constitutional law outline -8

PG&E Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, p.233

- a CA law (a) which required the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to determine if adequate capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel rods was available,, before the building of additional nuclear plants à. Held not ripe for review

- another CA law (b) placed a moratorium on building until the long term storage of those rods was demonstrated à. Held

o ripe for review of whether it was preempted by ACE (federal statute)

o not preempted by the ACE,, because the CA law (b) was concerned with the costs of long-term storage, while the ACE pervasively regulated the radiological safety aspects of the construction and operation of nuclear plants ; thus, the CA law (b) did not interfere with the objectives of the ACE

- federal government’s efforts to ensure that nuclear power is safe (safeguard the public and the environment from the unpredictable risk) v. historic state authority over the generation and sale of electricity

- this spent fuel is intensely radioactive and must be carefully stored ; in recent years, a study indicates that a number of reactors could be forced to shut down in the near future die to the inability to store spent fuel

- safety and economic aspects to the nuclear waste issue

o (i) safety – if not properly stored, nuclear waste might leak, (ii) economic - the lack of long-term disposal option will lead to reactor-shutdown

- The CA law is response to these concerns

<1st contention – field preemption on safety concern>

< a strong presumption against field regulation in areas of traditionally local concern>

- federal (regulation of radiological safety aspects) v. state (regulation of electrical utilities, rates and services)

- start with assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the federal law unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress

- Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear-powered electricity generation: the Federal Government maintains complete control of the safety and "nuclear" aspects of energy generation, whereas the States exercise their traditional authority over economic questions such as the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, and ratemaking

<2nd contention that the CA law conflicts with federal regulation of nuclear waste disposal> - field preemption

- Here, there is no attempt on CA’s part to enter this field, one which is occupied by the federal government, we do not find the CA law preempted by federal law in the waste disposal field

<3rd contention : the CA law frustrates the federal goal of developing nuclear technology as a source of energy>

- Congress has left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons

Modes of Preemption Analysis (à. P.234) p.237

(1), Express Preemption

- When preemption is express ; Congress expressly states that a federal law (a valid law that is not beyond the constitutional power of Congress) intends to preempt certain types of state legislation

- the only issue is whether a state statute falls within the area preempted

(2), field preemption

- the Court requires a clear showing that Congress meant to occupy a field and so displace the states from regulation on that subject matter

Rice v. Santa Fe , 331 US 218, p.237

-

“what the purpose of Congress was”

- presumption against field regulation in areas of traditionally local concern>

o Congress legislated here in a field which the state have traditionally occupied (grain warehousing practice) ; start with the assumption that the historic power of the States were not to be superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress

-

o the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it ;

o the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant (e.g. immigration or foreign affairs) that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject

o If the area regulated by Congress is an area that has traditionally been regulated by the states (e.g., regulating electrical utilities), the Court will be less likely to presume that Congress intended to occupy the field, ; and the Court may require that Congress make its intent to preempt clear and manifest.

o Even if field preemption exists, there may still be a dispute as to the scope of the field that Congress intends to preempt

(3), conflict preemption

1), <physical impossibility> a state law is in conflict with a federal law because it is impossible to comply with both at the same time

2), <state legislation obstructs the purposes and objectives of federal regulation > a state law is in conflict with a federal law because it interferes with the objectives of the federal law or is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the congressional purpose

- it is necessary to determine the purpose of the federal law and how that purpose is impacted by the operation of the state law

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, p.238

- the Court barred enforcement of PA’s alien registration act, because of federal alien registration act

- where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens,,, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations ;

- there is not any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress ; no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula ;

- the Court’s primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress

- This Court, in considering the validity of state laws … has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, p.238

- This case involved avocados certified as mature under the federal regulation but containing less than the minimum CA oil content

(majority)

- no such actual conflict b/w the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area

o the maturity of avocados seems to be an inherently unlikely candidates for exclusive federal regulation

- no evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field

o could not find an unambiguous congressional mandate to exclude state regulation

o the federal law here involved concerned “minimum” rather than “uniform” standards ß **

(dissent)

- Supremacy Clause barred the application of CA’s “inconsistent and conflicting” legislation ; the federal scheme is a comprehensive regulatory program ;

- CA’s interest was identical to the federal one

o Here, no health interest, but a purely economic one ; protecting the good will of the avocado industry

Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, p.239

- federal law preempted the IL law for licensing workers who handle hazardous waste, though federal regulation aimed only at worker safety, and state regulation aimed both at worker safety and public health

- conflict preemption – federal scheme forbids duplicative regulation

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, p.239

- (Fact complicated)

(Majority)

- Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense … Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements

- Wyeth also argues that requiring it to comply with a state-law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV-push administration would obstruct the purposes and objectives of federal drug labeling regulation ; We find no merit in this argument, which relies on an untenable interpretation of congressional intent and an overbroad view of an agency's power to pre-empt state law (** use the phrase, when upholding (against implied conflict preemption challenge) a state law)

Concurring à the Court cannot guess or manipulate congressional intent>

- The Supremacy Clause thus requires that pre-emptive effect be given only those to federal standards and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text that was produced through the constitutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures.

Dissent (put more weight in federal law)

- Federal law relies on the FDA to make safety determination like the one it made here ; Whether wisely or not, the FDA has concluded that the drug is safe when used in accordace with its FDA-mandated labeling

Preemption and the foreign affairs power

Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, p.240

- Invalidated a MA law barring state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing biz with Burma

Held

- Congress’s passage of a federal law imposing mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma preempted the MA law, since the MA’s more stringent and inflexible provisions presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ full objectives under the federal law

- The MA law undermines the intended purpose and natural effect of the federal law

- The fact of a common end (b/w federal and state law) hardly neutralizes conflicting menas

- Congress's express command to the President to take the initiative for the U.S. among the international community invested him with the maximum authority of the National Government ; This clear mandate and invocation of exclusively national power belies any suggestion that Congress intended the President's effective voice to be obscured by state or local action

<Congressional Consent to State Regulation> p.241

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, p.241

The McCarran Act of 1945

- limited the applicability of antitrust laws to the insurance biz ; ; sought to assure continued state authority over insurance

fact

- a NJ insurance company objected to the continued collection of a long-standing tax of 3% of the premiums received from all biz done in SC

Held

- the McCarran Act validated the tax (state court invalidated the tax as discriminatory against inter-state commerce)

- In enacting the McCarran Act relating to state regulation and taxation of the insurance business,,,, Congress intended to give support to existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance,, and to sustain such state systems from attacks under the commerce clause,,,, but did not intend to circumvent constitutional limitations upon Congress' own power or to validate unconstitutional provisions of state laws except in so far as the Constitution itself gives Congress the power to do so by removing obstacles to state action arising from Congress' own action or by consenting to such laws.

- In adopting the McCarran Act relating to state regulation and taxation of the insurance business, Congress must have had full knowledge of the nation-wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation, of the fact that such systems differ greatly in the scope and character of the regulations imposed and of the taxes exacted, and of the further fact that many of the systems include features which to some extent have not been applied generally to other interstate business.

- Under the commerce clause, Congress can not only promote, but can also prohibit, interstate commerce

White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emplrs, 460 U.S. 204, p.243

- Upheld an executive order by the Mayor of Boston reserving 50% of jobs on public works projects to Boston residents

- The facial discrimination was upheld against Dormant Commerce Clause challenge as to city-funded projects under the market participant exception ; as to federal funded projects under Congressional consent

- Where state or local government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause (challenge) even if it interferes with interstate commerce Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)

- Thus, if the restrictions imposed by the city on construction projects financed in part by federal funds are directed by Congress then no dormant Commerce Clause issue is presented