Showing posts with label war on terror. Show all posts
Showing posts with label war on terror. Show all posts

AUMF 2.0 - the U.S. would not need it


AUMF 2.0
March 9th, 2013   by Deborah Pearlstein

I hope soon to get more directly to the important news of the prosecution of former Al Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith in U.S. federal court in New York and much else of interest in our pages, but I didn’t want to let pass without comment the also important piece in the Washington Post this week that the Obama Administration is examining whether it should seek to extend the legal authorization for targeted killing operations beyond those groups currently identified by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Per The Post: “The debate has been driven by the emergence of groups in North Africa and the Middle East that may embrace aspects of al-Qaeda’s agenda but have no meaningful ties to its crumbling leadership base in Pakistan. Among them are the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Ansar al-Sharia, which was linked to the September attack on a U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya. As the article rightly explains, these are “militant groups with little or no connection to the organization responsible for the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.”

The AUMF has been the cornerstone of U.S. domestic authority to detain and target members of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and “associated forces,” but it is limited by its terms, by Administration interpretation, and by the courts to uses of force against these groups. As the U.S. prepares to leave Afghanistan and as the Al Qaeda that attacked the United States on 9/11 collapses, the AUMF is of decreasing import. More, as Steve Coll recently wrote, distinguishing the AUMF’s target groups from various violent Jihadi successor groups in Yemen, Mali and elsewhere: “A franchise is a business that typically operates under strict rules laid down by a parent corporation; to apply that label to Al Qaeda’s derivative groups today is false.”

So if the AUMF doesn’t authorize the use of force against the next generation of terrorist organization, what should we do? Former DOD General Counsel Jeh Johnson suggested before his departure that when Al Qaeda ceased to be a coherent enough enemy to justify a state of armed conflict, U.S. counterterrorism would mostly return to a field dominated by international policing and intelligence work (the way most of the rest of the world treats it still). (or) Others have suggested the opposite direction: new congressional authority to use force against a new/different/alternative list of terrorist organization enemies. My friends over at Lawfare, Bobby Chesney, Matt Waxman, Jack Goldsmith and Ben Wittes, are hard at work on just what a statutory framework should be.

(the U.S. would not need a new Congressional authority to use force because its law enforcement and intelligence tools will be adequate to address the emergent terrorist threats -- but for a law like AUMF, Bin Laden could have been killed prior to 9/11 attack)
The problem is, deciding what we should do next is a lot harder than determining what we could, legally, do next. AUMF II proposals (for lack of a better descriptor) turn on the critical assumption that law enforcement and intelligence tools (coupled with the rare Presidential use of force in national self defense – a power used rarely and publicly before 9/11) will be inadequate to address the emergent terrorist threats. But the accuracy of that assumption is far from clear. In part, the assumption is based on a lesson taken from the history of U.S. counterterrorism leading up to 9/11, in particular the notion that but for a failure of legal authorization the United States could have killed bin Laden in the 1990’s. But law was hardly the only (or indeed, sometimes any) issue. In his book, Peter Bergen explains that many of the best chances to target bin Laden were missed not as a result of legal constraints but because we rarely knew where he would be with 8+ hours lead time, the amount of time it took to ready and land a cruise missile, our best available weapon for such a purpose then. On one occasion when we did have such time (in 1999), CIA Director Tenet determined striking bin Laden was not worth the political price we would have paid, killing a group of U.A.E. civilian allies of the United States also present at the same hunting camp. As a matter of law though, especially after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, a strike against bin Laden in those circumstances (assuming it otherwise necessary, proportional, etc.) could have been legally justified even under pre-2001 international law understandings as national self-defense.

(another reason against AUMF II is the criminal and intelligence powers made available to the U.S. gov. after 9/11)
Then there’s the other side of the legal authorization ledger – the criminal and intelligence powers (and capabilities) available to the U.S. government today that didn’t exist in the lead up to 9/11. From the range of federal criminal offenses that now apply extraterritorially (like receiving military-type training from or on behalf of a designated terrorist organization) to vast statutory surveillance authorities, from the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center to the substantial expansion in U.S. intelligence resources focused directly on violent jihadist threats – our government is better organized and empowered to identify and confront the next bin Laden (should he emerge) in ways short of requiring the launching of another armed conflict (or two or three or four).

In any case, as the 9/11 Commission Report details, the threat bin Laden and his organization posed by the mid-late 1990’s was very clear to U.S. intelligence and executive branch policy makers. Bin Laden had declared war against America, his stated goals expressly involved America, he had already engineered significant attacks against this country, and was actively developing others. There’s little doubt that today’s violent jihadist groups in Mali and Somalia and Syria and Libya pose various dangers. Do they harbor the intent and the capability to carry out attacks in the United States, or are they otherwise a great enough threat to the United States to justify effectively declaring war – again? Coll and others aren’t so sure. Historically, democracies expected a public case to be made before determining that new war authorities were necessary. That case hasn’t yet been made.

“The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?” by Jeh Johnson at Oxford Union in Nov. 2012


Jeh Johnson Speech at the Oxford Union
By Benjamin Wittes   Friday, November 30, 2012 at 12:01 PM

At this hour, Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson is giving the following speech at the Oxford Union in England:

“The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?”
Jeh Charles Johnson
General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense at the Oxford Union, Oxford University[1]
November 30, 2012

Thank you for inviting me.  It is a privilege for me to stand here, in the same place, before the same Union, as the Prime Ministers, Presidents, and other world notables who have preceded me.

I am the General Counsel of the U.S. Defense Department.  If I had to summarize my job in one sentence: it is to ensure that everything our military and our Defense Department do is consistent with U.S. and international law.  This includes the prior legal review of every military operation that the Secretary of Defense and the President must approve.

My counterpart here in the United Kingdom is Ms. Frances Nash, the legal adviser to the U.K. Ministry of Defence.  Like Ms. Nash, I am a civilian, not a member of the military, consistent with the principle in both our countries of civilian oversight of the military.  Unlike Ms. Nash, who is a civil servant and a long-time official of the Ministry of Defence, I am a political appointee.  This means I serve at the pleasure of the current President, and have no expectation of serving for any other.

Here in the United Kingdom, you refer to July 7, 2005, the day of the terrorist suicide bombings of the London subway, as “7/7.”  I am a New Yorker and a personal witness to the events of “9/11.”  I was a private citizen then, and like many others that day, wandered the streets of Manhattan asking: “what can I do to help?”

Over the last 46 months as a public official, I have tried to answer that question.

There is a quote from the Brookings Institution in Washington, which motivates my own public service:

American government was designed to be led by citizens who would step out of private life for a term of office, then return to their communities enriched by service and ready to recruit the next generation of citizen servants.  The Founding Fathers believed in a democracy led by individuals who would not become so enamored of power and addicted to perquisites that they use government as an instrument of self-aggrandizement.

Indeed, it was the British poet Lord Byron who called our First President, George Washington, the “Cincinnatus of the West” for his decision to surrender his personal power after the American Revolution and retire to his farm on Mount Vernon.[2]

As a member of the Obama Administration for the last four years, I have been privileged to witness many transformational and historic events in the national security of the United States. 

We ended the combat mission in Iraq.

We increased the number of combat forces in Afghanistan and have reversed much of the Taliban’s momentum in the country.  Challenges remain, but violence is down across the country. We have a timetable for transitioning our efforts in Afghanistan to the Afghans’ own security forces, and we are adhering to it.  And though we have disagreed with our Afghan partners from time to time, as of this date we have negotiated and signed understandings with the Afghan government on detention operations,[3] special operations[4] and an overall strategic partnership,[5]  representing major milestones toward the day when the peace and security of that country is fully in the hands of the Afghan people and their government.

I was in Afghanistan last week, to spend Thanksgiving with the troops.  While there I encountered a number of Her Majesty’s armed forces.   The British subjects here should be proud of them all.  The British hospital I visited at Camp Bastion was first-rate and amazing.  And the very good news on that particular day was, at three separate hospitals, I saw not a single U.S. or UK casualty, except for a U.S. soldier in need of an appendectomy, a British soldier with a bad knee, and many bored and happy trauma teams standing around with nothing to do.

We banned “enhanced interrogation techniques,” consistent with the calls of many in our country, including our own military, that great nations simply do not treat other human beings that way.  These controversial practices have been banned, yet we continue to gather valuable intelligence in a manner consistent with our Army Field Manual, the Detainee Treatment Act, and international law.

We worked with our Congress to enact the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which reformed our system of military commissions to ensure due process and fairness for the accused. Today, our system of military commissions prosecutions of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and the other alleged organizers of the September 11 attacks is more credible, sustainable and transparent.  One of our nation’s finest military lawyers, and a Rhodes Scholar, Brigadier General Mark Martins, is now the chief prosecutor in that system.

We worked with our Congress to pass the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, such that gay and lesbian members of the U.S. military can now be open and honest about their sexual orientation without fear of being separated for that reason.  In the words of one gay servicemember: “you took a knife out of my back; you have no idea what it is like to serve in silence.”

And, finally, we have, in a manner consistent with our laws and values, taken the fight directly to the terrorist organization al Qaeda, the result of which is that the core of al Qaeda is today degraded, disorganized and on the run.  Osama bin Laden is dead.  Many other leaders and terrorist operatives of al Qaeda are dead or captured; those left in al Qaeda’s core struggle to communicate, issue orders, and recruit.

But, there is still danger and there is still much to do.  Al Qaeda’s core has been degraded, leaving al Qaeda more decentralized, and most terrorist activity now conducted by local franchises, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (based in Yemen) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (operating in north and west Africa).  So, therefore, in places like Yemen, and in partnership with that government, we are taking the fight directly to AQAP, and continually disrupting its plans to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. and Yemeni interests.

Al Qaeda has sought to attack the UK on a number of occasions.  Two years ago, Her Majesty’s government assessed:

“We face a real and pressing

threat from international terrorism, particularly that inspired by Al Qaeda and its affiliates . . . Al Qaeda remains the most potent terrorist threat to the UK.”[6]

Our efforts against al Qaeda have involved multiple instruments of the U.S. government, including the military, civilian law enforcement, and intelligence services, in partnership with the United Kingdom and other nations.

It is the U.S. military’s efforts against al Qaeda and associated forces that has demanded most of my time, generated much public legal commentary, and presented for us what are perhaps the weightiest legal issues in national security.  It is the topic I will spend the balance of my remarks on tonight.

The United States government is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda and associated forces, to which the laws of armed conflict apply.  One week after 9/11, our Congress authorized our President to “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those nations, organizations and individuals responsible for 9/11. President Obama, like President Bush before him, as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, has acted militarily based on that authorization.  In 2006, our Supreme Court also endorsed the view that the United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda.[7]  Therefore, all three branches of the United States government – including the two political branches elected by the people and the judicial branch appointed for life (and therefore not subject to the whims and political pressures of the voters) – have endorsed the view that our efforts against al Qaeda may properly be viewed as an armed conflict.

But, for the United States, this is a new kind of war. It is an unconventional war against an unconventional enemy.  And, given its unconventional nature, President Obama – himself a lawyer and a good one – has insisted that our efforts in pursuit of this enemy stay firmly rooted in conventional legal principles.  For, in our efforts to destroy and dismantle al Qaeda, we cannot dismantle our laws and our values, too.

The danger of al Qaeda is well known.  It is a terrorist organization determined to commit acts of violence against innocent civilians.  The danger of the conflict against al Qaeda is that it lacks conventional boundaries, against an enemy that does not observe the rules of armed conflict, does not wear a uniform, and can resemble a civilian.

But we refuse to allow this enemy, with its contemptible tactics, to define the way in which we wage war.  Our efforts remain grounded in the rule of law.  In this unconventional conflict, therefore, we apply conventional legal principles – conventional legal principles found in treaties and customary international law.

As in armed conflict, we have been clear in defining the enemy and defining our objective against that enemy.
We have made clear that we are not at war with an idea, a religion, or a tactic.  We are at war with an organized, armed group — a group determined to kill innocent civilians.

We have publicly stated that our enemy consists of those persons who are part of the Taliban, al-Qaeda or associated forces,[8] a declaration that has been embraced by two U.S. Presidents, accepted by our courts, [9] and affirmed by our Congress.[10]

We have publicly defined an “associated force” as having two characteristics: (1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.[11]

Our enemy does not include anyone solely in the category of activist, journalist, or propagandist.

Nor does our enemy in this armed conflict include a “lone wolf” who, inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology, self-radicalizes in the basement of his own home, without ever actually becoming part of al Qaeda.  Such persons are dangerous, but are a matter for civilian law enforcement, not the military, because they are not part of the enemy force.

And, we have publicly stated that our goal in this conflict is to “disrupt, dismantle, and ensure a lasting defeat of al Qaeda and violent extremist affiliates.”[12]

Some legal scholars and commentators in our country brand the detention by the military of members of al Qaeda as “indefinite detention without charges.”  Some refer to targeted lethal force against known, identified individual members of al Qaeda as “extrajudicial killing.”

Viewed within the context of law enforcement or criminal justice, where no person is sentenced to death or prison without an indictment, an arraignment, and a trial before an impartial judge or jury, these characterizations might be understandable.

Viewed within the context of conventional armed conflict — as they should be — capture, detention and lethal force are traditional practices as old as armies.  Capture and detention by the military are part and parcel of armed conflict.[13]  We employ weapons of war against al Qaeda, but in a manner consistent with the law of war.  We employ lethal force, but in a manner consistent with the law of war principles of proportionality, necessity and distinction.  We detain those who are part of al Qaeda, but in a manner consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and all other applicable law.[14]

But, now that efforts by the U.S. military against al Qaeda are in their 12th year, we must also ask ourselves: how will this conflict end?  It is an unconventional conflict, against an unconventional enemy, and will not end in conventional terms.

Conventional conflicts in history tend to have had conventional endings.

Two hundred years ago, our two Nations fought the War of 1812.  The United States lost many battles, Washington, DC was captured, and the White House was set ablaze.  By the winter of 1814 British and American forces had strengthened their forts and fleets, and assumed that fighting would resume between them in the spring. But, the war ended when British and American diplomats in Belgium came to a peace agreement on December 24, 1814.  Diplomats from both sides then joined together in a Christmas celebration at Ghent cathedral. Less than eight weeks later, the U.S. Senate provided advice and consent to that peace treaty, which for the United States legally and formally terminated the conflict.[15]

In the American Civil War, the Battle of Appomattox was the final engagement of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s great Army of Northern Virginia, and one of the last battles of that war.  After four years of war, General Lee recognized that “[i]t would be useless and therefore cruel to provoke the further effusion of blood.” Three days later the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered.[16]  Lee’s army then marched to the field in front of Appomattox Court House, and, division by division, deployed into line, stacked their arms, folded their colors, and walked home empty-handed.[17]

The last day of the First World War was November 11, 1918, when an armistice was signed at 5:00 a.m. in a railroad carriage in France, and a ceasefire took effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918.

The Second World War concluded in the Pacific theater in August 1945, with a ceremony that took place on the deck of the USS Missouri.

During the Gulf War of 1991, one week after Saddam Hussein’s forces set fire to oil wells as they were driven out of Kuwait, U.S. General Schwarzkopf sat down with Iraqi military leaders under a tent in a stretch of the occupied Iraqi desert a few miles from the Kuwaiti border.  General Schwarzkopf wanted to keep discussions simple; he told his advisors: “I just want to get my soldiers home as fast as possible . . . I want no ceremonies, no handshakes.”[18]  In the space of two hours they had negotiated the terms of a permanent cease-fire to end the First Gulf War.[19]

We cannot and should not expect al Qaeda and its associated forces to all surrender, all lay down their weapons in an open field, or to sign a peace treaty with us.  They are terrorist organizations.  Nor can we capture or kill every last terrorist who claims an affiliation with al Qaeda.

I am aware of studies that suggest that many “terrorist” organizations eventually denounce terrorism and violence, and seek to address their grievances through some form of reconciliation or participation in a political process.[20]

Al Qaeda is not in that category.

Al Qaeda’s radical and absurd goals have included global domination through a violent Islamic caliphate, terrorizing the United States and other western nations from retreating from the world stage,[21] and the destruction of Israel.  There is no compromise or political bargain that can be struck with those who pursue such aims.

In the current conflict with al Qaeda, I can offer no prediction about when  this conflict will end, or whether we are, as Winston Churchill described it, near the “beginning of the end.”

I do believe that on the present course, there will come a tipping point – a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed.

At that point, we must be able to say to ourselves that our efforts should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” against al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort against individuals  who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda, for which the law enforcement and intelligence resources of our government are principally responsible, in cooperation with the international community – with our military assets available in reserve to address continuing and imminent terrorist threats.

At that point we will also need to face the question of what to do with any members of al Qaeda who still remain in U.S. military detention without a criminal conviction and sentence.  In general, the military’s authority to detain ends with the “cessation of active hostilities.”[22]  For this particular conflict, all I can say today is that we should look to conventional legal principles to supply the answer, and that both our Nations faced similar challenging questions after the cessation of hostilities in World War II, and our governments delayed the release of some Nazi German prisoners of war.[23]

For now, we must continue our efforts to disrupt, dismantle and ensure a lasting defeat of al Qaeda.  Though severely degraded, al Qaeda remains a threat to the citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom and other nations.   We must disrupt al Qaeda’s terrorist attack planning before it gets anywhere near our homeland or our citizens.  We must counter al Qaeda in the places where it seeks to establish safe haven, and prevent it from reconstituting in others.  To do this we must utilize every national security element of our government, and work closely with our friends and allies like the United Kingdom and others.

Finally, it was a warfighting four-star general who reminded me, as I previewed these remarks for him, that none of this will ever be possible if we fail to understand and address what attracts a young man to an organization like al Qaeda in the first place.  Al Qaeda claims to represent the interests of all Muslims.  By word and deed, we must stand with the millions of people within the Muslim world who reject Al Qaeda as a marginalized, extreme and violent organization that does not  represent the Muslim values of peace and brotherhood.  For, if al Qaeda can recruit new terrorists to its cause faster than we can kill or capture them, we fight an endless, hopeless battle that only perpetuates a downward spiral of hate, recrimination, violence and fear.

“War” must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs.  War permits one man – if he is a “privileged belligerent,” consistent with the laws of war — to kill another.  War violates the natural order of things, in which children bury their parents; in war parents bury their children.  In its 12th year, we must not accept the current conflict, and all that it entails, as the “new normal.”  Peace must be regarded as the norm toward which the human race continually strives.

Right here at Oxford you have the excellent work of the Changing Character of War program: leading scholars committed to the study of war, who have observed that analyzing war in terms of a continuum of armed conflict — where military force is used at various points without a distinct break between war and peace — is counterproductive.  Such an approach, they argue, results in an erosion of “any demarcation between war and peace,” the very effect of which is to create uncertainty about how to define war itself.[24]

I did not go to Oxford.  I am a graduate of a small, all-male historically black college in the southern part of the United States, Morehouse College.  The guiding light for every Morehouse man is our most famous alumnus, Martin Luther King, who preached the inherent insanity of all wars.  I am therefore a student and disciple of Dr. King – though I became an imperfect one the first time I gave legal approval for the use of military force.  I accepted this conundrum when I took this job.  But, I still carry with me the words from Dr. King: “Returning hate for hate multiples hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars … violence multiplies violence, and toughness multiplies toughness in a descending spiral of destruction … The chain reaction of evil—hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars—must be broken, or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss of annihilation.”[25]

Thank you again for the honor and the opportunity to be in this special place, and thank you for listening to me.



[1] With the valuable research assistance of David A. Simon, Special Counsel to the General Counsel (J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil., International Relations, Oxford University).
[2] George Gordon, Lord Byron, “Ode to Napoleon Buonaparte.”  Available at: http://theotherpages.org/poems/2001/byron0101.html
[3] Memorandum of Understanding between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America On Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan, March 9, 2012.
[4] Memorandum of Understanding between The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on Afghanization of Special Operations on Afghan Soil, April 8, 2012.
[5] Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America, May 1, 2012.
[6] “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010, available on http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/
[7] Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-31 (2006) (holding that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda).
[8] See Respondent’s Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442, at 1 (D.D.C. March 13, 2009).
[9] See e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
[10] See Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (December 31, 2011).
[11] Remarks by Jeh Charles Johnson, Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (February 22, 2012).
[12] Remarks by John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, April 30, 2012, available at:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi
[13] Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war”).
[14] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
[15] Treaty of Peace and Amity (Treaty of Ghent), U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IX, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218.  The treaty entered into force for the United States on February 17, 1815. The parties to the Treaty were Britain and the United States.
[16] U.S. Library of Congress, Today in History: April 9, available athttp://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/apr09.html.
[17] Id. at 630-631
[18] Shyam Bhatia, Daniel McGrory, Brighter Than the Baghdad Sun: Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Threat to the United States, available athttp://tinyurl.com/8rttl4v.
[19] Encyclopedia Britannica, Persian Gulf Waravailable at:http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/452778/Persian-Gulf-War; History.Com, Topic: Persian Gulf War,  available at:  http://www.history.com/topics/persian-gulf-war.  Gulf War: Background Briefing, CBS News, available athttp://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-2524.html.  Philip Shenon, After The War: Cease-Fire Meeting; A Hard-Faced Schwarzkopf Sets Terms at Desert Meeting, New York Times, March 4, 1991, available at:http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/04/world/after-war-cease-fire-meeting-hard-faced-schwarzkopf-sets-terms-desert-meeting.html
[20] Seth G. Jones & Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida 13 (2d ed. 2008) (RAND Corp.).
[21] Remarks by John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, June 29, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/remarks-john-o-brennan-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter.
[22] See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”).
[23] Regarding post-hostilities detention during the conclusion of World War II, see Ludecke v. Watkins 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (holding that the President’s authority to detain German nationals continued for over six years after the fighting with Germany had ended); See alsoAlien Enemy Act of 1798 50 U.S.C. §§21-24 (2000).  See James Richards, British Broadcasting Corporation, Life in Britain for German Prisoners of War, (noting that by the end of 1947, 250,000 of the prisoners of war were repatriated, and the last repatriation took place in November 1948); available at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/german_pows_01.shtml.
[24]  The Changing Character of War 10-11 (Hew Strachan & Sibylle Scheipers eds., Oxford University Press 2011).
[25] Martin Luther King, Jr., Loving Your Enemies 53 (1981).

Don’t Close Guantánamo By JENNIFER DASKAL


Don’t Close Guantánamo
By JENNIFER DASKAL  Published: January 10, 2013

IN 2010, I was branded a member of the “Al Qaeda 7” — a notorious label attached to Department of Justice lawyers who were mocked by critics claiming they had “flocked to Guantánamo to take up the cause of the terrorists.” My crime: I advocated for the closure of the detention facility — a position that has also been taken up by the likes of former President George W. Bush, former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell — and for more humane living conditions for those imprisoned there.

At the time, I reacted defensively. I was indignant. I insisted on the legitimacy of my convictions. But even then the writing was on the wall. For a core group of detainees, closing Guantánamo would not mean release or prosecution, as most human rights and civil liberties groups have long advocated. Rather, it would mean relocation to the United States, or elsewhere, for continued detention.

Now, almost four years later, I have changed my mind. Despite recognizing the many policy imperatives in favor of closure, despite the bipartisan support for this position, and despite the fact that 166 men still languish there, I now believe that Guantánamo should stay open — at least for the short term.

While I have been slow to come to this realization, the signs have been evident for some time. Three years ago, Barack Obama’s administration conducted a comprehensive review of the Guantánamo detainees and concluded that about four dozen prisoners couldn’t be prosecuted, but were too dangerous to be transferred or released. They are still being held under rules of war that allow detention without charge for the duration of hostilities.

Others happened to hail from Yemen. Although many of them were cleared for transfer, the transfers were put on indefinite hold because of instability in Yemen, the fear that some might join Al Qaeda forces, and Yemen’s inability to put adequate security measures in place.

While the specific numbers have most likely shifted over time, the basic categories persist. These are men whom the current administration will not transfer, release or prosecute, so long as the legal authority to detain, pursuant to the law of war, endures.

President Obama raised the hopes of the human rights community when during his re-election campaign he once again said the detention center should be closed. But it was not clear whether he had a viable plan, and any such plan would almost certainly involve moving many of the detainees into continued detention in the United States, where their living conditions would almost certainly deteriorate.

Guantánamo in 2013 is a far cry from Guantánamo in 2002. Thanks to the spotlight placed on the facility by human rights groups, international observers and detainees’ lawyers, there has been a significant, if not uniform, improvement in conditions.

The majority of Guantánamo detainees now live in communal facilities where they can eat, pray and exercise together. If moved to the United States, these same men would most likely be held in military detention in conditions akin to supermax prisons — confined to their cells 22 hours a day and prohibited from engaging in group activities, including communal prayer. The hard-won improvements in conditions would be ratcheted back half a decade to their previous level of harshness.

And Guantánamo would no longer be that failed experiment on an island many miles away. The Obama administration would be affirmatively creating a new system of detention without charge for terrorism suspects on American soil, setting a precedent and creating a facility readily available to future presidents wanting to rid themselves of a range of potentially dangerous actors.

The political reality is that closure of Guantánamo is unlikely to happen anytime soon, and if it did, it would do more harm than good. We should instead focus on finding places to transfer those cleared to leave the facility and, more important, on defining the end to the war.

In a recent speech, Jeh Johnson, then the Department of Defense general counsel, discussed a future “tipping point” at which Al Qaeda would be so decimated that the armed conflict would be deemed over. Statements from high level officials suggest that this point may be near. And as the United States pulls out of Afghanistan, there is an increasingly strong argument that the war against Al Qaeda is coming to a close. With the end of the conflict, the legal justification for the detentions will finally disappear.

At that point, the remaining men in Guantánamo can no longer be held without charge, at least not without running afoul of basic constitutional and international law prohibitions. Only then is there a realistic hope for meaningful closure, not by recreating a prison in the United States but through the arduous process of transferring, releasing or prosecuting the detainees left there.

In the meantime, we should keep Guantánamo open.

Jennifer Daskal is a fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Law Center. She has served as counsel to the assistant attorney general for national security at the Department of Justice and as senior counterterrorism counsel at Human Rights Watch.  (has just accepted an offer to join the faculty at Washington College of Law)

Message from the Acting Director: "Zero Dark Thirty"


Message from the Acting Director: "Zero Dark Thirty"
Statement to Employees from Acting Director Michael Morell: "Zero Dark Thirty"
December 21, 2012

I would not normally comment on a Hollywood film, but I think it important to put Zero Dark Thirty, which deals with one of the most significant achievements in our history, into some context.  The film, which premiered this week, addresses the successful hunt for Usama Bin Ladin that was the focus of incredibly dedicated men and women across our Agency, Intelligence Community, and military partners for many years.  But in doing so, the film takes significant artistic license, while portraying itself as being historically accurate.

What I want you to know is that Zero Dark Thirty is a dramatization, not a realistic portrayal of the facts.  CIA interacted with the filmmakers through our Office of Public Affairs but, as is true with any entertainment project with which we interact, we do not control the final product.

It would not be practical for me to walk through all the fiction in the film, but let me highlight a few aspects that particularly underscore the extent to which the film departs from reality.

  • First, the hunt for Usama Bin Ladin was a decade-long effort that depended on the selfless commitment of hundreds of officers.  The filmmakers attributed the actions of our entire Agency—and the broader Intelligence Community—to just a few individuals.  This may make for more compelling entertainment, but it does not reflect the facts.  The success of the May 1st 2011 operation was a team effort—and a very large team at that.
  • Second, the film creates the strong impression that the enhanced interrogation techniques that were part of our former detention and interrogation program were the key to finding Bin Ladin.  That impression is false.  As we have said before, the truth is that multiple streams of intelligence led CIA analysts to conclude that Bin Ladin was hiding in Abbottabad.  Some came from detainees subjected to enhanced techniques, but there were many other sources as well.  And, importantly, whether enhanced interrogation techniques were the only timely and effective way to obtain information from those detainees, as the film suggests, is a matter of debate that cannot and never will be definitively resolved.
  • Third, the film takes considerable liberties in its depiction of CIA personnel and their actions, including some who died while serving our country.  We cannot allow a Hollywood film to cloud our memory of them.

Commentators will have much to say about this film in the weeks ahead.  Through it all, I want you to remember that Zero Dark Thirty is not a documentary.  What you should also remember is that the Bin Ladin operation was a landmark achievement by our country, by our military, by our Intelligence Community, and by our Agency.
Michael Morell

Leading experts call on Obama to focus on aid instead of drone attacks on Yemen

Leading Experts Call for Recalibration of US Policy on Yemen in Letter to President Obama

June 26, 2012

WASHINGTON -- Twenty-seven leading foreign policy experts have sent a letter to President Obama, calling for a broader approach on US policy towards Yemen that “expands beyond the narrow lens of counterterrorism.” As US intelligence agencies point to the rise of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) activity making Yemen the next front in counterterrorism, the letter, signed by diplomats, security specialists, scholars, and US policy experts, argues that current US policy is short-sighted. It strongly urges for better policy that still serves America’s national interests by decreasing extremism and combating security threats in the region, but through a comprehensive, long-term approach that addresses Yemen’s social, economic, and political challenges.

The five-page letter, argues that current US counterterrorism policy toward Yemen “does not address the underlying causes that have propelled such [militant] forces to find fertile ground in Yemen” and that US public diplomacy only reinforces such perceptions: “Although the Department of State, USAID, and others have invested millions in development and governance projects, the perception both in the US and in Yemen is that we are singularly focused on AQAP. Yemenis need to know that their country is more than a proxy battleground and that our long-term commitment to the stability, development, and legitimacy of the country matches our more immediate and urgent commitment to the defeat of AQAP.”

Among the letter’s recommendations, the experts call for the US Administration to:
  • Change the primary face of the US government in Yemen to alter the perception that US interest and attention are solely dominated by counterterrorism and security issues.
  • Reevaluate the strategy of drone strikes with the recognition that it is generating significant anti-American sentiment.
  • Work with Friends of Yemen to provide humanitarian aid for the more than 10 million Yemenis going hungry daily.
  • Increase economic and governance aid to support democratic institution-building, so that it represents a greater proportion of overall assistance compared with military assistance
  • Support the restructuring of Yemeni security towards a unified command hierarchy under Yemeni civilian leadership.

The bipartisan letter includes signatories from a range of backgrounds including Andrew Natsios, former Administrator of USAID; Emile Nakhleh, former Director of the CIA's Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program; David Kramer of Freedom House; Steven Heydemann of Georgetown University; and Andrew Exum of the Center for New American Security.

This letter to President Obama was coordinated by the Yemen Policy Initiative, a new collaborative effort of the Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), which seeks to advance a more sustainable, long-term US policy that guarantees US national security interests and supports Yemen’s political transition.


Yemen Policy Initiative Letter to Obama 6-25-12

Obama's drone wars and the normalisation of extrajudicial murder


Obama's drone wars and the normalisation of extrajudicial murder
Michael Boyle, 11 June 2012

In his first campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama promised to reverse the worst excesses of the Bush administration's approach to terrorism – such as the use of torture, the rendition of terrorist suspects to CIA-run black sites around the globe, and the denial of basic legal rights to prisoners in Guantánamo – and to develop a counterterrorism policy that was consistent with the legal and moral tradition of the United StatesIn an address at the Woodrow Wilson Center in August 2007, Obama criticized the Bush administration for putting forward a "false choice between the liberties we cherish and the security we demand", and swore to provide "our intelligence and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to track and take out the terrorists without undermining our constitution and our freedom".

As a candidate, Obama also promised to restore proper legislative and judicial oversight to counterterrorism operations. Rather than treat counterterrorism policy as an area of exception, operating without the normal safeguards that protect the rights of the accused, Obama promised that his approach "will again set an example for the world that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers, and that justice is not arbitrary."

Four years later, it is clear that President Obama has delivered a very different counterterrorism policy from that which he promised on the campaign trail. (Full disclosure: I was an adviser on the Obama campaign's counterterrorism expert group from July 2007-November 2008.) In fairness, he has delivered on a few of his promises, including closing the CIA-run "black site" prisons abroad and ordering that interrogations of all suspects be conducted according to the US army field manual, which proscribes many of the tactics widely considered torture. And some failures were not wholly his own: Obama's inability to close Guantánamo Bay was due more to congressional opposition and to an array of legal obstacles than to his own lack of initiative.

Yet, contrary to his campaign promises, Obama has left most of the foundations of Bush's counterterrorism approach intact, including (i) its presumption of executive privilege, (ii) its tolerance of indefinite detention in Guantánamo and elsewhere and (iii) its refusal to grant prisoners in America's jails abroad habeas corpus rights. While the language of the "war on terror" has been dropped, the mindset of the Bush approach – that America is forever at war, constantly on the offensive to kill "bad guys" before they get to the United States – has crept into this administration and been translated into policy in new and dangerous ways.

This fact is clearly demonstrated in a recent New York Times article, which details how President Obama has become personally involved in an elaborate internal process by which his administration decides who will be the next victim of America's drone strikes. The article itself – clearly written with the cooperation of the administration, as the writers had unprecedented access to three dozen counterterrorism advisers – was designed to showcase Obama as a warrior president, thoughtfully wrestling with the moral issues involved in drone strikes, but forceful enough to pull the trigger when needed.

What it instead revealed was that the president has routinized and normalized extrajudicial killing from the Oval Office, taking advantage of America's temporary advantage in drone technology to wage a series of shadow wars in Afghanistan, PakistanYemen, and Somalia.  Without the scrutiny of the legislature and the courts, and outside the public eye, Obama is authorizing murder on a weekly basis, with a discussion of the guilt or innocence of candidates for the "kill list" being resolved in secret on "Terror Tuesday" teleconferences with administration officials and intelligence officials.

The creation of this "kill list" – as well as the dramatic escalation in drone strikes, which have now killed at least 2,400 people in Pakistan alone, since 2004 – represents a betrayal of President Obama's promise to make counterterrorism policies consistent with the US constitution. As Charles Pierce has noted, there is nothing in the constitution that allows the president to wage a private war on individuals outside the authorization of Congress.

The spirit of the constitution was quite the opposite: all of the founders were concerned, in varying degrees, with the risk of allowing the president to exercise too much discretion when declaring war or using force abroad. For this reason, the constitution explicitly grants the right to declare war to the Congress in order to restrain the president from chasing enemies around the world based solely on his authority as commander-in-chief. The founders would be horrified, not comforted, to know that the president has implicated himself in the killing of foreign nationals in states against which the Congress has not passed a declaration of war.
Beyond bypassing the constitution and the War Powers Act, the Obama administration has also adopted a dangerously broad interpretation of the legal right to use drone strikes against terrorist suspects abroad. According to his counterterrorism chief, John Brennan, the legal authority for the drone strikes derives from the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by the Congress in September 2001 to authorize the attack on Afghanistan. He notes that there is "nothing in the AUMF that restricts the use of military force against al-Qa'ida to Afghanistan".

This interpretation treats the AUMF as a warrant to allow the president to use force against anyone at any time in a war without a defined endpoint.

Together with the bland assertion that the US has the right to self-defense against al-Qaida under international law, these legal arguments have enabled the president to expand drone operations against terrorist organizations (quantitatively) to Yemen and Somalia, as well as to escalate the campaign against militant networks in Pakistan. To date, Obama has launched 278 drone strikes against targets in Pakistan. The use of drone strikes is now so commonplace that some critics have begun to wonder if the administration has adopted (qualitatively) a "kill, not capture" policy, forsaking the intelligence gains of capturing suspects for an approach that leaves no one alive to pose a threat.

This vast, expansive interpretation of executive power to enable drone wars conducted in secret around the globe has also set dangerous precedent, which the administration has not realized or acknowledged. Once Obama leaves office, there is nothing stopping the next president from launching his own drone strikes, perhaps against a different and more controversial array of targets. The infrastructure and processes of vetting the "kill list" will remain in place for the next president, who may be less mindful of moral and legal implications of this action than Obama supposedly is. (within the U.S., G.O.P president) (beyond the U.S., China – what if China use its own drones against minorities? Chinese leadership decides who to be on “the kill list”  )

For those Democrats who are comforted by the fact that Obama has the final say in authorizing drone strikes and so refuse to criticize the administration, ask yourself: would you be as comfortable if the next decision on who is killed by a drone was left to President Romney, or President Palin?

Also in contravention of his campaign promises, the Obama administration has worked to expand its power of the executive and to resist oversight from the other branches of government. While candidate Obama insisted that even terrorist suspects deserved their due process rights and a chance to defend themselves in some kind of a court, his administration has now concluded that a review of the evidence by the executive branch itself – even merely a hasty discussion during one of the "Terror Tuesdays" – is equivalent to granting a terrorist suspect due process rights. With little fanfare, it has also concluded that American citizens may now be killed abroad without access to a "judicial process".

As the complexity and consequences of the drone strikes have grown, the administration has insisted that it alone should be trusted with the decision about when drone strikes are permitted, and consequently provides only the bare minimum of information to congressional oversight committees about drone activities.

What is also striking about Obama's embrace of drones and targeted killings is that he – who, during his 2008 campaign, displayed awareness that America's reckless actions abroad were damaging to its long-term interests – has become so indifferent to civilian casualties. According to statistics compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, at least 551 civilians have been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, though the figure could be much higher. Yet, the Obama administration has consistently argued that almost no civilians are killed in these strikes, despite independent assessments that put the number of civilians killed as much higher.

This claim is only possible because the administration has engaged in an Orwellian contortion of language, which assumes that anyone in the area of a drone strike must be "up to no good" and therefore a militant. This assumption of guilt by association, and the grotesque misuse of definitions to cover up the deaths of innocents, including children, has allowed the administration to inflate the number of successful "hits" it has, while playing down the number of civilian casualties.

Now emboldened by this apparent success and the lack of an outcry over deaths caused by drone strikes, the administration is proposing to (further) loosen the standards for targeting in Yemen even further by approving so-called "signature strikes", in which attacks are launched on patterns of behavior rather than the known presence of a terrorist operative. These signature strikes are almost guaranteed to increase the number of civilian casualties, as they are far more likely to catch innocent people who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

negative consequences trump successful hits (distinction to be made b/w strategic goal and tactical victory)   
The drone strikes are portrayed by the administration as successful because they are able to take out high-ranking terrorist operatives, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi . But such a portrayal conflates a tactical victory (killing one al-Qaida commander) with a strategic success (that is, dampening the growth of extremist movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan). It also rarely looks at the other side of the ledger and asks whether the drone strikes have jeopardized the stability of the governments of Pakistan and Yemen, possibly risking more chaos if they are overthrown.   (DO- the very last line should be here – a young child in Pakistan … ; strategic goal is to stabilize the “safe heaven.” However, the drone attack is likely to encourage children in Pakistan to be extremists)

another negative consequence = hurt the relationship with other governments
During his first presidential campaign, Obama promised to control counterterrorism operations and to put them in their proper place as one piece of a wider set of relationships with other governments. But he has done the opposite, allowing short-term tactical victories against terrorist networks to overwhelm America's wider strategic priorities and leave its relations with key governments in a parlous state. His embrace of drones and his willingness to shoot first may also be policies that the US comes to regret when its rivals, such as China begin to develop and use their own drones. (DO – this last line seems out of place. This paragraph is about the drone attack endangered the relationship with other gov.)

Beyond simply failing to live up to campaign promises, the real tragedy of Obama's counterterrorism policy is that he has squandered an unprecedented opportunity to redefine the struggle against al-Qaida in a way that moves decisively beyond the Bush administration's mindset. Instead, he has provided another iteration of that approach, with a level of cold-blooded ruthlessness and a contempt for the constitutional limits imposed on executive power that rivals his predecessor.

Instead of restoring counterterrorism to its proper place among America's other foreign policy priorities, President Obama has been seduced by political expediency and the lure of new technology into adopting a policy that kills first and asks questions later. He may succeed in crippling al-Qaida and preventing some attacks today, but it is now harder than ever to believe that a young child in Pakistan hearing the whirring noises of drones above them will look up and see Obama's America as "the relentless opponent of terror and tyranny, and the light of hope to the world".