Turkey's self-confidence could tip into arrogance

The International Herald Tribune

Turkey tries to balance influence and confidence

With region in crisis, even some at home fear Ankara is a bit too brash

DAN BILEFSKY, December 24, 2011

As many praise Turkey's newly assertive leadership, there are concerns that its self-confidence could tip into arrogance and aggravate allies and foes at a critical time.

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''We feel a strong pride in our strength and influence, much as we did during the Ottoman days.''

Yet, even as many in Washington and Europe praise Turkey's newly assertive leadership, such brashness is prompting some concerns both at home and abroad that the nation's giddy sense of self-confidence could tip into arrogance and aggravate allies and foes at a critical time.

its long-term goal of obtaining regional power status

Ankara faces a raft of foreign policy challenges on its doorstep, any one of which could derail its long-term goal of obtaining regional power status. An increasingly outsized national ego, analysts say, has already frayed ties with Europe. On Thursday, Ankara recalled its ambassador from Paris after France voted to criminalize the denial of the genocide of up to 1.5 million Armenians between 1915 and 1918 by the Ottoman Turks.

And with talks to join the European Union hopelessly stalled, many Turks have greeted the euro crisis with barely concealed glee, saying Europe has rejected them because they are Muslim.

Three neighboring countries

Closer to home, three of the most volatile states in the world - Syria, Iraq and Iran - are lined up along Turkey's southern and eastern borders. Syria is already in a state of civil war and Iraq seems to be flirting once again with sectarian strife and dissolution. Throw in the longstanding Kurdish problem and an Iran that erupted in 2009 and now may be descending into economic chaos, and the possibilities of regional destabilization, mass refugee flows and even war do not seem terribly remote.

Turkey on the rise politically

Facing such threats, analysts and diplomats say, Turkey needs to resist the temptation to gloat and swagger. Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Kadir Has University in Istanbul, said that the European and American economic decline, coupled with the Arab Spring, was emboldening Turkey as it evolves into the model of democracy for the Arab world.

''Turks are saying, 'We are now on the rise, you are running out of steam and we don't have to take any stuff from Westerners,''' he said. But he added: ''There is a fine line between self-confidence and hubris.''

Turkey and its charismatic prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could be forgiven for displaying some vanity. He has overhauled a country once haunted by military coups into a regional democratic powerhouse. He is so popular in the Arab world that there has been a surge in babies named Tayyip.

On the rise economically

While Turkey's economy surges - growing by 8.2 percent in the third quarter, second only to China in the world - Europe is sputtering; Greece, a long-time rival, has been flattened by the sovereign debt crisis. With its new clout as a leader in a region long dominated by the United States, this large Muslim country of 79 million people has also been basking in its role as the voice of regional indignation against Syria and chastising Israel.

Earlier this month a deputy prime minister boldly lectured Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. that it was Turkey, and not the struggling economies of the United States and Europe, that would win the 21st century.

Challenge on diplomatic front

Indeed, for all of Turkey's recent achievements, its aim of having ''zero problems'' with its neighbors has shown few successes.

Turkish officials tried in vain for months to persuade President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to halt his violent crackdown against civilians, before finally turning against him. Turkey has been unable to resolve conflicts with Cyprus and Armenia. Its recent decision to host a NATO radar installation has rankled Iran. Relations with Israel collapsed after Israeli troops killed nine people aboard a Turkish flotilla trying to break the blockade of Gaza.

In September, the limits of Turkey's appeal as a political model were laid bare when Mr. Erdogan told the Egyptian satellite channel Dream TV that secularism was not the enemy of religion and Egypt should embrace a secular constitution. A spokesman in Egypt for the Muslim Brotherhood party, which won first-round parliamentary elections there, told the Egyptian daily Al Ahram that Mr. Erdogan was interfering in Egyptian affairs. (Mr. Erdogan's aides said the term secularism had been mistranslated as atheism.)

Nor were many Kosovar Albanians amused in August when Turkey's minister of education, Omer Dincer, asked his Kosovo counterpart to remove offending paragraphs from history textbooks, which he said insulted the Ottoman Turks. Local historians protested that Turkey was trying to whitewash centuries of Ottoman subjugation.

The perils of standing in Turkey's way became abundantly clear at the United Nations during the annual General Assembly meeting of world leaders this autumn.

Mr. Erdogan was on the fourth floor of the general assembly hall when he learned that the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, whom he ardently supports, was making his address demanding full U.N. membership for Palestine. When Mr. Erdogan rushed to the nearest entrance to take Turkey's seat on the main floor, a security guard refused to let him pass. When Mr. Erdogan pressed forward, a loud scuffle erupted that was audible four floors below.

One Western diplomat noted that ''the Turks were literally throwing their weight around.''

Counter-argument

Yet Turkey's many defenders say the West cannot expect the country to play regional leader and then criticize it when it flexes its muscles. Moreover, they note, the country is entitled to defend its dignity.

At the Cannes summit meeting of the G-20 major economies in November, cameras showed Mr. Erdogan suddenly kneeling down when he noticed a sticker of the Turkish flag on the floor to mark the position where he was supposed to stand for a group photo, near President Barack Obama.

He gently folded it and put it in his pocket.

the reasons why working-class Americans vote for Republicans - Paul Krugman

February 16, 2012

Moochers Against Welfare

By PAUL KRUGMAN, February 16, 2012

First, Atlas shrugged. Then he scratched his head in puzzlement.

Modern Republicans are very, very conservative; you might even (if you were Mitt Romney) say, severely conservative. Political scientists who use Congressional votes to measure such things find that the current G.O.P. majority is the most conservative since 1879, which is as far back as their estimates go.

And what these severe conservatives hate, above all, is reliance on government programs. Rick Santorum declares that President Obama is getting America hooked on “the narcotic of dependency.” Mr. Romney warns that government programs “foster passivity and sloth.” Representative Paul Ryan, the chairman of the House Budget Committee, requires that staffers read Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged,” in which heroic capitalists struggle against the “moochers” trying to steal their totally deserved wealth, a struggle the heroes win by withdrawing their productive effort and giving interminable speeches.

Many readers of The Times were, therefore, surprised to learn, from an excellent article published last weekend, that the regions of America most hooked on Mr. Santorum’s narcotic — the regions in which government programs account for the largest share of personal income — are precisely the regions electing those severe conservatives. Wasn’t Red America supposed to be the land of traditional values, where people don’t eat Thai food and don’t rely on handouts?

The article made its case with maps showing the distribution of dependency, but you get the same story from a more formal comparison. Aaron Carroll of Indiana University tells us that in 2010, residents of the 10 states Gallup ranks as “most conservative” received 21.2 percent of their income in government transfers, while the number for the 10 most liberal states was only 17.1 percent.

Now, there’s no mystery about red-state reliance on government programs. These states are relatively poor, which means both that people have fewer sources of income other than safety-net programs and that more of them qualify for “means-tested” programs such as Medicaid.

By the way, the same logic explains why there has been a jump in dependency since 2008. Contrary to what Mr. Santorum and Mr. Romney suggest, Mr. Obama has not radically expanded the safety net. Rather, the dire state of the economy has reduced incomes and made more people eligible for benefits, especially unemployment benefits. Basically, the safety net is the same, but more people are falling into it.

But why do regions that rely on the safety net elect politicians who want to tear it down? I’ve seen three main explanations.

First, there is Thomas Frank’s thesis in his book “What’s the Matter With Kansas?”: working-class Americans are induced to vote against their own interests by the G.O.P.’s exploitation of social issues. And it’s true that, for example, Americans who regularly attend church are much more likely to vote Republican, at any given level of income, than those who don’t.

Still, as Columbia University’s Andrew Gelman points out, the really striking red-blue voting divide is among the affluent: High-income residents of red states are overwhelmingly Republican; high-income residents of blue states only mildly more Republican than their poorer neighbors. Like Mr. Frank, Mr. Gelman invokes social issues, but in the opposite direction. Affluent voters in the Northeast tend to be social liberals who would benefit from tax cuts but are repelled by things like the G.O.P.’s war on contraception.

Finally, Cornell University’s Suzanne Mettler points out that many beneficiaries of government programs seem confused about their own place in the system. She tells us that 44 percent of Social Security recipients, 43 percent of those receiving unemployment benefits, and 40 percent of those on Medicare say that they “have not used a government program.”

Presumably, then, voters imagine that pledges to slash government spending mean cutting programs for the idle poor, not things they themselves count on. And this is a confusion politicians deliberately encourage. For example, when Mr. Romney responded to the new Obama budget, he condemned Mr. Obama for not taking on entitlement spending — and, in the very next breath, attacked him for cutting Medicare.

The truth, of course, is that the vast bulk of entitlement spending goes to the elderly, the disabled, and working families, so any significant cuts would have to fall largely on people who believe that they don’t use any government program.

The message I take from all this is that pundits who describe America as a fundamentally conservative country are wrong. Yes, voters sent some severe conservatives to Washington. But those voters would be both shocked and angry if such politicians actually imposed their small-government agenda.

'Who Rules in Honduras?' The Coup's Legacy of Violence

Weekend Edition Sunday, NPR

'Who Rules in Honduras?' The Coup's Legacy of Violence

ANCHORS: Annie Murphy, February 13, 2012

GUESTS: Manuel Zelaya, Edgardo Valeriano, Rafael Callejas, Fulton Armstrong, Crisencio Arcos

RACHEL MARTIN: The United Nations recently named Honduras the most violent country in the world. The government there is weak, it's a major stop for drug traffickers and corruption is rampant. Many analysts say things got markedly worse there after a 2009 coup that ousted democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya. Annie Murphy reports on the struggle in Honduras to recover from the coup's fallout.

ANNIE MURPHY: When it comes to coups and dictators, Latin America has a difficult past, but today, the region is largely democratic. Dictators and coups are supposed to be a thing of the past. In Honduras, the last dictatorship ended in 1982. So, the June 2009 coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya was a shock to the region and a surprise to world leaders, including Zelaya.

MANUEL ZELAYA: (Through translator) The shooting started around 5:20 am. I went downstairs and there were about 250 masked soldiers around my house. All you could see were their eyes. I said, my God, what is this?

ANNIE MURPHY: The military whisked Zelaya out of the country on a tiny plane and left him in Costa Rica.

MANUEL ZELAYA: (Through translator) They took off, and there I was, the democratically elected president of Honduras, standing in my pajamas in the middle of a runway in Costa Rica. And I said to myself, so this is that great new future everyone is talking about for Latin America?

ANNIE MURPHY: Zelaya was speaking from his home in Honduras's capital, Tegucigalpa. He spent two years in forced exile. Last year, he returned home as part of negotiations for Honduras's re-entry into the Organization of American States, which it had been kicked out of after the coup.

The coup itself was ordered by members of the Supreme Court and carried out by the military. Zelaya had been pushing for a poll to gauge public interest in rewriting the constitution and the court ruled that it was illegal. After ousting Zelaya, the coup government sent the army and police into the streets, then began arresting, beating, and even killing anyone who protested against the new government. According to an official truth commission, they were responsible for at least 20 deaths in the immediate aftermath.

(SOUNDBITE OF PROTEST)

ANNIE MURPHY: Edgardo Valeriano is a medical doctor and researcher. He'd never been political, but after the coup he joined protests demanding democracy and Zelaya's return. Like many protestors, he was beaten. His skull was split open by batons, and police lashed him with chains. Valeriano says he feels like Honduras went back to the 1980s.

EDGARDO VALERIANO: (Through translator) I remember those years well. I was a student in medical school back then, and I remember how some students would show up tortured by the police - stories on the news about other young people that had been brutally tortured, whose bodies would turn up at different spots in the capital. There was an atmosphere of strong repression.

ANNIE MURPHY: Former president Rafael Callejas ruled from 1990 to 1994, and his election marked the first time in 60 years that power was transferred peacefully between two major parties. He believes Zelaya is too brash but says illegally ousting him has had huge repercussions.

RAFAEL CALLEJAS: We're in a crisis. We went back 20 years. We lost again the issue of democracy. Who rules in Honduras now? Really, who rules? The people, the system or strength? I mean, that's the question that has to be solved.

ANNIE MURPHY: For over a century, the U.S. government has had significant influence in Honduras, from the era of U.S.-owned banana plantations, to military and economic ties that endure today. Because of that history, the U.S. response carried a lot of weight. Fulton Armstrong is a former analyst for the CIA and was working as a senior staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the coup. He watched the U.S. response unfold.

FULTON ARMSTRONG: After the coup, a lot of the line that was taken by pro-coup people here in Washington was that the coup was the restoration of democracy, and they sold that in Washington. But when you look at what was actually happening in Honduras, he really was part of a continuation of halting but definitely forward-moving consolidation of democracy.

ANNIE MURPHY: Despite the call for Zelaya's return by nearly every other country in the hemisphere, Washington chose to back new elections, which were condemned internationally because of widespread violence and repression. Polls were held and, five months after Zelaya's ouster, Porfirio Lobo was elected president. Eventually, the crisis was declared over but violence has only increased. Crisencio Arcos was ambassador to Honduras in the early '90s, and has been involved in the country for decades. He says the Obama administration failed to take a firm position regarding the coup.

CRISENCIO ARCOS: And I think that this stems from the following: that Latin America is an orphan in our foreign policy. I don't think we have a defined policy. We never defined - we had one during the Cold War, they were our allies. After the Cold War ended, we never redefined, we never retooled.

ANNIE MURPHY: Many here say the outcome of the coup is what pushed Honduras to where it is today - the world's most violent nation. Edgar Valeriano, the doctor who was beaten by the police.

ANNIE MURPHY: It was shocking that in the 21st century, they could pull off a coup. If the president can be taken out of a country and have his rights taken away without a trial or anything, he says, then what becomes of your average citizen? For NPR News, I'm Annie Murphy.

RACHEL MARTIN: Reporting for this story was supported by a fellowship from the investigative reporting program at the University of California Berkeley's journalism school.

The Curious Case of the Hwanggumpyong Island Economic Zone

- 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea - http://38north.org -

China’s Embrace of North Korea: The Curious Case of the Hwanggumpyong Island Economic Zone

Posted By 38 North On February 19, 2012 @ 8:53 pm

Background

In early June 2011, China and the DPRK announced an agreement to establish a free trade area on Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands, undeveloped sites adjacent to China’s border city of Dandong where a tax-free zone will also be established. These islands are located in the downstream area of the Yalu River on the border between the two countries and are part of North Pyongyang Province. The announcement underlined the North’s increasingly close ties with China; the presence of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law and a senior DPRK official, at the opening ceremonies symbolized direct involvement by the North Korean leader in the project. It also highlighted the likelihood that investment by the Chinese government and companies will drive development of the zone. According to a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly issued on June 6, 2011, “Hwanggumphyong-ri, Sindo County; Sangdan-ri, Hadan-ri and Taji-ri, Sinuiju City and Soho-ri, Uiju County of North Phyongan Province shall belong to the zone.” It also noted that development of the zone shall “start from the Hwanggumphyong district.”[1] ^[1]

^[2]

Figure 1. Korean peninsula and the Chinese border with the planned economic zone at the western edge.

Planning to establish this zone has probably been underway for a year or more. It is worth noting that the ribbon cutting ceremony took place only weeks after Kim Jong Il’s May trip to China, his third visit in 2011. The new zone fits into a surge of development projects, many designed to improve infrastructure in the area, including the construction and upgrading of several bridges along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, new railway service from China to North Korea (ostensibly for tourism), and large Chinese investments in North Korean mines. All of these developments fit into China’s plans for development of its northeastern provinces and the view held by local officials that fulfilling those plans will not be possible without parallel developments in the North Korean economy. In that context, the Chinese know full well the state of the North Korean side of the border—little existing infrastructure or development—but probably intend to remedy that problem in order to fulfill their economic and political goals.

Pyongyang reportedly proposed to lease the two islands to China in order to build the “Hong Kong of North Korea.” They would become free trade zones in order to reduce trade barriers and bureaucratic requirements between the two countries. Chinese nationals and foreigners would be able to enjoy visa-free status when traveling to the islands. Incentives for investors include: tax refunds, lifting of tariffs on imported equipment and materials used for production, freedom to choose or establish banks for financial services, use of foreign currencies for transactions, direct signing of labor contracts, right to hire and fire employees, right to transfer and inherit profits and assets, right to set prices, and unimpeded cell phone and internet access. These incentives are a significant improvement over current practices relating to Chinese investment in North Korea. The primary disincentive is the poor infrastructure condition on the islands and uncertainty about plans for the financing and management of needed infrastructure. The duration of the lease would be 50 years and could be extended up to 100 years.

The official outline of the joint development project stated that four major industries—information, tourism and culture, modern agriculture, and light manufacturing—would be pursued. In that context, Dai Yulin, secretary of the Dandong Committee of the Communist Party of China announced, “projects in sectors of marine engineering, special steel, colored steel, and car audio will soon settle in Hwanggumpyong Island and Dandong City.” Future construction plans include docks for passenger and freight ships connecting Hwanggumpyong and Shinuiju, a network of roads within the zone and two access roads linking Hwanggumpyong with the Dandong economic zone in China. The new free trade area will be administered jointly by the two countries and include the participation of local governments as well as the establishment of an investment development corporation.

Major Chinese Industrial Activity

China’s plans to build a large industrial and residential area adjacent to Hwanggumpyong are illustrated in this billboard entitled, “Detailed Regulatory Plan of the Liaoning Harbor Industrial Zone” (figure 2).

^[3]

Figure 2. China’s plan for areas bordering Hwanggumpyong (the large, undeveloped light blue island right of center). The legend (as best as can be determined) is as follows, reading each column right to left and top to bottom: Column 1: residential area, middle school and elementary school area, administration and offices, culture and entertainment facilities, physical education (sports) and public health facilities, community services and business and financial district; Column 2: public green land (grassy area), protected green land, eco-green land, storage materials (resources), type 1 industrial area and type 2 industrial area; Column 3: type 3 industrial area, harbor area, square area, municipal public facilities, water area, development regulatory range; Column 4: detailed regulatory planning range, city streets, city expressway, railway, highway, intersection (unclear from low resolution); and Column 5: high school, middle school, elementary school, hospital, culture center, government agencies, library, retiree residence and other items which can’t be identified due to poor picture quality.

Satellite photography graphically illustrates that over the past 5 years, China has made a major investment in the adjacent area, which has been a beehive of activity with new factories, large blocks of multi-story flats, roads, and new infrastructure (figure 3).

^[4]

Figure 3. Photos of the Dandong industrial suburb of Zhonghecun taken in 2005 and 2010 demonstrate huge Chinese investments. (Photos: Google Earth and Geoeye)

The Chinese are also in the process of building a major sports complex adjacent to the border with North Korea.

^[5]

Figure 4. Graphic illustration of the sports complex plans.

Chinese construction activities appear to have spilled over into North Korean territory on Hwanggumpyong Island (figure 5). The Chinese seem to be using North Korean land as a place to dump their construction waste (e.g. soil). The second, more substantial bridge built since late 2010 would suggest heavy loads and the river inlet has been filled in. They may also intend to use the same area for parking for the stadium and related facilities. On the other hand, there appears to be plenty of land on the Chinese side of the border for that purpose.

^[6]

Figure 5. Progress on large Chinese sports complex with construction extending across border into North Korea (image on left from October 2010 and on right from December 2011). (Photo left: Google Earth and GeoEye; Photo right: DigitalGlobe)

Rural North Korean Territory

Most of Hwanggumpyong remains a small, boggy island located on the west side of the very wide estuary of the Yalu River. It is largely separated by muddy sloughs from the Chinese mainland, although for several kilometers the island is part of the mainland and divided from Chinese territory by a simple security fence and some irrigation ditches. Hwanggumpyong is more a part of China than North Korea, making it a convenient land area for cooperative activities between the two countries without having to cross a wide river (figure 6). Since the island is at the mouth of the historic river, China may see it as having some strategic value as well.

^[7]

Figure 6. Hwanggumpyong Island with the international border between the DPRK and China shown in yellow. The island is nestled against the Chinese industrial zone of Donggang. (Photo:Google Earth and GeoEye)

A major Chinese highway parallels the border, often only a few feet from a barbed wire border fence with a large Chinese language billboard and a smaller white fence that is probably North Korean. No roads or even tracks seem to cross the divide. While these pictures of the border purport to be taken from the Chinese side, they cannot be fully authenticated, although the landscape matches satellite imagery.

^[8]

Figure 7. A stretch of the border where Hwanggumpyong is part of the Chinese mainland. (Photo: Panoramio)

^[9]

Figure 8. The landscape of Hwanggumpyong as seen from the Chinese side of the border. The DPRK fence is simple compared to the Chinese barrier in the previous picture. (Photo: Panoramio)

The island itself is similar to the countryside around Dandong, which not long ago had no industry to speak of. It has one major village—the largest section with 200 dwellings—which is part of a cooperative farm. (Hwanggumpyong is located across the river from a major North Korean showpiece farm.) Some sites appear to have barracks but there are no signs of major military equipment. There is no obvious power source on the island; power poles along the street cannot be discerned from satellite photos. Since supplying electricity to the island would require a two-mile or longer cable under the river, any large power connections will probably have to come from China.

^[10]

Figure 9. Although little to no change is apparent on Hwanggumpyong Island between 2005 (top left) and 2010 (top right), there appears to be a build-up on the Chinese side, not far from the border (bottom photo, as of December 2011). (Photos above: Google Earth, Digital Globe and GeoEye; Photo below: DigitalGlobe)

^[11]

(Photo: DigitalGlobe)

Joint press releases describing the new zone mention establishing ports on Hwanggumpyong Island in order to improve marine connections to the North Korean mainland. Since the island is largely surrounded by mud flats, it would seem to be unattractive as a port for deep draft vessels. Sampans can be found on the Chinese side of the slough and barges up to 175 feet long appear in Chinese stretches of the river further north, but Hwanggumpyong only has a small boat dock near the village.

In contrast, China has a large well-constructed, deep-water port at the town of Donggang near the mouth of the river that is better suited for ocean connections than Hwanggumpyong, which is shallow and frozen in winter.

Wihwa Island, located further north and across the Yalu from Dandong city, is also part of the new free trade zone. Despite the announcement of the new zone, it has remained poorly developed and appears to add little to aggressive Chinese growth on the west bank of the river.

^[12]

Figure 10. Undeveloped Wihwa Island lies across the river from heavily industrialized Dandong (image on left from April 2006; on right from December 2011). (Photos: DigitalGlobe)

Conclusion

Imagery and other photos show a great deal of industrial expansion on the Chinese side of the river adjacent to Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands over the past five years. In stark contrast, the North’s territory remains entirely agricultural with little infrastructure and largely undeveloped for industrial use.  Since the announcement of the free trade zone, there has been virtually no new activity on North Korean territory, with the exception of a strip of land near a Chinese sports complex under construction. While it is too soon to tell, that activity may either be the start of some related North Korean effort or the Chinese are merely using the land as a dump for waste (i.e. soil) from their project.

China’s willingness to collaborate on the development of new enterprise zones is, above all else, a strategic decision about strengthening its bilateral relationship with the North and pushing Pyongyang towards market mechanisms. Beijing must also see an advantage in acquiring the rights to these adjacent Korean lands, particularly in view of the very liberal set of incentives for Chinese investors that do not apply outside the physical bounds of the zone. These incentives may be more important than whether the zone is on an island or the DPRK mainland. For the North Koreans, locating the zone on these islands, aside from potential political and economic benefits, may provide reassurance that any potential political or economic “contagion” can be contained on the Chinese side of the river and prevented from infecting the DPRK mainland.

In either case, the key and still unanswered question, especially in light of the fact that little has changed on North Korean territory since the announcement of the zone, is who will build the infrastructure necessary to attract investors to set up manufacturing and other facilities? It is worth remembering that the Korea Land Corporation and Hyundai Asan provided a platform for South Korean investors in the Kaesong Industrial Zone with ROK government subsidies. Strategic motivations aside, the answer may lie with local Chinese governments and businesses who will have to be motivated by the economic incentives of cheap North Korean labor and raw materials and the potential for preferential access to North Korean markets for their wares.

This article is a “38 North” exclusive in cooperation with DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center, with contributions by Robert Kelley, Michael Zagurek, and Bradley O. Babson, and translation assistance by Nat Kretchun and Jennifer Lee.

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[1] ^[13] “DPRK Decides to Set up Hwanggumphyong and Wihwa Islands Economic Zone,” KCNA, June 6, 2011.

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