S. Korean embassy
staff admit 'high-handed' treatment of N. Korean defectors in Thailand
2012/06/18 kdh@yna.co.kr
SEOUL, June 18
(Yonhap) -- Some South Korean embassy staff in Thailand had taken a
"high-handed" approach during their treatment of North Korean
defectors at a refugee camp there, but they strongly denied an allegation of
using expletives toward the defectors, Seoul officials said Monday.
Seoul's foreign ministry launched a probe
into its embassy staff in Thailand last week, following a published media
report that criticized the staff for allegedly "cussing out" North
Korean defectors in May last year, citing letters and accounts by two of the
defectors who arrived in South Korea this year.
The ministry sent a team of investigators to
its embassy in Bangkok on Thursday and interviewed the staff.
"Two female staff admitted that they
had made high-handed remarks or used loud voices during their treatment of
North Korean defectors, but they strongly denied the allegation of using foul
language," said a senior ministry official, who interviewed them as part
of the investigation.
However, the two female staff were relieved
of duty and a further investigation is underway, the official said on condition
of anonymity.
The initial investigation found that there is an "insufficient"
treatment system for North Korean defectors there, the official said,
adding his ministry plans to improve monitoring on how its embassy officials
treat such defectors.
According to the Dong-A-Ilbo report, a
80-something North Korean defector filed a petition with the South Korean
ambassador in Bangkok, saying a female embassy staff told him, "Hey, dude,
why are you here?" The defector said his petition was ignored.
Tens of thousands of North Korean
defectors are believed to be hiding in China, hoping to travel to
Thailand or other Southeast Asian countries before resettling in South
Korea, home to more than 23,000 North Korean defectors.
Although refugee camps for North Korean
defectors in Thailand are operated by the Bangkok government, South Korean
officials are allowed to treat them inside the camps under cooperation with
Bangkok, Seoul officials said
This Day in the
History of the DPRK: June 18, Juche 41 (1953)
JUNE 17, 2012 by Brandon K. Gauthier
The bombs continued to
fall with a thunderous roar on June 18, 1953.
For the previous five
days, American F-84s, F-86s, and B-29s had carried out repeated bombing raids
on the Toksan and Kusong irrigation dams, north of the Chongchon River, in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The U.S. Far East Air Force (FEAF), The
New York Times reported on June 20, hit the Toksan dam 12 times alone
on the last day of the bombardment.[i] A North Korean communiqué, broadcast in Moscow,
acknowledged the strikes, stating:
“The American Air Force continues to subject
to bombing peaceful populated areas, which have no military objects whatsoever. Yesterday United States airplanes
bombed the water reservoirs at Thaychon and Kusen. Great damage has been
done.”[ii]
In reality, the damage
was substantially offset by North Korean counter-efforts. Despite the
zealous attempts of the U.S. Air Force to destroy the dams—consequentially
producing mass floods that would ruin rice crops vital to the Communist war
effort—the dams did not break. Kim Il Sung’s regime had learned from
earlier strikes and ordered water levels reduced at Toksan and Kusong to
heighten the earth protecting the irrigation dams. Work crews even
labored to fix holes while the bombs rained from the sky.
Since May of 1952,
American military planners—led vocally by Generals Otto P. Weyland and Hoyt S.
Vandenberg, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff—had embarked on a new strategy
to end the Korean conflict: “air pressure” would be used to crush the morale of
the North Korean populace. An Air Force staff study report from April
1952 called for the use of aerial bombardments “‘to inflict maximum pressure on
the enemy by causing him permanent loss…’”[iii] However, with few strategic military targets left in
the DPRK, the bombing missions focused on minor military objectives that
squeezed the civilian populace.
Implementing the
strategy in June of 1952, U.S. bombing runs destroyed five hydroelectric dams
at Fusen, Chosen, Kyosen, Funei, and Kongosan. Other operations followed
throughout the summer. In Operation “Pressure Pump,” U.S. bombers
napalmed thirty different areas of the North Korean capital. Thereafter,
U.S. commanders—in an attempt to create chaos among the populace—ordered planes
to drop leaflets reading “You Are Next” across North Korea before launching
nighttime B-26 raids that leveled two cities. Though seventy-eight other
potential targets were identified, the U.S. Department of State convinced the
Air Force that the raids were counterproductive and only served to strengthen
the resolve of the northern citizenry. The U.S. military largely returned
to focusing on enemy units, for a time.[iv]
By May of 1953,
though, with cease-fire negotiations stalled over the intractable prisoner of
war issue, U.S. generals looked to new bombing missions that would foster
instability north of the 38th parallel by reducing food supplies. Out of
283,000 tons of rice produced by North Korea annually, some 70% of the planting
grounds, officials estimated, required the use of water stored in irrigation
dams. The destruction of these dams would not only ruin much of
Pyongyang’s rice crop but would also sabotage future harvests by washing away
topsoil.
With these goals, the
U.S. FEAF struck five irrigation dams in North Korea in May and June of
1953. F-84 Thunderjets launched successful attacks on irrigation dams at
Toksan and Chason in mid-May, breaching both and flooding miles of surrounding
rice fields. But DPRK officials responded to the new strategy quickly,
and US bombing runs against the Kuwonga dam on May 21 and 29 failed to create
similar results after work crews reduced water levels. Thus, massive
bombings raids by the U.S. Air Force from June 13-18 failed to create the
desired mass flooding.
Still, the Korean War
had reached yet a new phase of escalation. With the threat of nuclear war
hanging in the air, U.S. war planners—haunted by the ghost of Carl von
Clausewitz—blurred the increasingly fine line between conventional and total
war. On July 27, 1953, at 9:36 PM, just twenty-four minutes before the
tenuous cease-fire ending the Korean War went into effect, a lone B-26
completed one last bombing mission over North Korea. The cacaphanous echo
of that explosion remains to this day.
Brandon K. Gauthier
graduated from Elon University in 2006, and is presently a doctoral student in
American history at Fordham University. Specializing in U.S. diplomatic history,
he is at work on a dissertation examining the intellectual history of U.S.
foreign relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during the
Cold War.
For Further Reading:
- Cumings, Bruce. North
Korea: Another Country. New York: New Press, 2004.
- Cumings, Bruce. The
Korean War. New York: Random House, 2010.
- Pape, Robert A. Bombing
to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Sherwood, John D. Officers
in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fight Pilots In the
Korean War. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
[i]“Official Reports of Today’s Operations in the Korean War,” The
New York Times, June 20, 1953. pg. 2
[ii] Ibid., “North Korean Communiqué,” pg. 2
[iii] Quoted on pg 160 of Robert A. Pape, Bombing to
Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996).
[iv] See: Bombing to Win, 160-163.
No Shangri-La For
North Korea – Analysis
Eurasia Review.
6/18/12 By Catherine Samaniego
THE OUTCOME of the
11th IISS Asia Security Summit, otherwise known as the Shangri-La Dialogue 2012
(SLD), has not been blissful for North Korea. Apart from Myanmar’s new
initiative to forge closer ties with the US, and the bolstering of the
US-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance, Kim Jong-un’s regime has been further
rendered vulnerable by China’s minimal participation in the Dialogue due its
preoccupation with internal issues.
Demise Of The Unholy Alliance?
North Korea
Myanmar-North Korea relations have never been easy though both were perceived as pariah states. Barely a decade since the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1974, this so-called “unholy alliance” was abruptly ruptured when North Korean agents carried out an assassination attempt against visiting South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon. Relations were not restored until 2007, which gradually involved nuclear research, and allegedly, the shipment of illicit arms.
At the moment, it appears that relations between them have reached another turning point upon Myanmar’s announcement at the Dialogue of its plans to discontinue its nuclear project and downgrade the extent of its political and military ties with North Korea. It’s top defense official, Lieutenant General Hla Min, cited Myanmar’s efforts toward democratic reform as a stimulus for this initiative. That is to say, this decision comes in line with the civilian government’s strategy for shaping a policy that is more consistent with the image it seeks to project to the international community.
The US-Japan-South Korea Security Triangle
As North Korea’s long-time adversaries, the US, Japan and South Korea are constantly seeking ways to improve relations with North Korea in order to carefully manage instability on the Korean Peninsula. During the course of the Dialogue, American, Japanese, and South Korean leaders agreed to step up trilateral efforts to counteract prevailing North Korean nuclear threats and to discourage Kim Jong-un from resorting to aggressive military strategies, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010. While the situation appears to be looking up for the three allies, it is simply too early to draw conclusions given the unpredictable behaviour North Korea has exhibited in the past. As a matter of fact, there have been claims that Pyongyang may be conducting a nuclear test in the near future to compensate for the embarrassing result of its failed rocket launch last April.
In addition to engaging in transfer of nuclear technology and exchange of relevant information, Myanmar had also been procuring weapons from North Korea for 20 years. Myanmar’s move to put an end to the arms purchase is likely to reduce trade with North Korea and leave the regime with fewer sources of income to sustain its vast military expenditures. Fewer allies would also mean weakened tolerance for Pyongyang’s political deviance, especially after its satellite launch, which was supposedly for “peaceful means,” fell short of success.
In line with deterring threats from its neighbour, South Korea has also declared that it will not object to Japan’s plan of deploying Aegis destroyers in the Yellow Sea. However, this proposal has met with domestic opposition from both sides in view of the lingering tension over contrasting historical interpretations and maritime territorial dispute over Liancourt Rocks. Nevertheless, it is expected to bring numerous benefits to both countries, as this will make it easier to track the trajectory of North Korean missiles.
Further, this will complement Japan’s joint efforts with the US and South Korea to secure the freedom of navigation on the high seas, particularly in the surrounding area. In other words, the presence of Japan’s Aegis destroyers can be instrumental in blocking Chinese attempts at seizing control of those waters in the event of an escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang’s Shrinking Political Leverage
Although China and North Korea have traditionally been allies, their interests, perceptions and expectations do not always align. Pyongyang remains keen on pursuing a foreign policy that is independent from Beijing and shows great determination in ensuring that its biggest ally does not interfere with its internal affairs. To China’s dismay, this is only becoming increasingly apparent since Kim Jong-un succeeded his father, Kim Jong-il, as supreme leader. North Korea’s continued refusal to heed China’s warning on conducting nuclear tests, and the detention of 28 Chinese fishermen in May by North Korean gunmen who were believed to be affiliated with the military, are only a few of the instances that have threatened to drive a wedge between the two countries.
As the US-Japan-South Korea triangle closes in on North Korea, there is no certainty as to how far China is willing to put its international reputation on the line for its ally this time, for the following reasons: 1) growing diplomatic pressure from its immediate neighbours and the US, 2) heightened Chinese disillusionment with North Korean policies, 3) its involvement in the brewing conflict on South China Sea with ASEAN countries, and 4) the Chinese Communist Party’s preoccupation with overcoming the crisis of legitimacy in preparation for the upcoming leadership transition. In this regard, China’s minimal involvement in the Dialogue may well serve as an indication of its wavering patience with North Korea in the midst of growing concern over its own domestic politics.
Against the backdrop of the North Korean regime’s diminishing political leverage in Northeast Asia, the more pragmatic approach is for Pyongyang to make more cautious calculations before taking any steps. Otherwise, it could find itself sinking further into international isolation.
Demise Of The Unholy Alliance?
North Korea
Myanmar-North Korea relations have never been easy though both were perceived as pariah states. Barely a decade since the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1974, this so-called “unholy alliance” was abruptly ruptured when North Korean agents carried out an assassination attempt against visiting South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon. Relations were not restored until 2007, which gradually involved nuclear research, and allegedly, the shipment of illicit arms.
At the moment, it appears that relations between them have reached another turning point upon Myanmar’s announcement at the Dialogue of its plans to discontinue its nuclear project and downgrade the extent of its political and military ties with North Korea. It’s top defense official, Lieutenant General Hla Min, cited Myanmar’s efforts toward democratic reform as a stimulus for this initiative. That is to say, this decision comes in line with the civilian government’s strategy for shaping a policy that is more consistent with the image it seeks to project to the international community.
The US-Japan-South Korea Security Triangle
As North Korea’s long-time adversaries, the US, Japan and South Korea are constantly seeking ways to improve relations with North Korea in order to carefully manage instability on the Korean Peninsula. During the course of the Dialogue, American, Japanese, and South Korean leaders agreed to step up trilateral efforts to counteract prevailing North Korean nuclear threats and to discourage Kim Jong-un from resorting to aggressive military strategies, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010. While the situation appears to be looking up for the three allies, it is simply too early to draw conclusions given the unpredictable behaviour North Korea has exhibited in the past. As a matter of fact, there have been claims that Pyongyang may be conducting a nuclear test in the near future to compensate for the embarrassing result of its failed rocket launch last April.
In addition to engaging in transfer of nuclear technology and exchange of relevant information, Myanmar had also been procuring weapons from North Korea for 20 years. Myanmar’s move to put an end to the arms purchase is likely to reduce trade with North Korea and leave the regime with fewer sources of income to sustain its vast military expenditures. Fewer allies would also mean weakened tolerance for Pyongyang’s political deviance, especially after its satellite launch, which was supposedly for “peaceful means,” fell short of success.
In line with deterring threats from its neighbour, South Korea has also declared that it will not object to Japan’s plan of deploying Aegis destroyers in the Yellow Sea. However, this proposal has met with domestic opposition from both sides in view of the lingering tension over contrasting historical interpretations and maritime territorial dispute over Liancourt Rocks. Nevertheless, it is expected to bring numerous benefits to both countries, as this will make it easier to track the trajectory of North Korean missiles.
Further, this will complement Japan’s joint efforts with the US and South Korea to secure the freedom of navigation on the high seas, particularly in the surrounding area. In other words, the presence of Japan’s Aegis destroyers can be instrumental in blocking Chinese attempts at seizing control of those waters in the event of an escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang’s Shrinking Political Leverage
Although China and North Korea have traditionally been allies, their interests, perceptions and expectations do not always align. Pyongyang remains keen on pursuing a foreign policy that is independent from Beijing and shows great determination in ensuring that its biggest ally does not interfere with its internal affairs. To China’s dismay, this is only becoming increasingly apparent since Kim Jong-un succeeded his father, Kim Jong-il, as supreme leader. North Korea’s continued refusal to heed China’s warning on conducting nuclear tests, and the detention of 28 Chinese fishermen in May by North Korean gunmen who were believed to be affiliated with the military, are only a few of the instances that have threatened to drive a wedge between the two countries.
As the US-Japan-South Korea triangle closes in on North Korea, there is no certainty as to how far China is willing to put its international reputation on the line for its ally this time, for the following reasons: 1) growing diplomatic pressure from its immediate neighbours and the US, 2) heightened Chinese disillusionment with North Korean policies, 3) its involvement in the brewing conflict on South China Sea with ASEAN countries, and 4) the Chinese Communist Party’s preoccupation with overcoming the crisis of legitimacy in preparation for the upcoming leadership transition. In this regard, China’s minimal involvement in the Dialogue may well serve as an indication of its wavering patience with North Korea in the midst of growing concern over its own domestic politics.
Against the backdrop of the North Korean regime’s diminishing political leverage in Northeast Asia, the more pragmatic approach is for Pyongyang to make more cautious calculations before taking any steps. Otherwise, it could find itself sinking further into international isolation.
