask whether Chevron is an “innocent victim.” I asked whether the ends pursued by plaintiffs’ lawyers (environmental remediation) justify their means (making covert payments to the court’s “independent” expert from their “secret account,” writing his report and then lying about it, meeting secretly with the judge in an abandoned warehouse, etc.).

I answered, “No.” Human rights lawyers cannot vindicate rights by trashing the rights to due process and fair trial. Doing so undermines our moral and professional credibility.

I hold that view as a career human rights lawyer, not (in Heller’s ad hominem) as an “advocate for Chevron.” My post linked to my longer open letter, which made explicit that I billed Chevron for representing it on an amicus brief, but not for the time entailed in writing the open letter.

Heller’s “other side of Chevron” consists of a series of erroneous, tendentious or unsupported accusations, based almost entirely on press statements by plaintiffs’ PR operatives. In the order he raises them:

  • Chevron did not lie about environmental damage “documented by its own internal audits.” The audits were done in 1992 and 1993, before Chevron’s predecessor company, TexPet, conducted tens of millions of dollars in remediation during 1995 to 1998, and well before Chevron (which never operated in Ecuador) bought TexPet in 2001. Plaintiffs’ own experts later conceded that significant contamination has not spread beyond the oil facilities.
  • Chevron did not “fraudulently” alter a report to its scientific consultants in order to hide “dishonest sampling practices.” This claim was rejected as “baseless” and “fallacious” in an Open Response by the consultants, who include professors at Rice University and the University of California Davis. The allegation, they replied, shows that plaintiffs’ lawyers have “no understanding of how environmental investigations are properly done.”
  • Chevron did not use a “secret lab” to “hide dirty samples.” Analyses from what plaintiffs themselves call the “NewFields lab” were submitted to the Ecuadorian court, in reports prominently labeled as “NewFields,” in dozens of filings beginning in 2005.
  • Heller notes that two Chevron lawyers were indicted in Ecuador for allegedly false claims about TexPet’s remediation program. He seems not to know that the charges were later dismissed. Nor does he note that the indictments came only after President Correa met with plaintiffs’ lawyers and announced publicly that anyone who signed off on the remediation should be prosecuted. Heller is also (understandably) unaware of an email between plaintiffs’ lawyers, obtained under court order, warning that if Chevron lawyers “get a hold of this, it’s gonna hurt us. It’s pretty much irrefutable evidence of us collaborating with the [public prosecutor] to get [the two lawyers] convicted.” As a U.S. court concluded, plaintiffs “attempt[ed] to procure criminal prosecutions for the purpose of extracting a settlement [from Chevron].”
  • Chevron’s consultants did not “misrepresent” their studies. The letter from “leading scientists” cited by Heller was published in 2005 – before the principal studies were completed, andbefore both plaintiffs’ and Chevron’s experts concluded that no significant contamination had spread beyond the oil facilities. The 2005 letter recommended that Chevron’s consultants submit their reports to peer review by publication in scientific journals; they have since done so (123). The letter also recommended that oil companies do environmental health impact assessments. Chevron concurs. Since 2007 its Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment process “requires that all new capital projects be evaluated for potential environmental, social and health impacts.”
  • Heller asserts that Chevron “tried to bribe the Ecuadorian government into quashing the case.” One might expect that such an unqualified accusation would be supported by evidence. Heller cites only a Huffington Post article – authored by an Amazon Watch activist – which, in turn, cites only a press release by plaintiffs’ PR office which, in turn, cites (a) the same Huffington Post article, (b) “anonymous” Ecuadorian officials, and (c) Chevron meetings with Ecuadorian officials. The Ecuadorian official in question rejects the accusation. Chevron correctly points out that there is nothing wrong – quite the contrary – with the company and the government meeting to engage in a constructive dialogue. The company categorically denies any attempted bribery.
  • Chevron did not threaten the judge with jail time “if he did not rule in favor of the company.” Chevron did inform the judge of evidence of criminal conduct by plaintiffs’ lawyers and reminded him of his obligation under article 292 of Ecuador’s criminal code, enforceable by jail time, to report crimes to an investigating judge.
  • Chevron did not try to entrap a judge into taking bribes and then pay off the individual who offered the bribe. As plaintiffs’ own lawyer on this issue (a former Assistant U.S. Attorney) informed his colleagues: “Chevron is telling the truth when they claim … not to have even known about these conversations until [the next month].”
  • A Chevron attorney was indeed sanctioned for discovery excesses in one U.S. case. But Chevron has not been sanctioned for “vexatious lawsuits.” While its suit for malicious prosecution against a former attorney for plaintiffs was dismissed, the suit was understandable: in the underlying case against Chevron, the court sanctioned plaintiffs’ attorney for a Rule 11 violation and dismissed his clients’ claims because of their “deliberately deceptive practices.” (12)
  •  
In short, the “other side” of Chevron turns out to be no more than a pastiche of press releases, hastily and uncritically assembled. Surely the readers of Opinio Juris deserve better.

안철수 강연 2012.03.27 서울대문화관 - 이준길 (청년당)

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http://youtu.be/gFPmYWLw6Rw
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http://youtu.be/gFPmYWLw6Rw
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http://hopeplanner.tistory.com/312
청년당 2012/03/28 07:00

어제(27) 저녁 서울대 문화관에서 열린 안철수 원장의소통과 공감강연회에 다녀왔습니다. 작년 한해는 전국 27개 지역에서 안철수 원장과 함께 청춘콘서트를 하며 정말 정이 많이 들었었습니다. 지난 9월 대구에서 열린 마지막 청춘콘서트를 끝으로 안철수 원장과 7개월 만에 처음 만났습니다.

서울대 문화관 입구에는 취재진의 취재 경쟁이 너무 치열해서 발디딜 틈이 없었습니다. 기자들을 뒤로하고 무대 뒤편 대기실에서 조용히 안철수 원장을 만날 수 있었습니다. 인사를 드리자 환한 웃음을 보여주었습니다경호가 워낙 삼엄해서 곧바로 대기실을 빠져나왔습니다. 이어서 강연이 시작되었습니다.

청춘콘서트 이후 7개월 만에 만난 안 원장은 다소 긴장된 모습이 역력해 보였습니다. 맨 앞자리에서 강연을 들었는데, 청춘콘서트 때처럼 푸근하고 편안한 표정이 아니여서 강연 듣는 내내 내심 걱정이 되었습니다.

청춘콘서트 이후 청년들과 함께 부대끼지 않은 지난 7개월의 공백이 크게 느껴진 시간이었네요. 강연 내용을 생생히 전달해 드립니다. 청년들과 나눈 일문일답입니다

일문일답 중에 가장 많은 주목을 끌었던 부분은 안철수 원장의 대선출마 여부에 대한 질문이었습니다. 이 질문이 등장하자 청중석에도 크게 술렁였습니다.

언론에서는 안철수 원장의 대선출마에 대한 발언만 집중 보도하고 있는데, 강연을 들은 청년들의 입장에서는 반응이 어떠했는지 다루는 기사는 없네요. 강연을 들은 청년들은 어떤 부분에서 큰 박수가 터져나왔고 어떤 부분에서 많은 공감이 있었는지 그 분위기를 생생하게 영상과 글로 전해드립니다.

우선, 많은 국민들이 가장 궁금해 하는 내용입니다. 안철수 원장은 과연 대선에 출마할 의향이 있을까요답변 내용을 영상에 그대로 담았습니다.  

답변을 들으며 현장에서는 여러차례 큰 박수가 터져나왔습니다.

"내가 만약에 우리 사회의 긍정적인 발전 도구로 쓰일 수 있다면 정치라도 감당할 수 있다. 그럴 생각이다."

안철수 원장이 정치에 직접 참여할 뜻이 있음을 본격 선언했습니다. 본격적인 정치참여의 가능성을 연 것은 이번이 처음이여서 앞으로 큰 파장이 예상되었습니다.

아래 내용은 대선출마 여부에 대한 답변을 포함 청년들과 함께 나눈 대화 내용들입니다. 소리가 들리지 않은 컴퓨터 환경에 계신 분들은 아래 글을 읽어주시면 됩니다. 친절하죠? ^^

질문1) 인생을 살면서 가장 큰 실수는 무엇인가요?

여기 온 것이 가장 큰 실수가 아닐까 싶네요.” 
청년들의 서운한 목소리가 웅성거렸습니다. 사회를 본 친구는그럼 저는 여기서 뭘하고 있는 건가요?” 농담 했습니다. 아마 지나치게 취재 경쟁을 하며 몰려든 기자들을 의식해서 한 말 이었던 것 같습니다.

질문2) 자기가 정말 하고 싶어 하는 일은 어떻게 찾아야 하나요

하고 싶은 일과 잘 할 수 있는 일은 달라요. 하고 싶은 일이라고 하더라도 본인이 직접 해보지 않으면 그 일을 잘 할 수 있는지 모릅니다. 학생 때는 다양한 시도들을 해보는 것이 필요합니다. 우리나라에 만 가지 직업이 있다고 하잖아요. 학생 때는 최대한 경험을 해봐야 합니다. 자기가 잘 하는 일은 직접 해보지 않으면 모릅니다.” 

질문3) 올바른 리더십은 무엇이라고 생각하나요?

오늘 제가 강조한 소통, 공감, 수평적 리더십이 다 같은 말입니다. 그보다 더 근본적인 것은 내 개인의 이익을 위해서 상대방을 이용해 먹지 않는다는 이 진심이 있어야 합니다. 결국 진심은 전달이 되요. 가장 기본적인 것은 상대방을 내 개인의 이익을 위해서 이용하지 않는다. 그게 있으면 절반 이상은 성공할 수 있습니다. 진심은 전달되게 되어 있거든요.”

질문4) 대선에 출마하실 의향이 있으신가요?

이 질문이 던져지자 순식간에 이목이 집중되었습니다.

어떻게 할까요(청년들 환하게 웃으며 큰 박수) 

 작년 9월 이후부터 제가 한 말이 3가지입니다. 첫째, 학교 일과 재단 만드는 일에 집중하겠다. 둘째, 총선 출마하지 않겠다. 셋째, 제가 정치참여 하고 안 하고는 문제의 본질이 아니다. 그 이외에는 상상과 만든 이야기이지 제가 한 말은 아닙니다. 저는 지난 9월부터 제가 하는 말을 모두 지켰습니다. 왜냐하면 작은 약속을 못 지키는 사람은 큰 약속도 못 지킨다고 생각하기 때문입니다

 저는 살아오면서 모든 판단 기준이사회의 긍정적인 변화에 보탬이 될 수 있다면!’ 이것이었습니다. 그래서 의대교수 그만두고 벤쳐기업 했고, 벤쳐기업 놔두고 대학으로 온 것이고요. 모두 우리 사회에 얼마나 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 것인가 그것이 기준이었습니다. 지금까지도 말한 대로 살아왔습니다

 왜 오해들이 있을까 생각해 보면, 저 높은 자리를 욕망의 대상이라고 생각하는 것 같습니다. 욕망의 대상이 아니고 희생의 자리이고 굉장히 엄중의 자리입니다. 그런데너무나 하고 싶을 거야지레 짐작을 하고 그러는 것 같아요. 50년 동안 꾸준히 살아왔는데 하루아침에 생각이 바뀔 사람이 아닙니다

 제가 사회의 긍정적인 발전에 도움이 될 수 있을까 이 관점에서 모든 것을 봤습니다. 지난 몇 달간우유부단이런 표현도 쓰시더라구요.

생각해 보시면제가 정치를 안 하겠다고 선언을 하면 어떻게 될까요? 그동안 긴장했던 양당들이 긴장을 풀고 예전대로 돌아갈 것이잖아요. (청년들이 환호를 하며 뜨거운 박수를 쳤습니다)

저는 그 때 판단했습니다. 제가 우리 사회에서 할 수 있는 가장 큰 역할은 이 자리에서 있으면서 양쪽을 끊임없이 자극을 해서 양쪽이 쇄신의 노력을 하게 만드는 것임을요. (청년들이 다시 환호를 하며 뜨거운 박수를 쳤습니다)
지지율이 낮아지니까 무슨 액션을 해야 되지 않겠는가 하시는데... 천만의 말씀입니다저는 지지율에 관심이 없습니다.

제가 만약 사회에 긍정적인 발전에 쓰일 수 있는 도구로만 쓰일 수 있으면 정치라도 감당해 낼 수 있습니다. 첫째로는 제가 자격이 되느냐 입니다. 둘째로는 사회적인 책무가 저에게 주어지느냐 입니다. 자격은 제가 판단할 수 없고 대중들이 판단을 하면 그렇게 주어질 것 같고요, 사회적인 책무는 지난번 미국에 다녀와서 말씀드렸듯이 양쪽 모두 쇄신의 노력을 다하면 저 같은 사람까지 정치에 나설 필요가 있을 것이냐입니다.

지금 있는 분들이 잘해주시면 제가 나설 이유가 없어요결국 (정치 참여는제가 선택하는 문제가 아니라 결국은 주어지는 것입니다. 우리나라의 보수와 진보 진영은 너무 심하게 싸웁니다보수나 진보가 적이 아니라 상호 보완적이어야 합니다사회문제를 해결하려면 어느 한쪽 주장만 가지고 해결할 수 없거든요어느 정도 타협점을 찾아야 사회가 발전됩니다국민이 커다란 권한을 주는데 자기네들끼리 싸우면 말이 안 됩니다.

미래가치가 중요합니다대립이 아니라 소통과 화합을 해서 사회문제를 해결하는 게 중요합니다하지만 (정치권은서로 싸우기만 해요. (청년들이 다시 환호를 하며 뜨거운 박수를 쳤습니다사회학자들이 말하는 '안철수 현상'의 핵심은 구체제와 미래가치의 충돌입니다오래된 시스템국민들의 각 생각을 반영하지 못하는 정당들사회 간의 계층 이동이 차단된 사회구조빈부 격차를 만들어내는 사회 시스템 모두 구체제라고 볼 수 있어요우리사회에서 사회갈등을 풀고 일자리를 창출하고 빈부격차를 해소하고 계층 간에 이동할 수 있도록 하는 게 필요합니다.

만약 그런 능력이 없으면 보수든 진보든 누가 정권을 잡든 일반 국민은 관심 없습니다문제를 풀 수 있는 사람들이 정권을 잡아야 합니다. (정치권 양측이승리에 집착하는 것은 바람직하지 않습니다. 제가 (정치할자격이 되느냐에 대해서는 어떤 현안에 대해 발언하는 과정에서 대중들이 판단하면 될 것 같습니다.

그래서 만약 제가 정치참여를 하게 된다면 이것 하나는 확실합니다특정 진영 논리에 기대지 않을 것입니다. 공동체의 가치를 최우선으로 삼는 그런 쪽으로 할 것입니다진영 논리에 갇혀 공동체 전체의 가치를 저버리는 판단은 하지 않을 것입니다. 그것이 저의 입장입니다. 지지율 떨어지는데 왜 이렇게 가만히 있는가에 대한 답이 될 것 같습니다.

아직은 대선 출마 이야기를 하기가 너무 빠릅니다. 아직 대선 츨마하겠다고 이야기하신 분이 한 분도 없잖아요.(청년들 웃으며 큰 박수)

강연장에 참석한 청년들은 안철수 원장이 "그동안 정치참여를 안하겠다고 하면 양당이 긴장을 풀고 예전대로 돌아가지 않겠느냐"고 했을 때 큰 박수를 치며 환호했습니다. 강연이 끝나고도 제가 인터뷰한 많은 청년들이 기성 정치인들과는 다른 결을 보여주는 이 발언을 통해 안철수 원장의 진심을 알 수 있었다고 했습니다. 그리고 그동안 정치참여 여부에 대해 명확하게 밝히지 않는 것에 대해 너무 우유부단하지 않느냐는 등 온갖 억측들이 있었는데, 그랬던 이유가 양쪽을 끊임없이 자극을 해서 쇄신하도록 하는 것이었다는 말에 청년들은 다시한번 진정성을 느꼈습니다.그리고 국민들은 싸우는 것을 원하는 것이 아니라 사회문제가 해결되기를 바란다는 말에도 큰 박수가 터져나왔습니다. 안철수 원장은 국민들이 원하는 바를 정확히 짚고 있었기에 청년들도 공감의 박수를 함께 친 것입니다.

질문5) 요즘 행복한가요?

개인적으로는 행복해요. 어떤 발언을 하면 재단이 오해를 받을까봐 걱정했었습니다. 지금은 재단도 출범했고 학교에 나가 학생들도 가르치고 행복합니다. 사회적으로는... 설명하면 구차해지고 받아들일 수 밖에 없는 상황들이 많지만, 그냥 받아들여야 할 것 같습니다. 그런 상황입니다.” 

질문6) 마지막 말씀 부탁드립니다.

“7개월 만입니다. 그동안 같이 만나서 눈높이를 맞추고 서로의 고민도 듣고 이야기도 해주고 싶었습니다. 많은 질문 중에저희들한테 해주시는 조언과 따님한테 하는 조언 다르죠?“ 이런 질문 하는데 제 딸한테도 해주는 말이 똑같습니다. 그럴려면 서로 눈높이를 맞추는 시간이 필요합니다. 지난 반년 동안은 그러지 못했는데 앞으로는 그런 시간을 많이 가졌으면 좋겠습니다.” 

안철수 원장이 자리를 일어서자 뜨거운 박수가 쏟아졌습니다. 특히 대선 출마에 대한 질문에 많은 관심이 쏠렸고 이에 대한 답변에 청년들의 환호도 가장 많이 터져 나왔습니다. 기존 정치인들과는 다른 그의 신뢰감 있는 언행이 청년들의 마음에도 진정성으로 와 닿은 것 같았습니다.

총선을 앞두고 새누리당과 야권연대 모두 국민들에게 큰 실망을 안겨주고 있는 상황에서 안철수 원장의 이와 같은 발언은 또다시 '안철수 현상'이라는 국민적 열기를 총선 이후에도 계속 가져가게 할 것 같습니다.  

강연장을 나가는 청년들에게 소감을 물었습니다.
되게 재미있었고. 기억에 남는 장면은 대선 출마를 밝히지 않은 이유가 양당에 자극을 주기 위해서였다는 말씀이 진심인 것 같아서 감동적이었습니다. 대선은 직접 출마를 하셔도 좋을 것 같고요. 아니면 좋은 후보에 대한지지 의사를 밝혀서 어느 정도 영향을 미치는 일을 해주셨으면 좋겠어요.”

인터뷰에 응해준 대부분이 이처럼 '전정성'을 느꼈다는 소감을 말했습니다. 출입구 앞에서는 수많은 기자들이 카메라 셔터를 누를 준비를 하고 있었는데, 스탭 한 명이 와서안 원장님은 뒷문으로 나가셨습니다해서 기자들이 한숨과 함께 다들 투덜투덜 거렸습니다.

안철수 원장은 청춘콘서트 할 때의 향수를 진하게 갖고 있는 것 같았습니다. 저도 그 때의 향수가 느껴졌구요. 그 때는 콘서트 끝나고 같이 이야기도 나누고 그랬는데, 지금은 뒷문으로 나가버리시네요...ㅠ 한국사회의 긍정적 변화에 보탬이 되는 것이 지금껏 살아오는 동안 가장 중요한 판단의 기준이었다고 강조했는데, 오늘 청년들도 그런 소중한 가치를 많이 배우고 돌아가서 뿌듯한 시간이었네요

아무튼 확실해진 것은사회에 긍정적인 발전을 일으킬 수 있는 도구로 쓰인다면 정치라도 감당할 수 있다고 말한 부분입니다. 총선 이후에 정국이 어떻게 흘러가게 될지 다시한번 많은 기대감을 갖게 되네요. 얼마전 청춘콘서트 서포터즈들이 중심이 되어 '청년당'도 창당하고, 청춘콘서트를 함께한 안철수 원장도 정치 참여 의사를 내비치고, 2012년에는 이들에 의해 대한민국이 크게 변화하게 될 것 같습니다.^^

======================
DO
"세 가지를 말해왔고, 그 세 가지 지켜왔다.
작은 약속도 못 지키는 사람이 어떻게 큰 약속을 지키겠느냐"

NUAC conference on Korea - Mar. 27 at Nat'l Press Club


NUAC Invitation
Mar 03, 2012 by Administrator

Conference on the 2012 South Korean and United States Presidential Elections, and Prospects for the Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
Hosted by the National Unification Advisory Council

Tuesday, March 27, 2012
1:30 pm – 5:00 pm (registration begins at 1:00 pm)
The National Press Club
529 14th Street NW, 13th Floor, Washington, DC 20045

Keynote Speaker
     Dr. Hyunuk (Bosco) Kim – Executive Vice President, National Unification Advisory Council of the Republic of Korea
Master of Ceremonies
     Dr. Paull H. Shin – Senator, Washington State Senate
Panelists
     Mr. Carl Gershman – President, National Endowment for Democracy
     Dr. Suzanne Scholte – President, Defense Forum Foundation
     Mr. Greg Scarlatoiu – Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
     Mr. Scott Snyder – Director, Program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (invited)
     Dr. Chung Sang-hwa – Senior Fellow, Sejong Research Institute
     Professor Jhe Seong-ho –Professor, Choong-Ang University
     Dr. Song Jong-hwan – Visiting Professor, Myung-ji University
     Dr. Lee Choon-kun – Executive Director, Korea Economic Research Institute

About the National Unification Advisory Council
The National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC) was established in July 1983 to enable and foster an amicable relationship between South and North Korea. With the support of fifteen chapters totaling over 1200 members located in the United States, in addition to other chapters throughout the globe, NUAC strives to reach a consensus on the topic of peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula based on the opinions of Koreans worldwide. In order to highlight awareness of this matter and encourage action, there are many initiatives in progress towards the achievement of this ultimate goal. Located in the capital of the US, the Washington, DC Chapter of NUAC is leading the way in promoting awareness and spurring discussion of the issue of peaceful Korean reunification.

For more information: contact Dr. George Hong, 703-675-5959, hhkmmi@yahoo.com
To RSVP: Please e-mail alanahn@thegabi.com

=========================
DO - 
stayed there for abt an hour. 
Michael Horowitz's speech was interesting, as it was at testimony on the Hill. 

Without China, the North will collapse within 15 minutes. 
How to move China? Should move the US. How? Korean community is the right actor in shifting the US policy on China. E.g. go to Congress and say to Republicans, “if you do not push China, we will be Democrat.” Do the same thing o the Democrats. That was how Israeli and South African communities in the US did to push or shove the US. 

Korean politicians and businessmen, when over to the US, go to White House or State Dept to earn relationship. But Israeli politicians go to Israeli community in the US to support them in pushing the US government. 

--------------------
Fair point.

What is lacking in the discussion is the aftermath of collapse. In discussing the way of bringing down Kim’ regime, we should incorporate the way of addressing aftermath of the collapse into the strategies. The collapse itself is not at all the end of the game. 



How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse


How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse
Local Is the Only Way to Go
February 29, 2012
J. Edward Conway
J. EDWARD CONWAY is an independent political risk consultant for mining companies in Central Asia. He is also a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia, and Caucasus Studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.

A big dig will soon be coming to Afghanistan. (Tim Winborne / Courtesy Reuters)

Until just a few weeks ago, serious talk about an Afghan economy based on natural resources seemed premature. But as Kabul inks more mining deals with international investors -- it awarded two major tenders at the end of 2011 -- and as NATO continues its drawdown of international troops, natural resources are shaping up to serve as the cornerstone of sustainable development there. This raises an unavoidable and possibly tragic question: Considering the country's lack of infrastructure and its rampant corruption, will Afghanistan become yet another data point in the literature on underdeveloped countries that fall victim to the resource curse [1]?

The possibility is real. Officials in both Washington and Kabul claim that the country's mineral wealth is worth as much as $3 trillion. Experts have suspected Afghanistan's resource potential for decades, and U.S. Geological Survey fieldwork conducted between 2009 and 2011 confirmed the existence of significant copper, iron ore, gold, lithium, rare earths, and mineral fuel resources such as coal, oil, and gas, and possibly even uranium.

plans to develop
Mining corporations and the Afghan government have wasted no time. In late 2011, Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines signed an oil exploration and production deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to develop the Amu Darya basin's 80 million barrels of estimated crude reserves over the next 25 years; production is expected to begin this year. At the moment, the ministry is finalizing details with an Indian consortium of mining companies to develop the Hajigak deposit, one of the largest undeveloped iron ore deposits in the world, which has the potential to produce steel for the next 40 years. Both of these deals come after Kabul signed over to the Chinese the rights to the Aynak copper deposit in 2008, and the Qara Zaghan gold deposit to a consortium of investors gathered together by J. P. Morgan in early 2011.   Taken together, these first forays into Afghanistan's newfound subterranean treasure chest will mean billions of dollars in investment over the next decade; there will be new rail infrastructure, power plants, and possibly even a refinery. Kabul will reap significant new tax revenues, and tens of thousands of Afghans will be put to work.

hurdles in materializing the plans
Unconditional celebration, however, would be premature. Agreements notwithstanding, not a single mine has produced anything tangible -- not even the almost four-year-old Aynak copper mine, which will allegedly begin operation next year. Chinese investors also appear to be sliding on their promise to build a railroad as a part of the Aynak deal. Because of likely high operating costs, it remains unclear when the J. P. Morgan consortium will be able to produce an ounce of gold that competes at market prices.

reserve v. resource (resource – risk – reserve)
What's more, estimates for trillion-dollar earnings are almost entirely based on resources, not reserves -- a technical but critical difference. Reserve estimates incorporate economic, legal, social, governmental, and environmental risks to determine what is actually profitable to develop, as well as the site-specific mining and metallurgical challenges. Resource estimates result in optimistic press releases; reserve estimates result in foreign investment, jobs, and budgetary contributions. Kabul and Washington have focused on signing deals, thinking that a few key agreements would soothe the concerns of risk-averse investors. But the real challenge for the industry will be in production. And the test for Afghanistan -- herein lies the possibility of a curse -- will be whether or not a majority of the country reaps the secondary benefits of the mining sector's development.

two dimension resource curse involves
Resource curse theories follow two tracks. On the first, the overwhelming revenue drawn from the sector exacerbates corruption within the government. That scenario is hardly difficult to imagine in Afghanistan, as the country is currently considered the second most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. On the second track, increased mineral exports strengthen a country's currency and consequently crowd out other sectors (such as agriculture) from being competitive on the world market. This is a threat in Afghanistan, clearly, as its economy is largely dependent on farming. 

the goal should be
But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. Many states in the region are blessed with mineral wealth but cursed by infrastructure obstacles and social instability; accordingly, they have faced challenges in attracting foreign investors, cultivating resources without losing profits to graft, and avoiding introducing new divisions among the population. The most important lesson for Afghanistan to learn is that it will have to build a resource-based economy with the support of local Afghans

Kyrgyzstan
Take Kyrgyzstan, a mountainous, landlocked country with little rail infrastructure, deteriorating roads, and an economy based on foreign aid, remittances, and mining. Until recently, successive authoritarian leaders since the mid-1990s, such as Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, advised foreign mining companies to avoid getting involved locally; a few token social projects to placate the people living near a project would suffice. But keeping out of local affairs has backfired. Mining revenues were funneled to elites in the capital, and a negligible percentage went to the local community for development and infrastructure projects.

Over time, local miners moved their families (and wealth) to the capital city; the loss of revenue and investment left the mining towns without running water or a functioning sewage system. In Barskaun, the only paved road is the one that leads to the mine -- Kumtor, a single gold mine, which represents ten percent of the country's GDP. That neglect not only shortchanged the locals but breeds insecurity today. In Aral, where there is a foreign-operated gold mine, armed men on horseback caused a million dollars' worth of damage in October 2011, forcing the site to remain closed until a settlement was reached with villagers three months later.

Kazakhstan
But then consider Kazakhstan, where the opposite has happened. The country of 16 million is an oil and gas exporter but also a global leader in copper, iron ore, chromite, lead, zinc, gold, coal, and uranium reserves and production. Since its independence in the 1990s, both foreign investors and government officials have focused on socioeconomic development in the areas surrounding key mining sites; today mines serve as a catalyst for province-wide growth. Managers and workers live locally, spend locally, and educate their children locally.

Astana has imposed strict requirements on foreign miners -- forcing them to sign annual memorandums of cooperation with local governors, under which both parties together determine the social investment projects to be funded by the firm in the province for that year. The strategy dates back to the Soviet era, when most of these mining operations had their hand in all aspects of the local community. Today this is reflected in foreign mining companies funding schools, gyms, sports stadiums, daycare centers, and orphanages and foster care networks, as well as providing electric-power capacity to homes and businesses across the country. Not coincidently, Kazakhstan ranks far ahead of all other Central Asian states on country risk indices for foreign investors.

Afghanistan at the moment
Unfortunately, at the moment Afghanistan is looking more like the former than the latter. Politically the country is already overly centralized in Kabul, and with Aynak and Hajigak within driving distance, it's not difficult to envision a future where the benefits of the extractive sector remain in the capital. Further, while all foreign developers are required to invest in development projects, it remains to be seen if these firms will make good on their promises and if local leaders will be empowered in the subsequent decision-making process. Whereas Kazakhstan enforces strict production and investment quotas -- if you don't produce and invest as you promised, you're out -- citing force majeure in Afghanistan (from war to civil disturbances to labor issues) seems like an easy way for Aynak and Hajigak to renege on local commitments, potentially aggravating the existing socioeconomic gap between Kabul and the rest of the country.

key solution is
It all comes back to ensuring a positive correlation between increased foreign investment and improved quality of life. In Kyrgyzstan you have armed men on horseback; in Kazakhstan you have local athletes wearing jerseys sporting the foreign miner's logo. There's no question that there are significant differences between the situation in Afghanistan and those in the Central Asian states. Afghanistan's levels of corruption and violence are far higher, the education level is much lower, and on transport infrastructure and power capacity issues, it is starting from scratch. But just as Kabul's mining deals to date are little more than agreements on paper, the unsettled nature of the larger issues can provide an opportunity to forge a path ahead. If Afghanistan wants to achieve that positive correlation of foreign investment with local quality of life -- and in doing so open the gates to foreign investment from the more risk-averse -- the Kabul-based elites and their foreign miners will need to spread the wealth.

Copyright © 2002-2012 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 

Links:
[1] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137195/edited-by-paul-collier-and-anthony-j-venables/plundered-nations-successes-and-failures-in-natural-resource-ext

Long Range Missiles Of Any Kind: predicted trouble cuz N.Korea not consider space-launch rockets as missiles


Long Range Missiles Of Any Kind
BY JEFFREY | 16 MARCH 2012 |

I have previously noted the importance of reading very, very closely the utterances of the Great Fitzpatrick.

Another case in point: On March 15, Mark gave a talk at the Daiwa Foundation Japan House in which he “predicted trouble” over the DPRK moratorium on long-range missiles launches “because North Korea does not consider space-launch rockets to be missiles.”

Of course, today, I awake to learn that KCNA has announced the DPRK will launch a “space launch” vehicle on Kim Il Sung’s birthday.

I will spare you the back and forth on whether there is any meaningful difference between a missile and a “space launch” vehicle –Mark does a wonderful job of summarizing the minute details in a blog post at the IISS Voices site. The short version is that there is no important difference from a testing standpoint. A moratorium on missile launches that includes an exception for space launches is like a moratorium on nuclear testing that permits “peaceful nuclear explosions” — pointless.

1.

Should the Obama Administration have seen this coming? If Fitzpatrick could, why didn’t the State Department ?  Why, by the way, doesn’t Fitzpatrick have a job in this Administration?

I’d like to hold off judgement on a thing like this, as someone once said, until all the facts are in.  But it appears this was a pretty serious foul up.

When the US and DPRK issued statements about the resumption of talks, their competing statements of what had been agreed differed in some interesting ways.  Both statements, however, used identical language relating to the moratorium: “The DPRK has agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches.”  (That’s the US version, but the DRPK version translates as “The DPRK… agreed to a moratorium on … long-range missile launches.”)

I went back to look at the how the Clinton Administration handled the issue of space launches during North Korea’s 1999-2003 moratorium, embodied in the 2000 Joint Communique.  And there it was: “long-range missile launches of any kind.”  [Emphasis added.]  The details matter!

2.

The interesting thing about the 1999-2003 moratorium was that it evolved.  North Korea made a private pledge in 1999 that eventually became a written commitment in the form of the  2000 Joint Communique.

In September 1999, the DPRK privately committed to a moratorium of one sort or another. North Korea then publicly announced, ” It will not launch a missile while the talks are under way…” The Clinton Administration then attempted to secure that pledge in an agreed statement.  Unfortunately, the few accounts of the missile negotiations — by Albright,Samore and Sherman (well, a long account by Michael Gordon quoting Sherman)– focus on the Albright visit to Pyongyang, which followed the 2000 Joint Communique.

Still, the evolution of “missile” into “long-range missile of any kind” is tantalizing evidence of intensive discussions about scope.  I observe that US officials usually used the entire phrasein written documents.  It seems clear that it meant something.

Without access to the negotiating record, it is impossible to conclude that “of any kind” referred to precisely the problem we face now, but that seems like a good bet. Regardless, why omit it now?  Certainly, departing from the previous language should have thrown up red flags.  I have to ask: Did the relevant officials not examine the original moratorium? Wouldn’t they have become suspicious if the North Koreans had objected to adding “of any kind”?

State Department Spokesperson Toria Nuland released a statement today that is not encouraging — she appeals to the UN Security Council Resolution  as opposed to the agreed language.  That’s going to get you far.  What the hell?  Wendy ShermanGary Samore and Bob Einhorn are all senior US officials who were deeply involved in the details of this in 1999-2000.  I am just baffled.

Sigh.  So, what to do?  We gave the North Koreans a loophole large enough to fly a Taepodong through and they took it. (Or at least announced their intent to take it.) The North Koreans have really made a mess here: If the Administration admits it made a mistake (fat chance), its political opponents will use that admission as a cudgel against any future agreement its negotiates anywhere in the world.  On the other hand, if the Administration blames North Korea for walking away from an agreement after a few days, then the Administration will get killed in Congress over any future deal.

4.

By the way, I observe that Kim Jong Un has made some very interesting visits of late, including to the Strategic Rocket Forces Command.  If I am not mistaken, that would be the first mention of this particular organization.  This is my chance to plug the excellent, North Korean Leadership Watch.

Some of the pictures are priceless, especially if you know the Kim Jong Un-cake meme.

Also priceless are the description of the location of the command, as well as the exterior shots. I bet I can find this place.

Late Update | 9:40 pm PST 16 March 2012 In a press briefing today, Toria Nuland claims that the United States “made clear unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.” Of course, a US diplomat can “make clear” the US position in a negotiation without securing the agreement of the other party.
Here is the relevant graf:

MS. NULAND: Well, first of all, in the context of working on the Leap Day agreement, we made clear unequivocally that we considered that any satellite launch would be a deal-breaker. So on the front end, they understood that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MS. NULAND: We were called yesterday. We were contacted through the New York channel and advised late in the afternoon yesterday that they were likely to move forward with this. Obviously, the individual who took that message was uninstructed at that time, but made very clear what he considered the implications of this to be. And then just a few hours afterwards, the statement was released by the North Korean news service, which was why we felt we had to respond almost immediately. Hence the notification you got at 4 o’clock in the morning.

So from our perspective, there shouldn’t have been any doubt in the North Koreans’ mind before this what the implications will be if they go forward.

I am still waiting to hear someone from the Obama Administration say “North Korea accepted our position that space launches are a kind of long-range missile launch.”

[1] here: http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5083/long-range-missiles-of-any-kind
[2] Image: http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tumblr_lxhvfyLpcr1qf71bqo1_500.jpg
[3] reading very, very closely: http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2475/covert-site-in-iran
[4] announced: http://www.kcna.kp/
[5] blog post: http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/north-korean-rocket-may-shoot-down-leap-day-deal/
[6] US: http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_pr_022912.html
[7] 2000 Joint Communique: http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html
[8] privately committed: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/44966876.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Sep+18%2C+1999&author=John+Burgess&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.01&desc=U.S.+Lifts+Key+Facets+Of+N.+Korea+Embargo%3B+Some+Trade%2C+Investment+to+Be+Legal
[9] publicly announced: http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9909/news09/24.htm
[10] Albright: http://www.madamsecretary.com/
[11] Samore: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92samore.pdf
[12] Michael Gordon: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/06/world/how-politics-sank-accord-on-missiles-with-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
[13] statement: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/185910.htm
[14] Wendy Sherman: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/174931.htm
[15] Gary Samore: http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/147931.htm
[16] Bob Einhorn: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/125079.htm
[17] Strategic Rocket Forces Command: http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201203/news02/20120302-42ee.html
[18] North Korean Leadership Watch: http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2012/03/03/kim-jong-un-visits-missile-command/
[19] priceless: http://www.kcna.kp/kcnadata/kor/photo/2012/3/311339-7.jpg
[20] meme: http://www.funnyordie.com/slideshows/02af4e01b0/10-funniest-examples-of-the-hungry-kim-jong-un-meme
[21] exterior shots: http://www.kcna.kp/kcnadata/kor/photo/2012/3/311339-1.jpg
[22] press briefing today: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/03/185935.htm
[23] Jeffrey Lewis: http://38north.org/author/jeffrey-lewis/