To stop Syria atrocities, should take a cue from ICTY

An Arab war-crimes court for Syria

ARYEH NEIER, April 6, 2012 Friday

(gist) A war-crimes tribunal run by the Arab League could be the solution to Syrian atrocities. + development of ICTY

The United States and other governments don't want to intervene militarily in Syria. That's understandable; hardly anyone wants another Middle East war.

In seeking other ways to ensure that the Syrian government and its henchmen pay a price for slaughtering their citizens, U.S. officials are seeking ways to bring them to justice. A war crimes tribunal run by the Arab League could be the solution. The experience of war-torn countries like Bosnia has proved that such tribunals can work, if properly designed.

A war crimes tribunal run by the Arab League is the only viable option to bring the butchers to justice

Last weekend, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the United States would ''support and train Syrian citizens working to document atrocities, identify perpetrators, and safeguard evidence for future investigations and prosecutions.'' A difficulty with this plan, however, is how to use the evidence that is collected. Syria is not a party to the treaty for the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and Russia and China would most likely use their veto power to block any United Nations Security Council effort to refer the case to the court.

To overcome such obstructionism, another innovation is required: an Arab League tribunal to deal with the crimes against humanity that are taking place in Syria. Such a tribunal could have Arab judges, Arab prosecutors, Arab investigators and Arab defense attorneys and conduct its proceedings in Arabic. The Arab League could give it jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes as the treaty for the International Criminal Court defines them. And such a court should have jurisdiction over all crimes, including those committed by rebels. It is essential to uphold the principle that, no matter the justice of the cause or the crimes committed by one's opponents, all must be held to the same standards.

Because it would take time to establish such a tribunal and because there is an urgent need to stop Syrian forces from committing more crimes, the Arab League could specify that prosecutions for crimes committed after the resolution's adoption would have priority. That would put the forces of Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, on notice that the surest way to end up in the dock is to persist in the crimes they have been committing.

We should not grant them impunity for crimes committed up to now. But the urgent need to prevent further atrocities justifies giving them an incentive to stop. Of course, some of those responsible for crimes would imagine that they would never be apprehended and brought to justice. Yet the record of other international tribunals makes it increasingly necessary for them to take such courts seriously.

In case those responsible imagine that they would not be apprehended or brought to justice, ICTY could be a good example

Something similar took place during the Bosnian war, which began 20 years ago this week. Neither the administration of President George Bush nor that of President Bill Clinton was ready to intervene militarily. But both expressed outrage at the crimes of ethnic cleansing in that conflict. That led to American support for the establishment of what became the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. At the time (of establishment of ICTY), few took it seriously.

It had no capacity on its own to get hold of those accused of crimes. Hardly anyone imagined that the leading perpetrators could be brought to justice. Yet the court has been remarkably successful. Of the 161 people on all sides of the Balkan wars whom the court indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, all were eventually apprehended and brought to The Hague except those who died or had their indictments withdrawn; 64 were convicted and sentenced, and 13 were acquitted. The rest are appealing their convictions, are still on trial, have died or have had their cases referred to courts at home.

Indeed, national courts in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia have conducted scores of high-quality trials of lower-ranking defendants accused of war crimes.

As a result, most of those principally responsible for the ghastliest crimes in the former Yugoslavia, like the murder of 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995, have been forced to serve long prison sentences. A process that some initially supported only as a substitute for more forceful action has turned out much better than expected. It provided a substantial measure of justice in the Balkan conflicts, and it has led to the establishment of several other ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court. And it has contributed to national prosecutions, in many countries, of dictators, warlords and guerrilla leaders responsible for crimes against humanity.

Establishing the Balkan court in 1993 was an innovation in international law, and creating a tribunal for Syria today would be a bold decision for the Arab League - one that could ensure that those who committed atrocities would face consequences.

NOTES: is president of the Open Society Foundations and the author, most recently, of ''The International Human Rights Movement: A History.''

ICTR ends up with no mastermind behind the genocide

http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/international-justice-tribune-142

ICTR: Rwandan genocide - no master plan (long version)

19 December 2011 - 4:05pm | By International Justice Tribune           

Time has the same effect on trial judgements rendered by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as acid on limestone. On December 14, 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR reduced Colonel Bagosora’s factual responsibility in the genocide to a minimum, and his life sentence to 35 years. After seventeen years of investigations and trials, the ICTR ends up with no mastermind behind the genocide.

By Thierry Cruvellier*

It took 14 years from its creation for the ICTR to render the judgement that had been from the start the most eagerly-awaited and the most central to its work on the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, between April and July 1994.

On December 18, 2008, it found Colonel Théoneste Bagosora guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Since 1994, Bagosora had been the ‘number one suspect by default’ of the genocide. However, when it was issued, the judgement by the Trial Chamber appeared iconoclastic. After hearing 242 witnesses, admitting some 1,600 exhibits, producing 30,000 pages of transcripts and receiving 4,500 pages of closing arguments by the parties, the trial judges came to a decision that profoundly questioned the nature of the genocide in Rwanda as a carefully orchestrated crime.

Suspicious witnesses

Since 1998, the ICTR’s chief prosecutors had asserted that the genocide was a conspiracy that had been relentlessly planned and executed by supporters of ‘Hutu Power’, assembled around Colonel Bagosora, who was cabinet director in the Ministry of Defence at the time. From then on, Bagosora was the emblematic face of the proceedings carried out in Arusha.

Ten years later, when Bagosora was finally convicted, all elements of the conspiracy alleged by the Office of the Prosecutor were dismissed or found unconvincing. The creation and work of a military commission chaired by Bagosora in 1991 were not considered as criminal; the 1992-reported warning by the accused that he was going to “prepare the apocalypse” proved to come from two highly suspicious witnesses who contradicted themselves; Bagosora and others had played a role in the creation, arming and training of civil militias, but the judges could not conclude that “these efforts were directed at killing Tutsi civilians with the intention to commit genocide”; the organisation of civil defence was insufficient to claim conspiracy; the preparation of lists targeting Tutsis and members of the political opposition did “not show that the purpose of the lists was to identify Tutsis, as such, and to eliminate them”, so Bagosora escaped the accusation of having participated; there was “considerable evidence” of death-squad activity in Rwanda before April 1994 and several sources say that Bagosora was a member of them. Yet the evidence was indirect, second-hand, proved nothing in legal terms, and did “not mean that [they were] preparing a genocide.”

Historic judgement

The Bagosora judgement was undoubtedly one of the most scrupulously-written of all those reached by the Arusha tribunal. Rarely in the analysis of the birth of the genocide had a more nuanced tone been used. The extermination of Rwandan Tutsis had taken place, but its history was not that of a ‘tropical Nazism’.
“It is not argued that the accused simultaneously agreed to a plan, or that such a plan consisted of a single course of equally-divided or unified conduct,” carefully wrote the judges.

“Instead, the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence is that at various times, each of the accused agreed to participate in a larger, lengthier effort to increasingly homogenise Rwandan society in favour of Hutu citizens, with the objective of killing Tutsi civilians, as required. It is their participation in this process – and the willingness to create or exploit various opportunities to achieve it – which is the hallmark of their agreement.” This was a complex and almost volatile analysis. The 600-page decision also read like a painful inventory of the mediocrity of the assembled evidence and its devastating effects. It was a measure of the extraordinary flimsiness of the work carried out by the prosecution to support such extraordinarily heavy charges.

After the presidential plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, a wave of political assassinations marked the beginning of the massacres. There was no credible and reliable proof of Bagosora’s direct participation, the trial judges wrote. But he was found guilty by inference. Considered to be the person having authority over the army at the time, the order to attack could only have come from him, said the judges. The same applied to the murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers on April 7. Bagosora knew and his inaction served to encourage the killers. He was therefore responsible.

Most of the conclusions on the other charges brought against the alleged ‘brains’ of the genocide read like a litany of powerlessness. ‘The Prosecution has not presented any direct evidence that Bagosora…,” repeated the judges tirelessly. But the accused knew that the soldiers under his authority were killing and, therefore, he was responsible.

No formal authority 

Fifteen years after the events, Bagosora seemed punished in the same way that he was accused: by deduction, and by default. “A detailed analysis of the list of offices within the Ministry as well as the organisational chart reflects that the post of directeur de cabinet was the most senior one after that of the Minister in the Rwandan Ministry of Defence,” said the judges. “He would replace the Minister in his absence. This occurred in April 1994 when Augustin Bizimana, the Minister of Defence, was on official mission in Cameroon.”

During the three days in which the Minister was away, from 6-9 April, Bagosora exercised his authority. After 9 April, the Minister of Defence returned to the country and Bagosora’s formal authority over the army was no longer legally apparent. The possibility of finding him guilty under the same legal principle disappeared. All the crimes allegedly committed by Bagosora after 9 April fell away, without exception. But the infamous colonel had nevertheless been found guilty and sentenced to life.

“The fact of daring to say with humility that, in the Bagosora case, there was insufficient factual evidence to substantiate the theory of an arrangement is a decision with considerable impact, especially in terms of political practices,” said Rwanda expert André Guichaoua, after the 2008 judgement. He now describes Bagosora as a “temporary project manager.”

Ruling 

In its judgement, the Trial Chamber recalled that “when confronted with circumstantial evidence, it may only convict where it is the only reasonable inference.” Three years later, the Appeals Chamber has just turned this very argument against the trial judges. In 300 pages, it slashed the trial judgement so deeply that, 17 years after the court was created, it seems almost impossible to understand what's the narrative of the genocide that has come out of the most important trial at the ICTR.

Because the appeals judges found that Bagosora’s order or authorisation was not “the only reasonable inference” in the killings of 7-9 April, the direct responsibility of Bagosora in the murders was annulled.  --  -- (DO- thus, direct responsibility is established only when order or authorization is the only reasonable inference ? -- interesting)  ---  What’s left? “The Appeals Chamber finds that Bagosora had sufficient knowledge of his subordinates’ criminal conduct in Kigali on 7, 8, and 9 April 1994 to trigger his duty as a superior to prevent their crimes.” Bagosora remains guilty as a superior who failed to prevent those killings, as well as a number of massacres in different parts of Kigali, and the killings at roadblocks in the capital city.

To have an idea of the basis on which Bagosora is finally convicted, one has to read and understand the following sentence: "While the Trial Chamber could not have relied upon the finding that Bagosora must have ordered or authorised the crimes to find that he bore superior responsibility for failing to fulfil his duty to prevent them, Bagosora’s convictions may be upheld if the Trial Chamber’s factual findings support the conclusion that Bagosora failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent these crimes." The Appeals Chamber found that they do – and only that.

Almost 18 years after the genocide, the ICTR essentially concluded that “there is no finding or sufficient evidence that Bagosora ordered or authorised any of the killings for which he was found to bear superior responsibility.” He is solely held responsible for failing to prevent crimes committed by his subordinates over a period of 65 hours during which he had effective control. As a consequence, a majority of judges approved a reduction of his sentence from life to 35 years. Two dissenting judges called it a “monumental reduction.” But it was the departure from the story of the “mastermind of the genocide” that appeared monumental. There was a genocide, yes, but it was brainless.

(*) A detailed analysis of the first instance judgement will soon be published in the DVD book of the film"Arusha from Arusha".

Antonio Cassese; helped develop law on war crimes

The International Herald Tribune, October 25, 2011 Tuesday, BY MARLISE SIMONS

Antonio Cassese; helped develop law on war crimes

PARIS

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DO- he would have been the chief architect of another area—terrorism. The STL could have produced another piece of a breath-taking decision like the one in Tadic case.      

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He was often described as the chief architect of modern international criminal justice.

Antonio Cassese, who helped found two international war-crimes tribunals and who was often described as the chief architect of modern international criminal justice, died on Saturday at his home in Florence. He was 74.

He had had leukemia. After receiving the diagnosis some years ago, he underwent taxing treatments but worked ever harder, staying late in his office, writing on weekends and helping students.

In books, law journals and decisions from the bench, Mr. Cassese expanded the body of international law that had lain mostly dormant since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II.

He taught law at the University of Florence, the European University Institute and the University of Oxford. In 1993, he became the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, a court established by the United Nations to deal with war crimes in the Balkans in the 1990s.

He proved to be something of a maverick among normally discreet justices. Invariably affable but outspoken, he prodded fellow lawyers and Western governments into providing more support for the fledgling tribunal. And he played a central role in defining rules that would guide it and that have since served as a model for other tribunals and courts.

Among his early decisions, seen as controversial at the time but widely accepted since, were several that changed basic precepts of international criminal law. One was that war crimes could be punished not only in wars between nations, but also in conflicts within a particular country. In another, he wrote that even if there was no war going on, massacres, torture and other atrocities committed by governments or groups could be found to be crimes against humanity and punished accordingly.

''Perhaps more than any other person, Antonio Cassese was both the visionary and the architect of international criminal justice,'' said Theodor Meron, an American judge who will take over next month as president of the Yugoslavia tribunal.

Most recently, Mr. Cassese was president of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, created by the United Nations to try those accused of killing Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others. He resigned as president this month as his health failed but stayed on as a judge.

As an independent expert, he led the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur and reviewed the judicial efficiency of the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Over the years, Mr. Cassese became a familiar figure in The Hague, where several international courts are based. He was often seen riding his bicycle, and he was popular with colleagues for his wit and personal modesty, as well as his erudition.

Claude Jorda, a former judge from France at the Yugoslavia tribunal, said that when Mr. Cassese arrived in The Hague, he was a great legal scholar with no idea what it meant to be a judge. ''But he did know that the new tribunal was the one and perhaps only chance to make international justice work,'' Judge Jorda said. ''Failure was unthinkable to him.''

Mr. Cassese, who was born on Jan. 1, 1937, in Atripalda, Italy, had hoped to study philosophy or sociology. He said his father, whom he once described as an impecunious civil servant, urged him to pursue a more secure career. He chose law; a bonus was that he was offered free board and lodging at the University of Pisa if he did so.

In an essay called ''Soliloquy,'' a personal history, he wrote that he initially found it difficult to learn the hard discipline and the rigorous logic of law. But eventually he became known for scholarly work ranging from numerous essays to books including ''The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger,'' based on his conversations with a Dutch judge, B.V.A. Roling.

Mr. Cassese won many awards for his work, including the 2009 Erasmus Prize in the Netherlands. He used the prize money to help law students publish their papers. He was editor in chief of The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, a reference work, and founded The Journal of International Criminal Justice, which became a prestigious forum for debate.

Mr. Cassese insisted on the need for continuous debate because international law was gradually emerging, and as such, reflecting the common conscience of mankind. But he said it was vital to remain skeptical about harsh laws. ''Laws may and should be improved if they are not up to reality,'' he said frequently.

To remind himself, he kept these words from Bertolt Brecht, the German playwright and poet, on his office wall in The Hague: ''I am by nature a man who is difficult to control. I reject with outrage any authority that does not rest on my respect. And I regard laws only as provisional and changeable proposals for regulating human intercourse.''

Patricia M. Wald, a former U.S. judge who also served on the Yugoslavia tribunal, said, ''There are moments in history when one individual can make a great difference, and he was such a man.''

http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/key-characters/judges-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon/tributes-to-judge-antonio-cassese

The former President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Judge Antonio Cassese, has died after a long fight with cancer. He passed away peacefully at home in Florence on Saturday 22 October 2011. He was 74.

Judge Cassese was professor of international law at the University of Florence from 1975 until 2008. Between 1987 and 1993 he was professor of law at the European University Institute. Judge Cassese was also a visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University (1979-80). He was a member of the Institut de Droit International and former president of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture

An enthusiastic proponent of self-determination and human rights throughout his whole life, Judge Cassese wrote extensively on all aspects of international law, with a particular focus on international criminal law. He was the recipient of many honorary degrees and awards. Read the full press release about the death of Judge Cassese

seminar on IHL Oct. 22, 2011

One instructor who used to work at ECCC presented on international enforcement of IHL.

the cost of international criminal tribunal (ICTR, ICTY, SCSL, ECCC, and ICC) 

as of 2010, $4.7 B 

He threw out a question: international criminal tribunals worth the money? 

I responded: what else can we do? R2P -- military intervention -- is too intrusive. Diplomatic resolution, e.g., under Ch. 6 of the UN Charter is toothless. International criminal tribunal is the only viable option available to international community. He tried to pose a question of what we could get out of the money (or the efforts) -- cost-benefit analysis. I would point out opportunity cost. 

After presentation, I asked a question on the ECCC: why the UN does not really step in to fix the governmental intervention in the ECCC. I prefer to see UNSG condemning and accusing Cambodian government of crippling independence of the ECCC. 

He responded by saying that unless pulling out of Cambodia, the UN should be cooperative with the Cambodian government, rather than confrontational.  

송상현ㆍ권오곤ㆍ박선기 등 국제 재판관 4명 배출

http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2011073152001&sid=&nid=&type=0

송상현ㆍ권오곤ㆍ박선기 등 국제 재판관 4명 배출

"축하합니다. " 정창호 광주지방법원 부장판사(44 · 사법연수원 22기)에게 최근 한 통의 이메일이 날아들었다. 발신처는 유엔본부 법률국.캄보디아 크메르루주 전범재판소(ECCC) 재판관으로 뽑혀 축하한다는 간단한 인사말과 함께 '8월1일부터 캄보디아에서 열리는 재판관 회의에 참석해달라'는 내용이었다.

이것저것 출국을 위해 준비할 시일이 촉박했지만 정 판사는 쾌재를 불렀다. 2008년부터 주 오스트리아 대사관에서 사법협력관으로 있으며 유엔국제상거래법위원회(UNCITRAL)에 적극 참여하는 등 강한 인상을 남긴 것이 주효했던 것이다. 정 판사는 예심-1심-2심으로 이어지는 ECCC 재판부에서 예심 재판관으로 활동하게 된다. 예심은 본안심사에 앞서 검찰이 제시한 증거나 절차의 적법성을 가리는 곳이다. 1975~1979년 폴 포트가 이끄는무장단체 크메르루주에 의해 200만명가량(당시 캄보디아 전체 인구 700만명)을 학살한 사건(킬링필드)의 세기적 재판에 한국인 판사가 참여하게 된 것이다.

정 판사의 ECCC 재판관 임명에 대해 네덜란드 헤이그의 권오곤 구(舊)유고슬라비아국제형사재판소(ICTY) 부소장은 31일 본지와의 전화통화에서 "국제 형사재판업무에 4명의 재판관을 낸 국가가 몇 곳이나 있나. 한국 사법계의 쾌거다"라고 기뻐했다.

정 판사가 속한 ECCC는 프랑스식의 대륙법적 재판절차를 택하고 있다는 점이 특징이다. 국제형사재판소(ICC),ICTY,르완다국제형사재판소(ICTR) 등 기존 대부분의 국제형사재판은 주로 영미법에 따르고 있다. 권 부소장은 "구술심리주의에 의존하는 영미법적 제도로는 복잡 다기한 국제 형사재판을 다루기에 적당치 않다는 것이 입증되고 있다"며 "대륙법적인 접근을 하는 ECCC의 경험은 국제 형사재판뿐만 아니라 같은 대륙법 계통인 국내 형사재판에도 시사하는 점이 많을 것"이라고 설명했다.

현재 국제 형사재판에서 활약 중인 한국인 재판관은 송상현 ICC 소장과 권 부소장,박선기 ICTR 재판관(2003년 임명),정 판사 등 총 4명.이들 중 국제 사법계에 한국의 존재감을 부각시키는 데 가장 기여한 인물은 송 소장이다. 2002년 최초의 상설 국제 형사사법기관인 ICC 초대 재판관에 선출된 이후 2006년에는 9년 임기 재판관에 재선됐고,2009년에 소장으로 임명돼 한국인 최초로 국제 사법기구 수장에 올랐다. 최근에는 민주화 시위 중이던 민간인을 유혈진압한 혐의로 무아마르 카다피 리비아 국가원수에게 체포영장을 발부한 바 있고,연평도와 천안함 사건 조사에 착수함으로써 김정일을 법정에 세울 수 있을지 세계적인 주목을 끌고 있다.

송 소장은 "정 판사의 임명은 법조인뿐 아니라 다른 직역의 많은 한국인이 국제기구에 진출하는 데 커다란 구체적 목표를 제공해주었다고 본다"고 평가했다.

유고 내전(1992~1995) 당시 '인종 청소'(25만명 사망)를 자행한 혐의로 기소된 슬로보단 밀로셰비치 전 유고 대통령 재판에 이어 1급 전범 라도반 카라지치 사건의 재판장을 맡고 있는 권 부소장은 후배 법조인과 로스쿨생들에게 "국제 재판소에서 일하려면 국제사회가 필요로 하는 스펙을 쌓아가야 한다"고 조언했다.

김병일 기자 kbi@hankyung.com

Balkan Justice Hasn’t Deterred Crimes Elsewhere

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-07-21/balkan-justice-hasn-t-deterred-crimes-elsewhere-view.html

July 21, 2011

July 22 (Bloomberg) -- Until his July 20 arrest by the Serbian government, Goran Hadzic was the last person indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia to have escaped capture. Hadzic was charged for his alleged role in the murder of Croatian civilians. This arrest is a welcome milestone for international law and for peace and prosperity in southeastern Europe.

Along with the May 26 capture of Ratko Mladic, who was indicted for war crimes committed in Bosnia, the news indicates that Serbia has broken decisively with the virulent nationalism that was the primary cause of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Serbian President Boris Tadic deserves much credit for this transformation.

Serbia now is a strong candidate for membership in both the European Union and NATO. The prospect of joining those organizations surely spurred Belgrade’s action. Both now have a duty to respond by expeditiously welcoming a new Serbia into these crucial European institutions.

Credit also is due to the court, which focused on individual responsibility rather than collective guilt. This helped foster reconciliation among Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.

(failure of the ICTY to deter other would-be war criminals)

But beyond the Balkans, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the court’s relevance as a deterrent to other would-be war criminals.  The court was successful because its jurisdiction was limited and a broad consensus existed that these were the most heinous human rights violations in Europe since World War II.

The genocide in Darfur, Charles Taylor’s crimes in western Africa, the slaughter of civilians in Sri Lanka, and Muammar Qaddafi’s willingness to wage war against his own people in Libya all demonstrate a larger truth. International law, for all its good intentions, is no substitute for international action.

Read more Bloomberg View editorials.

--Editors: Stuart Seldowitz, James P. Rubin


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It would be naive to expect that the ICTY or even the ICC will directly cause atrocities to drop. 
Anyway, war or more broadly speaking armed conflict keeps happening.

If the ICTY had been designed specifically to deter would-be such crimes, the punishment would have been much more severe. Given the seriousness of the crime the convicted committed, the punishment is symbolic, rather than corresponding to retribution or deterrence. 


I am not saying deterrence was not in minds of the ad hoc tribunal founders. The establishment of the ICTY is a compromise around responsibility to protect and political inertia. In this sense the ICTY can be counted as an "international action." 


I don't really see what the author meant by "international action." If s/he meant something like an action under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, the ICTY should be a substitute for international action under some circumstances. 

UNSC Extends Terms of ICTY Judges

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/international_law/2011/06/unsc-extends-terms-of-icty-judges.html

June 30, 2011

UNSC Extends Terms of ICTY Judges

Yesterday, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to extend the terms of the eight permanent judges serving on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  The ICTY was created to try perpetrators of the worst crimes committed during conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  The extension is necessary to ensure that the court is adequately staffed to complete its work.  Their terms have been extended until 31 December 2012 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned.   In addition, the terms of nine ad litem judges – who are limited to particular cases – were also extended until 31 December 2012 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned.

The UNSC Resolution “reiterates the importance of the International Tribunal being adequately staffed to complete its work expeditiously and calls upon relevant United Nations bodies to intensify cooperation with the Secretariat and the Registrar of the International Tribunal and to take a flexible approach in order to find practicable solutions to address this issue as the International Tribunal approaches the completion of its work, and at the same time calls upon the International Tribunal to renew its efforts to focus on its core functions,” said the resolution.

The Resolution calls on all States, especially those that emerged from the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, to intensify cooperation with and to render all necessary assistance to ICTY, particularly in the arrest of Goran Hadžic, a key war crimes suspect who remains at large.

The UNSC also commended States that have concluded agreements for the enforcement of sentences of those convicted by ICTY or have otherwise accepted such convicts to serve their sentences in their territories, and urged countries to renew their commitment to the enforcement of sentences and to positively consider requests from the tribunal in this regard.  Finally, it urged States that have not concluded agreements for the enforcement of sentences of ICTY convicts to consider entering into such pacts.

(cgb) (adapted from a UN Press Release)