Showing posts with label U.N. Security Council. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.N. Security Council. Show all posts

UNSC 2094 - UNSC sanctions on DPRK in response to the nuke test on Feb. 12, 2013


7 March 2013
Security Council
SC/10934

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York
Security Council
6932nd Meeting* (AM)

SECURITY COUNCIL STRENGTHENS SANCTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA,


IN RESPONSE TO 12 FEBRUARY NUCLEAR TEST



Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2094 (2013); Expresses Determination to Take
Additional ‘Significant Steps’ in Event of Further Missile Launch, Nuclear Test

The Security Council today passed unanimously a resolution strengthening and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country’s banking relationships, in response to that country’s third nuclear test on 12 February.

Acting under the Charter’s Chapter VII, through resolution 2094 (2013), the Council strongly condemned the test and maintained the sanctions it first imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006 under resolution 1718, deciding that some of those, along with additional restrictions, would apply to the individuals and entities listed in two annexes of today’s text.

In that connection, a travel ban and asset freeze were imposed on the Chief and Deputy Chief of a mining trading company it deemed “the primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons”, as well as on an official of a company designated by the Sanctions Committee to be the main financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to assembly and manufacture.

The Council also froze the assets of a national-level organization responsible for the research and development of advanced weapons systems, and a conglomerate, designated by the Sanctions Committee in 2009, to be specializing in acquisition for the country’s defence industries and support to related sales.  Further, it added to the list of prohibited equipment and technologies, and included a list of luxury goods that cannot be imported.

States are directed under the resolution to enhance their vigilance over the diplomatic personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in a provision aimed at halting any activities that could contribute to the country’s weapons programme, or which would violate any prohibited activities.

More specifically, States are directed to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer of any financial or other assets or resources, including “bulk cash”, which might be used to evade the sanctions.  They are also called on to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches or offices of “DPRK” banks and to prohibit such banks from establishing new joint ventures.

Moreover, in the effort to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the Democratic People’s Republic or Korea or its nationals of any banned items, States are authorized to inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or that is destined for that country.  They are to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have reasonable grounds to believe the aircraft contains prohibited items.

States were also asked to supply any information on non-compliance and to report to the Council within 90 days, and thereafter, at the Committee’s request, on measures they have taken to implement the text.  The Sanctions Committee is directed to respond to violations and is authorized to add to the list.  The expert panel, under the Committee’s auspices, was extended until 7 April 2014.

The Council promised to keep the situation under continuous review and stated it was “prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance”, or to “take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test”.

The meeting began at 10:11 a.m. and ended at 10:14 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and resolution 2087 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Concerned that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Welcoming the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) new Recommendation 7 on targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation, and urging Member States to apply FATF’s Interpretative Note to Recommendation 7 and related guidance papers for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile­related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

“1.   Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions;

“2.   Decides that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation;

“3.   Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

“4.   Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

“5.   Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403);

“6.   Reaffirms its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

“7.   Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply to items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i), 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), decides that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also apply to paragraphs 20 and 22 of this resolution, and notes that these measures apply also to brokering or other intermediary services, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States;

“8.   Decides further that measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annexes I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to any individuals or entities acting on the behalf or at the direction of the individuals and entities that have already been designated, to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means;

“9.   Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

“10.  Decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and the exemptions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any individual whom a State determines is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or individuals assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and further decides that, if such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of an individual is required for fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business;

“11.  Decides that Member States shall, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

“12.  Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“13.  Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, and other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution;

“14.  Expresses concern that transfers to the DPRK of bulk cash may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of this resolution to the transfers of cash, including through cash couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of bulk cash do not contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“15.  Decides that all Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“16.  Decides that all States shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

“17.  Decides that, if any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009), all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, and decides further that any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee;

“18.  Calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing;

“19.  Requests all States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft or vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

“20.  Decides that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;

“21.  Directs the Committee to review and update the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013) no later than 12 months from the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter, and decides that, if the Committee has not acted to update this information by then, the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional 30 days;

“22.  Calls upon and allows all States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, and directs the Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice regarding the proper implementation of this provision;

“23.  Reaffirms the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;

“24.  Calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“25.  Calls upon all States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, and requests the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

“26.  Calls upon all States to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“27.  Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, directs the Committee to designate additional individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, and decides that the Committee may designate any individuals for measures under paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and entities for measures under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) that have contributed to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

“28.  Decides that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009) and this resolution;

“29.  Recalls the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph, decides to extend until 7 April 2014 the Panel’s mandate, as renewed by resolution 2050 (2012), decides further that this mandate shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution, expresses its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to create a group of up to eight experts and to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect, and requests the Committee, in consultation with the Panel, to adjust the Panel’s schedule of reporting;

“30.  Emphasizes the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

“31.  Underlines that measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK;

“32.  Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

“33.  Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;

“34.  Reaffirms its support to the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption, urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

“35.  Reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large;

“36.  Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test;

“37.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Annex I

Travel ban/asset freeze

1.    YO’N CHO’NG NAM

(a)   Description: Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).  The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

2.    KO CH’O’L-CHAE

(a)   Description: Deputy Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).  The KOMID was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

3.    MUN CHO’NG-CH’O’L

(a)   DescriptionMun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l is a TCB official.  In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB.  Tanchon was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.

Annex II

Asset freeze

1.    SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES

(a)   Description: The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons.  The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programmes.  Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.

(b)   AKA:  2ND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHE 2 CHAYON KWAHAKWON; ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; CHAYON KWAHAK-WON; NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY; KUKPANG KWAHAK-WON; SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE; SANSRI

(c)   Location: Pyongyang, DPRK

2.    KOREA COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IMPORT CORPORATION

(a)   Description: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation.  Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.

(b)   LocationRakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Annex III

Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology

Nuclear items

1.    Perfluorinated Lubricants
They can be used for lubricating vacuum pump and compressor bearings. They have a low vapour pressure, are resistant to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, and are used for pumping fluorine.

2.    UF6 Corrosion Resistant Bellow-sealed Valves
They can be used in uranium enrichment facilities (such as gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion plants), in facilities that produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous uranium compound used in the gas centrifuge process, in fuel fabrication facilities and in facilities handling tritium.

Missile items

1.    Special corrosion resistant steels — limited to steels resistant to Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) or nitric acid, such as nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS).

2.    Ultra high-temperature ceramic composite materials in solid form (i.e. blocks, cylinders, tubes or ingots) in any of the following form factors:

(a)   Cylinders having a diameter of 120 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater;

(b)   Tubes having an inner diameter of 65 mm or greater and a wall thickness of 25 mm or greater and a length of 50 mm or greater; or

(c)   Blocks having a size of 120 mm x 120 mm x 50 mm or greater.

3.    Pyrotechnically Actuated Valves.

4.    Measurement and control equipment usable for wind tunnels (balance, thermal stream measurement, flow control).

5.    Sodium Perchlorate.

Chemical weapons list

1.    Vacuum pumps with a manufacturer’s specified maximum flow-rate greater than 1 m3/h (under standard temperature and pressure conditions), casings (pump bodies), preformed casing-liners, impellers, rotors, and jet pump nozzles designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come into direct contact with the chemicals being processed are made from controlled materials.

Annex IV

Luxury goods

1.    Jewelry:

(a)   Jewelry with pearls;

(b)   Gems;

(c)   Precious and semi-precious stones (including diamonds, sapphires, rubies, and emeralds);

(d)   Jewelry of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal.

2.    Transportation items, as follows:

(a)   Yachts;

(b)   Luxury automobiles (and motor vehicles): automobiles and other motor vehicles to transport people (other than public transport), including station wagons;

(c)   Racing cars.

* *** *

__________

*     The 6931st Meeting was closed.

For information media • not an official record

U.N. Security Council prepares to expand North Korea sanctions list with new firms, individuals

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17933634

UN sanctions three North Korea firms over rocket launch
2 May 2012

The UN has imposed sanctions on three North Korean state-owned companies in response to Pyongyang's failed rocket launch last month.

The decision to freeze the assets of the firms and ban them from global trade was approved by the UN Security Council's sanctions committee.

The US and EU had wanted to blacklist some 40 North Korean firms but China blocked the move.

Tension on the Korean peninsula remains high after the 13 April launch.

Pyongyang said at the time it was putting a satellite into orbit but critics said the launch was a disguised test of missile technology banned under UN resolutions.  The rocket launch failed, with the device crashing into the sea shortly after take off.

'Credible response'

On Wednesday, the sanctions committee named the three blacklisted companies as Green Pine Conglomerate, Amroggang Development Banking Corporation and Korea Heungjin Trading Company.

It said they were all involved in financing, exporting and procuring weapons.

US envoy to the UN Susan Rice hailed the decision, saying in a statement that it "constitutes a serious and credible response to North Korea's provocation".

"These measures will increase North Korea's isolation and make it harder for Pyongyang to move forward with its illicit programmes," she said.

In addition, the sanctions committee approved extra items and technology that would be prohibited for transfer to or from North Korea - updating its lists dealing with Pyongyang's missiles and nuclear related material.

However, the total number fell far short of the roughly 40 firms proposed by the West, Japan and South Korea.
This is because it was opposed by China, North Korea's protector in the UN Security Council, says the BBC's Barbara Plett in New York.
Before Wednesday's decision, the North Korean sanctions lists included eight companies and five individuals.  Pyongyang has not publicly commented on the new sanctions


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U.N. panel prepares to expand North Korea sanctions: envoys
By Louis Charbonneau, UNITED NATIONS | Mon Apr 30, 2012

(Reuters) - The United States, South Korea, Japan and European nations have submitted to the U.N. Security Council's North Korea sanctions committee lists of individuals and firms they want blacklisted after Pyongyang's recent rocket launch, envoys said on Monday.

Earlier this month the 15-nation council strongly condemned North Korea's April 13 rocket launch, called for adding new names to the list of those hit by existing U.N. sanctions and warned Pyongyang of further consequences if it carried out another missile launch or nuclear test.

"So far the United States, European council members, South Korea and Japan have proposed new designations ahead of tomorrow's midnight deadline (to agree on new names)," a council diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

It was not immediately clear which firms and individuals the council would blacklist, assuming it reached agreement.

The Security Council imposed sanctions on Pyongyang in response to its 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests.

China, North Korea's protector on the Security Council and a permanent veto-wielding member, also backed the council's "presidential statement" from two weeks ago, ensuring its unanimous adoption. The statement gave the council's North Korea sanctions committee 15 days to propose new sanctions listings.

"That deadline might be extended for a few days to give China a little more time to think about the proposed designations," another council diplomat said. The deadline for agreement is midnight EDT on Tuesday (0400 GMT on Wednesday).

"It looks as if China won't stand in the way of an agreement (on expanding the sanctions list) though they won't necessarily accept adding all the proposed individuals and entities," he added. Several other Western diplomats said they also expected China would agree to an expansion of the U.N. blacklist.

Diplomats say that if the committee can agree on adding new names to the blacklist, it will be a further sign of Beijing's irritation with its hermit neighbor over a satellite rocket launch North Korea had been widely urged not to carry out.

The North Korea sanctions committee includes all 15 council members.  It works on the basis of consensus, which means any individual council member can block agreement.

The U.N. blacklist includes individuals facing international travel bans and asset freezes, companies whose assets are to be frozen and goods that North Korea is not allowed to export or import.

The current list includes eight companies and five individuals. Under two Security Council sanctions resolutions from 2006 and 2009, North Korea is barred from importing nuclear and ballistic-missile technology, as well as luxury goods.
(Reporting By Louis Charbonneau; Editing by Paul Simao)


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http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/


Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

North Korea's Missiles Displayed At Parade Are Fake ; whether China violated UNSC Res


North Korea's Missiles Displayed At Parade Are Fake
By ERIC TALMADGE 04/26/12

TOKYO -- Analysts who have studied photos of a half-dozen ominous new North Korean missiles showcased recently at a lavish military parade say they were fakes, and not very convincing ones, casting further doubt on the country's claims of military prowess.

Since its recent rocket launch failure, Pyongyang's top military leaders have made several boastful statements about its weapons capabilities. On Wednesday, Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho claimed his country is capable of defeating the United States "at a single blow." And on Monday, North Korea promised "special actions" that would reduce Seoul's government to ashes within minutes.

But the weapons displayed April 15 appear to be a mishmash of liquid-fuel and solid-fuel components that could never fly together. Undulating casings on the missiles suggest the metal is too thin to withstand flight. Each missile was slightly different from the others, even though all were supposedly the same make. They don't even fit the launchers they were carried on.

"There is no doubt that these missiles were mock-ups," Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker, of Germany's Schmucker Technologie, wrote in a paper posted recently on the website Armscontrolwonk.com that listed those discrepancies. "It remains unknown if they were designed this way to confuse foreign analysts, or if the designers simply did some sloppy work."

The missiles, called KN-08s, were loaded onto the largest mobile launch vehicles North Korea has ever unveiled. Pyongyang gave them special prominence by presenting them at the end of the parade, which capped weeks of celebrations marking the 100th anniversary of the country's founding father, Kim Il Sung.

The unveiling created an international stir. The missiles appeared to be new, and designed for long-range attacks.

That's a big concern because, along with developing nuclear weapons, North Korea has long been suspected of trying to field an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, capable of reaching the United States. Washington contends that North Korea's failed April 13 rocket launch was an attempt to test missile technology rather than the scientific mission Pyongyang claims.

But after pouring over close-up photos of the missiles, Schiller and Schmucker, whose company has advised NATO on missile issues, argue the mock-ups indicate North Korea is a long way from having a credible ICBM.

"There is still no evidence that North Korea actually has a functional ICBM," they concluded, adding that the display was a "dog and pony show" and suggesting North Korea may not be making serious progress toward its nuclear-tipped ICBM dreams.

North Korea has a particularly bad track record with ICBM-style rockets.  Its four launches since 1998 – three of which it claimed carried satellites – have all ended in failure.

Though North Korea frequently overstates its military capabilities, the missiles displayed this month might foreshadow weapons it is still working on.

David Wright, a physicist with the Union of Concerned Scientists who has written extensively about North Korea's missile program, said he believes the KN-08s could be "somewhat clumsy representations of a missile that is being developed."

Wright noted that the first signs the outside world got of North Korea's long-range Taepodong-2 missile – upon which the recent failed rocket was based – was from mock-ups seen in 1994, 12 years before it was actually tested on the launch pad.

"To understand whether there is a real missile development program in place, we are trying to understand whether the mock-ups make sense as the design for a real missile," he said. "It is not clear that it has a long enough range to make sense for North Korea to invest a lot of effort in."

Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former scientific adviser to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, said the Taepodong-2 design remains the more real future threat – though even that remains at least a decade away – and the KN-08 is simply a smoke screen.

"I believe that these missiles are not only mock-ups, but they are very unlikely to be actual mock-ups of any missiles in design," he said. "Fabricating a missile like the KN-08 would require a gigantic indigenous technical effort. ... The only way North Korea could develop such a missile with its pitiful economy would be if someone gave it to them."

He noted that a comparable U.S. missile, the Minuteman III, required "decades of expertise in rocket motors, and vast sums of intellectual, technological and financial capital."

Much attention, meanwhile, has been given to the 16-wheel mobile launchers that carried the missiles during the parade, which experts believe may have included a chassis built in China. That raises questions of whether China has violated U.N. sanctions against selling missile-related technology to Pyongyang.

Some missile experts say the launchers were designed to carry a larger missile than the 18-meter-long KN-08, and argue that North Korea would not have spent millions of dollars on them unless it has, or intends to have, a big missile to put on them.

But Wright said the launchers, like the missiles they carried, could also have been more for show than anything else.

"Given the international attention it has gotten from parading these missiles you could argue that the cost of buying the large trucks – which add a lot of credibility to the images of the missiles – was money well spent in terms of projecting an image of power," he said.

DPRK ICBM Items
BY JEFFREY | 19 APRIL 2012

I am a little baffled that the media isn’t making a bigger deal out of the fact that North Korea paraded six road-mobile ICBMs through Pyongyang.  Six road-mobile ICBMs.  Hey!  Look!  ICBMs!  Road-mobile ICBMs! Just like Gates said!

As best I can tell, reporters don’t really understand that this isn’t the same missile as the Unha-3.
It’s not.  It’s different.  This is important.

1.

One set of issues relates to whether the missiles were real, or simply aspirational mock-ups.  I am uploading a paper — “Dog and Pony Show” — by Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker that is strongly of the view that we are looking at mockups.  Some commenters may disagree, especially about the little white straps.

(Schiller and Schmucker are skeptical that this will ever be a real missile, although I hasten to add that the United States saw a pair of “missile simulators” — better known as  mockups — in 1994 that gave us the TD-1 and -2 names we use today. See: Barbara Starr, “N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow with the TD-2,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 12, 1994.)

2.

To the extent that this new missile has received any attention at all, it is the truck that seems to interest reporters.  I find that fascinating.  Normally, I’d be impressed, but stop ignoring the missile!

The TEL is an important part of the weapons system (unless you plan to strap the missile to a donkey) and North Korea is dependent on foreign suppliers for heavy-duty vehicle chassis (warning: wikileaks cable).

China appears to be the supplier, in violation of existing sanctions on North Korea.

There seems to be some confusion about the basis for stating that the export of  TEL is a violation of the Security Council ResolutionUNSCR1718 and UNSCR 1874 are actually pretty clear about this. All member states are obligated to prevent the supply to the DPRK of a number of items, including:
(ii)  all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;

S/2006/815 defines ballistic missile programs list pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).  It is identical to the MTCR Annex. Both list “Vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation and launching of the systems specified in 1.A” as controlled items.  Although such a vehicle is a less-sensitive Category II transfer under the MTCR, there is little doubt it violates the sanctions resolution. (UNSCR 1874 expanded these obligations and provided the opportunity for an updated statement of controlled items.  Short version: TELs still not okay to transfer.)

If China exported the trucks after 2006, this is a clear violation of sanctions. The resemblance between the DPRK TEL and two Chinese models — WS2600 and the WS51200–  are obvious.


I think it is a WS51200.  The little face plate to hide the notch in the cab doesn’t fool me any more than the bright red paint job.  That sucker is designed to carry very large missiles. There are a series of interesting Chinese announcements about initial production of the WS51200 (1|2) including one that has been taken down.

Why the rush boys?  Have an export order that needed to be filled before a parade?

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Sam |    April 19, 2012
So would this be a more serious MTCR violation than UK sending cruise missiles to Saudis?

Does the relevant UNSCR say “calls on” nations to refrain from such exports to NK or does it say “decides” ? The “calls on” are kind of optional non-enforceable nice things that UNSC would like. e.g. UNSCR 487 also has some “calls on”

joshua |  April 19, 2012
Good question. China is not a member of the MTCR, but has undertaken its own, similar commitments in parallel to the MTCR. Which is in any case not binding in the manner of a Security Council resolution, but rather a voluntary commitment.

Regardless, it’s not such a good development

George William Herbert | April 19, 2012
One note -
I believe they have a real program here, even if the missiles are mockups.  The TELs seem to have cost around $1 million each (30 million Yuan for 6, total US dollar value about $4.7 million at current exchange rates). The TELs are also bigger than we think they’d need to be for this missile (max weight rating 122 tons or so), which seems to indicate they intentionally overbuilt the TEL for performance reasons.
That’s a lot of money to spend on a masrikova activity.
It’s not that big in comparison with their total imports ($3.7 billion or so) or export ($2 billion or so), but it’s big enough in their total budget that it seems unlikely they’d do it just for show.
Reply  P | April 20, 2012
Don’t think the ‘cost much = real’ argument holds.
‘Careful spending’ and ‘show’ are two concepts which do not usually seem to be connected in North Korea. The massive military parade itself is an example in itself.
Or this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZQDWV_0nOM&feature=related
or this
http://atlasobscura.com/place/ryugyong-hotel

Pieter | April 20, 2012
The sanctions against North Korea are certainly pretty restrictive of just about anything that could be used or adapted in any way by North Korea, for carrying ballistic missiles but also for most types of major conventional weapons. Which basically means that no truck whatsoever could be supplied to North Korea, because almost any truck can be adapted as carrier of ballistic missiles or major conventional arms. But that is not really the intention of the UN sanctions on the country.
I mentioned it before, in the case of Iran we have seen the same issue some years ago. In that case it German trucks were used and in reaction the German government tried to stop the export of relevant trucks.
In at least one other UN sanction regime (Darfur) not related to nuclear programmes similar issues relating to dual-use/civilian vehicles used for military use have arisen.

Peter Brown | April 20, 2012
Let me see if I get this straight. The China-Iran-Pakistan-North Korea missile club is providing substantial momentum to a broadening and serious deterioration of the MTCR’s effectiveness.  Meanwhile, Russian bombers are more active over the western Pacific now than they were in the closing hours of the Soviet Union. And the U.S. seems willing to not only extend a pass to India on both the nuclear and missile front,  but to reinforce Japan’s remilitarization as well.

Seems to me that Asia is doomed to continue down this precarious path until it is too late to reverse course.

George William Herbert | April 21, 2012
Jeffrey writes:
Neither the MTCR nor the sanctions have an exception for dual-use vehicles. The important word is “designed or modified.” The MTCR guidelines (and sanctions) are quite clear thst such items could be used in other applications.
There is another phrase — “specially designed” — to describe goods for which there are no civilian applications.
All of this discussion about possible civilian uses is interesting, but quite irrelevant from an MTCR perspective.

I think the point is whether the Chinese bear much culpability.
For stuff I routinely see on US roads in a civilian capacity…
I think it should be investigated, but if they thought they were going to be construction cranes that’s not obviously just a cover story.
Caterpillar’s mining trucks could similarly be converted for TEL use. They don’t ask export customers about missile support end user conversions.

P | April 22, 2012
The UNSC resolutions ‘decide’ that UN Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in the MTCR annex, which includes ‘vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation AND launching of the systems specified in 1.A.’

However the WS2600 or WS51200 we know of are not such vehicles. They are chassis only without all the other bits which makes them TELs. Also note the use of ‘and’ not ‘or’, indicating that a vehicle which incorporates all the functions. (Unless we assume that the whole TEL had been delivered from China, but there is no indication for that whatsoever.)

It can also be argued that if the missiles are real the vehicles should not have been delivered because the UN sanctions prohibit the supply to DPRK of ‘all arms and related materiel’.

But as they are chassis only and seem to have civilian applications also this is not so straightforward. After all, many, many materiel of all sorts is ‘related to arms’. I’d say that if it was known or could be suspected based on available information about the end-user that they would be used for building a TEL or if the buyer was one of the DPRK entities that are under UN embargoes the delivery it would be a deliberate violation of the UN sanctions. Otherwise it is just something to learn from and to prevent in future and raises questions about how China makes assessments regarding exports of strategic goods.

For me the whole point of this discussion is to counter anyone jumping the gun and suggesting that the Chinese government deliberately helped the DPRK with building an ICBM. Why potentially piss off the Chinese if the evidence is so weak? Based on the information we have the allegation is about as valid as claiming that in violation of UN sanctions Germany helped Iran with its Shahabs because the Shahabs are pulled around by Mercedes Benz Trucks or Sweden ‘violated’ its MTCR commitments because the AGNI-4 is pulled around by a Volvo truck.   Important will be if China will investigate the matter, will provide full assistance to the the UN panel on the DPRK which is investigating the matter and if China and will take action to prevent future similar violations of the UN sanctions. If they don’t or if someone will come up with proper evidence that the Chinese government has deliberately and for reasons unclear to me supported the DPRK ICBM effort, we have reason tho complain and should really wonder what the Chinese are up to.

But as someone here argued before, until then, the questions if these missiles are real is may be more important.

Jeffrey | April 22, 2012
This only makes sense if you don’t read the actual sanctions documents, which make clear that civilian applications are not an exception for goods “designed or modified” for certain purposes, like TELs. There is a special phrase, “specially designed”, that describes goods with no other purpose.

The wording of the MTCR and the sanctions are very clear that the existence of civilian applications does not change the controlled nature of the item. There is even a nice example of titanium coating (I think; I am working from memory) provided to make this clear.

I don’t know whether the transfer is deliberate or not, but I’d love to know what the civilian/defense ratio for WS52100 is. The company certainly knew that North Korea might use this equipment in a missile program. After all, the Chinese missile progr appears to be their primary customer.

I meant to add that the suspension alone — an off-road vehicle capable of carrying tens of tons — ought to meet the standard, to say nothing of other little details right down to the notch in the cab.

Or is that purely stylistic? Or to carry very pointy cranes?

Markus Schiller | April 23, 2012
There seems to be some confusion on the liquid/solid issue, as well as on the cable ducts. Let me try to clarify this.

Cable ducts are always external at a certain point, for both solid- and liquid-fueled missiles. It is the location of their endings that is important – these positions hint at the missile’s inner configuration. It is too risky (or impossible) to have the cables inside the combustion chamber (solid-fueled) or inside the tanks (liquid-fueled) for various reasons: A spark might ignite the propellants, the breach in the tank wall/chamber wall is a potential source for leakage, and so on. The cables are then routed back inside the airframe as soon as possible for several reasons – the cable covers are unnecessary extra mass, for example, as are the cables if you have them extending to the aft skirt and then leading back up again inside the missile.

True, the cable ducts at the UR-200 (and the R-36) lead down to the very end of the aft skirt. But there is still more than 1 m of engines sticking out behind the aft skirt. The UR-200 and R-36 were developed for silo use – they did not have to be protected against dust and dirt and weather, allowing for an “open skirt” design with exposed engines. And at the UR-200′s upper stage, the cable is routed back into the missile at the end of the tank section (the conical section houses the propulsion unit).

We forgot to add one other observation: North Korean rocket engineers certainly are not stupid, especially when they are designing and developing a road-mobile ICBM. In that case, they should know that a liquid-fueled ICBM is better designed as a two stage rocket, while a three stage design is great for a solid-fueled missile (simply look how many three stage liquid-fueled ICBMs there are, and how many solid ones).

Things just don’t add up on the presented configuration.