North Korea Nuclear Timeline - Fast Facts

North Korea Nuclear Timeline - Fast Facts

Tue October 29, 2013   By CNN Library  

http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/

(CNN) -- Here's a look at what you need to know about North Korea's nuclear capabilities and history.

1985
North Korea joins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1993 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) charges that North Korea is violating the NPT and demands that inspectors be given access to two nuclear waste storage sites.

North Korea threatens to quit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty amid suspicions that it is developing nuclear weapons. It ultimately does not quit the program but agrees to inspections in 1994.

1994 
North Korea and U.S. sign an agreement. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to build two power-producing nuclear reactors.

1998
August 31 - North Korea fires a multistage rocket that flies over Japan and lands in the Pacific Ocean, proving the North Koreans can strike any part of Japan's territory.

November 17 - The U.S. and North Korea hold the first round of high-level talks in Pyongyang over North Korea's suspected construction of an underground nuclear facility. The United States demands inspections.

1999
February 27-March 16 - During a fourth round of talks, North Korea allows U.S. access to the site in exchange for U.S. aid in increasing North Korean potato yields. U.S. inspectors find no evidence of any nuclear activity during a visit to site in May.

September 13 - North Korea agrees to freeze testing of long-range missiles while negotiations with the U.S. continue.

September 17 - President Bill Clinton agrees to ease economic sanctions against North Korea.

December - A U.S.-led international consortium signs a $4.6 billion contract to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea.

2000
July - North Korea threatens to restart its nuclear program if the U.S. does not compensate it for the loss of electricity caused by delays in building nuclear power plants.

2001
June - North Korea warns it will drop its moratorium against testing missiles if the U.S. does not pursue normalized relations with North Korea. It also says it will restart its nuclear program if there is not more progress on two U.S.-sponsored nuclear power plants being built in North Korea.

2002
January 29 - President George W. Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger," he says.

October 4 - U.S. officials, in closed talks, confront North Korea with evidence that they are operating a nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 nuclear agreement. Specifically, the U.S. has proof that they are operating a uranium enrichment facility. North Korea admits that is has been operating the facility in violation of the agreement. The information is NOT made public.

October 16 - The Bush Administration first reveals that North Korea has admitted operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement. They have NOT, apparently, admitted having any nuclear weapons.

December 22 - North Korea says it has begun removing IAEA monitoring equipment from nuclear facilities.

December 31 - North Korea expels IAEA inspectors.

2003
January 10 - North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

February 5 - North Korea's official news agency says the nation has reactivated its nuclear power facilities.

February 24 - North Korea test fires a land-to-ship missile into the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.

February 26 - The United States says North Korea has reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

March 10 - North Korea test fires another surface-to-vessel anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan.

April 23, 2003 - Declares it has nuclear weapons.

August 27 - The U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia take part in talks about the crisis in North Korea.

2004
February 24-28 - The U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia meet in Beijing, China for more talks. The summit closes with no major progress but with an agreement for more talks.

June - The six nations meet again in Beijing for more talks.

August 2004 - North Korea offers to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for aid, easing of sanctions and being removed from the US's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The U.S. wants North Korea to disclose all nuclear activities and allow inspections.

2005
February 10 - North Korea drops out of six-party nuclear talks and says it will bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal. North Korea insists on a bilateral non-aggression pact with the U.S. before it will consider dismantling its nuclear program. The U.S. insists Pyongyang must first agree to permanently and verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program before it will grant any incentives, including economic assistance and diplomatic recognition.

August 7 - After meeting for 13 straight days, diplomats from the United States, North Korea and four other Asia-region powers decide to take a recess from talks aimed at getting North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.

September 13 - The six-party talks resume in Beijing.

September 19 - North Korea agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons, a joint statement from six-party nuclear arms talks in Beijing said. "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards," the statement said.
- In exchange, the U.S., China, Japan, Russian and South Korea have "stated their willingness" to provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.
- North Korean officials later state that their country would begin dismantling its nuclear program only if the U.S. provides a light-water reactor for civilian power -- a demand that could threaten a day-old agreement among North Korea, its neighbors and the United States.

"Without this physical guarantee of the (light-water reactor), our position is not to even dream of us giving up our nuclear deterrence."

2006
July 4 - North Korea test-launches a Taepodong-2 missile along with two short-range rockets, but the long-range missile apparently fails.

July 15 - The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend its missile program. The North Korean ambassador immediately rejects the resolution.

October 9 - North Korea claims to have successfully tested a nuclear weapon. The supposed test is conducted at an underground facility in Hwaderi near Kilju city. Though the nature of the blast as nuclear remains unconfirmed, South Korea's geology research center detects an artificial earthquake in the region of the test, and world leaders condemn North Korea's actions (test conducted at 10:36 am local time or 9:36 pm Eastern time on 10/8/2006).

October 14 - The UN Security Council approved a resolution imposing sanctions against North Korea, restricting military and luxury good trade and requiring an end to nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

October 16 - An analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detects radioactive debris, confirming North Korea's nuclear test.

2007
February 13 - North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth $400 million.

March 5-6 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill meets with his North Korean counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, to discuss North Korea's nuclear program.

March - During six-party talks, the U.S. agrees to release approximately $25 million of North Korean funds frozen at a Macao bank, a sticking point in the negotiations. The actual release of funds does not occur until June.

June 25 - After spending two days in Pyongyang meeting with North Korea's nuclear negotiator, the U.S. Envoy to North Korea, Chris Hill, says that North Korea has reaffirmed its commitment to the nuclear disarmament agreement reached in February. He also says North Korea has invited the IAEA to monitor the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, scheduled to occur within a few weeks.

September 2 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill announces that after talks in Geneva between U.S. and North Korean officials, North Korea has agreed to fully declare and disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.

September 30 - At six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea signs an agreement stating it will begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities. North Korea also agrees to include a U.S. team of technical experts in the disabling activities.

October 2, 2007 - South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun becomes the first South Korean leader to walk across the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea on his way to a three day summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

October 4, 2007 - North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun sign an eight-point agreement in Pyongyang; among other things, it calls for a smooth implementation of the six-party agreements to shut down of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the replacement of North and South Korea's current armistice agreement with a permanent peace.

November 14-16, 2007 - North Korean Prime Minister Kim Yong Il and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo meet in Seoul, South Korea. At the end of the summit, they announce a number of economic projects including cross-border cargo train services, road repairs, and construction of a new industrial complex near Haeju, North Korea.

December 31 - North Korea misses a deadline to declare all its nuclear programs.

2008
January 4 - The North Korean Foreign Ministry states, via broadcast message, that North Korea had already provided enough explanation to meet the 12/31/2007 deadline, and that it had provided that information in a report presented to the U.S. in November. Members of the six party talks dispute this claim.

February 21 - After meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, South Korean envoy Chun Yung Woo states that North Korea still plans to meet the obligations it agreed to during six party talks in 2007.

May 8 - An official with the U.S. State Department announces that North Korea has handed over thousands of documents pertaining to its nuclear activities, especially related to its production of plutonium, to visiting U.S. official Sohn Kim. Another official puts the number of documents at 18,000 to 19,000.

June 27 - North Korea destroys a water cooling tower at the Yongbyon facility, where officials now acknowledge they extracted plutonium to build nuclear weapons. The massive implosion is intended to be a powerful public symbol of a move to end nuclear activities by the Communist nation.

September 24 - At the request of North Korea, the IAEA removes surveillance equipment and seals from the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

October 11 - U.S. State Dept. spokesman Sear McCormack announces that North Korea has been removed from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism.

October 10-17 - In response to the U.S. move, North Korea replaces the seals and surveillance equipment at its Yongbyon nuclear facility.

December 8 -11 - Another round of six-party talks is held in Beijing, China. The talks break down over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspectors unfettered access to suspected nuclear sites.

2009
January - U.S. scholar Selig Harrison meets with senior officials in North Korea. After the meeting he reports that the officials have claimed that North Korea has weaponized most of its plutonium stockpile. The amount of weaponized plutonium is allegedly enough for four to five nuclear bombs.

April 25 - North Korea announces it has begun reprocessing spent fuel rods.

May 25 - North Korea announces it has conducted its second nuclear test shortly after the U.S. Geological Survey reports a magnitude 4.7 seismic disturbance at the site of North Korea's first nuclear test. The White House is reporting that North Korea also test-fired a short range missile.

June 12 - The UN Security Council approves Resolution 1874, condemning North Korea's May 25th nuclear test. The UN also impose new sanctions, banning the sale of most arms to or from North Korea.

November 3 - North Korea's state run news agency reports that the reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods has been completed. The reprocessing garnered enough weapons-grade plutonium for one to two nuclear bombs.

2010
November 20 - According to a report by Stanford University professor, Siegfried Hecker, North Korea has a new nuclear enrichment facility composed of 2,000 centrifuges. Hecker was given unprecedented access to North Korea's facility and documents.

2011
October 24 - 25 - U.S. officials, led by U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, meet with a North Korean delegation, led by First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan, in Geneva, Switzerland, in an effort to restart the six-party nuclear arms talks that broke down in 2008.

December 15 - U.S. and North Korean officials meet in Beijing to discuss possible food assistance to North Korea in exchange for the suspension of North Korea's uranium enrichment program.

2012
January 11 - North Korea indicates that it is open to further discussions with the U.S. over suspending its uranium enrichment program in exchange for food aid, an agreement that seemed close to realization before Kim Jong Il's death on December 17, 2011.

February 29 - The U.S. State Department announces that North Korea has agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile launches and nuclear activity at Yongbyon, the nation's major nuclear facility.

April 10 - Ryu Kun Chol, the deputy director of the Space Development Department of the Korea Space Technology Committee, outlines the country's plans to complete and launch a rocket within the next seven days. Japan, South Korea and the U.S. believe the launch to be a cover-up for testing a long-range ballistic missile.

April 13 - North Korea's long-range rocket launch is a failure. Shortly after launch, it breaks apart and falls into the sea.

May 24 - A spokesperson for South Korea's Defense Ministry says that based on analysis of commercial satellite images at North Korea's nuclear test site, North Korea appears ready to carry out a nuclear test at anytime.

December 12, 2012 - North Korea successfully launches an Unha-3 long-range rocket from the Sohae Space Center in Cholsan County and puts a "working satellite" into orbit, days after Pyongyang suggested the launch could be delayed.

2013
January 24, 2013 - North Korea's National Defense Commission says it will continue nuclear testing and long-range rocket launches, all of which are a part of an "upcoming all-out action" aimed at the United States, "the sworn enemy of the Korean people." Two days prior to this statement, the United Nations Security Council condemned a recent rocket launch by North Korea and expanded sanctions.

February 12, 2013 - Conducts its third underground nuclear test. This is the first nuclear test carried out under leader, Kim Jong Un.

DPRK Deadlock: Implications for the Future of US-Japan Defense Cooperation

DPRK Deadlock: Implications for the Future of US-Japan Defense Cooperation

http://38north.org/2012/07/ytatsumi070912/?utm_source=38+North+Bulletin%2C+070912&utm_campaign=38+North&utm_medium=email

By Yuki Tatsumi  Post Published: 09 July 2012  Found in section: Foreign Affairs

(all talk based on the assumption  that the US policy shifts from dismantlement to containment)

(a brief historical backdrop on “little hope” for renewed Six Party Talk)  

It has been nearly four years since the Six Party Talks last took place. Since then, the North Korean nuclear problem has been essentially at a standstill. While some had hoped for a resumption of the Talks when the United States and DPRK reached the February 29 Agreement, that hope quickly turned into disappointment when the North Korean government announced less than three weeks later its intention to conduct a “satellite launch.” Although the test itself ended in failure, Pyongyang’s defiance brings about a renewed sense of frustration, one that is close to despair. North Korea’s provocative behavior under its new leader Kim Jong Un has dashed any hopes had before the power succession that the young Kim might be open to negotiating with the West. So far, there is little hope that North Korea will return to the Six Party Talks anytime soon.

(growing possibility that North Korea may never give up its nuclear program, leads the US to (i) strategic patience, (ii) growing probability of the US policy shift from “dismantlement” to “containment”)

In fact, the most disturbing development on the North Korean problem since 2008 is the growing possibility that North Korea may never give up its nuclear program, no matter how long diplomatic efforts go on. This presents a serious problem for the United States. On the one hand, upcoming presidential elections in Washington and Seoul, an anticipated leadership transition in China, and continuing political uncertainty in Japan all suggest that the next six to twelve months will not be the best time for diplomacy. In this sense, “strategic patience”—maintaining pressure on the North by enforcing existing economic sanctions, sending a clear signal that any provocative behavior would be promptly met by decisive action, and keeping channels of communication open while not rushing to enter into negotiations prematurely—may be the best course of action in the short term. On the other hand, “strategic patience” should not mean continuing the status quo forever. If North Korea consistently refuses to return to negotiations (Six Party Talks or otherwise) as it continues to make progress on its nuclear program, Washington may be forced to change its declared policy goal vis-à-vis North Korea’s nuclear program from “dismantlement” to “containment,” acquiescing to Pyongyang’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state as long as it does not proliferate. The probability of such a policy shift by the US will only grow as the current diplomatic impasse persists.

(The policy shift will have impact on international community and, more importantly, alliance relations with Japan and South Korea)

Should the US make such a shift, it would have a devastating impact on the international community’s effort to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What is potentially more serious for US security interests in Northeast Asia, however, is its possible impact on alliance relations with Japan and South Korea.

(what I mean by a “devastating impact on alliance relations with Japan and South Korea, is the common goal of an dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program shared by the US, Japan and South Korea will shatter. The difference in perceiving threat posed by the North will resurface.)

Over the years, the security threats posed by North Korea—both nuclear and conventional—have served as a primary driver to facilitate relations between the US, Japan, and South Korea. In particular, these three countries have long shared the goal of an eventual complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Should this overarching goal disappear due to a change in American policy, the divergence in threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea—which has existed among the three partners but has not been explicitly demonstrated in the face of this overarching goal of a nuclear-free North Korea—will likely resurface, only to cause a strain on trilateral security relations.

(what a US policy shift means to Japan  v.  what it means to the US and South Korea.  Japan considers itself as the only potential target for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons.  The US policy shift will trigger a strong sense of abandonment and betrayer)

Specifically, what would such a US policy change mean for Japan? Tokyo has consistently insisted that it cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea, largely because Japan considers itself as the only potential target for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. From the American perspective, the distance between the continental United States and North Korea makes Washington more concerned about Pyongyang’s nuclear and other WMD proliferation, rather than a nuclear attack. Although South Korea is investing more heavily in improving its military capability to deal with the WMD threat, Seoul’s primary concern remains the North’s conventional military capability and short-range missiles. Furthermore, as long as the two Koreas strive for eventual reunification, many South Koreans believe that it is inconceivable for the North to target them with its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, while the United States and South Korea may think that a nuclear North Korea is not desirable but tolerable, Japan feels a tangible and direct military threat. This means a US policy of containing a North Korea with a limited nuclear capability is an unacceptable prescription for Japan, and will likely to be seen as the US not only sacrificing Tokyo’s acute security concerns in order to reach a settlement with Pyongyang, but also triggering a strong sense of abandonment, resentment, and betrayal among the Japanese public and in the political leadership.

(the sense of abandonment and betrayer will have adverse effects, such as (i) undermine the working relationship between the two defense establishments, (ii) undermine the public’s confidence in America’s commitment to extend nuclear deterrence) 

An increasing perception of the US abandoning Japan would have a number of adverse effects. For example, the cooperation between US and Japanese defense officials as well as the two militaries is today closer than ever—in fact, deepening defense cooperation between the two militaries is a positive development in the US-Japan alliance that remains unpublicized. Even when the US-Japan alliance hit a significant speed bump during the tenure of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama over the issue of the relocation of Marine Air Station in Futenma, the US military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces continued to nurture their working relationship. The public perception of a diminishing US security commitment to Japan would create an atmosphere that would significantly undermine the working relationship between the two defense establishments, despite the fact that the US would, of course, still be obligated to defend Japan as stipulated by the Mutual Security Treaty. It would also undermine the public’s confidence in America’s commitment to protect Japan by providing extended nuclear deterrence. In short, a US policy shift away from the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program could considerably sour attitudes among the Japanese public and political leadership—two important constituents for maintaining the alliance.

(the erosion of confidence will have adverse regional effect.  Japan’s defense buildup has focused on the capabilities to achieve joint operations with the US military.)   

The erosion of Japanese confidence would be destabilizing for the region as well. Up to the present, the security threat from North Korea has been driving Japan to deepen its defense ties with the United States. Japan’s efforts so far have been focused on acquiring defense capabilities that are useful not only in shoring up its own capabilities, but also in strengthening cooperation with the United States. Cooperation on ballistic missile defense is the prime example. From cooperation on ballistic missile defense, to the decision by the Maritime Self-Defense Force to invest in its command and control, communications, computer, intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) several years ago, to last year’s decision by the Air Self-Defense Force to acquire the F-35 to replace its retiring F-4 fighter aircraft, Japan’s post-Cold War defense buildup has focused on the capabilities and platforms that allow its Self-Defense Forces to achieve seamless joint operations with the American military.

(the erosion of confidence will drive Japan to distance itself from the US and move toward preemptive offensive capabilities.) 

Even if Japan does not go so far as to walk away from the alliance, a US decision to shift the goal of its North Korea policy from “dismantlement” to “containment” would likely drive Tokyo to distance itself from the United States. This means, for example, the revival of the debate in support of Japan acquiring preemptive offensive capabilities and adjusting its legal framework to allow such an acquisition in the near term. The sense of abandonment and/or betrayal vis-à-vis the United States under such a circumstance would result in a politically permissive environment for Japan to make such a move.

(the erosion of confidence will give ammunition to proponents of an autonomous defense posture.)  

It would also create space in Japanese policy discourse for proponents of an autonomous defense posture, many of whom also argue that Japan should acquire an independent nuclear capability. Today, they are considered marginal, too extreme, and only representing a small part of the Japanese population. It is unlikely that Japan would eventually decide to pursue its own nuclear weapons capability, particularly in view of the intensified nuclear opposition among the public after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Still, this kind of policy shift would likely create an environment in which a nuclear option is more openly discussed and considered. Given Japan’s rising tension with China and persisting mistrust of South Korea, such developments would only destabilize the security environment in East Asia. It would not benefit anyone in the region (maybe with the exception of North Korea), and certainly would not benefit the United States.

(an assurance that the US’s ultimate goal remains the denuclearization of North Korea)

One step to lessen the immediate impact of a US policy shift would be for Washington to continue to argue that its ultimate goal remains the denuclearization of North Korea. That would certainly be true although achieving such an outcome is clearly more difficult. Even if how to get from here to there remains a challenging open question, this approach would, at least in the near term, give Japan a sense of reassurance that its security concerns are being taken into account, which would go a long way in countering the extreme voices within the country.

(time sensitiveness)

However, policymakers should realize that the longer the current impasse lasts, the harder it will be to sustain such an approach, particularly if North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to grow unchecked. On the other hand, if the US can, through diplomatic or other means, achieve some progress on the North Korean nuclear problem—even if only by gradually limiting the growth of Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities—then it may be possible to successfully manage its allies’ reactions to this recalibration, avoiding greater mistrust and instability in East Asia.

The DPRK Constitution and Nuclear Weapons

The DPRK Constitution and Nuclear Weapons

by Stephan Haggard        and Jaesung Ryu | June 5th, 2012

Just as the talk about talks was heating up again, the North Koreans appear to have upped the ante by enshrining the country’s status as a nuclear power in a new constitution. At least, that is what everyone from CNN to the DailyNK seems to think.

Even the Chinese foreign ministry got into the act. According to Yonhap, the question was asked by a reporter from the Global Times during a regular press conference by Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin on June 1 (Chinese here, English here shortly).

“Q: North Korea recently passed a constitutional amendment, indicating the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons. What is your comment?

A: The denuclearization of the peninsula and safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula is in line with the common interests of all parties and requires joint effort.”

Global Times, hardly a voice of moderation on foreign policy issues, weighed in with a pointed editorial titled “China Must Not Let North Korea Go Nuclear.” The piece notes that China must not side with the US and Seoul, but nonetheless stick to its principles in its relationship with the DPRK:

“Washington and Seoul have dismissed the claim, saying that they would not recognize North Korea as a nuclear power. China should not join the two and help them exert pressure on North Korea. However, it is also necessary for China to criticize North Korea’s latest move and oppose its intention to legalize its nuclear status.”

So is this really a constitutional commitment to nuclear weapons?  We are skeptical. (DO- (i) the purpose of amending constitution, and (ii) a tactic to raise the bribe price of negotiating over the nuclear program)   The lightly-amended Constitution, modified during last month’s Supreme People’s Assembly meeting, had the primary purpose of inscribing Kim Jong Il’s eternal status and making titular adjustments to accommodate the new offices bestowed on Kim Jong Un. For example, while the old constitution was known as the Kim Il Sung constitution, the new one is now the Kim Il Sung Kim Jong Il constitution.

The passage in question is from the Preamble and reads roughly as follows:

“Comrade Kim Jong Il, in the midst of the breakdown of the international socialist system and the vicious anti-DPRK attacks by the imperialist coalition, gloriously defended comrade Kim Il Sung’s precious achievements of socialism and transformed our nation into a state of strong political ideology, a nuclear power [literally a state with nuclear capability], and an invincible military power as well as opening the shining great passage [towards] the construction of a thriving [kang song guk ga, not “strong and prosperous”] nation.”

(“김정일동지께서는 세계사회주의체계의 붕괴와 제국주의련합세력의 악랄한 반공화국압살공세속에서 선군정치로 김일성동지의 고귀한 유산인 사회주의전취물을 영예롭게 수호하시고 우리 조국을 불패의 정치사상강국, 핵보유국, 무적의 군사강국으로 전변시키시였으며 강성국가건설의 휘황한 대통로를 열어놓으시였다.”)

The preamble is as much about Kim Jong Il’s achievements as it is the nuclear question per se. The nuclear issue does not come up anywhere else in the document.

Nonetheless, this looks like a classic commitment technology to us: the regime raises the bribe price of negotiating over the nuclear program by writing it into a constitution with both Dear and Great Leaders’ names on it. Clever and certainly in line with current policy.

But we should not get agitated about it, as Chung Mong-joon is wont to do; the Saenuri Assemblyman has now gone beyond his previous statements on the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons—whichsome House Republicans have also advocated–to argue for an independent nuclear path. Hankyorehoffers up by far the most balanced South Korean coverage, although they too buy into the line that this is a “declaration” of nuclear status.

-----------

North Korea calls itself a nuclear power

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/535684.html

we've overestimated the N. Korean nuclear threat.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/134657

North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb

The Predictable Missile Mishap That No One Predicted

Jacques E. C. Hymans, April 16, 2012

JACQUES E. C. HYMANS is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California. His most recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (Cambridge University Press, 2012), from which this essay is adapted.

The Tongch'ang-ni rocket launch facility in North Korea. (Courtesy Reuters)

(key word – the poverty of standard proliferation analysis ; examples of overestimation around the recent botched rocket launch)

The dismal failure of North Korea's April 13 long-range missile test -- it broke into pieces after 81 seconds [1] of flight time -- has also exposed the poverty of standard proliferation analyses.  In the days leading up to the test, most commentators apparently took Pyongyang's technological forward march for granted.  Even the more sober voices[2] evinced little doubt that this test would go at least as well as the country's 2009 effort, which managed to put a rocket into flight for about fifteen minutes before it malfunctioned. Meanwhile, other technical experts regaled readers with tales of the "emerging" [3] bona fide North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile [4] force, which might soon be able to target the continental United States. And there were renewed calls for the United States and its East Asian allies to embrace the "Israeli option" [5]: pre-emptive military strikes against North Korean strategic weapons facilities. The actual results of the test, however, demonstrate that the analysts' nightmare scenarios were hardly more credible than North Korea's own propaganda volleys.

a long line of botched strategic weapons tests in N. Korea ; the recent failure is not in isolation

To be sure, a single technical failure need not condemn an entire strategic weapons program. Pyongyang's missile mishap, however, was not a lone failure; it was merely the latest in a long line of botched strategic weapons tests. The country's long-range missile test record [7] is frankly pathetic: a total failure in 2006, a partial failure in 2009, and a total failure in 2012. (A 1998 test of a medium-range missile that had been jerry-rigged to fly a longer distance was also a partial failure.) And its nuclear test record is almost as bad: a virtual fizzle [8] in 2006, and a very modest blast at best [9] in 2009.

Washington's blind certainty about the North Korean menace has long driven U.S. policy

Amazingly, the assumption that Pyongyang already owns the very weapons that it has consistently failed to demonstrate has long driven U.S. policy. The Clinton administration's North Korea diplomacy was based on the belief that there was a "better than even chance" [10] that Pyongyang had built the bomb. The George W. Bush administration then ripped up the Clinton-era policy because it thought that the North Koreans had cheated [11] and built even more bombs than Clinton realized. Most recently, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has gone so far as to state that "we know" [12] that Pyongyang possesses "between one and six nuclear weapons," creating the impression that new leader Kim Jong Un could give the order to take out Seoul or Tokyo at any time. Given Washington's blind certainty about the North Korean menace, it is little wonder that few analysts anticipated its latest belly flop.

Washington's miscalculation .. is also a result of the tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted [13] that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in .. would-be nuclear states

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb [14]" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

Admittedly, the North Korean saga is not over. Pyongyang is reportedly already preparing a new nuclear test [15]. There is reason to be skeptical of these reports, since the country probably has very little weapons-grade plutonium to spare, and the widespread view that it is rapidly accumulating a highly enriched uranium stockpile [16] smells like yet another wonky overestimation of its technical capabilities. But whether or not North Korea carries out a successful nuclear test in the near future, its institutional dysfunction indicates that any further progress toward an operational nuclear arsenal is likely to remain slow and halting at best. Among the various tigers that populate the East Asian region, this one is made of paper.

= = = = == = = = =

Click here to read "Botching the Bomb [14]" from the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs: Nuclear weapons are hard to build for managerial reasons, Jacques Hymans writes, not technical ones. This is why so few authoritarian regimes have succeeded: they don’t have the right culture or institutions. When it comes to Iran’s program, then, the United States and its allies should get out of the way and let Iran’s worst enemies -- its own leaders -- gum up the process on their own.

Links:

[1] http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/13/north-koreas-rocket-gone-in-81-seconds/

[2] http://blog.sfgate.com/pyun/2012/04/11/the-8-things-you-should-know-about-the-north-korea-missile-launch/

[3] http://38north.org/2012/04/jpollack041012/

[4] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/the_rocket_in_kim_jong_uns_pocket?page=full

[5] http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/04/11/north-koreas-missile-threat-which-country-will-be-the-israel-of-east-asia/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed: AsiaUnbound/SSnyder (Asia Unbound » Scott A. Snyder)

[6] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/newsletters?cid=oth-in-newsletters-041312

[7] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-13/chronology-of-north-korean-missile-development/3948272

[8] http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jungmin-Kang/2254

[9] http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-north-korean-nuclear-test-what-the-seismic-data-says

[10] http://books.google.co.jp/books?id=x9sn_SpWmiYC&pg=PA94&lpg=PA94&dq=north korea better than even chance sigal&source=bl&ots=pxEUiKEzA_&sig=p62sUHbgoW6lyIoXLH_HbVU8Lvs&hl=ja&sa=X&ei=Ff2JT_aZDKvImQWjoPXhCQ&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

[11] http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-10-11-north-korea-nuclear_x.htm

[12] http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/04/11/26/0301000000AEN20100411000200315F.HTML

[13] http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/01_nuclear_proliferation_yusuf.aspx

[14] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb

[15] http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/09/2012040901149.html

[16] http://38north.org/2011/06/heinonen062211/

Burma (Myanmar) would need to ditch North Korea for rapprochement with international community, esp. the US

http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/12/20/north-korea-and-kim-jong-il-the-myanmar-element/

North Korea and Kim Jong-il: The Myanmar Element

Tuesday, December 20, 2011 , by Joshua Kurlantzick

Burma becomes the North's strategic ally over the past five years 

(nuke  vs.  a staging point for all illegal activities of the North) 

Over the past five years, as North Korea’s few friends and allies in the world dwindled, and the international community cracked down on its proliferation activities, Myanmar has apparently become much more important to Pyongyang strategically. From virtually no relationship at all ten years ago, now the two pariah nations have regular high-level military-military dialogues, including some of the senior-most members of the former Myanmar military regime. As The Irrawaddy reported several years ago:

In November 2008, a Burmese military delegation led by Gen Shwe Mann flew secretly to North Korea and met the army-in-chief, Gen Kim Kyok-sik. They agreed terms of cooperation on several military initiatives, including radar and jamming units, air defense systems, and a computer-controlled command center. The delegation also visited North Korean SCUD missile factories which are located in the tunnels. The two countries signed an agreement that North Korea will help in the construction of military facilities for missiles, aircraft and war ships.

That’s far from all. There is considerable suspicion in Western and Asian intelligence communities that North Korea has been helping Myanmar develop some elements of a nuclear and/or ballistic missile program, and that Myanmar has also served as a staging point for all manner of illegal North Korean money-making activities, including American currency fraud, smuggling of other goods, and possibly proliferation to other, third nations. Shortly before Hillary Clinton’s trip to Myanmar three weeks ago, Senator Richard Lugar revealed that his office has had information about Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions, with the help of North Korea, for five years now. North Korean technicians have been reportedly helping Myanmar build tunnels and other underground facilities whose purpose is unknown, and ships carrying weapons from North Korea have been stopped in international waters on their way to Myanmar. Some Burmese defectors say that North Korean military technicians have been closely involved in nascent efforts to develop a Burmese nuclear weapons program.

Burma renew its relationship with the US 

Burma can't have both: claiming a solid place in international community and maintaining strategic alliance with the North 

But with the emerging U.S.-Myanmar rapprochement, there is a real opportunity here for the United States to gain insight into North Korea’s proliferation activities, criminal networks, and other foreign endeavors, through discussions with Myanmar military and civilian officials. Other than Chinese officials, or a high-level North Korean defector (which has not happened in years), these Myanmar military men may be the most knowledgeable sources about the North available. There is evidence that Myanmar might be willing to give up information about its North Korean ally and North Korean aid inside Myanmar: As The Irrawaddy reported, Myanmar President Thein Sein “told U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Burma follows the resolution of the UN Security Council regarding nuclear non-proliferation when the pair met in Naypyidaw on Dec. 1.”

Other Myanmar officials say that some military and civilian leaders recognize that, if Myanmar is going to have real rapprochement with the international community, it will need to give up its ties to North Korea, or at least make them far more transparent. And some older Burmese officials remember that Pyongyang is not exactly a stable ally: In an attempt to kill South Korea’s then-president, Chun do-Hwan, North Korean terrorists in 1983 exploded a large bomb in downtown Rangoon,  murdering much of the South Korean cabinet, and 21 people in total (though not Chun)