Showing posts with label IHL. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IHL. Show all posts

Why the “Public Authority” Defense Does Not Work for the CIA


Why the “Public Authority” Defense Does Not Work for the CIA
March 10th, 2013   by Kevin Jon Heller

I’m grateful to KenWells Bennett, and Marcy Wheeler for speculating that my April 2010 blog post on 18 USC 1119, the foreign-murder statute, is the post referred to in today’s New York Times article on the behind-the-scenes machinations that culminated in the CIA using a drone to kill Anwar al-Awlaki. I imagine they are correct; the post fits the timeline and Marcy notes that no other post around that time on a legal blog specifically addressed the foreign-murder statute. If so, it’s a testament to the growing importance of academic blogging.

In this post, I want to discuss the part of the White Paper that seems to be motivated by the questions I raised in my 2010 post — Part III, which argues that killing a US citizen abroad who qualifies as a senior operational leader in al-Qaeda or its associated forces would not be murder because the individual responsible for the killing would be entitled to a public-authority defense. Here, for example, is one statement to that effect (p. 14):

A lethal operation against an enemy leader undertaken in national self-defense or during an armed conflict that is authorized by an informed, high-level official and carried out in a manner that accords with applicable law of war principles would fall within an established variant of the public authority justification and therefore would not be murder.

I have no problem with sections A and B of Part III, which argue that an individual prosecuted for violating the foreign-murder statute would be entitled to argue that the killing was justified because it was conducted pursuant to public authority. I also have no issue with the idea, offered in section C, that a member of the US armed forces would indeed be acting pursuant to public authority if he killed a combatant in an international armed conflict (IAC); in such conflicts, members of a state’s armed forces always have the right to kill — in other words, are justified in killing — members of the enemy state’s armed forces. The existence of the combatant’s privilege in IAC is black-letter international humanitarian law (IHL).

But that is not the end of the inquiry, for one simple reason: al-Awlaki was killed by the CIA, not by the US military. The White Paper does not discuss whether a CIA drone operator would be entitled to a public-authority defense in a prosecution under the foreign-murder statute; indeed, all of the sources cited in III.C regarding the defense (p. 14) — three classic criminal-law treatises and an old state case — claim that the laws of war entitle a soldier to kill the enemy. They say nothing about the right of anyone else to kill.

So would a CIA drone operator be entitled to a public-authority defense? I don’t see how. I won’t spend much time explaining why “national self-defense” does not provide the requisite public authority; as I explain in my signature-strikes article (and as Marko Milanovic explains here), a legitimate act of self-defense may justify the US violating another state’s sovereignty, but it does not — and cannot — justify depriving the target of his right to life. That deprivation would have to be independently justified either by IHL (if the killing took place in armed conflict) or by IHRL (if it took place outside of armed conflict). In the words of the International Law Commission’s commentaryto the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:

This is not to say that self-defence precludes the wrongfulness of conduct in all cases or with respect to all obligations…. As to obligations under international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human rights provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct.

The real question, then, is whether the laws of war would justify a CIA drone operator killing an American citizen like al-Awlaki. Let’s assume, for sake of argument, three things: (1) the killing took place in armed conflict, so was subject to IHL; (2) the target qualified as a combatant, or at least as a civilian directly participating in hostilities, at the time of the attack; and (3) members of the US armed forces possess the combatant’s privilege — the right to kill — in non-international armed conflict (NIAC) as well as in international armed conflict. All three assumptions are debatable; I have discussed (1) and (2) many times on the blog and in my scholarship, and it’s not worth getting into (3) here, because the US has always accepted it.

But even if we grant those assumptions, I simply fail to understand how the US could argue that a CIA drone operator has the right to kill an American citizen abroad, even one who otherwise qualifies as a legitimate target. In an international armed conflict, the categories of individuals who possess the combatant’s privilege are specified by Art. 43 of the First Additional Protocol (AP I):

Art 43. Armed forces
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.

The CIA is obviously not an “organized armed force, group, or unit” that is under the command of the US military; the CIA is, in its own words, “an independent US Government agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior US policymakers.” Nor are the CIA’s drone strikes controlled by the military (which would not satisfy Art. 43 anyway).  The interesting provision is paragraph 3. The CIA may be an “armed law enforcement agency,” but it still does not satisfy Art. 43(3): first, it has not been “incorporated” into the US’s armed forces, because incorporation requires national legislation subjecting the agency to military control (see the ICRC Commentary to AP I, para. 1682); and second, the US has not informed al-Qaeda and its associated forces that it has been so incorporated — indeed, as widely noted, the US has never even formally acknowledged that the CIA drone program exists.

In an IAC, then, CIA drone operators would not have the right under IHL to kill anyone. And it is difficult to see how the situation could be any different in a NIAC. Arguing that the rules of IAC apply analogically in NIAC, as the US often does – it borrows the concept of an al-Qaeda “associated force,” for example, from the IAC concept of co-belligerency — is no help, for all the reasons just mentioned. So the US would have to argue that the category of privileged combatants in NIAC is somehow actually wider in NIAC than in IAC, an idea for which there is no precedent in state practice and little if any support in conventional international law. (An excellent Australian scholar, Ian Henderson, has argued that a state can authorize anyone it wants to use lethal force in a NIAC. I don’t find his argument persuasive, particularly in the context of a transnational NIAC where a state is using force on the territory of many other states, but interested readers should check out his article.)

This is a critical conclusion. If a CIA drone operator does not possess the combatant’s privilege in the US’s “NIAC” with al-Qaeda and its associated forces, the US cannot plausibly argue that — to quote another paragraph in the White Paper (p. 15) — killing someone like al-Awlaki “would constitute a lawful killing under the public authority doctrine” because it was “conducted in a manner consistent with the fundamental law of war principles governing the use of force in a non-international armed conflict.” Such a killing would not be “consistent with the “the fundamental law of war principles governing the use of force,” because the absence of combatant’s privilege means that a CIA drone operator has no right under IHL to use any force at allAs a result, a CIA drone operator prosecuted for violating the foreign-murder statute would not be entitled to a public-authority defense – at least insofar as the US purports to base his or her public authority from IHL’s recognition of the right of privileged combatants to kill.

Finally, I want to say a few words about Part IV of the White Paper, which argues that killing someone like al-Awlaki would not qualify as a war crime. I completely agree with that conclusion, assuming that the target of the drone strike was, in fact, a combatant or a civilian directly participating in hostilities. An unprivileged combatant — ie, someone who does not possess the combatant’s privilege — does not commit a war crime simply because he uses force; he commits a war crime only if he uses force in a manner specifically prohibited by IHL. That’s why, for example, considering al-Nashiri’s attack on the USS Cole to be a war crime is absurd: although al-Nashiri had no right to use force against the USS Cole, the USS Cole was a legitimate military target that could have been lawfully targeted by a privileged combatant.

Does that mean al-Nashiri did not commit a criminal act when he attacked the USS Cole? Absolutely not. But here’s the point: an unprivileged combatant who attacks a legitimate military target does not commit a war crime, but his actions can still be prosecuted as an ordinary crime under domestic law. The US has every right to prosecute al-Nashiri for murder in a federal court —just as it would have every right to prosecute an American who, because he lacked the combatant’s privilege, violated federal law by using force against a target that could have been lawfully attacked by a privileged combatant.

Sound familiar? This is exactly the situation faced by a CIA drone operator who kills an American citizen abroad. Because CIA drone operators do not possess the combatant’s privilege, a drone operator does indeed violate federal law when he kills an American citizen abroad — namely, the foreign-murder statute. That is true even though the exact same attack would not be criminal if it was carried out by a drone operator working for the US military. The difference is precisely one of public authority: the military drone operator has it (the combatant’s privilege); the CIA drone operator does not.

NOTE: An earlier version of this post suggested that the White Paper was written prior to al-Awlaki’s death. The New York Times article claims that, on the contrary,it was “prepared months after the Awlaki and Khan killings amid an internal debate over how much to disclose.” If so, that’s troubling — because it suggests that the author(s) of the White Paper did not even recognize that the public-authority defense might function differently depending on whether the defendant in a prosecution under the foreign-murder statute was a soldier or a CIA officer.

“The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?” by Jeh Johnson at Oxford Union in Nov. 2012


Jeh Johnson Speech at the Oxford Union
By Benjamin Wittes   Friday, November 30, 2012 at 12:01 PM

At this hour, Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson is giving the following speech at the Oxford Union in England:

“The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?”
Jeh Charles Johnson
General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense at the Oxford Union, Oxford University[1]
November 30, 2012

Thank you for inviting me.  It is a privilege for me to stand here, in the same place, before the same Union, as the Prime Ministers, Presidents, and other world notables who have preceded me.

I am the General Counsel of the U.S. Defense Department.  If I had to summarize my job in one sentence: it is to ensure that everything our military and our Defense Department do is consistent with U.S. and international law.  This includes the prior legal review of every military operation that the Secretary of Defense and the President must approve.

My counterpart here in the United Kingdom is Ms. Frances Nash, the legal adviser to the U.K. Ministry of Defence.  Like Ms. Nash, I am a civilian, not a member of the military, consistent with the principle in both our countries of civilian oversight of the military.  Unlike Ms. Nash, who is a civil servant and a long-time official of the Ministry of Defence, I am a political appointee.  This means I serve at the pleasure of the current President, and have no expectation of serving for any other.

Here in the United Kingdom, you refer to July 7, 2005, the day of the terrorist suicide bombings of the London subway, as “7/7.”  I am a New Yorker and a personal witness to the events of “9/11.”  I was a private citizen then, and like many others that day, wandered the streets of Manhattan asking: “what can I do to help?”

Over the last 46 months as a public official, I have tried to answer that question.

There is a quote from the Brookings Institution in Washington, which motivates my own public service:

American government was designed to be led by citizens who would step out of private life for a term of office, then return to their communities enriched by service and ready to recruit the next generation of citizen servants.  The Founding Fathers believed in a democracy led by individuals who would not become so enamored of power and addicted to perquisites that they use government as an instrument of self-aggrandizement.

Indeed, it was the British poet Lord Byron who called our First President, George Washington, the “Cincinnatus of the West” for his decision to surrender his personal power after the American Revolution and retire to his farm on Mount Vernon.[2]

As a member of the Obama Administration for the last four years, I have been privileged to witness many transformational and historic events in the national security of the United States. 

We ended the combat mission in Iraq.

We increased the number of combat forces in Afghanistan and have reversed much of the Taliban’s momentum in the country.  Challenges remain, but violence is down across the country. We have a timetable for transitioning our efforts in Afghanistan to the Afghans’ own security forces, and we are adhering to it.  And though we have disagreed with our Afghan partners from time to time, as of this date we have negotiated and signed understandings with the Afghan government on detention operations,[3] special operations[4] and an overall strategic partnership,[5]  representing major milestones toward the day when the peace and security of that country is fully in the hands of the Afghan people and their government.

I was in Afghanistan last week, to spend Thanksgiving with the troops.  While there I encountered a number of Her Majesty’s armed forces.   The British subjects here should be proud of them all.  The British hospital I visited at Camp Bastion was first-rate and amazing.  And the very good news on that particular day was, at three separate hospitals, I saw not a single U.S. or UK casualty, except for a U.S. soldier in need of an appendectomy, a British soldier with a bad knee, and many bored and happy trauma teams standing around with nothing to do.

We banned “enhanced interrogation techniques,” consistent with the calls of many in our country, including our own military, that great nations simply do not treat other human beings that way.  These controversial practices have been banned, yet we continue to gather valuable intelligence in a manner consistent with our Army Field Manual, the Detainee Treatment Act, and international law.

We worked with our Congress to enact the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which reformed our system of military commissions to ensure due process and fairness for the accused. Today, our system of military commissions prosecutions of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and the other alleged organizers of the September 11 attacks is more credible, sustainable and transparent.  One of our nation’s finest military lawyers, and a Rhodes Scholar, Brigadier General Mark Martins, is now the chief prosecutor in that system.

We worked with our Congress to pass the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, such that gay and lesbian members of the U.S. military can now be open and honest about their sexual orientation without fear of being separated for that reason.  In the words of one gay servicemember: “you took a knife out of my back; you have no idea what it is like to serve in silence.”

And, finally, we have, in a manner consistent with our laws and values, taken the fight directly to the terrorist organization al Qaeda, the result of which is that the core of al Qaeda is today degraded, disorganized and on the run.  Osama bin Laden is dead.  Many other leaders and terrorist operatives of al Qaeda are dead or captured; those left in al Qaeda’s core struggle to communicate, issue orders, and recruit.

But, there is still danger and there is still much to do.  Al Qaeda’s core has been degraded, leaving al Qaeda more decentralized, and most terrorist activity now conducted by local franchises, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (based in Yemen) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (operating in north and west Africa).  So, therefore, in places like Yemen, and in partnership with that government, we are taking the fight directly to AQAP, and continually disrupting its plans to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. and Yemeni interests.

Al Qaeda has sought to attack the UK on a number of occasions.  Two years ago, Her Majesty’s government assessed:

“We face a real and pressing

threat from international terrorism, particularly that inspired by Al Qaeda and its affiliates . . . Al Qaeda remains the most potent terrorist threat to the UK.”[6]

Our efforts against al Qaeda have involved multiple instruments of the U.S. government, including the military, civilian law enforcement, and intelligence services, in partnership with the United Kingdom and other nations.

It is the U.S. military’s efforts against al Qaeda and associated forces that has demanded most of my time, generated much public legal commentary, and presented for us what are perhaps the weightiest legal issues in national security.  It is the topic I will spend the balance of my remarks on tonight.

The United States government is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda and associated forces, to which the laws of armed conflict apply.  One week after 9/11, our Congress authorized our President to “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those nations, organizations and individuals responsible for 9/11. President Obama, like President Bush before him, as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, has acted militarily based on that authorization.  In 2006, our Supreme Court also endorsed the view that the United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda.[7]  Therefore, all three branches of the United States government – including the two political branches elected by the people and the judicial branch appointed for life (and therefore not subject to the whims and political pressures of the voters) – have endorsed the view that our efforts against al Qaeda may properly be viewed as an armed conflict.

But, for the United States, this is a new kind of war. It is an unconventional war against an unconventional enemy.  And, given its unconventional nature, President Obama – himself a lawyer and a good one – has insisted that our efforts in pursuit of this enemy stay firmly rooted in conventional legal principles.  For, in our efforts to destroy and dismantle al Qaeda, we cannot dismantle our laws and our values, too.

The danger of al Qaeda is well known.  It is a terrorist organization determined to commit acts of violence against innocent civilians.  The danger of the conflict against al Qaeda is that it lacks conventional boundaries, against an enemy that does not observe the rules of armed conflict, does not wear a uniform, and can resemble a civilian.

But we refuse to allow this enemy, with its contemptible tactics, to define the way in which we wage war.  Our efforts remain grounded in the rule of law.  In this unconventional conflict, therefore, we apply conventional legal principles – conventional legal principles found in treaties and customary international law.

As in armed conflict, we have been clear in defining the enemy and defining our objective against that enemy.
We have made clear that we are not at war with an idea, a religion, or a tactic.  We are at war with an organized, armed group — a group determined to kill innocent civilians.

We have publicly stated that our enemy consists of those persons who are part of the Taliban, al-Qaeda or associated forces,[8] a declaration that has been embraced by two U.S. Presidents, accepted by our courts, [9] and affirmed by our Congress.[10]

We have publicly defined an “associated force” as having two characteristics: (1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.[11]

Our enemy does not include anyone solely in the category of activist, journalist, or propagandist.

Nor does our enemy in this armed conflict include a “lone wolf” who, inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology, self-radicalizes in the basement of his own home, without ever actually becoming part of al Qaeda.  Such persons are dangerous, but are a matter for civilian law enforcement, not the military, because they are not part of the enemy force.

And, we have publicly stated that our goal in this conflict is to “disrupt, dismantle, and ensure a lasting defeat of al Qaeda and violent extremist affiliates.”[12]

Some legal scholars and commentators in our country brand the detention by the military of members of al Qaeda as “indefinite detention without charges.”  Some refer to targeted lethal force against known, identified individual members of al Qaeda as “extrajudicial killing.”

Viewed within the context of law enforcement or criminal justice, where no person is sentenced to death or prison without an indictment, an arraignment, and a trial before an impartial judge or jury, these characterizations might be understandable.

Viewed within the context of conventional armed conflict — as they should be — capture, detention and lethal force are traditional practices as old as armies.  Capture and detention by the military are part and parcel of armed conflict.[13]  We employ weapons of war against al Qaeda, but in a manner consistent with the law of war.  We employ lethal force, but in a manner consistent with the law of war principles of proportionality, necessity and distinction.  We detain those who are part of al Qaeda, but in a manner consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and all other applicable law.[14]

But, now that efforts by the U.S. military against al Qaeda are in their 12th year, we must also ask ourselves: how will this conflict end?  It is an unconventional conflict, against an unconventional enemy, and will not end in conventional terms.

Conventional conflicts in history tend to have had conventional endings.

Two hundred years ago, our two Nations fought the War of 1812.  The United States lost many battles, Washington, DC was captured, and the White House was set ablaze.  By the winter of 1814 British and American forces had strengthened their forts and fleets, and assumed that fighting would resume between them in the spring. But, the war ended when British and American diplomats in Belgium came to a peace agreement on December 24, 1814.  Diplomats from both sides then joined together in a Christmas celebration at Ghent cathedral. Less than eight weeks later, the U.S. Senate provided advice and consent to that peace treaty, which for the United States legally and formally terminated the conflict.[15]

In the American Civil War, the Battle of Appomattox was the final engagement of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s great Army of Northern Virginia, and one of the last battles of that war.  After four years of war, General Lee recognized that “[i]t would be useless and therefore cruel to provoke the further effusion of blood.” Three days later the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered.[16]  Lee’s army then marched to the field in front of Appomattox Court House, and, division by division, deployed into line, stacked their arms, folded their colors, and walked home empty-handed.[17]

The last day of the First World War was November 11, 1918, when an armistice was signed at 5:00 a.m. in a railroad carriage in France, and a ceasefire took effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918.

The Second World War concluded in the Pacific theater in August 1945, with a ceremony that took place on the deck of the USS Missouri.

During the Gulf War of 1991, one week after Saddam Hussein’s forces set fire to oil wells as they were driven out of Kuwait, U.S. General Schwarzkopf sat down with Iraqi military leaders under a tent in a stretch of the occupied Iraqi desert a few miles from the Kuwaiti border.  General Schwarzkopf wanted to keep discussions simple; he told his advisors: “I just want to get my soldiers home as fast as possible . . . I want no ceremonies, no handshakes.”[18]  In the space of two hours they had negotiated the terms of a permanent cease-fire to end the First Gulf War.[19]

We cannot and should not expect al Qaeda and its associated forces to all surrender, all lay down their weapons in an open field, or to sign a peace treaty with us.  They are terrorist organizations.  Nor can we capture or kill every last terrorist who claims an affiliation with al Qaeda.

I am aware of studies that suggest that many “terrorist” organizations eventually denounce terrorism and violence, and seek to address their grievances through some form of reconciliation or participation in a political process.[20]

Al Qaeda is not in that category.

Al Qaeda’s radical and absurd goals have included global domination through a violent Islamic caliphate, terrorizing the United States and other western nations from retreating from the world stage,[21] and the destruction of Israel.  There is no compromise or political bargain that can be struck with those who pursue such aims.

In the current conflict with al Qaeda, I can offer no prediction about when  this conflict will end, or whether we are, as Winston Churchill described it, near the “beginning of the end.”

I do believe that on the present course, there will come a tipping point – a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed.

At that point, we must be able to say to ourselves that our efforts should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” against al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort against individuals  who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda, for which the law enforcement and intelligence resources of our government are principally responsible, in cooperation with the international community – with our military assets available in reserve to address continuing and imminent terrorist threats.

At that point we will also need to face the question of what to do with any members of al Qaeda who still remain in U.S. military detention without a criminal conviction and sentence.  In general, the military’s authority to detain ends with the “cessation of active hostilities.”[22]  For this particular conflict, all I can say today is that we should look to conventional legal principles to supply the answer, and that both our Nations faced similar challenging questions after the cessation of hostilities in World War II, and our governments delayed the release of some Nazi German prisoners of war.[23]

For now, we must continue our efforts to disrupt, dismantle and ensure a lasting defeat of al Qaeda.  Though severely degraded, al Qaeda remains a threat to the citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom and other nations.   We must disrupt al Qaeda’s terrorist attack planning before it gets anywhere near our homeland or our citizens.  We must counter al Qaeda in the places where it seeks to establish safe haven, and prevent it from reconstituting in others.  To do this we must utilize every national security element of our government, and work closely with our friends and allies like the United Kingdom and others.

Finally, it was a warfighting four-star general who reminded me, as I previewed these remarks for him, that none of this will ever be possible if we fail to understand and address what attracts a young man to an organization like al Qaeda in the first place.  Al Qaeda claims to represent the interests of all Muslims.  By word and deed, we must stand with the millions of people within the Muslim world who reject Al Qaeda as a marginalized, extreme and violent organization that does not  represent the Muslim values of peace and brotherhood.  For, if al Qaeda can recruit new terrorists to its cause faster than we can kill or capture them, we fight an endless, hopeless battle that only perpetuates a downward spiral of hate, recrimination, violence and fear.

“War” must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs.  War permits one man – if he is a “privileged belligerent,” consistent with the laws of war — to kill another.  War violates the natural order of things, in which children bury their parents; in war parents bury their children.  In its 12th year, we must not accept the current conflict, and all that it entails, as the “new normal.”  Peace must be regarded as the norm toward which the human race continually strives.

Right here at Oxford you have the excellent work of the Changing Character of War program: leading scholars committed to the study of war, who have observed that analyzing war in terms of a continuum of armed conflict — where military force is used at various points without a distinct break between war and peace — is counterproductive.  Such an approach, they argue, results in an erosion of “any demarcation between war and peace,” the very effect of which is to create uncertainty about how to define war itself.[24]

I did not go to Oxford.  I am a graduate of a small, all-male historically black college in the southern part of the United States, Morehouse College.  The guiding light for every Morehouse man is our most famous alumnus, Martin Luther King, who preached the inherent insanity of all wars.  I am therefore a student and disciple of Dr. King – though I became an imperfect one the first time I gave legal approval for the use of military force.  I accepted this conundrum when I took this job.  But, I still carry with me the words from Dr. King: “Returning hate for hate multiples hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars … violence multiplies violence, and toughness multiplies toughness in a descending spiral of destruction … The chain reaction of evil—hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars—must be broken, or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss of annihilation.”[25]

Thank you again for the honor and the opportunity to be in this special place, and thank you for listening to me.



[1] With the valuable research assistance of David A. Simon, Special Counsel to the General Counsel (J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil., International Relations, Oxford University).
[2] George Gordon, Lord Byron, “Ode to Napoleon Buonaparte.”  Available at: http://theotherpages.org/poems/2001/byron0101.html
[3] Memorandum of Understanding between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America On Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan, March 9, 2012.
[4] Memorandum of Understanding between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on Afghanization of Special Operations on Afghan Soil, April 8, 2012.
[5] Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America, May 1, 2012.
[6] “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010, available on http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/
[7] Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-31 (2006) (holding that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda).
[8] See Respondent’s Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442, at 1 (D.D.C. March 13, 2009).
[9] See e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
[10] See Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (December 31, 2011).
[11] Remarks by Jeh Charles Johnson, Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (February 22, 2012).
[12] Remarks by John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, April 30, 2012, available at:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi
[13] Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war”).
[14] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
[15] Treaty of Peace and Amity (Treaty of Ghent), U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IX, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218.  The treaty entered into force for the United States on February 17, 1815. The parties to the Treaty were Britain and the United States.
[16] U.S. Library of Congress, Today in History: April 9, available athttp://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/apr09.html.
[17] Id. at 630-631
[18] Shyam Bhatia, Daniel McGrory, Brighter Than the Baghdad Sun: Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Threat to the United States, available athttp://tinyurl.com/8rttl4v.
[19] Encyclopedia Britannica, Persian Gulf Waravailable at:http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/452778/Persian-Gulf-War; History.Com, Topic: Persian Gulf War,  available at:  http://www.history.com/topics/persian-gulf-war.  Gulf War: Background Briefing, CBS News, available athttp://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-2524.html.  Philip Shenon, After The War: Cease-Fire Meeting; A Hard-Faced Schwarzkopf Sets Terms at Desert Meeting, New York Times, March 4, 1991, available at:http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/04/world/after-war-cease-fire-meeting-hard-faced-schwarzkopf-sets-terms-desert-meeting.html
[20] Seth G. Jones & Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida 13 (2d ed. 2008) (RAND Corp.).
[21] Remarks by John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, June 29, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/remarks-john-o-brennan-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter.
[22] See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”).
[23] Regarding post-hostilities detention during the conclusion of World War II, see Ludecke v. Watkins 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (holding that the President’s authority to detain German nationals continued for over six years after the fighting with Germany had ended); See alsoAlien Enemy Act of 1798 50 U.S.C. §§21-24 (2000).  See James Richards, British Broadcasting Corporation, Life in Britain for German Prisoners of War, (noting that by the end of 1947, 250,000 of the prisoners of war were repatriated, and the last repatriation took place in November 1948); available at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/german_pows_01.shtml.
[24]  The Changing Character of War 10-11 (Hew Strachan & Sibylle Scheipers eds., Oxford University Press 2011).
[25] Martin Luther King, Jr., Loving Your Enemies 53 (1981).

Osama Bin Laden’s killing constitute the war crime of wilful killing? -- hors de combat


Does Navy SEAL's New Book Suggest Bin Laden Killing was a War Crime?
By Adam Serwer|   Fri Aug. 31

The famously shifting Obama administration narrative of the special forces raid that killed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden left some understandable doubts about how the operation actually went down. The key question, from a legal perspective, is whether or not the administration had ordered Bin Laden killed no matter the circumstances, and whether or not he had tried to surrender or was otherwise "hors de combat" or "out of the fight" as defined in the Geneva Conventions

No Easy Day, the memoir by "Mark Owens" (later outed as Mark Bissonette), a former Navy SEAL who participated in the raid, sheds light on both questions. According to Owen, Bin Laden was unarmed when he was shot. Here's the description from the Associated Press:

Bissonnette says he was directly behind a "point man" going up the stairs. "Less than five steps" from top of the stairs, he heard "suppressed" gunfire: "BOP. BOP." The point man had seen a "man peeking out of the door" on the right side of the hallway[.]  
Bissonnette writes that bin Laden ducked back into his bedroom and the SEALs followed, only to find the terrorist crumpled on the floor in a pool of blood with a hole visible on the right side of his head and two women wailing over his body.
Bissonnette says the point man pulled the two women out of the way and shoved them into a corner and he and the other SEALs trained their guns' laser sites on bin Laden's still-twitching body, shooting him several times until he lay motionless.

Kevin Jon Heller, a senior lecturer at Melbourne Law School and a blogger for Opinio Juris, has quite a different take. Heller argues that the shots fired at Bin Laden's body after he was already wounded make his killing a war crime. "[Bissonette] and his fellow SEAL thus intentionally killed bin Laden while he was 'otherwise incapacitated by wounds' and hors de combat," Heller writes. "That was a war crime—the war crime of wilful killing." Heller had previously defended the operation as legal.

Kenneth Anderson, a law professor at American University Washington School of Law, disagrees. "Being wounded does not necessarily render one hors de combat; hors de combat means they’re not actually posing a threat to you," Anderson says, citing moments where wounded combatants have used hidden guns or explosives to kill American servicemembers who thought they were surrendering or incapacitated. "There have been far too many incidents in the past, including in Afghanistan and Iraq...cases where American soldiers get killed because they were mistaken about the other side, or parts of the other side surrendering... There’s still no obligation to pause the attack, you’re allowed to put your own safety first."

Author of “No Easy Day” Admits to Committing a War Crime
by Kevin Jon Heller   August 29th, 2012

I claimed that the killing of Usama bin Laden was perfectly legal under international law
I based the conclusion that bin Laden’s death was legal under IHL on Nicholas Schmidle’s account of the bin Laden operation in The New Yorker.
As recounted by Schmidle, the SEALs’ actions were consistent with IHL.

Art. 41(1) of the First Additional Protocol: “A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.“  A combatant is hors de combat in three situations: (1) “he is in the power of an adverse Party” (ie., captured); (2) “he clearly expresses an intention to surrender”; or (3) “he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself.”

In Schmidle’s account, bin Laden was not in the power of the U.S. when he was killed; he was not wounded or sick; and — most relevantly — he had not clearly expressed an intention to surrender.

The author of the new book “No Easy Day,” however, provides a very different account of bin Laden’s death — one that has to be taken seriously, because the author is one of the two SEALs who fired the fatal shots.  Here is the Huffington Post’s summary of the author’s account(emphasis mine):

He and his fellow SEAL thus intentionally killed bin Laden while he was “otherwise incapacitated by wounds” and hors de combat.  That was a war crime — the war crime of wilful killing.

I imagine some readers will respond by pointing out that bin Laden was already fatally wounded when the SEALs shot him.  There are two problems with that response.  To begin with, the author is not a doctor; bin Laden might not have actually been fatally wounded.  More importantly, though, it makes no difference if he was dying — he was still alive when the author and his fellow SEAL shot him, and that is all the war crime of wilful killing requires.  That is not a controversial idea; no domestic criminal-law system would consider shooting a person dying of a fatal heart attack to be anything but murder.  If your actions deprive someone of even one second of life, you are both the factual and legal cause of their death.

My Response to Ken About Bin Laden’s Death (Updated)
by Kevin Jon Heller    August 31st, 2012

recent post at Mother Jones mentions my view of UBL’s killing and provides Ken’s brief thoughts on his death:

To be clear, though, I am not claiming that being wounded necessarily makes a combatant hors de combat.  I chose my words carefully: UBL was hors de combat because he was “otherwise incapacitated by wounds” — the language in Art. 41(2)(c) of the First Additional Protocol.  Wounding is not enough; incapacitation is required.

Owens clearly states that UBL was shot and fatally wounded by someone else; after “[taking] their time entering the room,” Owens and his fellow SEAL found UBL lying on the floor, “blood and brains” spilling out of his skull, being attended to by his wives.  Only at that point did they shoot him.  It is thus problematic to see UBL’s death as part of a continuous attack — or to imply, as Ken does, that viewing UBL’s death as a war crime requires imposing “an obligation to pause the attack” on Owens and his fellow SEAL.  The facts clearly indicate that their attack on UBL began when they first discovered his prone, dying body.

(DO- why did author italicize “some else”?  They are one team.  How could it make a difference?)
(the team only began after Bin Laden had his brains spilling out of his skull --, Kevin argues, falls within “otherwise incapacitated by wounds.”)

Finally, and most importantly, we need to recognize the implication of the “danger” argument made by Ken and a number of commenters on my previous post: if a combatant who is in his death throes with his brains spilling out of his head does not qualify as “incapacitated by wounds,” Art. 41(2)(c) is a complete nullity, because by that standard no wounded combatant could ever be considered incapacitated.  If UBL’s wounds were not incapacitating, what wounds could be? 

Nor is it an adequate response to say that the key is whether the wounded combatant had been captured prior to his killing (and thus presumably neutralized); that response also renders Art. 41(2)(c) a nullity, because Art. 41(2)(a) already deems a combatant “in the power of an adverse Party” to be hors de combat.  

Here is my question for Ken or for anyone else who believes UBL’s killing was consistent with IHL: can you please identify a situation in which a wounded but non-captured combatant cannot be lawfully killed?

NOTE 1: Ken’s response, like many of the comments, appears to assume that fear or suspicion that a wounded soldier might continue to engage in combat justifies killing him.  That assumption is incorrect.  As the ICRC’s authoritative commentary on the First Additional Protocol makes clear, the wounded soldier loses his presumptive hors de combat status only if he engages in some kind of positive act that indicates he intends to continue fighting (emphasis mine):

The wounded and sick in the sense of Article 8 (Terminology), sub-paragraph (a), of the Protocol, are those persons who need medical care as a result of a trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, and who refrain from any act of hostility.…  On the other hand, there is no obligation to abstain from attacking a wounded or sick person who is preparing to fire, or who is actually firing, regardless of the severity of his wounds or sickness.

In other words, a soldier cannot simply assume — even based on past experience with different wounded combatants — that a seemingly incapacitated combatant will continue to fight if given the chance.  That is an important limitation in the context of UBL’s death; nothing in Owens’ account indicates that they believed UBL was capable of harming them — much less that he actually tried to harm them.

NOTE 2: Don’t forget that the First Additional Protocol was adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War.  The Viet Cong relied heavily on nearly every perfidious tactic imaginable, yet the drafters of AP I still adopted Art. 41(2)(c).  So it impossible to argue that al-Qaeda’s tactics somehow render the “incapacitated by wounds” provision obsolete.

9.01.2012 at 8:13 am EST Kevin Jon Heller
Ben,
As for your first comment, my point is that the critical question is whether the SEALs had time to determine that UBL had been incapacitated by the wounds inflicted by whomever shot him.  Had the SEAL who shot UBL continued to fire at him even as he fell to the ground with his brains spilling out, I would accept that he would not have had time to recognize that his earlier shots had rendered UBL hors de combat

But that is not the situation here. 

The two SEALS saw UBL shot (or at least shot at), “took their time entering the room,” saw UBL on the ground with his brains spilling out and in his death throes, and then killed himThat is not a continuous attack, and I think it is very difficult to argue that the SEALS did not have time to recognize that UBL had been rendered hors de combat by his wounds  (And that assumes, of course, that the SEALs honestly believed that he was not hors de combat when they fired at him, which is anything but clear from Owens’ account.)

9.01.2012 at 2:37 pm EST Kenneth Anderson

Quick note from Ken – I realize you can’t tell from the article, but I hadn’t actually read Kevin’s piece and didn’t know it was up when I gave the reporter a quick reaction.  Not reacting to Kevin here – I’ve been away from blogging for some family reasons – plan to be back in a week – and haven’t read either Kevin’s post or the Mother Jones piece.  Adam Serwer mentioned Kevin’s blogging in our conversation, and I thought he was referring to Kevin’s post from when UBL was killed.  I’m going to keep my promise to my wife and stay away from this until I am genuinely back, though.  Ken