Iran Deal Report Card, Friedman, Thomas L, Sep 16, 2015

Friedman, Thomas L

Sep 16, 2015

The Iran nuclear deal is now sealed -- from Washington's end. But since this has been one of America's most important foreign policy shifts in the last four decades, it's worth looking back and grading the performance of the key players.

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Grade: A.

His prediction last week that Israel won't be around in "25 years" was perfectly timed to complicate President Obama's effort to get the deal through Congress. Khamenei is a bad guy. When I asked a Middle East expert friend to explain Khamenei's behavior, he invoked a Yiddish curse on the Iranian: "May all his teeth fall out, except the ones that hurt."

But he's also a clever guy. Through this deal Khamenei gets Iran out from under crippling sanctions, which his people want, by pushing the breakout time for Iran to make a nuclear bomb from two months to a year -- for 15 years -- but getting the world to bless Iran's "peaceful" nuclear enrichment program, even though it cheated its way there. And he's done it all while giving his hard-line base the feeling that he's still actually against this deal and his negotiators the feeling that he's for it. So all his options are open, depending on how the deal goes.

Hat's off, Ali, you're good. When I sell my house, could I give you a call?

But here's a note to his parents: "Ali got an A, but he has a tendency to get cocky. He is confident that he can pull off this deal without any transformation in Iran's domestic politics. I suggest you buy him a good biography of Mikhail Gorbachev."

Dick Cheney. Grade: F.

I cite Cheney because his opposition to the deal, which he's been peddling along with a new book, was utterly dishonest, but in a way that summed up much of the knee-jerk Republican opposition: This is a bad deal because Obama was a wimp.

No, this deal is what it is because it reflects the balance of power, and the key factor in that balance is that the Iranians came to believe America would never use force to eliminate their nuclear program. But that's not all on Obama. Republicans, and Cheney personally, played a big role in the loss of U.S. credibility to threaten Iran with force.

After briefing Congress on Sept. 10, 2007, Gen. David Petraeus told Fox News that Iran was supporting and directing Iraqi Shiite insurgents who have "carried out violent acts against our forces, Iraqi forces and innocent civilians." Iran was cited for making specially shaped roadside bombs responsible for killing hundreds of U.S. troops. Yet, even though our commanders said that publicly, their bosses -- George W. Bush and Dick Cheney -- refused to ever order retaliation against Iranian targets. Iran noticed.

Ditto on nukes. As Peter Beinart wrote for The Atlantic last week, Cheney stopped by "Fox News Sunday" to bash Obama's nuclear deal, "but moderator Chris Wallace, to his credit, wanted to ask Cheney about his own failings on Iran. On the Bush administration's watch, Wallace noted, Iran's centrifuges for enriching uranium 'went from zero to 5,000.' Cheney protested, declaring that, 'That happened on Obama's watch and not on our watch.' But Wallace held his ground. 'No, no, no,' he insisted. 'By 2009, they were at 5,000.' Cheney paused for an instant, muttered, 'right,' and went back to his talking points."

Note to his parents: "Dick has a problem telling the truth, and he's not alone. Some G.O.P. critiques of this deal should be looked at, but they'll never be taken seriously if the party isn't straight about its own role in our loss of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran."

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: Grade C.

No one had more impact in getting the world to impose sanctions and take Iran's nuclear threat seriously than Netanyahu. But his reckless spat with Obama, which went beyond substance to openly endorsing Obama's G.O.P. rivals and colluding with G.O.P. House leaders to address Congress -- without the president's support -- hurt him, Israel and the deal.

Had Bibi hugged Obama, he could have made Israel effectively the sixth party in the P-5 side of negotiations with Iran and stiffened every spine. Instead, Netanyahu marginalized Israel. And by calling elections in the middle of it all, and forming a far-right cabinet with extremist Jewish settlers, Netanyahu is playing right into Iran's hands: Iran wants a one-state solution, where Israel never leaves the West Bank and is in permanent conflict with Palestinians and Muslims, so Iran can better delegitimize and isolate Israel.

Note to Netanyahu's parents: "Bibi won't be punished for any of his mistakes; domestic U.S. politics will ensure that. But beware: That will only increase the odds that he'll lead Israel into a permanent, corrosive occupation of the West Bank, make support for Israel an increasingly Republican cause and lose the next generation of American Jews."

President Obama. Grade: I (Incomplete).

Note to Obama's parents: "This deal makes sense; it can keep Iran away from a bomb. But Barack should go to bed every night for the next 15 years worrying whether Iran is living up to it. That's the best way to ensure that he, his party and his successors will stay vigilant and put in place an effective deterrence to Iran ever building a bomb. I hope he gets an A, but only history can give it to him."

A Better Approach Towards North Korea by Jeffrey Sachs

A Better Approach Towards North Korea

Jeffrey Sachs, Director, Earth Institute at Columbia University; Author, 'The Price of Civilization'  04/15/2013

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/a-better-approach-towards_b_3083799.html?utm_hp_ref=fb&src=sp&comm_ref=false

In 2003, Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi agreed with the US and Europe to end his pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons in order to normalize relations with the West. Eight years later, NATO abetted his overthrow and murder. Now we are asking North Korea to end its nuclear program as we once asked of Qaddafi. North Korea's leaders must be wondering what would await them if they agree.

US foreign policy is based on the idea that the US can dictate who rules and who does not, and which countries can keep nuclear weapons and which cannot. Moreover, the US Government reserves the right to change its opinion on these matters. It supported Qaddafi until it did not. It supported Saddam until it did not; it supported Iran's Mohammad Mossadegh in the early 1950s until it joined the UK in toppling him; and it supported Panama's Manuel Noriega until it toppled him. This list goes on, and North Korean leaders must suspect that they are next.

There is a huge problem with this strategy. Not only does it sow enormous discord and violence around the world. It also sows a deep distrust by other countries of US intentions and policies, and contributes to an arms race by at least some of these countries. Iran and North Korea pursue nuclear programs in part to ward off the kind of regime change that they've seen other non-nuclear opponents suffer at the hands of the US.

America continues in the regime-change business to this day. The current target is Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, whom we've declared, "must go." He's a very nasty guy, no doubt, like many others around the world. Yet by declaring that Assad must go, the US and Europe contributes to an escalation of bloodletting as the Assad regime brutally battles a rebellion stoked by Western arms and US intentions to topple Assad.

(DO – so, when it comes to Syria, is the author calling for Obama to act on the principle of non-intervention?)   

In fact, America's real target is not even Assad, but Assad's main backer, Iran. Americans are trying to topple Assad mainly to staunch Iran's regional influence in Syria and Lebanon. We claim we are tightening the noose on Assad, but in fact we are abetting the devastation of Syria itself as the result of a proxy war with Iran.

Through decades of practice, regime change comes naturally to the US Government and especially to the CIA, which carries out much of the operational support. Yet the US Government fails time and again to factor in the serious and sustained blowback that inevitably follows our overthrow of foreign governments. Consider, for example, the history of our current confrontation with Iran.

In 1953, the US and UK conspired to overthrow Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had committed to the grievous sin of believing that Iran's oil belonged to Iran rather than to Britain and the US. Mossadegh was brought down by the CIA and MI6 and replaced by the despotic Shah of Iran, who governed ruthlessly with US backing until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. In light of this history, Iran's current pursuit of nuclear-weapons capability is far more understandable.

Iran also has three not so friendly nuclear neighbors - Israel, India, and Pakistan - all of which are allied with the US despite their failure to sign, ratify, or honor the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Being a nuclear power is based on, well, power, not on international law. That the US demands that this or that state must denuclearize while others flout the treaty is an assertion of power, not principle. Nor are such demands likely to be heeded by Iran, given their plausible fear that unilateral disarmament would be met not by peace with the US, but by US attempts to destabilize the regime.

Which brings us back to North Korea. Secretary of State John Kerry is onto something when he broaches the idea of opening negotiations with North Korea. Every experienced observer in the world notes that North Korea's erratic behavior is mainly an attempt to be heard, acknowledged, and respected. As Kim Jong-un told basketball star Dennis Rodman, he simply wants Obama to call him, "because if we can talk, we can work this out."

But Kerry then went on this weekend to make the usual US demands. There will be no phone call until North Korea first pledges to denuclearize. In other words: surrender first and we'll talk afterwards.

I am reminded of one of John F. Kennedy's most famous admonitions: "And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy -- or of a collective death-wish for the world."

If we act calmly and sensibly, we can easily defuse the current crisis. North Korea is looking for respect, not war. It's time to talk, to lower the heat, and to avoid a confrontation or the imposition of impossible or humiliating demands. And we need to remember, if we are to induce good behavior among others, we will have to stop our bad habit of killing them afterward.

Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 lifts the Central Bank of Iran’s immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/usa-iran-idUSL2E8JO8W920120827

RPT-INSIGHT-Tweak to US bill on Iran sanctions opens door to damages

Mon Aug 27, 2012     By Basil Katz

 Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 lifts the Central Bank of Iran’s immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 and effectively neuters the Bank’s defences in a case pending before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in which plaintiffs are seeking to seize $1.75bn or Iranian assets to enforce an earlier judgment against Iran awarding $2.65bn in damages for its involvement, via Hezbollah, in the Lebanese civil war.

* Bill could unfreeze $1.75 billion for 1983 bomb victims

* Washington suspects Iran role in US Marine barracks attack

* Iran says sovereign immunity doctrine protects from payout

NEW YORK, Aug 24 (Reuters) - One way to win a court case is to get the United States Congress to change the rules of the game midstream.

A little-noticed provision tucked into the latest Iran sanctions bill may have done just that for American victims of a 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut.

The sanctions bill, signed by President Barack Obama on Aug. 10, set out additional penalties against Tehran to curb the country's nuclear ambitions.

The bill also specifically disarms claims the Central Bank of Iran has made in a legal battle in federal court in Manhattan over $1.75 billion in securities frozen in a New York bank account that the central bank says it owns.

The plaintiffs in that case are trying to get Tehran, through the Central Bank of Iran, to pay damages for Iran's suspected role in helping Hezbollah carry out the barracks attack during the civil war in Lebanon.

The $1.75 billion was uncovered by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2008 and sits in a New York branch of Citibank, part of Citigroup. Treasury says the money is effectively Iranian funds.

The Beirut plaintiffs' lawsuit, filed in 2010, argues that the funds should go toward paying a $2.65 billion damages award they obtained against Iran in 2007 and have so far been unable to collect.

In court papers, the Central Bank of Iran has argued that the funds are off limits from seizure under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which holds that foreign states or their agents are not subject to another nation's laws.

But Section 502 of the sanctions law, officially known as the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, takes direct aim at that defense.

The section specifically declares that the Central Bank of Iran "is not immune" under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the U.S. law that Iran's central bank claims protects its funds from seizure.

It also states that the "financial assets that are identified" in the Manhattan case "shall be subject to execution or attachment ... to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran."

Over the years, there have been billions of dollars in default judgments against Iran levied by U.S. courts in favor of Americans, but never collected. Language in the latest sanctions bill, which could be subject to legal challenge, appears to have brought the plaintiffs in the Manhattan case closer to seizing actual funds than in any other case.

David Lindsey, a New York-based lawyer for the Central Bank of Iran, also known as Bank Markazi, acknowledged that the new sanctions law could affect the Manhattan case.

"The purpose of this 10th inning change in the law was to do away with our defenses," Lindsey said. "No allegations have ever been made that the Central Bank of Iran was involved in the 1983 attack," he said.

Steven Perles, a lawyer for the Beirut plaintiffs, declined comment. The case was brought on behalf of Deborah Peterson, the personal representative of one of the deceased servicemen, and encompasses hundreds of individual plaintiffs.

"If this section stands, it does seem to overcome any defenses Iran might have," said Julian Ku, a professor at Hofstra University's School of Law.

Ku, who called the statute modification "unusual," said that "if the payment is made, I think it would be the first such payment, and certainly the largest ever paid out in a U.S. court against Iran."

To be sure, the plaintiffs must file supplemental briefs in light of the new legislation, and the judge must eventually decide whether to order that the funds be turned over - a process that could still take years.

A BIG ASSIST FROM CONGRESS

While Congress has previously intervened to help terrorism victims obtain compensation from foreign states,  it is rare for a law to directly address an active case, legal experts said.

"There is precedent for massive payouts, but this is a little bit unusual because it changes a law about Iranian sovereign immunity in just one case," said Roger Alford, a professor at the University of Notre Dame Law School. "How did the lawyers get Congress to do that?"

The amendment was introduced last winter by Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat. A senior aide to Menendez said the lawmaker's efforts were spurred on by a visit from a victim's family from his home state.

The aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the purpose of the legislation was to ensure that claims against Iran were in fact actionable.

"The amendment sends a message not just to Iran but to the other states that support terrorism that the U.S. will allow the seizure and attachment of assets to satisfy judgments against those countries," the aide said.

Experts and lawyers involved in such cases said the defendants in the Manhattan case may seek to challenge the constitutionality of Congress changing the statute, but that this would likely be a losing battle. One way would be to argue that the legislative branch had improperly interfered with judicial matters.

'INNOCENT THIRD PARTY'

There is another wrinkle in the claims over the $1.75 billion held in a Citibank account. The money was deposited there by Luxembourg-based bank Clearstream, which holds Iranian funds in accounts in Luxembourg.

Clearstream said in court papers in July that if it is forced to turn over the $1.75 billion in New York, it may be barred from docking an equivalent sum from a Bank Markazi account in Europe because of European sanctions against Iran.

Clearstream has argued that since the Iranian assets were booked in Europe, they could not be considered to be in the United States.

The sanctions law, however, said that a sum held in the United States that was "equal in value" to Iranian assets held abroad could be attached.

A spokesman for Clearstream's law firm, White & Case, declined comment.

FEEDING FRENZY

Ever since the Menendez amendment was introduced, other groups of plaintiffs who have won judgments against Iran have expressed interest in getting a piece of any possible payout.

Lawyers close to the case in New York say the $1.75 billion would currently be shared among about 1,350 people, which includes families of victims of a 1996 truck bomb attack at a U.S. military complex in Khobar near the Saudi Arabian oil city of Dhahran. The attack killed 19 soldiers and injured nearly 400.

Five days after Obama signed the sanctions bill, the Peterson plaintiffs sued London-based bank Standard Chartered seeking compensation over its concealment of Iran-linked transactions, citing the Beirut bombing, which killed 241 U.S. servicemen.

Experts say the U.S. State Department has been reluctant to push for enforcement of existing money judgments against Iran because they could serve as a potential lever in negotiations with Tehran, while levying the $1.75 billion would have only a minimal impact.

"While the assets involved are substantial," said Suzanne Maloney, a former State Department adviser who now works at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, "I don't believe they are perceived as a meaningful bargaining chip with Tehran on the nuclear issue or other elements of concern with respect to Iranian policy."

The case is Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 10-cv-04518.

Negotiations Behind U.S. Sanctions Against Iran

Negotiations Behind U.S. Sanctions Against Iran

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/negotiations-behind-us-sanctions-against-iran?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120703&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=9ca807cb98ae4e828182f27969140f13

July 3, 2012   By Reva Bhalla

Over the past week, the latest phase of U.S.-led sanctions against Iran has dominated the media. For months, the United States has pressured countries to curtail their imports of Iranian crude oil and is now threatening to penalize banks that participate in oil deals with Iran. In keeping with the U.S. sanctions campaign, the European Union on July 1 implemented an oil embargo against Iran. The bloc already has begun banning European countries from reinsuring tankers carrying Iranian oil.

On the surface, the sanctions appear tantamount to the United States and its allies serving an economic death sentence to the Iranian regime. Indeed, sanctions lobbyists and journalists have painted a dire picture of hyperinflation and plummeting oil revenues. They argue that sanctions are depriving Tehran of resources that otherwise would be allocated to Iran's nuclear weapons program. This narrative also tells of the Iranian regime's fear of economically frustrated youths daring to revive the Green Movement to pressure the regime at its weakest point.

But Iran's response to sanctions deadlines has been relatively nonchalant. Contrary to the sanctions lobbyist narrative, this response does not suggest Iran will halt its crude oil shipments, nor does it portend a popular uprising in the streets of Tehran. Instead, it suggests that sanctions are likely a sideshow to a much more serious negotiation in play.

Loopholes in the Sanctions Campaign

The sanctions applied thus far certainly have complicated Iran's day-to-day business operations. However, Iran is well versed in deception tactics to allow itself and its clients to evade sanctions and thus dampen the effects of the U.S. campaign.

One way in which Iran circumvents sanctions is through a network of front companies that enable Iranian merchants to trade under false flags. To enter ports, merchant ships are required to sail under a flag provided by national ship registries. Tax havens, such as Malta, Cyprus, the Bahamas, Hong Kong, the Seychelles, Singapore and the Isle of Man, profit from selling flags and company registries to businesses looking to evade the taxes and regulations of their home countries. Iranian businessmen rely heavily on these havens to switch out flags, names, registered owners and agents, and addresses of owners and agents.

The U.S. Treasury Department has become more adept at identifying these firms, but a government bureaucracy simply cannot compete with the rapid pace at which shell corporations are made. Several new companies operating under different names and flags can be created in the time it takes a single sanctions lawsuit to be drawn up.

Many of Iran's clients turn a blind eye to these shell practices to maintain their crude oil supply at steep discounts. Notably, the past few months have been rife with reports of countries cutting their Iranian oil imports under pressure from the United States. However, after factoring in the amount of crude insured and traded via shell companies, the shift in trade patterns is likely not as stark as the reports present.

The United States already has exempted China, Singapore, India, Turkey, Japan, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and the 27 members of the European Union from the sanctions. Many of these countries imported higher than average quantities of Iranian crude in the months leading up to their announcements that they had cut down their supply of Iranian crude. China, South Korea, India and Japan also are finding ways to provide sovereign guarantees in lieu of maritime insurance to get around the latest round of sanctions. Even though many of these countries claim to have reduced their oil imports from Iran to negotiate an exemption, falsely flagged tankers carrying Iranian crude likely compensate for much of Iran's officially reduced trade.

U.S. lawmakers are drawing up even stricter sanctions legislation in an effort to track down more Iranian shell companies, but the U.S. administration is likely aware of the inadequacies of the sanctions campaign. In fact, while Congress is busy trying to expand the sanctions, the U.S. administration is rumored to be preparing a list of options by which it can selectively repeal the sanctions for when it sits down at a negotiating table with Iran.

The Real Negotiation

While talk of sanctions has dominated headlines, a more subtle dialogue between Iran and the United States has been taking place. In an editorial appearing in U.S. foreign policy journal The National Interest, two insiders of the Iranian regime, Iranian political analyst Mohammad Ali Shabani and former member of Iranian nuclear negotiating team Seyed Hossein Mousavian, communicated several key points on behalf of Tehran:

• The United States and Iran must continue to negotiate.
• Sanctions hurt Iran economically but by no means paralyze Iranian trade.
• Iran cannot be sure that any bilateral agreement made with the United States will be honored by a new administration come November.
• The United States must abandon any policy intended to bring about regime change in Tehran.
• Washington has few remaining options other than military intervention, which is an unlikely outcome.
• Iran can significantly increase pressure on the United States by, for example, threatening the security of the Strait of Hormuz, an act that would raise the price of U.S. oil.

Perhaps most important, they said, "the Islamic Republic is willing to agree on a face-saving solution that would induce it to give up the cards it has gained over the past years."

On June 27, the United States delivered an important message. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert said during a Pentagon news conference that the Strait of Hormuz had been relatively quiet and that the Iranian navy had been "professional and courteous" to U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. According to Greenert, the Iranian navy has abided by the norms that govern naval activity in international waters. Previously, armed speedboats operated provocatively close to U.S. vessels, but they have not done so recently, Greenert said. It is difficult to imagine Greenert making such a statement without clearance from the White House. 

Red Lines

When Iran began the year with military exercises to highlight the threat it could pose to the Strait of Hormuz, Stratfor laid out the basic framework of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Both countries have defined their red lines. Iran raises the prospect of closing the Strait of Hormuz or detonating a nuclear device. The United States moves its naval carriers into the Persian Gulf to raise the prospect of a military strike. Both remind each other of their respective red lines, yet both stay clear of them because the consequences of crossing them are simply too great.

The situation calls for a broader accommodation. Over the past decade, Iran and the United States have struggled in negotiations toward such an accommodation. At the heart of the negotiation is Iraq -- a core vulnerability to Iran's western flank if under the influence of a hostile power and Iran's energy-rich outlet to the Arab world.  The United States has tried to maintain a foothold in Iraq, but there is little question that Iraq now sits in an Iranian sphere of influence.  With Iraq now practically conceded to Iran, the other components of the negotiation are largely reduced to atmospherics.

Iran's biggest deterrent rests in its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. The leverage Tehran holds over the strait allows Iran room to negotiate over its nuclear program. Of course, the United States would prefer that Iran abandon its nuclear ambitions and will continue efforts to impede the program, but a nuclear Iran might in the end be tolerated as long as Washington and Tehran have an understanding that allows for the free flow of oil through the strait. Everything from the sanctions campaign to U.S. covert backing of Syrian rebels to the nuclear program becomes negotiable. As the Iranians put it, a path has been created for a "face-saving solution" that would allow both to walk away from the dialogue looking good in front of their constituencies, but would also require the sacrifice of some of the levers they have gained in the course of the negotiation.

With only four months until the U.S. election, it is difficult to imagine that this negotiation will reach the point of a strategic understanding between Washington and Tehran. However, one would be remiss to overlook the important confidence-building measures that are being communicated at a time when neither power wants to skirt its respective red lines, Iraq is more or less a moot issue and the United States is trying to redirect its focus away from the Middle East.

Iran Can Disrupt Key Waterway -- the Strait of Hormuz?

All Things Considered, NPR

Iran Can Disrupt Key Waterway, But For How Long?

Peter Kenyon, Feb. 14 2012

GUESTS: Adal Mirza, Mustafa Alani, Theodore Karasik

PETER KENYON: So why have world oil markets, despite some jittery moments, remained relatively calm about the worst-case scenario for the Strait of Hormuz? Analysts say it's simple. Few people believe Iran can actually deliver on its threat.

Mustafa Alani with the Geneva-based Gulf Research Center says there are several factors weighing against Iran's ability to close the strait. Hormuz is classified as an international waterway by the U.N., meaning international military action to keep it open would not only be permitted, but expected. And as a practical matter, Alani says Iran has already demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War that it can't keep the strait closed.

MUSTAFA ALANI: The Iranian tried to close Hormuz eight years and they done everything possible, from mining to the air force to navy to the speed boat, tried to close Hormuz and to prevent the export of oil. They failed.

PETER KENYON: U.S. and European military officials have also said they don't believe Iran can close the strait for any length of time. Some analysts, however, say a temporary closure may be possible.

THEODORE KARASIK: We estimate that the strait could only be closed for maybe 10 days, maximum 15, depending on what transpires.

PETER KENYON: Theodore Karasik with the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in Dubai says despite what he calls a robust international military presence near the strait, Iran could cause problems with asymmetrical attacks.

What's the Deal With Brazil, Turkey, and Iran?

by David Shorr

May 23, 2010

If it seems like there are a lot of issues embedded in the dueling diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program, it’s because there are a lot of issues embedded in... Rising powers asserting their influence, the efficacy of sanctions, American fetishes and stubbornness; it’s all here. So I want to draw on some of the excellent commentary and analysis to tackle some of these. Should Brazil and Turkey be welcomed as facilitators or resisted as interlopers? Did they achieve a worthwhile deal? Do sanctions even work? And can this story have a happy ending?

The role played by Brazil and Turkey poses a real dilemma. Many of us have argued the need for help from the emergent powers with just these sort of issues. The inevitable corollary being that they'd assert their influence on their own terms, rather than ours. According to some of this week's commentary, President Lula and Prime Minister Erdogan were sticking their thumbs in America's eyes -- or at least tilting toward the Iranian side of the dispute -- rather than seeking a constructive solution to the problem. Then when the Obama Administration's rebuffed the attempted mediation, critics from the left (e.g.M.J. Rosenberg) said it was being too rigid -- refusing half a loaf will leave it with none.

Were these two key new players working in the right spirit, working the problem rather than merely showboating or seizing a political advantage? I believe so. Here's a quote on President Lula's aims from one of his top aides,Marcel Biato, writing in Americas Quarterly:

President Lula has condemned Iran’s failure to abide by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. When he hosted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in late 2009, he was forthright in expressing concern over Iran’s lack of transparency in dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He made it clear that Brazil will only defend Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes if it shows good faith in fulfilling its outstanding commitments.

That's singing from the same sheet music, and contrary to the cynics, I see no reason to doubt its sincerity. My quibble is with the execution, not the mission itself; though I do take issue with one key premise. Marcel argues elsewhere in the piece, as have others, that sanctions and confrontation with Iran will only provoke its resistance. Iran's insecurities and suspicions are indeed part of the equation, but there's no way that backing off will induce Tehran to be more responsive. Quite the opposite, Brazil and Turkey were able to reach their deal because of the sword of sanctions hung over Iran's head.

So, does wanting the new powers to take this kind of initiative obligate me to approve of the deal's terms? No, as in any negotiation, a deal has to be judged on its content. On this issue, Judah Grunstein makes a number of smart points, the strongest being:

it's premature to say that the deal is proof of Turkey reaching the "big leagues" in terms of its diplomatic stature. Sometimes just being involved is an accomplishment (although that's usually the case for minor leaguers), and to whatever extent Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan managed to gain concessions from Iran, it was a sign of Turkey's influence. But in the big leagues, influence is not measured by getting one party to sign on to a deal that's unacceptable to the other. It's measured by bridging differences to get both sides to sign on, and in the meantime, by getting both sides to abstain from provocative and inflammatory behavior. Turkey's ability to do that will clearly be limited in this case, as witnessed by Terhan's refusal so far to halt 20 percent enrichment and the U.S. decision to press on with U.N. sanctions.

Exactly. And in terms of the process story (the life bread of any true wonk), Josh Rogin tells us that Washington gave the mediators clear signals about the administration's red lines. In addition to Grunstein, RealClearWorld bloggers Kevin Sullivan and Greg Scoblete make further strong arguments for why the warmed-over and half-eaten agreement from last October doesn't cut it. In fact, if we're looking for counterfactuals that acknowledge a potential role for Ankara and Brasilia, a good question is why they didn't come through with a compromise in December or January (oh yeah, the damoclean sanctions threat).

Speaking of sanctions, I'd like to respond to all the skepticism about their efficacy -- particularly the why-is-the-fourth-time-different meme. First off, there is something new about imposing smart sanctions at this point. Remember all those news stories about how the Revolutionary Guard has built an industrial empire in recent years? Perhaps that exposes them to new vulnerabilities.

But the point of sanctions is not to cripple the leadership or create newly intolerable economic conditions. One can concede their limited direct effects and still believe in their value and efficacy. Because the real point of sanctions is a demonstration that a unified international community is staying on their ass, that the trend lines of pressure are not diminishing, irrespective of Tehran's intransigence. (As Greg Scoblete points out, Russia and China probably matter to Iran more than Brazil and Turkey.) The sanctions work when Iranian leaders become convinced non-cooperation isn't worth the hassle.

This also explains the failure of sanctions to work. Because they are instruments of pressure, they have a limited shelf life. Each set of sanctions failed over time as the associated pressure waned. Again, this is why a Brazil-Turkey initiative would have been more helpful in December. The key question about efficacy -- and the entire enterprise -- has to do with keeping the negotiating process on a relatively quick tempo. Does the administration have a game plan of additional requests and incentives to drive this toward a successful outcome?

Which brings me to the final question of a happy end for the current chapter. If Brazil and Turkey still have some diplomatic fight in them, perhaps rather than standing by their unsuccessful bargain, they could induce Iran to a more meaningful one. And if they do, I'll be the first to heap them with praise.

=============

Brazil's Take on Iran and NPT

Interviewee:	Antonio Ramalho, Professor of International Relations, University of Brasilia
Interviewer:	Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

May 19, 2010

The successful Brazilian-Turkish effort to get Iran to agree to a deal to send about half of its low-enriched uranium abroad was quickly upstaged by the announcement of a draft resolution for Iran sanctions that had Russia and China's blessing. Brazil wanted to project "political capacity" in the deal it helped craft, says Brazilian international relations expert Antonio Ramalho, who adds that "the very fact that the Iranians have agreed to sign an agreement has already diminished Iran's maneuverability." Ramalho says that Brazil, a late (1998) signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, debated about whether to sign the NPT but did so to gain access to peaceful nuclear technology.

Why did Brazil take such an active role in working out this nuclear agreement with Iran?

There was one important motivation, which is to project Brazil's political capacity in the world. The Brazilian government has a perception that there have been rearrangements in the international system politically, diplomatically, and economically. Brazil perceives that this allows some room for maneuvering to new powers such as China, India, South Africa, and Brazil. Brazil believes it can provide the international community with diplomatic expertise on the one hand, and help solve conflict through negotiations.

Brazil believes it can play an important role, as a representative of emerging countries, in delivering some solutions that do not depend on the use of force or on the threat of the use of force.

I don't necessarily say that I accept this as "truth," but the Brazilian government has this conviction. Brazil has another conviction, which is that international security cannot be provided without the promotion of an international order that is more equitable than exists today.

What was it in the case of Iran that led the Brazilian government to be so active?

It was, again, the perception of a diplomatic void on the one hand, and the perception of mounting tension over the imposition of new Security Council sanctions. The Brazilian government believes that new and tougher sanctions on Iran would not work. It would only contribute to strengthening Iran's position in the region and strengthening the hardliners within Iranian society and within the Iranian government. They would be able to say that the economic problems they face were due to the sanctions imposed by the international community.

If we impose further sanctions, that will only increase the secrecy in Iran and increase the military orientation of this program.

Brazil is now a member of the Security Council, and it's been involved in these discussions in New York on sanctions. Will the agreement worked out with Turkey and Iran result in tensions between Brazil and the United States?

The Brazilian government believes that new and tougher sanctions on Iran would not work. It would only contribute to strengthening Iran's position in the region and strengthening the hardliners within Iranian society and within the Iranian government.

I don't think so. Turkey is also a member of the Security Council. The perception of the Brazilian government was that there was no longer a possibility of a peaceful way out of this situation involving just the permanent Security Council members and Iran. Brazil believed it was necessary to find an alternative and a creative solution, to take the same agreement that Western countries had discussed with Iran last October, but to change the actors. There is more trust between the Iranian government with both the Turkish and the Brazilian governments, and so the agreement is transformed even though the substance of the agreement has not been changed substantially.

As you know, Brazil would like a permanent seat in the Security Council. There is a common refrain from experts abroad to ask what Brazil has to offer the international community. Brazil does not have nuclear weapons; it does not have a huge armed force. The answer is: What Brazil has to offer is political expertise. Because if you remember well, [Carl von] Clausewitz and all the great strategic thinkers are convinced that it's better to win a battle without having to fight it. So what Brazil offers is not the possibility of using military power or imposing its will, but the possibility of engaging the opponents and turning the Security Council into a more political organization than it is nowadays.

What is Brazil's attitude toward the NPT, which is now having a review conference at the UN? At one time in Brazil's history when the military ran the government, there were apparently secret efforts to develop some kind of nuclear weapon capacity.

What exists is the diplomatic and, again, politically principled position that the NPT is a discretionary treaty. It establishes a difference between countries that are supposedly responsible and can have this nuclear weapons technology, vis-à-vis those who are not considered responsible and would endanger international security if they had the nuclear capacity. Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994, which established a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. We have a unique relationship with Argentina, in fact, which permits experts from Argentina to enter into all nuclear installations in Brazil. Brazil has inserted into its own constitution that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. Last but not least, there is a deep involvement of civilians in the military program that is conducted within the Brazilian Navy. But, as far as I know, Brazil is the sole country in the world that allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make inspections within its own military facilities.

Was Brazil a latecomer to the NPT treaty?

In 1998, when Brazil signed the NPT treaty, there were arguments for and against. The argument against adhering to the NPT was that Brazil already made its program transparent, but at the same point, it had this principled position which is the one followed by India. Although we know that India had a military program, the Indian government has never agreed to adhere to the NPT [because] it is a discriminatory treaty. In 1998, the majority of the military, as well as many diplomats and experts, [thought] that Brazil should not sign the NPT, based on this argument. It is the tradition of Brazil to fight for a more fair international order that is ruled by institutions and norms [and] that considers states to be equally responsible from the point of view of international law. The argument was that we should not subscribe to a treaty that is discriminatory. This did not mean that Brazil aimed at developing nuclear artifacts or whatever.

There are economic and commercial applications of the nuclear technology, which explains Brazil's refusal to sign the additional protocols.

On the other side of the argument from those who were for signing the NPT was that doing so would lead to a greater access to peaceful nuclear technology. And also that Brazil, Israel, India, and Pakistan were the sole countries that had not signed the NPT. So the concern about being isolated persuaded many of the Brazilian diplomats. Brazil has signed the treaty; it has adhered to the regime. It refuses the "additional protocols."

The additional protocols allows IAEA inspectors to go everywhere they want?

Yes, particularly in terms of having access to technologies that have commercial purposes. The NPT just concerns the amount of uranium that enters and leaves the facilities, while the additional protocols would permit technicians to have access to some technologies that Brazil has developed itself, because it did not have access to foreign technology. So there are economic and commercial applications of the nuclear technology, which explains Brazil's refusal to sign the additional protocols.

You know these things are interconnected, to a certain extent. Brazil's position on its nuclear program is very clear. It is what it is in the Brazilian constitution: We will not use it to develop bombs or any nuclear artifacts. That does not mean that we cannot develop a reactor to be placed into a submarine, which is a military application--but not a military application of nuclear power, but nuclear energy, and that make a huge difference. Close to 95 percent of our foreign trade goes through the sea, and 80 percent of the oil Brazil produces is on the sea. The idea is to have nuclear submarines which are more effective than conventional submarines.

What has been the reaction in Brazil, to the agreement worked out in Iran? There was some criticism of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva welcoming Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last year, soon after the disputed elections in Iran. Was this regarded as a great achievement for Brazil or is Lula being criticized for it?

Both. I agree with those who are in favor of the agreement, but who are skeptical because they say it's too soon to evaluate the results. It is still too soon to evaluate whether this is going to be a breakthrough for the international community. But from the point of view of Brazil's image abroad, it has been positive already. Because even if it doesn't work, even if all this skepticism about it is correct, Brazil will have taken responsibility for trying to break a dangerous deadlock. If it were not for new initiatives to engage Iran, we would probably go for tougher sanctions, but that would lead to a tougher response from the Iranian government, and this could eventually lead to conflict. So even if it doesn't work, the very fact that the Iranians have agreed to sign an agreement has already diminished Iran's maneuverability, because one month from now if it does not work, Ahmadinejad would be seen as only manipulating Lula and Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan of Turkey. Iran would have lost a positive opinion of countries that favor engagement. And it would be even more isolated than it is now. So in a sense, this has already changed the process.

And what do the critics say?

The critics say that Brazil is too small, that this is an act of vanity based on the idea that he [Lula] can do more than he can. And again, why? Because those people tend to think if you don't have military muscles or economic capacity to press Iran, you will not be able to move the Iranians. But they do not consider that for the Iranians themselves, they want not to be isolated. Although they are right that Brazil does not have a military or economic capacity to sanction and to impose pressure on Iran, Brazil has this political capacity to change the process in such a way to create an opportunity for the Iranians to reorient their place in their region, and to reorient their relations with the international community in a way that would be positive for the Iranians.