America the exception: 7 other treaties the U.S. hasn't ratified
Doe v. Chiquita Brands International ; Lawsuit alleging complicity in financing and arming Colombian paramilitary terrorist groups will continue
WEST PALM BEACH, Fla. — A human rights lawsuit brought by Colombian families against banana company Chiquita Brands International for allegedly funding and arming known terrorist organizations in Colombia may continue in U.S. federal court, a judge decided today.
In 2007, after Chiquita pled guilty to federal criminal charges for illegally funding Colombian paramilitary death squads, victims filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that, in order to maintain its profitable control of banana growing regions, Chiquita abetted the paramilitaries in the commission of numerous human rights abuses. Among the plaintiffs who celebrate today’s victory are the families of community organizers, trade union leaders, social activists, and banana workers who were assassinated in the paramilitaries’ campaign of terrorizing civilians.
"We are very pleased with this ruling, and we hope that the U.S. courts do their job so that all the people who were persecuted in the banana-growing region can see justice," said Jane Doe 8 (a pseudonym), whose father was tortured and decapitated by paramilitaries due to his activities as a union leader.
"The court agreed that Chiquita's alleged actions, in providing financing and arms to brutal death squads, violated international human rights law under the federal Alien Tort Statute, and may constitute crimes against humanity," said Marco Simons, Legal Director of EarthRights International (ERI), counsel for the plaintiffs. "The plaintiffs look forward to having their claims heard by a jury," added Agnieszka Fryszman of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, also counsel for the plaintiffs.
Documents obtained under FOIA and released by the National Security Archive in April demonstrate that Chiquita knowingly paid the paramilitaries to provide beneficial security services for its operations, and then covered up the transactions. In addition to the payments, to which it has confessed, Chiquita is alleged to have helped the paramilitaries ship drugs out and smuggle arms in by giving the armed groups free access to its private port at Turbo, on Colombia’s Caribbean coast.
Today’s ruling by Judge Kenneth A. Marra of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida comes after three years of litigation. The case, Doe v. Chiquita Brands International, No. 08-01916, was originally filed in New Jersey, and was subsequently coordinated with other similar cases as In re Chiquita Brands International Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder Derivative Litigation in West Palm Beach, Florida. Judge Marra’s decision, which applies to all of the cases, dismisses some of the claims brought by the plaintiffs under New Jersey and Colombia law, but allows human rights claims to proceed under the Alien Tort Statute.
Corporate Liability and the ATS: Kiobel's Impacts Remain Unclear
by Marco Simons
Last fall, I blogged about a decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in New York, ruling that corporations could not be sued for international human rights abuses under the federal Alien Tort Statute (ATS). This sent shockwaves through the human rights legal community, but its impact is far from determined, especially as other federal appeals courts begin to decide whether to follow or reject Kiobel.
Yesterday, I watched a hearing at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v. Exxon Mobil, a human rights case involving abuses in Indonesia. Corporate liability is an issue in the appeal, but the judges made it clear that they were not about to follow the Second Circuit's ruling without examining whether it was correct--and they asked a lot of tough questions of both sides. One judge indicated that he thought it made sense that the issue of corporate liability under the ATS should be a question for US domestic law (in which corporations are universally held liable on the same basis as human beings)--and the judges made it clear that they had read the amicus briefs detailing the ways in which the Kiobel analysis was flawed (for example, in supposing that German corporations who partnered with the Nazis were not subjected to punishment after WWII).
Indeed, we still don't know what's happening with the Kiobel decision itself. After the ruling, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, which asked the panel to reconsider its decision and also asks all of the judges on the court (the "en banc" court) to review what the three-judge panel had done. In late December, the court issued a notice saying that the petition for rehearing had been denied, which would ordinarily signal the end of the process. But the next day, the clerk issued another notice saying that the first notice had been issued in error.
It's hard to know what to make of this, but that won't stop me from hazarding a wild guess: What happens when a petition like this is filed is that the three-judge panel first gets to decide whether they want to reconsider their decision. If they don't, then the rest of the judges can decide if the en banc court should rehear the case. The petition doesn't get granted or denied until the end of this process. What I suspect happened here is that the court erroneously issued an order denying the petition after the three-judge panel said they were not reconsidering their decision, but before the court had decided whether to hear the case en banc. If that's correct, the judges are probably in the process of voting whether to rehear the case en banc.
Meanwhile, the issue continues to come up in other cases. In October, I blogged about the Firestone case, in which the trial court agreed with Kiobel and dismissed the claims. That case is now on appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which will be the next court to take up the issue. The next year may determine whether Kiobel was an outlier or a seminal case--and conflicts between the federal appeals courts may bring us closer to having the issue decided by the Supreme Court.
Jan 26, 2011
The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
Some months after the U.N. General Assembly adopted the multilateral treaty on December 20, 2006, IntLawGrrl Jaya Ramji-Nogales predicted that this effort to address the phenomenon of forced disappearances "may represent the future of international human rights law – enforcement through specificity." Jaya wrote:
The enforced disappearance treaty makes the interesting move of labelling and targeting a certain pattern of human rights violations, thus creating very specific norms that might be used by advocates to overcome the enforcement problems faced by more general human rights treaties. In addition, the Convention’s enforcement committee has the ability to hear urgent claims, to undertake field investigations, and to bring widespread and systematic enforced disappearance to the attention of the General Assembly.
The treaty will be monitored, as Jaya's post indicated, by the U.N. Working Group on Enforced

Olivier de Frouville, a law professor at l'Université de Montpellier 1 in France; Osman El Hajjé, a law professor and president of the Jinan University Human Rights Centre in Lebanon; and Ariel Dulitzky of Argentina, a clinical law professor at the University of Texas.
Despite her optimism back in 2007, Jaya worried that desired "near-universal ratification" might be hard to come by.
Entry into force, at least, was relatively rapid.
The convention entered into force almost exactly 4 years after being adopted -- on December 23d of last year, 30 days after Iraq became its 20th state party. Today, less than a month later, it now has 21 states parties, Brazil having ratified soon after Iraq. Beside those 2 countries, the other states parties are Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Germany, Honduras, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, and Uruguay.
As pointed out in a U.N. press release respecting the status of the treaty, about 70 other states "have taken the preliminary step of signing it, an expression of their intention to ratify it at some point in the future."
And yet many countries remain fully outside the treaty regime.
Kimberley Process & Zimbabwe diamonds
Yet international legal scholarship has been slow to recognize the relationship between freer trade and the financing of internal conflicts. My recent article, "Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime," published earlier this year in the Cardozo Law Review, looks closely at a recent effort to address the global trade in so-called blood diamonds as a potential model for resource curses more generally.
I develop a case study of the Kimberley Process, an international diamond tracking regime (prior IntLawGrrls post), by investigating both the scope of the institution’s regulatory reach as well as the mechanisms by which members promulgate and enforce those regulations.
Evidence from the evolution of that institution suggests that although designers may indeed seek to maximize their own interests, what determines whether an institution can regulate effectively, and when it may move beyond the designers’ original interests, are legalization elements of that international institution.
► The obligations the regime creates;
► The precision with which those obligations are defined; and
► The possible delegation of interpretive and enforcement efforts.
In accumulating and assessing this evidence, my article contends that while skeptics may correctly identify the Kimberley Process’s initial alignment with state and corporate interests, this lightly legalized regime provides an opportunity for substantial progress on human rights. Although the Kimberley Process might appear as an attempt to whitewash state and corporate abuses, over time, the institution can -- even though it need not necessarily -- evolve to address both the rebel-induced and state-inflicted human rights violations related to the diamond trade.
► The importance and potential stickiness of initial design choices; and
► The fact that institutional evolution in favor of issue expansion and greater enforcement is merely feasible rather than inevitable.
Developments which occurred after my article went to press suggest that the Kimberley Process has in fact tried to address state-initiated human rights abuses. In so doing, it is facing some substantial state resistance:
► In 2009, the Kimberley Process sanctioned Zimbabwe for bad behavior in the newly discovered Marange diamond fields. Rather than expel Zimbabwe, members suspended its exports. By November 2009, Zimbabwe agreed to a joint work plan to restore compliance by eliminating smuggling, allowing greater monitoring, and reducing military abuses against civilian miners. Despite these promises, Human Rights Watch reported that as late as September of 2010, soldiers still control large portions of these Zimbabwe fields and continue to violate the human rights of the local miners. (credit for 2006 photo by Tsvangiray Mukwazhi/Associated Press of women and men miners at Marange)
► A November 2010 Kimberley Process meeting failed to reach agreement on whether to lift all export limitations, and thus kept the suspension in place. Zimbabwe’s monitor responded by unilaterally certifying millions of diamonds which are already beginning to make their way to market.
'In a country filled with corrupt schemes, the diamond business in Zimbawbe is one of the dirtiest.'
If Zimbabwe continues on its current path of non-compliance, or pulls out of the process entirely, many fear the diamond industry will return to the bad practices of the 1990s, in which widespread human rights abuses were common.
Others suggest, however, that targeted pressure campaigns could convince industry networks to reject working with those that trade in these blood diamonds and persuade individual consumers not to purchase them.
Only time will tell. But this article illuminates the institutional mechanisms that will facilitate success or failure on the Zimbabwe problem
Domestic violence as torture




The next step in this legal and cultural revolution is to treat gender violence as torture. So far, rape — in war, by the state and where the state does not take measures against it — has been acknowledged in international law as an act of torture. Domestic violence — the most private and most common of all forms of gender violence — is on its way.
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Simply recognizing domestic violence as torture will not solve the problem of domestic violence. But . . . it will help make domestic violence a front burner issue, hastening both the impartiality, adequacy and appropriateness of official responses and the cultural revolution that demands absolute and unconditional condemnation of such violence.
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All in the Family?
Among other arguments before the IACHR, the US government asserted its sovereign right under international law to expel criminal aliens; that the right to family life under Articles V and VI of the American Declaration protects only against state action that intends to harm family life, not secondary consequences of lawful, reasonable state actions (sound familiar?); and my personal favorite -- that because the United States is not party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prior IACHR analysis (pertaining to a party to the CRC) on the rights of the child with respect to their parent's deportation proceeding was not relevant.
The IACHR was not buying any of this. It found that the United States' sovereign rights of expulsion are not absolute, but are subject to a balancing test, drawing from elements laid out by the ECHR and UNHRC, including the strength of family ties, the duration of residence, the hardship of deportation to the family, and the nature and severity of the criminal offense (including age at the time of commission, time span of the offense, and subsequent rehabilitation). While the balancing test is to be applied flexibly, the IACHR emphasized strongly the importance of the best interest of the minor child. The IACHR also rejected the "intent to harm family life" limitation suggested by the US government, and noted that the American Declaration protects against foreseeable consequences that flow from state action.
Because the petitioners had no opportunity to a present humanitarian defense to deportation or to have rights to family considered and because the best interests of their US citizen children were not considered by the decision maker, the IACHR found a violation of Articles V (right to private and family life), VI (right to family life), and VII (rights of the child) of the American Declaration. Notably, the Commission held that heightened due process protections apply in immigration proceedings that include the sanction of deportation, and that the petitioners' deportations violated Article XXVI (right to a fair trial) and XVII (right to an effective remedy) of the American Declaration. The IACHR recommended that the U.S. allow petitioners to return, reopen their deportation proceedings, and present humanitarian defenses, as well as to allow the immigration judge to weigh these defenses. Finally, the Commission suggested that the U.S implement laws to protect non-citizen residents' right to family life. Now those would be some solid family values.